后股权分置背景下CEO更换与投资者保护:动因及效应研究

以中国后股权分置为背景,从公司业绩角度研究引起CEO变更的原因及其变更的业绩效应和价值效应。实证研究结果显示,亏损及会计收益下降会显著地带来CEO的变更,而盈利企业在业绩下降时CEO变更的敏感性更强。同时发现,CEO变更具有较强的价值效应,能够显著提升公司的市场价值,但对会计业绩的提升作用不明显;对亏损企业来说,其业绩效应和价值效应都非常显著,且远大于盈利企业。     

Does Independent Industry Expertise Improve Board Effectiveness? Evidence From Bank CEO Turnovers

This study explores the impact of independent bank directors’ financial industry expertise on board effectiveness by investigating bank CEO turnovers and post‐turnover bank performance. Empirical results find such expertise increases the probability of forced CEO turnover and the probability of outsider succession. It improves bank performance and reduces bank risk‐taking following a forced CEO turnover. This is likely because industry‐specific expertise enhances boards’ ability to locate a superior successor CEO and to monitor and advise the new management. Market reaction to bank CEO turnover announcements tends to agree with this view.     

Managerial Incentives and Investment Policy in Family Firms: Evidence from a Structural Analysis

This paper provides evidence that CEO incentive pay mediates the effect of family preferences on corporate investment policy. Our study focuses on the option portfolio volatility sensitivity vega, which motivates the risk‐taking behavior of undiversified managers. After controlling for factors that affect incentive pay and investment policy simultaneously, we find that one‐third of underinvestment in riskier R&D projects in active family firms can be attributed to a significantly lower vega. Passive family firms allocate more capital to R&D as opposed to active family firms, and are more active in M&A deal making. In contrast to many prior studies, pay incentives and families are not associated with capital expenditures. Overall, our empirical results suggest that CEO pay incentives induce investment policy contingent on firm risk. Family CEO incentive pay manifests the family preference for lower risk, especially in firms with higher firm risk. Nonetheless, after replacing family CEOs with outside professionals, investments in both R&D and M&A increase, which is consistent with the family preference for extended investment horizons. Interestingly, such a preference seems not to be manifested in incentive pay.     

Media Coverage and the Cross‐Section of Stock Returns: The Chinese Evidence

Using hand‐collected news headlines for a large sample of listed firms in China over a period of 2000–2015, we investigate the cross‐sectional relation between media coverage and stock returns. Our results document that no‐media coverage stocks earn 55 basis points a month higher than stocks that are featured in the media. This result is robust after controlling for common risk factors and is not driven by short‐run return reversals. Further analysis provides evidence to support the investor recognition hypothesis, suggesting that mass media may play an incremental role in providing a supplement to traditional channels of information dissemination. Therefore, results in this paper are of interests to both investors and regulators on drivers of stock returns.     

The Initial Public Offerings of Restaurant Firms: The Case of Industry-Specific Micromarket Capitalization Offerings

We investigate the pricing characteristics of 59 initial public offerings (IPOs) of firms in the restaurant industry. Many of these offers are by extremely small micromarket capitalization companies, ones that are typically excluded from other studies of IPOs. We find that the choice of underwriter and the issuing company's subsequent financial performance significantly affect the level of underpricing and aftermarket performance. Companies that employ small, regional investment banking houses as underwriters fail to attract much investor interest, resulting in less underpricing and poorer aftermarket performance. In addition, investors appear to accurately appraise those firms that subsequently suffer from poor financial performance. This is demonstrated through greater underpricing to compensate investors for the greater perceived risk.     

Investment Patterns of Informal Investors in the Alberta Private Equity Market*

This study identifies three main types of informal investors in private equity markets: relationship investors, opportunity‐based investors, and angel investors. We find evidence that the first two investor types are a major total source of capital and they prefer to invest smaller amounts close to home and in the context of existing relationships. With respect to angel investors, we find evidence of stratification in their desired investment amount which is consistent with a model where their investments evolve though a life cycle of investing. We also find evidence that changes to capital market regulations that allow for lower investment amounts by this type of investor increase the amount of capital available for early‐stage firms.     

Do negative investor attitudes drive corporate social responsibility? Evidence from China

This study explores the association between negative investor attitudes and corporate social responsibility. We conjecture that negative investor attitudes may drive firms to engage more actively in corporate social responsibility to improve shareholder perceptions. Consistent with this expectation, we find that firms facing negative investor attitudes exhibit better CSR performance, and this association is more pronounced in firms that receive more attention from investors and attach more importance to investor relationships. Overall, this study highlights the influence of investor attitudes on corporate social responsibility and contributes to the literature on the determinants of corporate social responsibility.     

Origin of Foreign Direct Investment and Firm Performance: Evidence from Foreign Acquisitions of Chinese Domestic Firms

Using a newly created panel of domestic Chinese firms who receive foreign direct investment (FDI), this paper finds that Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)‐acquired firms outperform those acquired by investors from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (HMT). To control for possible endogeneity of the FDI decision, I employ propensity score matching combined with a difference‐in‐differences approach. The results indicate that relative to HMT‐acquired firms, OECD‐acquired firms experience significantly higher productivity in the initial year of acquisition and this productivity differential persists in subsequent years, reaching 27.8 per cent by the third year. Further, OECD‐acquired firms exhibit higher profits, average wages and capital per worker compared to HMT‐acquired firms. These results suggest that the origin of the foreign investor differentially affects target firm performance.     

Corporate diversification and CEO turnover in family businesses: self-entrenchment or risk reduction?

Our study investigates differences in CEO turnover between focused and diversified firms to determine whether diversification strategies are necessarily associated with governance efficiency in family businesses. We find that large family CEO firms are more likely to engage in corporate diversification than are small non-family CEO firms and their CEOs are seldom replaced. Large family CEO diversified firms also have lower turnover sensitivity relative to focused firms. The results imply that the CEOs of diversified firms have entrenched themselves, thereby increasing agency costs within family businesses. However, we fail to find diversification discounts in family businesses. It is interesting that CEOs tend to diversify their businesses in order to decrease firm risk. Founding families favor risk-reducing decisions in order to maintain family wealth and prestige; suggesting that family businesses are more interested in survival than growth. Although family businesses may benefit from risk reduction, a negative relationship between diversification level and CEO turnover is still evidence of poor corporate governance. Agency theory may not completely account for the adoption of diversification strategies in family businesses and corporate diversification may weaken the effectiveness of internal monitoring mechanisms.

CEO Attributes,Board Composition,and Acquirer Value Creation: A Canadian Study

We examined CEO attributes, board composition, and ownership structure for their relationship to the share performance of the acquiring company around the acquisition announcement. Based on 273 acquisitions by Canadian firms from 1998 through 2002, we have shown that the levels of CEO and director ownership as well as the level of board independence were positively associated with the short‐term financial performance of the acquirer. Board size was negatively related to value creation. Finally, cash‐based deals and cross‐border transactions were also positively related to increases in shareholder wealth for the acquirer. Copyright © 2011 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Institutional investors as stewards of the corporation: Exploring the challenges to the monitoring hypothesis

The study explores the challenges UK‐based institutional investors face when trying to monitor investee companies and influence their social, environmental, and governance practices. Consistent with previous research, I find that misalignment of interests within the investment chain and dispersed ownership are factors which inhibit investor activism. However, other underexplored challenges include lack of investee company transparency and investor experience in activism, as well as low client demand for engagement and internal conflicts of interest. The results contribute to the literature on institutional investor activism by using direct empirical evidence to systematically discuss the challenges to stewardship. Given the intensification of media and regulatory attention on shareholders in the post‐global financial crisis era, coupled with investors’ growing awareness and practice of stewardship, the research opens new avenues for enquiry which go beyond the on‐going debate about the monitoring versus short‐termism roles of institutional investors.     

The Effects of Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation on U.S. Executive Turnover and Compensation

This study investigates the impact of fraud/lawsuit revelation on U.S. top executive turnover and compensation. It also examines potential explanatory variables affecting the executive turnover and compensation among U.S. fraud/lawsuit firms. Four important findings are documented. First, there was significantly higher executive turnover among U.S. firms with fraud/lawsuit revelation in the Wall Street Journal than matched firms without such revelation. Second, although on average, U.S. top executives received an increase in cash compensation after fraud/lawsuit revelation, this increase is smaller than that of matched non-fraud/lawsuit firms. Third, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to change top executive when chief executive officer (CEO) was not the board chairman and CEO had been on the board for a short time. Fourth, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation when profitability was low, firms were involved in fraud, the compensation committee size was small, and the board met more often. These findings indicate that although, in general, U.S. fraud/lawsuits firms did not reduce their executive cash compensation, those involved in fraud were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation than to change their top executives. The finding, that ethical standards is not a significant factor for U.S. executive turnover nor compensation reduction, suggests that ethics appears to play no part in the board’s decisions, and that U.S. firms may have ethical standards in writing but they do not implement nor enforce the standards.     

Security Markets versus Bank Finance: Legal Enforcement and Investors' Protection

When minority investors’ rights are poorly protected, the ability of firms to raise equity capital is impaired, leading to less finance for new ventures. Fewer firms will be financed with outside equity, resulting in a low market capitalization relative to GNP. External funding requires easily enforceable claims such as debt or requires long‐term relationships with institutions. Provision of funding shifts from risk capital to debt, and to a predominance of intermediated over market finance. We report supporting evidence for a few countries. To measure investor protection, we use a price measure, the premium on voting stock, related to the control premium. In countries where the voting premium is large, corporate financing is dominated by bank lending and equity markets are much smaller.     

Earnings Quality in Private SMEs: Do CEO Demographics Matter?

This study investigates the impact of CEO demographics on earnings quality for private SMEs. Using a 2012 sample of 30,476 French firms, we first find strong empirical support for a gender effect: female‐run firms engage in less earnings management than do male‐run firms. This result is consistent with female CEOs being more risk averse than their male counterparts are when making financial decisions. Second, CEO age is negatively correlated with the magnitude of discretionary accruals, and the relationship between gender and earnings quality is stronger for older CEOs. Overall, our findings suggest that CEO demographics affect the quality of accounting information.     

Government ownership and stock liquidity: Evidence from China

This paper documents that state ownership is associated with higher stock liquidity, a finding consistent with lower investor risk perception of firms that benefit from state ownership, like preferential financing and implicit government guarantees. The effect is found to be stronger when government ownership confers stronger benefits like firms with state controlling rather than non-controlling shareholders, and when the benefits of government ownership are important – for smaller firms, for financially constrained firms, and especially during the financial crisis period. These results suggest that investors perceive government ownership as value-enhancing, which increases their willingness to trade in such stocks.     

Earnings announcement timing,uncertainty, and volatility risk premiums

We examine the relationship between firms’ quarterly earnings report timing and uncertainty before quarterly earnings announcements. Prior research provides conflicting predictions on how investor uncertainty and report timing are related. Using implied volatilities from equity options and the realized returns to straddle positions, we find evidence that uncertainty and volatility risk premiums are higher for firms that report later in the quarter. Further tests show that the increase in option premiums is unexplained by risk factors suggesting a mispricing by investors. These results are not associated with static firm-level factors and our findings are concentrated in high growth firms.     

Foreign strategic ownership and minority shareholder protection

We show foreign strategic investors provide monitoring protection, by reducing tunneling through intercorporate loans. Further, foreign strategic investors mitigate minority shareholders expropriation through controlling excessive borrowing, whereas firms without foreign-founders channel excessive borrowing to controlling shareholders using intercorporate loans. The monitoring benefits are greater when corporate governance is weaker, and when foreign strategic investors are from English common law countries. Compared to foreign investor proxies typically used in Chinese studies, we use foreign-founder shareholders. As foreign-founders are long-term investors facing high liquidity risk, they are highly motivated to actively monitor and influence firm behaviours.     

Corporate Governance and the CEO Pay–Performance Link: Australian Evidence

We examine the influence of corporate governance mechanisms, namely blockholdings and board structure, on CEO pay–performance sensitivity in listed Australian firms. Results highlight blockholders' role in shaping observed pay–performance associations and their impact varying with their independence and relative magnitude of ownership. Monitoring blockholders increase the sensitivity of long‐term at‐risk pay to performance, better aligning manager and shareholder interests. However, consistent with a shorter investment horizon, insider blockholders increase (decrease) the responsiveness of cash bonuses (long‐term at‐risk pay). Finally, consistent with them affording less‐effective monitoring, larger boards raise (lower) the sensitivity of known pay (long‐term at‐risk pay) to performance.     

CEO's Total Wealth Characteristics and Implications on Firm Risk

We study the connections between firm risk and the CEO's personal wealth characteristics, using a unique dataset on CEO wealth and its components. Consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion, we find that wealthier CEOs are associated with higher risk firms. Riskier firms tend to have CEOs whose wealth is more independent of the firm. We also find that CEOs with high personal portfolio betas run firms with higher betas. CEO's tenure is negatively associated with firm risk measured either as beta, idiosynchratic risk, or volatility of accounting profitability. A possible interpretation is that risk‐averse managers are better able to imprint their risk preferences on the firm over time. Stronger corporate governance weakens the connection between CEO wealth characteristics and firm risk.     

DEFAULT AND SYSTEMIC RISK IN EQUILIBRIUM

We develop a finite horizon continuous time market model, where risk‐averse investors maximize utility from terminal wealth by dynamically investing in a risk‐free money market account, a stock, and a defaultable bond, whose prices are determined via equilibrium. We analyze the endogenous interaction arising between the stock and the defaultable bond via the interplay between equilibrium behavior of investors, risk preferences and cyclicality properties of the default intensity. We find that the equilibrium price of the stock experiences a jump at default, despite that the default event has no causal impact on the underlying economic fundamentals. We characterize the direction of the jump in terms of a relation between investor preferences and the cyclicality properties of the default intensity. We conduct a similar analysis for the market price of risk and for the investor wealth process, and determine how heterogeneity of preferences affects the exposure to default carried by different investors.