Eliminating Housing Tax Preferences: A Distributional Analysis

We examine the distributional impact of potential changes in the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing in this paper. In particular, we focus on the removal of mortgage interest and local property tax deductibility. A theoretical model of the demand for housing is developed that captures the impact of removing these deductions on housing demand. Then, we use a large cross section of individual income tax returns from the Internal Revenue Service for 1990 to estimate the distributional effects of removing housing deductions. Taxpayers are ranked by income and tax liability, both with and without the housing deductions. By comparing tax liability under the alternative regimes, and composing measures of the distributional impact of removing housing tax deductions using the classic Suits index, we assess both revenue neutral and nonrevenue neutral distributional effects. Results in both cases indicate that the removal of the tax deductibility of mortgage interest and property taxes would increase the progressivity of the income tax substantially.     

Transaction costs, capital-gains taxes, and housing demand

The paper considers the effect of transaction costs—particularly in the form of capital-gains taxes—on the aggregate demand for owner-occupied housing. The framework is an overlapping-generations model, where consumers can avoid the transaction costs (taxes) by keeping the same house for both periods of life. The first part of the paper analyzes the consumer's choice problem. It distinguishes between costs that are fixed irrespective of the size of the house bought or sold, and costs such as capital-gains taxes that are related to the house value. It is shown that higher transaction costs have lock-in effects, inducing consumers to keep the same house for both periods. Also it is found that under a wide variety of circumstances the amount of housing demanded will increase as the household is being locked in. Finally, the paper looks at the effects on aggregate demand from an increase in capital-gains taxes. It is shown that an increased rate of taxation decreases demand for low tax rates. But for high tax rates, when lock-in effects become important, one generally gets the opposite effect; high tax rates tend to increase housing demand.     

Property Tax Assessment Reform: A Source of Local Revenue Windfall or Fiscal Retrenchment

Abstract . Researchers, state officials and taxpayers have often speculated that property tax assessment reform would lead to an increase in the overall tax burden. They contend that, given the large non-discretionary increase in the tax base during the reform, local governments can raise more resources without increasing the nominal tax rate. An empirical analysis of 74 towns in New York supports that position. However, two types of tax shifts that occurred in the wake of reassessment—interclass shifts of tax burden to the owners of residential propertieskovn the other property classes and intra-class shifts observed among residential property owners—have caused significant moderation in this pattern of local government behavior. Therefore, tax reform, while it bestows revenue windfalls upon some local governments, may require fiscal retrenchment by others.     

Airport expansions and property values: the case of Chicago O'Hare Airport

The paper adds to the empirical literature by providing up-to-date estimates of the effect of airport noise on property values around one of the world's busiest airports, Chicago O'Hare. The results indicate that home values were about 9% lower within a 65 dB noise contour band of O'Hare in 1997. Opponents of airport expansions argue that increased noise will reduce property values and lower tax bases. The results of this paper suggest that aircraft are becoming so much quieter that the airport can be expanded without causing a drop in local property values or tax bases. Estimates suggest that house prices may rise by as much as $284.6 million in the densely populated area around O'Hare after a new runway is added to the airport.     

Alternative Methods of School Finance: An Empirical Analysis of Cities in San Diego County

. Two alternatives to the local school property tax are explored using a simulation model: a power equalizing property tax and a state-wide property tax. The effects on residents’tax burdens and service levels are estimated and compared for residents of 13 cities in San Diego County. Under each of the available options shifts in tax burdens would occur. One high income city is a major beneficiary. Three others which would be required to contribute more to education are otherwise dissimilar; one is already taxing itself heavily. When tax effort is considered, cities intended to be prime beneficiaries do benefit but not greatly. The principal gainer is a city with high income and high property values. This analysis does not indicate that these alternative programs are more equitable than the present property tax.     

Charitable Donations and the Estate Tax: A Tale of Two Hypotheses

Regression studies have suggested that reducing estate‐tax rates would lead to a net reduction in total charitable donations distributed at death. Not only is this notion counterintuitive, our empirical analysis yields the contrary conclusion: overall donations would increase. In rationalizing this donation‐decline outcome, investigators have pointed to the tax deductibility of donations in assessing estate‐tax liability. These efforts, we show, are dubious. The view that donations will decline is also shown to be inconsistent with axioms of generally accepted economic theory. Two distinct sets of indifference curves that imply these two antithetical views are suggested, their observable predictions derived and compared to the relevant evidence, showing that the increasing‐donation hypothesis is confirmed, offering overall a clear challenge to the decline‐in‐donation position. Our empirical results suggest that most estate‐tax payers possess indifference curves consistent with those that embody the increasing‐donation hypothesis.     

RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY AND HOUSING TAX REFORMS: Some Empirical Evidence*

The efficiency and equity implications of mortgage interest deductibility have been studied by a number of authors using models of housing demand that do not account for barriers to residential mobility. This paper examines how one's assessment of that proposed tax reform may differ based on models that do allow for such barriers, using data from Toronto, Canada. We find that earlier works tend to overstate the deadweight loss attributable to the introduction of mortgage interest deductibility, particularly in the short run.     

Implementing property tax reforms in Bangalore: an actor-network perspective

Many municipal governments in developing countries are experiencing serious difficulties in dealing with the rapid growth of population in cities. Catalysed through processes of globalisation, the growth of cities, especially the so-called ‘mega-cities’, has not been matched by investments in infrastructure like roads and power due to the inability of local government organizations to collect adequate revenues from sources like property tax. Recognizing these difficulties, agencies such as the Asian Development Bank have initiated systems for property tax reforms in a number of Asian cities, including Bangalore. In this paper, we discuss the story of this reform process drawing upon the actor-network perspective on translations. We argue that such a perspective helps to go beyond studying innovation processes through the lens of ‘technology diffusion’, and provides a more interesting and insightful perspective of ‘technology translation’.     

Federal Income Tax Reform in the United States: How Did It Happen? What Did It Do? Where Do We Go from Here?

Abstract . The 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913 provided the legal basis for progressive federal income taxes. They now yield revenues of about $450 billion annually. Tax base erosion eventually produced a levy in serious violation of norms of allocation efficiency, distributional equity, and macroeconomic performance. Vested private interests influenced legislators by propaganda and campaign contributions to minimize their tax burdens at the expense of less wealthy taxpayers. The result was an irrational and badly flawed tax structure. In 1981 the maximum marginal tax rate on income from property and wealth was significantly reduced along with other bracket reductions. The income tax reform movement culminated in 1984 to 1986. It expanded the base of the tax while reducing marginal rates as well as brackets, with little change in the distribution of the burden among different income groups but achieving some greater equity in tax liabilities for those with similar incomes.     

Property taxation and local public spending: the renter effect

The point of departure for this study is the pervasive finding that, other things equal, local jurisdictions tend to spend more on local services the larger the fraction of renters among their residents. This paper seeks to determine the approximate magnitude of this “renter effect” by posing the question “How much smaller would local public budgets be if all residents were home-owners?” Making use of two quite different approaches, the paper finds a typical renter effect on local public expenditure on the order of ten percent. This finding suggests that we might do well to reform the administration of the property tax so that changes in property tax liabilities on rental dwellings are directly and visibly transformed into changes of monthly rental payments.     

Identifying strategic interactions in Swedish local income tax policies

This paper uses data on Swedish local governments to test for strategic interaction in local tax setting. We make use of a number of indirect predictions from the theories of tax competition and yardstick competition in order to test for the presence of strategic interaction in these forms. Using such additional predictions of the theories serves a twofold purpose—first it helps us establish if the spatial coefficient is due to strategic interactions or merely reflecting spatial error correlation, and second, it helps identify the source of interaction. The analysis provides strong evidence for spatial correlation in tax rates among Swedish local governments. Moreover, we find weak evidence of tax competition effects in the setting of tax rates.     

Property taxation and the demand for housing: An econometric analysis

There is disagreement among economists regarding the effect of a local increase in property taxation on the housing market. In defining the price of housing services studies of the demand for housing have treated the property tax exclusively as an excise tax on housing consumption. Two recent theoretical developments suggest this is a misrepresentation of the tax. One theory holds that the excise effects of property taxation may be shifted backward to the factors employed in the production of housing. The other theory concludes that the property tax is not an excise, but rather serves as an efficient price for local public services. To investigate these hypotheses, data from the Annual Housing Survey were employed to estimate a housing demand model which included the net effective property tax rate among the set of independent variables. In addition to revealing the property tax-housing demand relationship, the model provides more reliable estimates of income and price elasticities by eliminating specification errors found in previous studies. Results indicate that the property tax reduces the housing consumption of central city homeowners, but does not distort the suburban housing market.     

企业所得税对债务融资影响分析——基于我国上市公司的实证研究

本文主要研究了企业所得税对企业债务融资决策产生的影响。研究结论支持了修正的MM理论关于税收对企业的债务融资决策有影响的观点。研究表明:在我国上市公司的债务融资决策中,企业所得税是考虑的因素之一,主要表现在其他条件相同的情况下,实际税率较高的企业债务融资的利用程度较高,享受税盾利益的动机相对较强。同时在我国上市公司中,债务性税盾与非债务性税盾的替代作用并不明显。     

Optimal property taxation in the presence of interregional capital mobility

A single region's optimal property tax policy is examined in a model with interregional capital mobility. In this model, property taxation is used to finance local public expenditures. Different tax rates may be imposed on property used to produce goods which are traded between regions and property used to produce nontraded goods (e.g., residential property). The key determinants of the difference between the optimal tax rates are identified, and it is argued that there exists a bias towards relatively low tax rates on property used to produce traded goods. The role of labor mobility is also investigated.     

Socioeconomic Impacts of Disinvestment on Communities in New York State

Abstract . In order to determine the effect of industrial decline on local tax revenues and to discern the stresses caused by higher demand for social services in a period of government fiscal crisis, the industrial migration activities and local government budgets of New York State from 1962 to 1976 are analyzed. These regression analyses show that: (1) manufacturing decline handicaps the growth of local property tax revenues; (2) when possible, local governments compensate for their lost property tax revenues by raising non-property taxes; displaced workers are likely to seek public assistance; and (4) local welfare expenditures do not correspond to the soaring social service demands. Provided that plant openings seldom re-employ displaced workers, the authors suggest that it is as important for local governments to adopt policies for retaining their current manufacturing plants as to attract new industrial investments.     

Tourism, Vacation Home Development and Residential Tax Burden:

Abstract . Differences in property tax rates among communities within a regional economy are a source of inefficiency and inequity. Less developed rural areas where natural amenities exist have often attempted to use the tourist industry as a means of importing economic development. Promoters of vacation home development argue that the impact on the local tax base is positive. However, the quantitative research in this paper indicates that under certain circumstances, vacation home development has the effect of increasing the tax burden on residential property.     

Income taxes and urban spatial structure

This paper examines the impact of an income tax in a monocentric city where households equilibriate their allocation of time between work, commuting, and leisure. An increase in the income tax rate lowers the implicit value of time, and hence transportation costs. “Compensated equilibrium” comparative statics analysis shows that under certain conditions, this results in a larger, more dispersed urban area, with lower land rents at the city center and less population within any given distance from the center. The welfare effect of an income tax rate change is also studied, and an expression for the marginal excess burden is derived. The income tax produces welfare losses both because it induces substitution in favor of leisure and in favor of travel—the latter accompanied by excessive spatial dispersion and consumption of space. The marginal excess burden depends not only on the compensated demand elasticity for leisure, but also on that for space. Finally, the problem of benefit measurement for transportation projects in this tax-distorted spatial economy is examined. Benefit measures should be deflated to adjust for the fact that further transportation improvements lead to reduction of land use intensity, exacerbating the problem of spatial resource misallocation in an already excessively dispersed urban area.     

Who offers tax-based business development incentives?

Many American communities seek to attract or retain businesses with tax abatements, tax credits, or tax increment financing of infrastructure projects (TIFs). The evidence for 1999 indicates that communities are most likely to offer one or more of these business development incentives if their residents have low incomes, if they are located close to state borders, and if their states have troubled political cultures. Ten percent greater median household income is associated with a 3.2% lower probability of offering incentives; 10% greater distance from a state border is associated with a 1.0% lower probability of offering incentives; and a 10% higher rate at which government officials are convicted of federal corruption crimes is associated with a 1.2% greater probability of offering business incentives. TIFs are the preferred incentive of communities whose residents have household incomes between $25,000 and $75,000; whereas TIFs are much less commonly offered by communities whose residents have household incomes below $25,000. The need to finance TIFs out of incremental tax revenues may make it infeasible for many of the poorest of communities to use TIFs for local business development.     

Income taxes and the destination of movers to multistate MSAs

We examine how differences in state income tax rates, as well as other state and local taxes and public service expenditures, influence the choice of state of residence for households (federal tax filers) moving into multistate metropolitan areas (MSAs) using data from the IRS on the migration of taxpayers. MSAs that are on borders provide a spatial discontinuity—discrete differences in state tax rates within a single labor market. These MSAs allow residents to live in one state and work in another state. We find that differences in state income tax rates have a significant impact on the relative rate of migration to the states within an MSA. However, contrary to what would be expected, this impact is only significant in MSAs in which the filing state is based on employment (states without reciprocity) and not for those states in which the filing state is the state of residence (states with reciprocity). In MSAs where states do not have reciprocity agreements, a difference of ten percent in tax rates leads to a 4.1 percent difference in the relative rate of incoming taxpayers. Analogously, we find that a ten percent difference in state tax rates in these MSAs results in a 3.3 percent difference in the rate of tax base inflow (AGI). Our results suggest that one reason that differences in state income taxes appear to have more impact in multistate MSAs without reciprocity is that only relatively large differences in state income tax rates have any impact on migration and these differences are much more pronounced in MSAs without reciprocity.     

Mobile Labor, Multiple Tax Instruments, and Tax Competition

The tax competition literature shows that local governments keep property tax rates inefficiently low to prevent capital outflows, thereby underproviding local public goods. This paper adds mobile labor and an alternative tax instrument to the model. Jurisdictions have access to a property tax levied on land and capital, plus either a head tax or a labor tax. Scale economies in public good provision create incentives to use the property tax, but these incentives are not accompanied by increased incentives to underprovide public goods. In contrast, underprovision is associated with the use of a distortionary labor tax.