A multiobjective decision support system for multiresource forest management

A multiobjective and/or multiperson decision support system for analyzing multiresource forest management problems is developed in this paper. The procedure includes formulating the problem in a multiobjective and group decision making framework, and solving it using two solution techniques which consist of a distance-based compromise programming (CP) and a cooperative game theoretic approach of the Nash equilibrium type. The problem consists of five forest resources management objective functions to be maximized. Solving the problem using the two solution techniques enables determining a satisfactory compromise solution of the five forest resource management objectives. Sensitivity analysis of the two techniques shows compromise programming to be more sensitive to changes in the weight and the p-parameter of the technique while the cooperative game theoretic approach is relatively robust with respect to changes in the worst utility set.     

国际贸易非零和博弈的约束因素和实现机制探究

当今世界,国际贸易具有强烈的冲撞与协调、竞争与合作的博弈特征。在这场博弈中,人们所期待的平和、有序、共赢的局面并没有如期出现。相反地,随着新贸易保护主义的兴起、“技术扩散负作用”论的流行以及国际产业结构静态上的重构和动态上的脱节,导致国际贸易的摩擦此起彼伏。因而,要实现国际贸易的非零和博弈,必须要求贸易各方建立起激励相容的自由贸易机制、加速先进科学技术在世界范围内的转移扩散以及构建结构互补、水平分工与垂直分工交织并存的国际分工网络体系。     

Negotiation over Costs and Benefits in Brownfield Redevelopment

A quantitative methodology is developed to support negotiations over the allocation of costs and benefits in brownfield redevelopment projects by utilizing cooperative game theory. In particular, guidelines for estimating the net benefits of various coalitions that can be formed by the landowners, developers and governments are presented. A general n-player cooperative game is formulated to model the negotiations. Two simple conditions are obtained for checking whether or not a three-player brownfield redevelopment negotiation game has a nonempty core. Various nucleolus concepts and the Shapley value are utilized to find alternative fair cost and benefit allocation schemes, from which the decision makers can negotiate. An illustrative example is employed to demonstrate how the proposed approach can be applied in practice.     

基于博弈论的零售商与供应商关系探讨

本文运用博弈论对零售商与供应商的关系进行了分析,认为在非合作博弈条件下,零售商与供应商为追求各自利益的最大化,必然会相互竞争,这正是目前零售商与供应商矛盾冲突的根源;而在合作博弈条件下,零售商与供应商之间相互合作的结果要优于非合作博弈。文章提出,要实现零售商与供应商之间的合作博弈,应具备一定的前提和条件,必须采取措施消除阻碍零售商与供应商进行合作的障碍,创造合作博弈的环境和氛围,使零售商与供应商相互信任,创造零售商与供应商重复博弈的条件,公开企业市场行为信息,增加破坏合作的违约成本。     

Stakeholder’s Preference and Rational Compliance: A Comment on Sacconi’s “CSR as a Model for Extended Corporate Governance II: Compliance, Reputation and Reciprocity”

Lorenzo Sacconi’s recent re-statement of his social contract account of business ethics is a major contribution to our understanding of the normative nature of CSR as the expression of a fair multi-party agreement supported by the economic rationality of each participant. However, at one crucial point in his theory, Sacconi introduces the concept of stakeholders’ conformist preferences – their disposition to punish the firm if it defects from the agreement, refusing to abide by its own explicit CSR policies and norms. We take issue with him over this concept: we show that the assumption of conformist preferences is a moral premise, and it arguably weakens the normativity of the theory as a whole. As an alternative, we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach. We draw upon recent applications of evolutionary game theory to moral philosophy (Skyrms, Danielson), and we use a computer simulation of the trust game. According to this approach, the failure of the logic of reputation, which is the problem conformist preferences were introduced to solve, is overcome through the dynamics of interaction.     

A STATE‐CONSTRAINED DIFFERENTIAL GAME ARISING IN OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO LIQUIDATION

We consider n risk‐averse agents who compete for liquidity in an Almgren–Chriss market impact model. Mathematically, this situation can be described by a Nash equilibrium for a certain linear quadratic differential game with state constraints. The state constraints enter the problem as terminal boundary conditions for finite and infinite time horizons. We prove existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and give closed‐form solutions in some special cases. We also analyze qualitative properties of the equilibrium strategies and provide corresponding financial interpretations.     

Business is not a Game: The Metaphoric Fallacy

Sport and game metaphors are ubiquitous in the culture and language of business. As evocative linguistic devices, such metaphors are morally neutral; however, if they are indicative of a deep structure of understanding that filters experience, then they have the potential to be ethically problematic. This article argues that there exists a danger for those who forget or confuse metaphor with definition: the metaphoric fallacy. Accordingly, business is like a game, but it is not the equivalent of a game. If business is equated to a game, then the potentially negative implications for ethical content and the application of ethical theories are numerous. This article suggests a fresh approach to issues of contemporary business ethics discourse, by attending to the business-as-game metaphor.     

Exploring South African consumers’ attitudes towards game meat—Utilizing a multi‐attribute attitude model

The study explored the use of a multi‐attribute approach, Fishbein’s attitude‐towards‐the‐object model, in finding the differences between the attitudes of consumers and nonconsumers of game meat among South African respondents towards the following attributes of game meat: sensory characteristics; health benefits; game meat production ethics; animal welfare; safety for human consumption; availability; and price. This quantitative study determined the attitudes of 1,096 consumers and 310 nonconsumers of game meat with an online survey. Based on attitudes towards individual attributes, as determined by Fishbein’s attitude‐towards‐the‐object model, respondents classified some product attributes as important in their decision to consume, or not to consume, game meat. Respondents indicated that the availability, sensory characteristics, game meat production ethics and health benefits are considered to be important in their decision to consume game meat.     

技术性贸易壁垒中的博弈及我国的对策

在新贸易保护主义下,技术性贸易壁垒已经成为非关税壁垒的主要形式。超过合理范围的技术性贸易措施限制了国外产品的正常进口,也阻碍了国际贸易的发展。本文采用博弈论的方法分析了技术性贸易壁垒产生的原因,并提出政府可以采取“针锋相对”的策略,使博弈双方达到共同的最优结果,从而消除技术性贸易壁垒对国际贸易的不利影响。     

构建网络组织路径的企业成功创新

丹麦学者Thomas Ritter认为科技竞争力和网络竞争力对于一个企业创新的成功与否起着至关重要的作用。借鉴Thomas Ritter提出的企业创新成功理论分析框架,从网络竞争力科技竞争力两个角度分析网络组织的创新效应。并对如何利用网络组织这一路径提高企业创新能力提出若干建议。     

冲突与合作世界中的博弈新视界--评2005年诺贝尔经济学奖得主奥曼和谢林

博弈理论大大影响了经济学和社会科学研究的进程.在纳什等人的博弈理论之外,博弈论怎样被用来解决社会上的问题吗？本文介绍的就是今年的诺贝尔经济学奖得主奥曼和谢林就博弈论如何应用于现实社会提出的证明和一些具体实践后取得的结论、尤其是他们对交互合作关系中合作的研究及其运用的创新观点.他们的理论对我们全面理解博弈论开辟了一个新领域.     

基于博弈论的网络贸易信息跨文化分析——以中越为例

文章从博弈论角度研究了网络贸易信息的跨文化因素,重点分析完全信息静态博弈和完全信息动态博弈条件下的语言及文化选择.指出企业应根据不同的贸易发展阶段和产品特征采取不同跨文化对策,以期为从事国际电子商务的企业提供参考和服务,有效地开拓国际市场.     

Financial Statement Audits,a Game of Chicken?

This paper uses the intuition from the game of chickento model client-auditor financial reporting and audit effort strategies. Within an ethical context, our model is concerned with the client misreporting and its detection by the auditor. The paper uses a welfare game(similar to the game of chicken) to more formally model client-auditor strategies. The welfare game is then extended to provide additional insight into ethical and audit effort issues.Such a welfare gameprovides equilibrium in mixed strategies. This mixed strategy solution makes possible four outcomes from the game: 1) Financial Statements are fairly presented by client and the auditor performs a normal audit, 2) Financial Statements are fairly presented by client and the auditor performs an extended audit (over auditing), 3) Financial State-ments are misstated by client and detected by the auditor, and 4) Financial Statements are misstated by client and not detected by the auditor (audit failure despite no intended unethical action on the part of the auditor).The first extension of the welfare gameallows clients to be ethical or unethical clients. Unethical clients are rewarded for misreporting because the auditor wishes to minimize audit effort for ethical clients. The second extension allows the client to unknowingly misstate the financial statements; the client "strategy" then becomes random (a play of nature). The auditor must distinguish between this random play and the strategic play of the welfare game. Finally auditor ethics are considered and the influence of auditor ethics on reducing failed audits.     

中韩游戏贸易比较分析

近年来,中国游戏贸易发展迅速,网络贸易市场规模已位居世界首位,中韩两国游戏贸易结构相似,均以网络游戏为主,且呈不断增长趋势。但中国游戏贸易发展仍存在国际市场竞争力不足,缺乏专业人才,游戏产品同质化等制约因素,提出增加游戏创意创新元素,加强人才培养等对策建议。     

试论设置内生技术贸易壁垒的原则

为了保护我国经济利益和国民生命健康及财产安全，建立内生TBT是完全必要的，同时，建立内生TBT也是国际经济合作活动中对等交易的客观需要。应考虑产品的国际竞争力大小、有利于国内产业结构调整、保护国内生态系统、国民的安全卫生与健康及国际贸易博弈等问题设置TBT的原则。     

A Non-cooperative Mechanism Yielding the Nucleolus of Airport Problems

A non-cooperative approach is employed to solve the problem of allocating the total cost of building and maintaining an airport runway among its users. More precisely, it is proposed a non-cooperative bargaining game with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, and it is shown that the SPE outcome payoffs coincide with those prescribed by the nucleolus of the corresponding airport cooperative game.     

Managerial morality and behavior: The questionable payments issue

This research examined the effect of managers' value systems and personality traits on ethical decision behavior, in the context of questionable payments to foreign officials to assure business. Using a complex international management game to simulate the real-world competitive business environment, the study measured the instrumental and terminal value systems of the game participants as well as their tendencies towards Machiavellianism. It then observed their decision behavior in response to what was clearly a demand for an illegal payment.The findings indicate that ethical values, in most instances, were subordinated to the manager's duty to achieve company goals. They also revealed that the inner conflict between what was professed as right, and what had to be done in practice, was generally resolved on the basis of utility rather than on ethical or moral grounds. Richard D. Rosenberg is Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management at Technion — Israel Institute of Technology. He has written several articles which have been published e.g., Industrial and Labor Relations Review; Industrial Relations; and Industrial Marketing Management.The guidance and suggestions of Professor Y. Rim and Dr. M. Erez of the Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management at the Technion are gratefully acknowledged.     

Advances in Drama Theory for Managing Global Hazards and Disasters. Part I: Theoretical Foundation

Global risk and disaster management challenges are complex and ill-structured group decision processes characterized by time-sensitive, multi-faceted, and self-organizing negotiations, high decision stakes, extreme uncertainty, and dynamic, value-laden tradeoffs. Drama theory asserts that conflict resolution requires players to engage in a rational-emotional process of re-defining both the game and their “positions” in it until agreement on a satisfactory resolution is reached. While game theory has been widely applied to problems dealing with hazards, risk, and disasters, it assumes fixed players, options, and preferences, and hence does not allow for the re-definition of the conflict under consideration. Results show that drama theory constitutes a flexible and powerful tool for modeling group decision and negotiation processes involving natural, man-made, and health-related hazards, risk, and catastrophes in the post-911 security environment by modeling emotional responses that, throughout the course of a game, can lead to unanticipated reactions and change basic assumptions. This is achieved through the use of option boards to construct and analyze emergency, disaster, or crisis models that are structurally similar to game models. Finally, drama theory is compared and contrasted to conflict analysis, which developed from common roots in metagame analysis. The strengths and weaknesses of drama theory are critically evaluated in the context of global climate change and the mounting risk of a worldwide influenza pandemic.     

个人信用行为的博弈分析

市场经济本质上就是信用经济,信用是市场经济发展的基础,而个人信用又是整个社会信用的基础。通过构建一个博弈模型分析个人信用是如何通过交易者双方一次性博弈、重复博弈和信号传递而形成的。基于此,在交易者双方中引入政府个人信用监督机关,构建出有个人信用监督机关的博弈模型。基于对以上博弈模型的分析,提出构建我国个人信用制度体系的对策。     

A general equilibrium model of bilateral trade with strategic public investment in commercial infrastructure

We explore how public investment in commercial infrastructure affects the composition of trade between countries. To this end, we develop a model of bilateral trade in which two countries produce, consume, and trade a continuum of goods. Goods are produced by a single homogeneous factor, labor, the productivity of which depends on the quality of the country’s commercial infrastructure, broadly conceived to encompass transportation, communication, and power transmission networks; regulatory and legal institutions; and basic research and educational systems. Countries may improve the quality of their commercial infrastructures through increased public investment. However, returns on these investments are constrained by fixed ‘natural’ endowments, with the better-endowed country enjoying greater labor productivity for a given level of public investment. We begin by analyzing optimal investment in public infrastructure in one country when public investment by the trading partner is fixed. We find that, ceteris paribus, greater public investment in commercial infrastructure raises general labor productivity, leading to gains in workers’ real income. We then analyze a non-cooperative game in which both countries strategically vary public investment in commercial infrastructure. We find that, in a Nash game, the better-endowed country optimally spends more on infrastructure and produces the goods requiring the greatest labor productivity. However, in a Stackelberg game, the results are ambiguous. An empirical analysis based on recent international trade data supports our theoretical finding that investment in public infrastructure is positively related to the export of ‘high-end’ goods.