市场经济模型的研究与分析

在一个由原始设备制造商、合同制造商和原材料供应商组成的三级链中,简述了在市场需求不确定情况下存在成本信息不对称的整合外包模型,并对这个模型进行了分析。说明了市场需求不确定对模型的影响。     

需求不确定对单周期产品的生产商—零售商供应链的影响

在单周期产品的生产商—零售商的供应链中,由于市场存在着激烈的竞争,市场需求的不确定性必然会对供应链双方的决策产生很大的影响。借助传统的报童模型,建立Stackberg博奕模型,考虑了一个供应商面对两个不同零售商时的情景,分别分析了当零售商决策依据是最大化期望利润和当两零售商的市场需求相关时,以及在零售商的决策依据是在给定利润水平时最大化其概率的情况下,市场需求不确定会对供应链双方产生怎样的影响。     

略论需求不确定条件下制造商主导的供应链协调

本文研究了市场需求不确定条件下获取市场需求信息的费用,及信息共享对制造商主导的供应链系统的影响.文章探讨了销售商是否获取市场需求信息及是否与制造商共享三种模型,通过分析各方利润得出结论.     

不确定条件下供应链主导企业利润模型研究

本文在市场需求不确定和制造成本变动条件下,考虑由于库存带来的库存成本和供给不足带来的缺货成本,建立了由一个供应商和一个制造商组成的供应链中主导企业的利润最大化模型,并设计了该模型求解的迭代算法,最后通过数据仿真,验证了该模型的有效性.     

基于对市场需求函数估计不同的Cournot博弈模型

通过对经典的Cournot博弈模型的某些假设进行改进的基础上构建一个新的Cournot博弈模型,主要研究当每个企业并不知道市场需求函数只能对其进行估计的情况下,并基于行为经济学和行为博弈论的一些原理对新的Cournot博弈模型进行求解,并把结果和经典的Cournot博弈模型的结果进行比较。通过比较分析,对竞争市场中的一些现象给予解释。     

板材订货稳定性预测方法及应用

合同订单稳定性的预测对于销售、生产、物流各个环节的顺利进行十分重要,企业通过对市场需求的情况的预测,决定如何有效地分配企业资源、制定合理的生产计划、保持适当的库存水平等。介绍了一种针对钢材板材市场需求预测、订单评价的模型,并对该模型的系统设计进行一定的阐述,同时也对该系统的实际使用意义做了相关的说明。     

基于对市场需求函数估计不同的Cournot博弈模型

通过对经典的Cournot博弈模型的某些假设进行改进的基础上构建一个新的Cournot博弈模型，主要研毙当每个企业并不知道市场需求函数只能对其进行估计的情况下，并基于行为经济学和行为博弈论的一些原理对新的Cournot博弈模型进行求解，并把结果和经典的Cournot博弈模型的结果进行比较。通过比较分析，对竞争市场中的一些现象给予解释。     

基于引力模型的中国玉米进口贸易影响因素研究

随着中国玉米产量、库存量、进口量的不断增加,国内玉米市场供给远远超过了市场需求,对中国经济持续健康发展产生了较大影响.利用2000年～2014年中国与玉米进口主要来源国的相关贸易数据,建立了一个扩展贸易引力模型对中国玉米进口贸易主要影响因素进行实证分析,最后提出了相关对策建议.     

企业异质性、国内市场贸易成本与扩大中国内需——Melitz模型在中国主要制造业的理论扩展及经验分析

本文扩展了Melitz的异质性企业模型,通过对我国主要制造业2001-2010年面板数据的分析,实证检验了影响我国国内市场需求的主要因素。研究结果表明,我国确实存在"生产率悖论",较高的国内市场贸易成本对国内市场需求产生不利影响,扩大内需关键是降低过高的国内市场贸易成本。     

控制缺货下的报童模型扩展

当卖主给出一个提前订货的折扣时,买主订货的数量忽视了预测偏差的影响。买主必须在订货前预测市场需求,但这样可能增大需求预测的偏差。在本论文的扩展报童模型中,当给平均缺货水平加一个上限时,订货时间和订货数量同时成为决定变量。     

Foreign demand shocks,product switching,and export product quality: Evidence from China

Using Chinese customs data spanning from 2000 to 2013, we explore how foreign demand shocks in exporting markets impact product switching, factor adjustments, and export quality of Chinese exporting firms. We document that positive demand shocks would render firms to expand product scope by increasing the number of added varieties and decreasing the number of dropped varieties. In line with the expansion of product scope, firms adjust their factor reallocations by hiring more employees and producing in a more capital-intensive way when facing higher positive demand shocks. Higher capital intensity induces productivity improvement, and thus increases firms' export revenue, export price, and export-product quality. We also document that positive foreign demand shocks render firms to concentrate less on their core varieties by skewing their export sales away from the best performing products.     

Do consumers value price transparency?

We examine the role of price transparency in consumer preferences and demand. We assemble a detailed dataset on the driving school industry in Portugal to quantify how firms present the price of the course of instruction, and its individual components, to potential students. Our unique data allows us to estimate a structural model of school choice and measure the impact of varying levels of price information on demand. The results show that consumers are willing to pay a significant amount for price transparency, on average 11% of the service price, and that consumer demographics drive heterogeneous preferences for transparency.     

BUYING VERSUS HIRING—AN INDIRECT EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

On a symmetric homogeneous oligopoly market with stochastic demand, firms can either hire employees or buy their labor input on a competitive labor market. Whereas the wage of hired labor does not depend on the realization of stochastic demand, the price of ‘bought’ labor reacts positively to product demand. We derive the equilibrium price vector to define an evolutionary process, assuming that the number of hiring firms increases when they earn more than buying firms. We then derive and discuss the stationary distribution of this stochastic adaptation process.     

A macroeconomic model of international price discrimination

This paper builds a baseline two-country model of real and monetary transmission in the presence of optimal international price discrimination by firms. Distributing traded goods to consumers requires nontradables, making the price elasticity of demand country-specific and a function of the exchange rate. Profit-maximizing monopolistic firms drive a wedge between prices across countries, optimally dampening the response of import and consumer prices to exchange-rate movements. We derive general equilibrium expressions for the pass-through into import and consumer prices, tracing the differential impact of real and monetary shocks on marginal cost and markup fluctuations through the exchange rate.     

Who should practice price discrimination using rebates in an asymmetric duopoly?

Price discrimination is generally thought to improve firm profits by allowing firms to extract more consumer surplus. In competition, however, price discrimination may also be costly to the firm because restrictive incentive compatibility conditions may allow the competing firm to gain market share at the discriminating firm’s expense. Therefore, with asymmetric competition, it may be the case that one firm would let the other firm assume the burden of price discrimination. We investigate optimal segmentation in a market with two asymmetric firms and two heterogeneous consumer segments that differ in the importance of price and product attributes. In particular, we investigate second-degree price discrimination under competition with explicit incentive compatibility constraints thus extending prior work in marketing and economics. Focusing on the managerial implications, we explore whether it would be profitable for either or both firms to pursue a segmentation strategy using rebates as a mechanism. We identify conditions under which one or both firms would want to pursue such segmentation. We find that segmentation lessens competition for the less price-sensitive consumer segment and that this results in higher profits to both firms. A key to understanding this result is that segmentation leads to consumer remixing. We establish the key result that if firms are asymmetric in their attractiveness to consumers, the disadvantaged firm in our model is more likely to pursue a segmentation strategy than its rival in equilibrium. We then ask whether this result prevails in practice. To this end, we explore competitive segmentation empirically and are able to verify that disadvantaged firms indeed pursue segmentation through rebates with greater likelihood.     

A MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION WITH PERSONAL INCOME DISPERSION

We introduce non‐homothetic preferences in the Dixit–Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, and enquire about the effects of a change in income dispersion on the firms’ optimal decisions and market equilibrium. Income dispersion, modeled as a mean preserving spread, is shown to affect only the degree of product differentiation under the standard negligibility hypothesis on the firms’ decision making process, while it generates a positive co‐movement of demand and demand elasticity, when this assumption is removed and the price index effect is taken into account.     

INPUT PRICE UNCERTAINTY,INVESTMENTS IN FLEXIBILITY AND COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM

This paper assumes that firms can respond to input price uncertainty by selecting a flexible technology. A simple model of industry equilibrium is used to examine the choice of flexibility. It is shown that the industry equilibrium is not characterized by excess capacity. This contrasts with the result in the previous literature dealing with equilibrium under product demand uncertainty. It is also shown that the effect of an increase in input price dispersion on the optimal level of flexibility and the equilibrium number of firms depends on the interaction between flexibility and the optimal size of the firm.     

Import Demand Elasticity and Exporter Response to Anti-Dumping Duties

ABSTRACT

This article investigates exporting firms’ behavior following the imposition of anti-dumping (AD) duties. AD duties tend to increase the prices of imported goods via a mechanism different from any other trade barrier because the AD duty size is endogenously dependent on import prices. Our model accounts for this feature and demonstrates that exporters are more likely to adjust their price upward when they face a less elastic demand. The theoretical predictions are supported empirically by relating product-level U.S. import demand elasticities and exporting firms’ reactions to duties inferred from a dataset on U.S. AD investigations from 1980 to 1995.     

Market information and channel price structure

An analytical model is developed that considers the effect of demand information, and the precision with which demand forecasts are made, on channel profitability. Different channel price structures such as Stackelberg and Vertically integrated are considered and comparisons are made of the impact of information precision on channel profits under each structure. Other demand factors such as brand substitutability and share of base level demand are also included in the analysis, and the interaction of information and demand effects is examined. An empirical study is carried out using a sample of firms based in Hong Kong and support is found for the model propositions.     

The influence of demand factors on dynamic competitive pricing strategy: An empirical study

This empirical paper investigates the relationship between the dynamic strategic interactions among competitors in a component market and demand factors in the market for the end product. The structure of competition in the US microprocessor (MPU) industry is analyzed using data on prices and sales in both the MPU market as well as the market for personal computers. The pattern of dynamic strategic interaction between competing firms in this market on a key decision variable, price is studied. Non-nested model comparison tests based on equilibrium solutions derived for specific differential games are applied to identify the mode of competitive strategy between pairs of competing brands. The empirical fit to the longitudinal and cross-sectional data, of alternative models of competition, independent (Bertrand?CNash), Stackelberg leader?Cfollower, and Collusion, is used to determine which dynamic model best describes actual competitive behavior over the life of each MPU. Demand for the product market which is downstream from microprocessors, that for personal computers, is estimated using a generalized diffusion model with price effects. Data from the markets for desktop and laptop computers are analyzed at the level of computer vendor and internal microprocessor. Patterns are uncovered, linking downstream demand parameters with upstream competitive strategy. There is evidence to suggest that when there are strong diffusion effects driving sales of both the competing computer brands, there is a higher likelihood of Bertrand?CNash competition among MPU firms. However, when there are higher cross-price effects (substitutability) among personal computer brands there is a greater chance of Stackelberg leader?Cfollower price competition. When self-price effects are relatively high, the likelihood of Bertrand?CNash competition among MPU firms increases. Furthermore, when the potential demand for the computer product category is high, there is a higher likelihood of Bertrand?CNash pricing in the MPU market.