Tax Reporting Behavior Under Audit Certainty

This study uses a confidential data set of firms assigned to the Internal Revenue Service's Coordinated Industry Case (CIC) program to examine the effect of audit certainty on firms' tax reporting behavior. We first model the determinants of assignment to the program. Although the ability and incentive to avoid taxes are related to CIC assignment, we find that the IRS assigns firms primarily based on size and complexity. We then test whether audit certainty has a detectable effect on tax payments. Our results show that tax payments do not change when firms enter the CIC program, suggesting the CIC program does not have higher deterrence or enforcement effects relative to the IRS's standard selection and audit process for large corporations not included in the CIC program. However, supplemental analysis suggests that audit certainty does alter managers' expectations regarding future tax payments. Our paper provides new empirical evidence on the strategic game between the taxpayer and the tax authority and has important implications for tax authorities as they consider the costs and benefits of certain audit programs.     

The Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 on Defined Benefit Pension Contributions*

This study examines the effect of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) on corporate defined benefit pension contributions. The TCJA decreases the corporate tax rate from 35 percent in 2017 to 21 percent in 2018 and thereafter. This change incentivizes firms to increase 2017 pension contributions to take advantage of tax deductions at a higher rate. Consistent with this incentive, we find firms increase defined benefit pension contributions by an average of 25 to 31 percent in 2017 compared with earlier years. We also find that taxpaying firms are the primary contributors. Further, taxpaying firms with high levels of pension-related deferred tax assets contribute over three times as much as taxpaying firms with low levels of pension-related deferred tax assets. We also find firms that increase pension contributions in 2017 reduce 2018 contributions, consistent with intertemporal income shifting rather than a permanent change in pension funding strategy.     

Shareholder Income Taxes and the Relation between Earnings and Returns*

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether and how shareholder‐level taxes affect earnings response coefficients (ERCs). Our tests indicate that when the tax rate on dividends increases, ERCs decrease for firms with high levels of dividend yield and whose marginal investor is likely to be an individual. For firms with high levels of share repurchase yield and whose marginal investor is likely to be an individual, an increase in dividend tax rate has no discernible effect on ERCs. These results are consistent with the notion that the tax penalty on dividends, relative to capital gains, reduces the earnings‐return relation.     

The Impact of Financial and Tax Reporting Incentives on Option Grants to Canadian CEOs*

This study explores the effects of financial and tax reporting incentives on options granted to chief executive officers in Canada. Extant studies with a similar objective (Yermack 1995; Matsunaga 1995) explore predominantly nonqualified U.S. option grants that are deductible to the extent that the options are in the money at the time of exercise. In contrast, Canadian firms do not get a tax deduction for their stock option grants at any time. In both countries, no expense is recorded for financial reporting purposes. As a result, the financial reporting and tax reporting trade‐off is more pronounced in the Canadian setting of this study compared with the U.S. setting. We measure option granting behavior as the ratio of the Black‐Scholes value of stock option grants to the sum of cash compensation and the value of stock option grants. Using a sample of 806 firm‐year observations during the period 1993‐95, we find that observed option grants are significantly correlated with proxies for short‐run financial reporting incentives. We also find evidence that option granting behavior is correlated with proxies for tax incentives.     

The impact of an accelerated depreciation tax policy on employment: Evidence from China

We examine the impact of an accelerated depreciation tax policy (ADP) on employment. As a tax incentive policy, we expect an ADP to impact firm behavior significantly, but its effect on employment remains uninvestigated. Leveraging the two-stage implementation of an ADP in selected industries in China in 2014 and 2015 and using a difference-in-differences research design, we find that: 1) the ADP significantly increases employment, which is consistent with the output effect hypothesis; and 2) the ADP increases firms’ labor demand, mainly by stimulating investment in fixed assets and easing their financial constraints. Additional analysis suggests that the impact of ADP on employment is more salient for small firms, non-state-owned firms, and high growth firms, and skilled labor employment, indicating that the ADP is more effective for firms with high financial constraints and hiring skilled labor to accompany the increase in capital investment.     

Transfer Pricing: Strategies,Practices, and Tax Minimization

Using a survey of tax executives from multinational corporations, we document that some firms set their transfer pricing strategy to minimize tax payments, but more firms focus on tax compliance. We estimate that a firm focusing on minimizing taxes has a GAAP effective tax rate that is 6.6 percentage points lower and generates about $43 million more in tax savings, on average, than a firm focusing on tax compliance. Available COMPUSTAT data on sample firms confirm our survey‐based inferences. We also find that transfer pricing‐related tax savings are greater when higher foreign income, tax haven use, and R&D activities are combined with a tax minimization strategy. Finally, compliance‐focused firms report lower FIN 48 tax reserves than tax‐minimizing firms, consistent with the former group using less uncertain transfer pricing arrangements. Collectively, our study provides direct evidence that multinational firms have differing internal priorities for transfer pricing, and that these differences are strongly related to the taxes reported by these firms.     

Trapped Cash and the Profitability of Foreign Acquisitions

Current U.S. reporting and tax laws create an incentive for some U.S. firms to avoid the repatriation of foreign earnings, as the U.S. government charges additional corporate taxes on these transfers. Prior research suggests that the combined effect of these incentives leads some U.S. multinational corporations to hold a significant amount of cash overseas. In this study, we investigate the effect of cash trapped overseas on U.S. multinational corporations' foreign acquisitions. Consistent with expectations, we observe firms with high levels of trapped cash make less profitable acquisitions of foreign target firms using cash consideration (lower announcement window returns, lower buy and hold returns, decreased ROA). The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA) reduced this effect by allowing firms to repatriate foreign earnings held as cash abroad at a much lower tax cost. Our study has implications for current proposals to change the tax laws related to foreign earnings.     

Volatility of Tax Payments and Dividend Payouts*

Dividends are a key mechanism for shareholders to discipline managers and mitigate agency conflicts. This study examines whether the volatility of tax payments is associated with dividend payouts. Consistent with the predictions, results suggest that firms with more volatile tax payments are less likely to pay dividends overall and their dividends are lower in magnitude when doing so. These effects are economically significant and incremental to a firm's operating risk. The link between volatile tax payments and the likelihood of dividend payouts is weaker for firms that distribute dividends to alleviate agency conflicts. Similarly, the link between volatile tax payments and the amount of dividend payouts is weaker for firms that hold more cash for tax reasons. Taken together, these findings add to our understanding of the economic consequences of volatile tax payments and the determinants of dividend payouts.     

Growth opportunities,collateral and debt structure: the case of the Japanese machine manufacturing firms

We explore the determinants of debt structure by analyzing the Japanese machine manufacturing firms’ data from 1990 through 1996. We find that firms with abundant growth opportunities and scarce collateral are likely to borrow from banks rather than to issue bonds. This is robust even if we consider the simultaneous decision of the debt composition and leverage or managerial incentive. We also find that firms with abundant growth opportunities or collateral tend to depend on equity rather than on debt. Though banks reduce the agency costs of debt for growing firms, equity costs less than bank loans for them.     

A Cross‐national Comparison of R&D Expenditure Decisions: Tax Incentives and Financial Constraints*

We provide evidence on the impact of tax incentives and financial constraints on corporate R&D expenditure decisions. We contribute to extant research by comparing R&D expenditures in the United States and Canada, thereby exploiting the differences in the two countries' R&D tax credit mechanisms and generally accepted accounting principles. The two tax incentive mechanism designs are consistent with differing views of the degree of financial constraints faced by firms in these economies. Our sample also allows us to explore the effects of capitalizing R&D on Canadian firms. Employing a matched design, we document relations between tax credit incentives and R&D spending consistent with both Canadian and U.S. public companies responding as though they are not financially constrained. We estimate that the Canadian credit system induces, on average, $1.30 of additional R&D spending per dollar of taxes forgone while the U.S. system induces, on average, $2.96 of additional spending. We also find that firms that capitalize R&D costs in Canada spend, on average, 18 percent more on R&D. Collectively, this evidence is important to the ongoing debates in both countries concerning the appropriate design of incentives for R&D and is consistent with the assumptions found in the U.S. tax credit system, but not those found in the Canadian system.     

Lack of successors,firm default,and the performance of small businesses

We investigate the effects of the lack of successors on small businesses with an elderly manager. Using firm-level data from Japan, a country with an aging population, we find the following results. First, smaller, younger, highly leveraged, and nongrowing firms are likely to have no successor. Second, firms with an elderly manager are more likely to exit and default if they have no successors, and this is particularly the case during the global financial crisis around 2009. This result suggests that these firms have less incentive to repay debts because they are not going concerns. As a result of the high probability of default, the annual change in bank borrowing is low if firms with an elderly manager have no successor. Third, the annual change of bank borrowing is lower for firms with no successor during the crisis and post-crisis periods, implying that banks reduce lending to these firms because of their high risk.     

Cancellation of Executive Stock Options: Tax and Accounting Income Considerations*

Canadian firms face a trade‐off between reporting higher accounting income and paying lower taxes that arises from their ability to cancel in‐the‐money executive stock options and making a substitute cash payment to the executive instead of issuing shares. Firms' trade‐off hypotheses are operationalized in a multilateral framework and empirically tested using insider‐trading data. The multilateral approach is designed to control for the incentive effects of alternative compensation schemes and to determine the cancellation payment that keeps the executive indifferent between receiving cash or shares. The results show that firms consider both taxes and financial reporting costs in determining their option cancellation behavior.     

Corporate In‐house Tax Departments*

In‐house human capital tax investment is a significant input to a firm's tax decisions. Yet, due to the lack of data on corporate in‐house tax departments, there is little empirical evidence on how tax departments are associated with tax planning and compliance outcomes. We expect the size of tax departments to be positively associated with the effectiveness of tax planning and compliance. Using hand‐collected data on the number of corporate tax employees in S&P 1500 firms over the 2009–2014 period, we find that firms with larger tax departments are associated with lower and less volatile cash effective tax rates. Furthermore, using tax employees' specialization, we identify tax departments' relative focus on planning or compliance and document a trade‐off between tax avoidance and tax risk. Specifically, tax departments with more of a tax planning focus have incrementally greater tax avoidance but higher tax risk, whereas tax departments with more of a tax compliance focus have incrementally lower tax risk but higher tax rates. Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by looking inside the “black box” of corporate tax departments and shedding light on the importance of human capital tax investment for tax outcomes.     

Is Tax Avoidance Associated with Economically Significant Rent Extraction among U.S. Firms?

Two influential papers in the tax‐avoidance literature (Desai and Dharmapala 2006 ; Desai, Dyck, and Zingales 2007 ) argue that aggressive forms of tax avoidance employ technologies that complement managerial rent extraction, and provide supporting evidence from firms in Russia. Several papers rely on this theory to motivate and interpret tests in a U.S. setting, but these tests are open to multiple interpretations. This paper investigates the extent to which shareholders of U.S. companies are affected by any such rent extraction. The evidence is inconsistent with the tax‐avoidance technologies employed by U.S. firms allowing managers to extract sufficient rents to negatively affect future performance. Additional tests on poorly governed U.S. firms find no evidence that tax‐avoidance activities relate positively to either overinvestment or higher executive compensation, and no evidence that either complexity or the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act moderates the relation between future performance and tax avoidance. The evidence suggests that caution is warranted in interpreting evidence according to this theory in a U.S. setting.     

Ex Ante Severance Agreements and Earnings Management

This research studies whether severance agreements may reduce fraudulent earnings management, and whether severance pay mitigates executives’ career concerns. In a sample of large U.S. firms, those with higher severance pay are less likely to be subject to accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs) by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Among S&P 500 firms in the post‐SOX period with premanaged earnings below analyst forecasts, firms with higher severance pay are less likely to meet/beat the analyst forecast using abnormal accruals. Overall, these results suggest that fear of losing a lucrative severance package, and/or the insurance offered by such a package curbs earnings management.     

Corporate hierarchy, promotion, and firm growth: Japanese internal labor market in transition

This paper investigates the incentive systems and the hierarchical design of the Japanese firms as integral parts of employment structure. Using the survey cross-section data on job ranks and wages, we analyze the promotion policy and compensations system as the key incentive mechanism in these firms with highly developed internal labor markets. We find that the incentive as well as hierarchical structures of the large Japanese firms are highly sensitive to the longrun growth rates of these firms. This finding is supported by a prediction of a model of internal promotions developed in the paper. We also find that the span of control, incentive effects of promotion, and wage-age profile at each job rank are all increasing in the longrun growth rates of these firms. These findings are jointly consistent with and in support of the hypothesis that the expected gains from the promotion is the key incentive in inducing efforts of the employees.     

地区营商环境对企业出口贸易的影响

文章利用世界银行于2013年公布的中国制造业企业问卷调查数据,实证检验地区营商环境对企业出口贸易的影响。研究发现,营商环境体系中的关贸监管效率、行政审批效率、基础设施条件、融资便利程度、高素质劳动力等因素显著阻碍了企业出口强度的提升,这几个方面应当成为政府部门改善营商环境的政策着力点。不同类型企业对营商环境的诉求存在显著差异,大型企业的出口贸易对营商环境各项指标的质量都更加敏感,高生产率企业的出口贸易则更易受到低质量税制环境和高素质劳动力短缺的制约。东部发达地区的企业出口贸易受要素市场条件的约束相对更多,而中西部欠发达地区的企业出口贸易受贸易便利条件的约束更为突出。     

Summary: Why is reforming state owned enterprises so difficult?

There are two schools of thought on the reform of Chinese state enterprises that argue either that nothing can be done about their reform or that nothing needs to be done. The former argues that bureaucratic resistance will torpedo reform. The latter argues that state enterprises will disappear naturally as collective and private small firms out-compete them. Neither view is very realistic in the Chinese case. Ultimately China will have to successfully reform state-owned enterprises in order to achieve continued high growth. Reforming these enterprises is difficult, however, because so many different and interrelated changes must be made. For the external environment of state enterprises, there must be fundamental changes in financial markets, the tax system, the legal, regulatory and accounting framework, and the worker welfare system. Internal to the enterprise there must be the creation of some kind of property rights plus a revamping of the internal incentive structure of the enterprise.     

Financing minority economic development

Conclusions A close analysis of the capital-asset pricing model’s assumptions and implications for efficient allocation of resources to investment in capital assets can form the basis for changes in the way capital markets are regulated by the federal government and in taxing policy of the government. In particular, our analysis indicates that the value of currently marketed assets can be increased by the inclusion in portfolios of currently nonmarketed assets.Moreover, the value of nonmarketed assets emerges as a significant instrumental variable for policy makers.The government can increase the value of all currently marketed assets by increasing positive changes in the value of nonmarketed assets.This might be accomplished by requiring by legislation or rule, for example, that a certain proportion of the listed securities on any exchange be comprised of the securities of black firms and other firms whose securities are not now marketed.The government might want, by tax incentive, to promote investment in firms with nonmarketed assets.It might want to increase the funding level of institutions such as MESBIC’S supplying equality finance to small black firms.     

纳税信用评级制度与企业创新——“赏善”比“罚恶”更有效？

前期研究证实纳税稽查、反避税等强制性税收征管可以规范企业纳税行为,对企业产生"约束效应",而不同于以往的强制性税收征管,纳税信用评级制度具有一定的激励性。由此,文章以2014年颁布实施的纳税信用评级制度刻画了激励性税收征管,基于这一新的视角,分析了激励性税收征管对企业创新投资的影响。利用2010-2017年沪深A股上市企业研发支出数据,文章采用PSM-DID模型估计了激励性税收征管对企业创新投资影响的"净效应"。结果表明,纳税信用评级制度实施后,纳税信用等级为A的企业,其创新投资显著增加,且这一效应在媒体关注程度低的企业、非国有企业及高新技术企业中更加明显。进一步的作用机制检验发现,激励性税收征管一方面通过增加信贷融资规模进而对企业的创新投资产生积极作用,另一方面通过增加市场关注压力进而对企业的创新投资带来负面影响,但由于积极作用要远大于负面影响,从而激励性税收征管表现出对企业创新投资的"激励效应"。