Bank liquidity creation,monetary policy,and financial crises

This paper examines the interplay among bank liquidity creation (which incorporates all bank on- and off-balance sheet activities), monetary policy, and financial crises. We find that: (1) high liquidity creation (relative to trend) – particularly off-balance sheet liquidity creation – helps predict crises, controlling for other factors; (2) monetary policy has statistically significant, but economically minor effects on liquidity creation by small banks during normal times, and these effects are even weaker during financial crises; (3) monetary policy has very little effects on medium and large bank liquidity creation during both normal times and crises. These findings suggest that authorities may wish to monitor bank liquidity creation closely in order to predict and perhaps lessen the likelihood of financial crises. They might also consider other tools to control bank liquidity creation, such as capital and liquidity requirements.     

Managing price and financial stability objectives in inflation targeting economies in Asia and the Pacific

Many central banks have adopted explicit objectives for financial stability, raising the possibility of trade-offs between price and financial stability objectives. Based on structural vector autoregressions that incorporate both monetary and macroprudential policy shocks for four inflation targeting economies in Asia and the Pacific, we analyse the role of each policy shock in explaining deviations from the other policy’s objective, by applying historical decompositions. The macroprudential measures used in the study affect credit extended to the private sector. We find that there are periods when macroprudential policy shocks have contributed to pushing inflation away from the central bank’s inflation target and when monetary policy shocks have contributed to buoyant credit, suggesting that there have been short-term trade-offs between price and financial stability objectives. However, we also find periods when macroprudential policy shocks helped stabilise inflation and monetary policy shocks contributed to financial stability.     

Capital inflows,monetary policy,and financial imbalances

Ahead of the global financial crisis, financial imbalances built up across advanced economies as credit grew and was increasingly funded in wholesale financial markets. This paper investigates empirically three potential drivers of the build-up of these financial imbalances: rising global imbalances (capital flows); loose monetary policy; and inadequate supervision and regulation. We perform panel data regressions for OECD countries from 1999 to 2007 to explore the relative importance of these factors. We find that differences in the build-up of wholesale-funded credit were driven by the strength of capital inflows. Moreover, we document an interaction effect, whereby the effect of inflows on the build-up was amplified where the supervisory and regulatory environment was relatively weak. In contrast, differences in monetary policy did not significantly affect differences across countries in the build-up of these financial imbalances ahead of the crisis.     

The impact of monetary policy announcements on the stock price of large European banks during the financial crisis

Since 2007, the European Central Bank responded decisively to the challenges posed by the global financial crisis, reducing key policy interest rates to unprecedented low levels and intervening with non-standard policy measures (i.e., monetary easing and liquidity provision). This paper aims to assess the impact of ECB monetary policy announcements on the stock price of large European banks. As a first step, an event study is conducted in order to measure cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcements over June 2007–June 2013; the second step is a regression analysis aimed at identifying the determinants of CARs. Results show that banks were more sensitive to non-conventional measures than to interest rate decisions, and that the same type of intervention may have a different impact depending on the stage of the crisis. In addition, banks with weaker balance sheets and operating with high-risk were more sensitive to monetary policy interventions.     

Reputation,risk-taking,and macroprudential policy

This paper examines the role of macroprudential capital requirements in preventing inefficient credit booms in a model with reputational externalities. In our model, unprofitable banks have strong incentives to invest in risky assets when macroeconomic fundamentals are good in order to avoid the stigma of being assessed as low ability by the market. We show that across-the-system countercyclical capital requirements that deter such gambling are constrained optimal when fundamentals are neither extremely weak nor extremely strong.     

Monetary and financial stability: Here to stay?

We argue that changes in the monetary and financial regimes over the last twenty years or so have been subtly altering the dynamics of the economy and hence the challenges that monetary and prudential authorities face. In particular, the current environment may be more vulnerable to the occasional build up of financial imbalances, i.e. over-extensions in (private sector) balance sheets, which herald economic weakness and unwelcome disinflation down the road, as they unwind. As a result, achieving simultaneous monetary and financial stability in a lasting way may call for refinements to current monetary and prudential policy frameworks. These refinements would entail a firmer long-term focus, greater symmetry in policy responses between upswings and downswings, with greater attention to actions during upswings, and closer coordination between monetary and prudential authorities.     

Pursuing financial stability under an inflation-targeting regime

We evaluate two main views on pursuing financial stability within a flexible inflation-targeting regime. It appears that potential gains from an activist or precautionary approach to promoting financial stability are highly shock dependent. We find support for the conventional view that concern for financial stability generally warrants a longer target horizon for inflation. The preferred target horizon depends on the financial stability indicator and the shock. An extension of the target horizon favoring financial stability may contribute to relatively higher variation in inflation and output.      

The impact of Basel III on financial (in)stability: an agent-based credit network approach

The Basel III accord reacts to the events of the recent financial crisis with a combination of revised micro- and new macroprudential regulatory instruments to address various dimensions of systemic risk. This approach of cumulating requirements bears the risk of individual measures negating or even conflicting with each other which might lessen their desired effects on financial stability. We provide an analysis of the impact of Basel III’s main components on financial stability in a stock-flow consistent agent-based computational economic model. We find that the positive joint impact of the microprudential instruments is considerably larger than the sum of the individual contributions to stability, i.e. the standalone impacts are non-additive. However, except for the buffers, the macroprudential overlay’s impact is either marginal or even destabilizing. Despite its simplicity, the leverage ratio performs poorly, especially when associated drawbacks are explicitly taken into account. Surcharges on SIBs seem to rather contribute to financial regulations complexity than to the resilience of the system.     

The application of visual analytics to financial stability monitoring

This paper provides an overview of visual analytics—the science of analytical reasoning enhanced by interactive visualizations tightly coupled with data analytics software—and discusses its potential benefits in monitoring systemic financial stability. The core strength of visual analytics is to combine visualization's high-bandwidth information channel to the human analyst with the flexibility and power of rapid-iteration analytics. This combination is especially valuable in the context of macroprudential supervision, which is increasingly dominated by large volumes of dynamic and heterogeneous data. Our contribution is to describe and categorize the analytical challenges faced by macroprudential supervisors, and to indicate where and how visual analytics can increase supervisors’ comprehension of the data stream, helping to transform it into actionable knowledge to support informed decision- and policy-making. The paper concludes with suggestions for a research agenda.     

House prices, consumption, and monetary policy: a financial accelerator approach

We consider a general equilibrium model with frictions in credit markets used by households. In our economy, houses provide housing services to consumers and serve as collateral to lower borrowing cost. We show that this amplifies and propagates the effect of monetary policy shocks on housing investment, house prices and consumption. We also consider the effect of a structural change in credit markets that lowers the transaction costs of additional borrowing against housing equity. We show that such a change would increase the effect of monetary policy shocks on consumption, but would decrease the effect on house prices and housing investment.     

Incentives and financial crises: Microfounded macroprudential regulation

We provide a micro-based rationale for macroprudential capital regulation of financial intermediaries (banks) by developing a model in which bankers can privately undertake a costly effort and reduce the probability of adverse shocks to their asset holdings that force liquidation (deterioration risk). A decline in the fundamental risk of assets ameliorates funding conditions, boosting the banks’ ability to expand their balance sheets. In principle, a higher continuation value would improve incentives to put effort. However, the rise in asset demand and prices also increases the payoff in liquidation, eventually reducing the equilibrium optimal effort. Poor incentives impose socially inefficient liquidation and can be corrected through a regulatory capital requirement. We show that the requirement should be high when fundamental risk is low. Therefore, the model suggests a theoretical foundation for macroprudential regulation and the countercyclical capital buffer of Basel III.     

Monetary policy and financial (in)stability: An integrated micro–macro approach

Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.     

货币政策十大理论问题辨析

采取对比分析的研究方法,讨论了当前流行的有关货币政策10大理论问题,得出了有别于传统观点的新的结论:货币政策不等同于金融政策;存款准备金政策的真正价值不在于"存在"而在于"实际应用";货币政策与金融监管之间不是平行关系而是主从关系;货币政策4大目标之间不是并存关系而是继起关系等.在此基础上,结合中国实际提出了充分发挥货币政策结构性调控功能、财政政策与货币政策的组合搭配应审时度势、灵活运用的对策思路.     

Risk premia,asset price bubbles,and monetary policy

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs to study the effects of monetary policy on prices, risk premia, asset price bubbles, and financial stability. We propose a new framework for monetary policy with respect to bubbles. Because bubble risk premia arise from an interaction between disagreements among investors and dynamic trading constraints, under a non-accommodative monetary policy, liquidity adjusted risk and bubble risk premia increase. What matters for policy is the trading constrained fraction/mass of agents that disagree about fundamentals (i.e. optimists/pessimists). Accommodative policy can lead to a larger fraction of trading constrained agents that disagree, larger bubbles, and increased systemic risk. An implication of our results is that accommodative monetary policy in response to the Covid-19 crisis does not increase systemic risk due to asset price bubbles, as long as the policy keeps inflation under control.     

Monetary and financial stability in the euro area: Pro-cyclicality versus trade-off

This paper investigates the nexus between monetary stability and financial stability. We examine, in the experience of EMU between 1994 and 2008, first, the response of the term structure of interest rates, share prices, exchange rates, property price inflation and the deposit–loan ratio of the banking sector (our proxies for financial stability) to changes in the consumer price level and ECB policy rate (our proxies for monetary stability); second, whether and to what extent lower inflation has caused share price stability and how ECB policy rate has reacted to inflation. Using a sign-restriction-based VAR approach, we find that there is a pro-cyclical relationship between monetary and financial stability in the long-run. With a positive inflation shock, we find on average a 2% estimated decline in share prices. This suggests that the interest rate instrument used for inflation targeting is conducive to financial stability.     

Growth-at-risk and macroprudential policy design

This paper explores the foundations for the application of the empirical growth-at-risk (GaR) approach to the assessment and design of macroprudential policies. It starts considering a stylized benchmark linear specification of the empirical GaR approach in combination with a linear–quadratic social welfare criterion that rewards expected GDP growth and penalizes the gap between expected GDP growth and GaR. If the growth rate follows a normal distribution, this welfare criterion can be microfounded as consistent with expected utility maximization under preferences for GDP levels exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion. The benchmark formulation implies an optimal policy rule linear in the risk indicator and an optimal gap between expected growth and GaR that does not depend on the time-varying risk indicator and is inversely related to the cost-effectiveness of macroprudential policy and the risk preference parameter. Extensions of the benchmark formulation show the potential to adapt the analysis and its insights to the richer specifications typically considered in empirical work.     

Benchmarking macroprudential policies: An initial assessment

In recognition of the severe consequences of the recent international financial crisis, the topic of macroprudential policy has elicited considerable research effort. The present study constructs, for 46 economies around the globe, an index of the capacity to deploy macroprudential policies. Building on elements that have been the subject of recent research, we develop an index that aims to represent the essence of what constitutes a macroprudential regime. Specifically, the index quantifies: (1) how existing macroprudential frameworks are organized; and (2) how far a particular jurisdiction is from reaching the goals established by the Group of Twenty (G20) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The latter is a benchmark that has not been considered in the burgeoning literature that seeks to quantify the role of macroprudential policies.     

Banking deregulation,macroeconomic dynamics and monetary policy

We assess the effects of increased bank competition on macroeconomic and lending dynamics and on the transmission of monetary policy. Applying panel local projections to state-level data, we, in a first step, investigate the dynamic effects of fiercer bank competition induced by deregulation allowing geographical expansion of banks across state borders in the 1980s and early-1990s. We allow for possible adjustments before the new laws became effective due to potential anticipation effects. Our findings suggest that these events were anticipated and that they temporarily increased economic activity as well as business and consumer lending. We also find a permanent increase in real estate lending and house prices. In a second step, we show that the impact of monetary policy on economic activity, house prices and lending tended to become stronger after interstate banking deregulation.     

The optimal monetary instrument for prudential purposes

The purpose of this paper is to assess the choice between adopting a monetary base or an interest rate setting instrument to maintain financial stability. Our results suggest that the interest rate instrument is preferable, since during times of a panic or financial crisis the Central Bank automatically satisfies the increased demand for money. Thus, it prevents sharp losses in asset values and enhanced asset volatility.     

Monetary policy and financial stability in a banking economy: Transmission mechanism and policy tradeoffs

The 2008 global financial crisis demonstrated that monetary policy and financial stability policy are more highly interrelated than previously thought. This paper analyzes the interactions between these policies using a non-linear overlapping-generations model with financial frictions in the form of banking financial intermediation. The paper embeds negative externalities due to contagion effects in physical investments which creates the need for financial stability policy. We show how the monetary policy transmission mechanism depends on financial stability policy tools as well as on regulatory and institutional constraints.We find policy tradeoffs in trying to accomplish both monetary and financial stability targets. The central bank must take these tradeoffs into account when selecting the tools in its policy toolbox. Another important finding is the interchangeability of price stability and financial stability policy tools.