Relationship-based debt financing of Chinese private sector firms: The role of social connections to banks versus political connections

We study whether a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it obtain loans. In China, Regulation No. 18 (announced in 2013) prohibits all high-level government officials from being independent directors of firms. As a result, many firms lost their political connections. We find that after firms lose their politically connected independent directors, firms having no social connections to banks experience, on average, a 12% decrease in the bank loan ratio relative to the median ratio; but those whose board chairs or CEOs are socially connected to local bank branch heads experience a 22% increase in the loan ratio relative to the median. However, this positive effect is short lived and thus not a new equilibrium. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it get bank financing.     

Star CEOs or Political Connections? Evidence from China's Publicly Traded Firms

This paper studies China's “star CEOs” defined as members of the National People's Congress (NPC) or the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and “politically connected” CEOs who have previous government or military experience. We evaluate the effect of “star CEOs” and “politically connected” CEOs on firm performance and CEO compensation. We find that announcement date returns, CEO compensation and incentives are all higher in firms that appoint “star CEOs”. However, the mechanism explaining these various premiums is largely political connectedness of these star CEOs. Our study finds only modest evidence that star‐CEO status directly determines firm performance. Our analysis strongly suggests that compensation and performance premiums are mostly driven by CEO political connections, as opposed to CEO talent/star effects.     

Aggressive CEOs and bank mergers and acquisitions

The U.S. banking industry has seen waves of mergers since the 1980s. Despite a significant body of research on the determinants of these waves, there are few studies of how CEOs influence banks’ mergers and acquisitions (M&As). This paper studies the effect of CEO aggressiveness on bank M&As. We construct a new measure of bank CEO aggressiveness based on CEOs’ ancestral countries of origin and data on inter-country wars. We find that aggressive CEOs are more likely to acquire other banks. Moreover, the impact of CEO aggressiveness on bank M&A decisions is more pronounced when the CEOs are from larger and more profitable banks, when CEOs have a longer tenure, and when CEOs’ ancestral country of origin has a more masculine culture. Moreover, we show that aggressive CEOs are more likely to make acquisitions when CEOs possess more cultural maintenance, which captures the extent to which CEOs retain their original cultural values and beliefs. Finally, we document positive short-term stock market reactions to bank M&As initiated by aggressive CEOs.     

Measuring systemic risk: A risk management approach

This paper proposes a new method to measure and monitor the risk in a banking system. Standard tools that regulators require banks to use for their internal risk management are applied at the level of the banking system to measure the risk of a regulator’s portfolio. Using a sample of international banks from 1988 until 2002, I estimate the dynamics and correlations between bank asset portfolios. To obtain measures for the risk of a regulator’s portfolio, I model the individual liabilities that the regulator has to each bank as contingent claims on the bank’s assets. The portfolio aspect of the regulator’s liability is explicitly considered and the methodology allows a comparison of sub-samples from different countries. Correlations, bank asset volatility, and bank capitalization increase for North American and somewhat for European banks, while Japanese banks face deteriorating capital levels. In the sample period, the North American banking system gains stability while the Japanese banking sector becomes more fragile. The expected future liability of the regulator varies substantially over time and is especially high during the Asian crisis starting in 1997. Further analysis shows that the Japanese banks contribute most to the volatility of the regulator’s liability at that time. Larger and more profitable banks have lower systemic risk and additional equity capital reduces systemic risk only for banks that are constrained by regulatory capital requirements.     

Do different forms of government ownership matter for bank capital behavior? Evidence from China

This study attempts to reconcile the conflicting theoretical predictions regarding how government ownership affects bank capital behaviour. Using a unique Chinese bank dataset over 2006–2015 we find that government-owned banks have higher target capital ratios and adjust these ratios faster compared to private banks, supporting the ‘development/political’ view of the government’s role in banking. This effect is stronger for local government-owned and state enterprise-owned banks than for central government-owned banks. We also find that undercapitalized government-owned banks increase equity while undercapitalized foreign banks contract assets and liabilities as their respective main strategy to adjust their capital ratios.     

Inside debt and shadow banking

This study examines the effect of inside debt arising from CEO compensation deferral policies on shadow banking. We construct a parsimonious model that shows that increased bank inside debt leads to increased shadow banking. Using a CEO compensation deferral policy imposed on the Chinese banking industry in 2010, we empirically test our theoretical prediction on the effect of inside debt on shadow banking proxied by non-principal-guaranteed wealth management products. We find that banks that adopt the CEO compensation deferral policy exhibit higher levels of shadow banking than their counterparts and that this result is not contingent on bank size or the extent of government control. Moreover, the effect of inside debt on shadow banking is stronger in banks with higher loan-to-deposit and non-performing-loan ratios and in banks with CEO turnover, suggesting that the compensation deferral policy induces CEOs, especially newly appointed CEOs, to do more shadow banking to circumvent regulations regarding the balance-sheet risk and to boost performance.     

Bank pay caps,bank risk,and macroprudential regulation

This paper studies the consequences of a regulatory pay cap in proportion to assets on bank risk, bank value, and bank asset allocations. The cap is shown to lower banks’ risk and raise banks’ values by acting against a competitive externality in the labour market. The risk reduction is achieved without the possibility of reduced lending from a Tier 1 increase. The cap encourages diversification and reduces the need a bank has to focus on a limited number of asset classes. The cap can be used for Macroprudential Regulation to encourage banks to move resources away from wholesale banking to the retail banking sector. Such an intervention would be targeted: in 2009 a 20% reduction in remuneration would have been equivalent to more than 150 basis points of extra Tier 1 for UBS, for example.     

What determines the profitability of banks? Evidence from Spain

This paper empirically analyses the factors that determine the profitability of Spanish banks for the period of 1999–2009. We conclude that the high bank profitability during these years is associated with a large percentage of loans in total assets, a high proportion of customer deposits, good efficiency and a low doubtful assets ratio. In addition, higher capital ratios also increase the bank’s return, but only when return on assets (ROA) is used as the profitability measure. We find no evidence of either economies or diseconomies of scale or scope in the Spanish banking sector. Finally, our study reveals differences in the performance of commercial and savings banks.     

Politically connected CEOs,corporate governance,and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms

Almost 27% of the CEOs in a sample of 790 newly partially privatized firms in China are former or current government bureaucrats. Firms with politically connected CEOs underperform those without politically connected CEOs by almost 18% based on three-year post-IPO stock returns and have poorer three-year post-IPO earnings growth, sales growth, and change in returns on sales. The negative effect of the CEO's political ties also show up in the first-day stock return. Finally, firms led by politically connected CEOs are more likely to appoint other bureaucrats to the board of directors rather than directors with relevant professional backgrounds.     

Euro area banking and monetary policy shocks in the QE era

This paper assesses the effects of monetary policy shocks on the macroeconomy and the euro area banking sector after the global financial crisis. First, financial risk-return indicators of the banking sector based on a compound option-based structural credit risk model are embedded in a large macro-financial quarterly database covering the period 2008Q4–2019Q4. Second, a SFAVAR identifies and estimates the shocks’ responses relating them to the endogenous build-up of banks’ vulnerabilities which are consistent with the internally coherent structure of the credit risk model. By introducing structure in the understanding of banks’ asset-liability management behavior following monetary policy shocks, the research strategy contributes to disentangling results that are often mixed in the empirical literature. The study finds that unconventional monetary policy, in particular the Asset Purchase Program of the European Central Bank, seems to have been more successful than conventional monetary policy in raising output and inflation. The desired boost to bank lending has been muted and loan cyclicality has varied across countries and loan types. The performance of the banking sector following monetary policy shocks can be characterized by a drop in expected return on equity and assets, a relaxation of lending conditions and increased correlation between banks’ assets return and the market return, a mechanism pointing to enhanced risk-taking. While banks’ probabilities of default fall following monetary policy shocks, the price of risk increases. Banks’ net worth rises via higher market capitalization and implied assets value together with lower volatility, despite often incurring more debt. Risk-taking in the banking sector may pose a risk to financial stability, especially if its effects on banks’ vulnerability spread and increase systemic risk. The unintended endogenous build-up of macro-financial vulnerabilities may need to become part of monetary policymaking.     

我国商业银行经营投资银行业务对风险影响的实证研究

本文以2009-2018年19家商业银行为研究对象,运用波动性分析、相关性分析及面板数据回归分析方法,考察了经营投资银行业务对银行风险的影响。研究结果表明,投资银行收入无明显周期性趋势,波动性明显高于利息净收入,经营投资银行业务会加剧银行业收入的不确定性,但由于收入占比较小,投资银行业务并非造成我国银行业收入波动的主要因素。多数银行的投资银行收入与利息净收入表现为正相关性,银行难以通过经营投资银行业务实现风险分散目的。投资银行业务对银行风险影响的回归结果较为显著,随着投资银行收入在银行收入结构中的权重越来越大,银行多元化收入程度随之加深,银行风险也随之下降。     

Does political pressure matter in bank lending? Evidence from China

Using provincial data from China between 2002 and 2011, we find substantial evidence indicating a positive association between the growth of bank loans issued by commercial banks and the political pressures faced by provincial leaders. This association is particularly true for state‐owned banks, which are much more politically pressurized than others, but is relatively attenuated in provinces with a more developed banking sector. We also find that bank loans issued under greater political pressures are less commercially oriented and have lower quality. Our findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity analyses and alternative measures of political pressure. Overall, our study contribute to a growing literature emphasizing the role of the political incentives of government officials in fuelling economic growth through credit allocation.     

Funding liquidity and bank risk taking

This study examines the relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk taking. Using quarterly data for U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2014, we find evidence that banks having lower funding liquidity risk as proxied by higher deposit ratios, take more risk. A reduction in banks’ funding liquidity risk increases bank risk as evidenced by higher risk-weighted assets, greater liquidity creation and lower Z-scores. However, our results show that bank size and capital buffers usually limit banks from taking more risk when they have lower funding liquidity risk. Moreover, during the Global Financial Crisis banks with lower funding liquidity risk took less risk. The findings of this study have implications for bank regulators advocating greater liquidity and capital requirements for banks under Basel III.     

Small Business and the Value of Community Financial Institutions

This paper examines whether community banks have a niche in the production of soft information when lending to small firms. A composite measure of soft information production is created from owner ratings of bank performance characteristics using survey data from a national sample of U.S. small firms. These characteristics capture some important aspects of soft information such as the bank’s knowledge of the owner’s business. This composite measure is related to the size of the owner’s primary bank, a measure of the intensity of market competition and proxies for the strength of banking relationships. After controlling for several sources of endogeneity, this composite measure is found to be significantly higher if the owner currently banks at a CFI and experiences less loan officer turnover.     

The economics of bank privatization

This paper surveys the empirical literature examining bank privatization. We begin by documenting the extent of, theoretical rationale for, and measured performance of state-owned banks around the world, and then assess why many governments have chosen to privatize their often very large state-owned banking sectors. The empirical evidence clearly shows that state-owned banks are less efficient than privately owned banks, and that state domination of banking imposes increasingly severe penalties on those countries with the largest state banking sectors. On the other hand, there is little in the empirical record to suggest that privatization alone transforms the efficiency of divested banks, especially when these are only partially privatized. Privatization generally improves performance, but by far less than is typically observed in studies of non-financial industries. An increasingly common outcome of large-scale bank privatization programs is foreign ownership of many nations’ banking sector, which evidence suggests is usually positive in an economic sense, but problematic politically.     

What's in an education? Implications of CEO education for bank performance

Exploiting a unique hand-built dataset, this paper finds that CEO educational attainment, both level and quality, matters for bank performance. We offer robust evidence that banks led by CEOs with MBAs outperform their peers. Such CEOs improve performance when compensation structures are geared towards greater risk-taking incentives, and when banks follow riskier or more innovative business models. Our findings suggest that management education delivers skills enabling CEOs to manage increasingly larger and complex banking firms and achieve successful performance outcomes.     

改进的效率测算模型、影子银行与中国商业银行效率

商业银行及其效率的高低是金融供给侧结构性改革的关键环节,而可以压缩的“坏”投入和影子银行对商业银行效率产生重要影响。本文首次建立理论模型并分析影子银行影响商业银行效率的路径;方法上,同时区分投入和产出的“好”或“坏”,拓展只区分产出的“好”或“坏”的效率测算模型;实证上,首次测算并分析“坏”投入、影子银行业务对商业银行利润、风险和效率的影响。结果表明:理论上,影子银行会同时增加风险承担和利润,但无法确定经风险调整后的利润增加能否提升效率;只区分产出的模型高估了效率,尤其是显著高估四大行和股份制商业银行第一阶段的效率,大型商业银行依靠网点的扩张不利于效率的提升;影子银行业务提升了四大国有银行尤其是股份制银行的效率,但对中小型商业银行效率影响较小。总的来看,压缩“坏”投入和规范影子银行是增加有效金融供给、优化金融供给结构和提升银行效率的重要途径。     

Bank CEO materialism: Risk controls,culture and tail risk

We investigate how the prevalence of materialistic bank CEOs has evolved over time, and how risk management policies, non-CEO executives’ behavior and tail risk vary with CEO materialism. We document that the proportion of banks run by materialistic CEOs increased significantly from 1994 to 2004, that the strength of risk management functions is significantly lower for banks with materialistic CEOs, and that non-CEO executives in banks with materialistic CEOs insider trade more aggressively around government intervention during the financial crisis. Finally, we find that banks with materialistic CEOs have significantly more downside tail risk relative to banks with non-materialistic CEOs.     

Beyond Bank Competition and Profitability: Can Moral Hazard Tell Us More?

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between competition, profitability, and risk. The investigation uses bank-level panel data from 171 Chinese banks during 1993 to 2007. Throughout the whole sample, the empirical results divulge that increased bank concentration in China improves the profitability and the risk of its banks. These results support the structure-conduct-performance and the moral hazard hypotheses. In terms of persistence, both the profit and the risk of the banks rise significantly by showing the enhancement of profit and risk from one period to the next. When different types of banks are considered, joint-stock banks have the highest persistence in profit and risk, and therefore more stable profits. City banks support the moral hazard hypothesis. They have entrenched managers that tend to take on more risk when the bank’s charter value falls in a very competitive (less concentrated) environment. Further, deregulation which in 2003 China allowed foreign banks to formally enter China has a negative impact on the structure of China’s banking sector.     

Earnings baths by CEOs during turnovers: empirical evidence from German savings banks

Existing research documents that incoming CEOs in non-financial firms tend to take an “earnings bath”. They reduce their first year’s profits through discretionary expenses, blame the “bad outcome” on their predecessors, lower the performance benchmark, and save income for subsequent accounting periods. Identifying such an earnings bath for incoming CEOs in banks requires us to disentangle under-provisioning, which may have triggered the turnover event, and the earnings bath. For a sample of German savings banks over the period 1993–2012, we find that incoming CEOs increase discretionary expenses and that this increase is stronger for incoming CEOs from outside the bank than for insiders. We further show that CEOs coming from outside increase discretionary expenses during their first year in charge even if the default risk of the bank is low and the stock of risk provisions relative to risk exposure is high. Therefore, we conclude that the effects are only partially driven by incoming CEOs who rectify discretionary expenses by insufficient existing risk provisions, and that big bath accounting plays an important role in explaining discretionary expenses during CEO turnovers.