The role of China's aid and ODI in the economic growth of African countries

Has external capital, such as foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI), been able to help the economic growth in host countries? Our paper examines the effects of China's aid and its overseas direct investment (ODI) on economic growth in 47 African countries from 2003 to 2013. We find that China's aid has significant positive effects on African economic growth. However, China's ODI plays no major role in African countries' economic growth. In addition, the relationship between aid and growth varies according to the different categories of aid, and its marginal contribution is nonlinear.     

Globalization of R&D and China: An Introduction

In this introduction, we discuss the recent changes in multinational corporations' (MNCs) research and development (R&D) strategies and China's rising role in this new development. Significant changes include: 1) More and more corporations have started overseas R & D operations; 2) the missions of many overseas R&D facilities have shifted from the traditional supplementing and supporting roles to become critical and strategic components of MNCs' global R&D networks; and 3) MNC overseas R&D operations have expanded their geographic reach to carefully selected developing countries. China has benefited from such changes and has become one major attraction for such R&D facilities due to its rich endowment of low-cost and well- trained scientists and engineers as well as its fast growing domestic market and burgeoning foreign investment in manufacturing. The explosion of foreign R&D investment has also been accompanied by the rapid growth of China's domestic investment in R&D. The growth in both domestic and foreign investment in R&D implies that China will improve its position in global economic and technological competition. However, it is unclear to the rest of the world about the implications of China's rising R&D and whether or not China can capture the value from the presence of foreign R&D centres. We conclude that issues related to China's science and technology development in general and foreign R&D in China in particular warrant more research in the future.     

Belt and road initiative and Chinese firms' outward foreign direct investment

This paper studies the impact of China's “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) on Chinese firms' outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Overall, the BRI positively impacts on Chinese OFDI activities. However, both the direction and the magnitude of this impact depend on the host countries' willingness to participate in the BRI. The BRI promotes more OFDI to developing countries that welcome China's economic engagement and alters the effect of Chinese domestic push factors on its OFDI patterns. In addition, Chinese firms in construction and infrastructure, manufacturing, and trade-related sectors are more responsive to the BRI than firms in other sectors.     

The Growing Dominance of China in South Asia: An Indian Perspective

India's economic relations with its neighbors are important for the stable and peaceful development of the South Asian region and for its own security. In a globalized world, economic relations play a major role in deciding political relations and collaboration at multilateral fora. In the context of China's increasing trade and investment relations with India's neighboring countries, the present study examines where and how China has been improving its presence vis-à-vis India in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Further, the study also explores the factors of India's loss of market in its neighboring countries and suggests remedial measures.     

Japan's Growing Outward Direct Investment in East Asia

Japan's outward direct investment (ODI) began to show an obvious expansion since 2005, accompanied by a greater importance in East Asia and in the manufacturing sector. By analyzing the new wave of Japanese ODI, three points are elaborated in this article. First, the recent Japanese ODI did not result in the same industry to be passed from one country to another as elucidated in the flying geese model. Instead, Japan's ODI only promoted the regional divisional of labor in the transport equipment and electrical machinery industries. Second, this study advances the theory of vertical production network by exploring two regional production networks constructed by Japanese ODI, including one between China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong and the other between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Finally, since Japan's economy has been tightly connected with foreign demand via overseas production, this article argues that any sign of Japan's declining ODI will have serious impact to its domestic economic prosperity. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Impacts of tangible and intangible elements of Aid for Trade on the globalisation of developing countries

The Aid for Trade initiative was launched by the WTO in 2005 to help developing countries build their supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure to improve their capacity in the global market. This study investigates the impacts of both the tangible and intangible elements of this initiative on the economic, social and political globalisation of recipient countries. Intangible elements of Aid for Trade (aid for trade policy and regulation) may be considered as the software of Aid for Trade, while tangible elements (aid for economic infrastructure and building productive capacity) are the hardware. Countries that receive Aid for Trade can use both types of elements to succeed in globalisation. This research hypothesises that the tangible elements of Aid for Trade have a singular effect on the overall level of globalisation since they are expected to only increase the level of economic globalisation. Moreover, we expect that the intangible elements of Aid for Trade will have multiple effects on the overall level of globalisation as they have an impact on not only economic aspects but also social and political aspects of it. Using the dataset of Aid for Trade from 2002 to 2015, we find that the intangible elements of Aid for Trade have increased the recipients' level of overall globalisation.     

China's National Champions: The Evolution of a National Industrial Policy—Or a New Era of Economic Protectionism?

In this article we ask a series of related research questions concerning China's recent industrial policies, particularly the 10th and 11th five‐year economic policy plans. Our questions go to the nature of China's long‐term competitiveness of its national champions, and to what extent Chinese government policies are evolving to domestic protectionism that adversely affects foreign invested enterprises' (FIEs) competitive position in the Chinese economy. We thus evaluate the nature of the five‐year economic policy plans, their adverse impact on FIEs operating in China, and the rise of designated Chinese national champions (in the 11th five‐year economic policy plan) to compete with major FIEs on a global scale. However, we suggest that the role of the Chinese government's recent industrial policy, when compared to Michael Porter's “Diamond of National Competitive Advantage” recommended government policy approaches, may not augur well in the long‐term for China's national champions. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Rapid rise of China's semiconductor industry: What are the implications for Singapore?

Lately, there has been a rush of foreign investment commitments in China's semiconductor industry, giving rise to predictions of a semiconductor revolution in the world's most populous country. Pull factors include China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), which would clarify trading and investment rules, government incentives, and, of course, burgeoning domestic demand. For the moment, because of U.S. export restrictions, China's chip industry will be kept behind the technology curve by around five years. However, its ample supply of engineers and low labor costs will aid in the development of the assembly & test and design sectors, which are labor‐intensive. But given strong government commitment, the industry is likely to continue to progress upward, gaining from the diffusion of high‐tech know‐how through its alliances with multinational corporations and tier‐one foundries. In the industry's value chain, there is potential for Taiwan and China to complement each other in both domestic and global markets, across both high‐ and low‐end technology segments, and across the entire chain of activities. To meet the challenges, Singapore needs to further leverage on its competencies in infrastructure and logistics, as well as the well‐established ASEAN production network for greater economies of scale. For Singapore's semiconductor industry to remain competitive, there is a need to strengthen the full value chain, from integrated circuit (IC) design to wafer fabrication to packaging & test, by attracting and building up companies specializing in different competencies. Singapore semiconductor manufacturers should continuously strive to stay at the technology forefront and provide competitive customer services. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The role of home governments in entry bargaining of multinationals: China's investment in Central Asia's natural resource sector

Over the last two decades, China's participation in Central Asia's energy sector has increased dramatically. This article explores the case study of China's outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in Central Asia's natural resource sector through the framework of bargaining model. Although the scholarly literature studied extensively FDI determinants and support of the home government on MNE activities abroad, there is little evidence‐based research on the effect of governmental negotiations on OFDI. The existing research on China's OFDI in natural resource sector highlighted the country's complex approach to energy deals, which was facilitated by investment in infrastructure projects and provision of loans. As this study confirmed, support with loans and investment in the development of export pipeline infrastructure was crucial in securing energy deals for Chinese multinationals (CMNEs). More specifically, this article makes an important contribution toward the understanding of China's investment in developing markets with high levels of political risk such as Central Asian region. The presented evidence suggests that there is a positive correlation between home government support and successful entry of CMNEs to natural resource sectors in emerging markets.     

我国对外直接投资的区位选择——基于投资动机的视角

从对外直接投资动机的视角,采用54国2003-2006年的面板数据,在对样本国聚类的基础上考察了我国对外直接投资区位选择的影响因素。发现在控制了东道国治理基础和双边贸易量后,对我国直接投资而言,发达国家的区位优势在于较高的科技水平,而发展中国家则在于丰富的矿产能源禀赋或潜在的国内市场。同时,发达国家的市场对我国直接投资并不具有吸引力,而在对一些资源丰富的发展中国家进行投资时市场因素的作用也不明显。     

中国参与WTO贸易援助所面临的问题评析

贸易援助是官方发展援助的重要形式,中国在WTO贸易援助倡议的启动、后续工作及实际参与中起到了积极作用。中国国际经济地位的转变让其他国家产生更高的援助期待。发达国家对发展中国家提供的贸易援助是其应当承担的国际义务。"南南合作"是发展中国家之间的互助合作形式,其本质是基于平等理念的合作,是贸易援助的补充形式。中国在力所能及的条件下应当尽量与发展中国家开展"南南合作"并在此过程中提供适当援助。完善对外援助法律制度是顺利开展贸易援助、实现援助目的的保障。     

Geographic clustering and outward foreign direct investment

This study addresses an important neglected question: To what extent do geographic clusters promote outward foreign direct investment (ODI)? We find evidence that clusters do promote ODI and so support Porter's argument that advantages gained in clusters can be the foundations of successful internationalisation. Digging deeper, we find that certain cluster incumbents promote more ODI than others, with more experienced firms and firms with stronger resource bases accounting for more ODI. We also find that firms located in clusters within major global nodes/cities engage in more ODI. Finally, we find that both localisation and urbanisation economies promote ODI. However, the former, within-industry effects, are more important. Overall, this study echoes Dunning's call for more focus on the ‘L’ component of the ownership, location, internalisation (OLI) paradigm and particularly on the advantages that reside in clusters that make them not only attractive destinations for foreign direct investment (FDI) but also fertile environments from which FDI can spring.     

Rationale of internationalization of China's national oil companies: seeking natural resources,strategic assets or sectoral specialization?

The bulk of the existing literature emphasized that China's companies sought strategic assets (technology, brands and access to markets) through internationalization in order to overcome latecomers' comparative disadvantage, while some studies suggested that these firms went after natural resources to address China's rising oil imports. The third argument (which we coin the ‘sectoral strength’ hypothesis) suggested that the upstream firms in extractive business would seek natural resources, whereas downstream ones would seek strategic assets. In this study, we examine the rationale of main overseas investment deals (‘going out’) of China's two largest national oil companies during 2002–2010 which were also China's top two non-financial firms with the largest outward investment stocks during 2004–2010. We conclude that these deals can be best explained by the ‘sectoral specialisation’ hypothesis supplemented with a consideration for strategic assets.     

Intensive and extensive margins of exports: What can India learn from China?

We decompose India's export performance in manufactured products during 2000–15 into changes at the intensive and extensive margins. India's performance, along different margins, is compared and contrasted with that of China. The results show that while China outperforms India at both the margins, the gap is particularly wide at the intensive margin. Decomposition of intensive margin along quantity and price margins shows that Chinese products are generally sold cheaper than Indian products. Higher price margin, however, has not translated into high intensive margin for India due to its abysmally low quantity margin. We examine different explanations for China's superior performance relative to India, along different margins, using a gravity model. Our results suggest that China's exchange rate policy was not the prime reason for its export success. Neither do we find that FDI inflows were significant in explaining the export performance gap between them. The results show that China's export relationship bias towards high‐income partner countries holds the key in understanding its superior performance. This bias is a natural consequence of China's high degree of specialization in labor‐intensive activities. India, by contrast, due to an idiosyncratic pattern of specialisation, has failed to exploit its export potential in high income countries.     

Is China's Exchange Rate Policy a Form of Trade Protection?

This paper examines how China's heavily managed exchange rate contributes to its huge trade surplus with its major trading partners, most notably the United States. Based on the distinction between economies’ aggregate output and expenditure and on the premise that exchange rates are shared variables, it develops a straightforward framework that shows how exchange rate management by China's central bank affects China's fast growing output, expenditure, employment, and trade balance, while simultaneously influencing these aggregates in its slower growing industrialized trading partners. This framework reveals that under conditions of limited private capital mobility an inflexible yuan yields higher short-run output gains for China at trading partners’ expense through a form of “exchange rate protection.” At the same time exchange rate misalignment limits China's consumption and hence living standards. A misaligned currency is also shown to bias international saving and investment flows and is central to any explanation of global imbalances.     

The Gravity of China's African Export Promise

Africa's largest trade partner, China, criticised for exchanging resources for manufactures, has promised to increase imports and optimise the structure of trade with Africa. Using a gravity model of China's imports for the years 1995–2009, we explore potential dynamics for this promise, uniquely accounting for market economy recognition and Taiwan recognition. The former is associated with increased imports, while the latter effect is ambiguous and statistically insignificant. Comparison of projected against actual imports across three growth‐path‐aligned economic geography typologies – resource‐rich; landlocked and resource‐poor; coastal and resource‐poor – sets out China's imports trends in an abstract framework of African export potential. We find not only ‘under’ importing across a majority of resource‐poor countries. We also find that current trade policy is the least applicable to these comparatively poor exporters’ trade with China. If the latter are to serve a broader catalytic role in Africa's regional industrial transformation as compared to the role of coastal and resource‐poor countries in regional economic transformation in Asia and Latin America, China–Africa trade and investment policies may need additional thinking.     

税收饶让抵免对涉外投资影响效应的实证研究

为研究双边税收协定中饶让抵免条款对我国涉外投资的影响效应,运用2003~2010年37个国家的宏观面板数据,通过一个简单的实证分析模型分别检验了外国予以我国的税收饶让对外国对华直接投资（FDI）的影响以及我国予以外国的税收饶让对我国对外直接投资（ODI）的影响。结果表明,税收饶让明显刺激了外国直接投资流量,但并未发现税收饶让对我国对外直接投资具有显著的促进作用。据此,建议在进行双边税收谈判与协定签订时,既要争取外国对我国的饶让抵免优惠,也要积极给予对外投资战略合作国家以税收饶让,从而充分利用国际税收协定,促进国内战略资本的优化布局,实现＂引进来＂与＂走出去＂的双向协调。     

The Rise of China and East Asian Export Performance: Is the Crowding‐Out Fear Warranted?

This paper examines how China's emergence as a major trading nation is affecting export performance of its East Asian neighbours. Following a stage‐setting overview of trends and patterns of China's export performance, it probes China competition in third country markets and emerging patterns of imports. The East Asian export experience is examined in a wider global context against the backdrop of the ongoing process of global production sharing. The findings indicate that the ‘China threat’ has been vastly exaggerated in the contemporary policy debate. China's rapid market penetration in traditional labour‐intensive manufactured goods has occurred mostly at the expense of the high‐wage East Asian countries, without crowding‐out the export opportunities of low‐wage countries in the region. More importantly, China's rapid integration into global production networks as a major assembly centre has created new opportunities for the other East Asian countries to engage in various segments of the value chain in line with their comparative advantage.     

Is fiscal revenue concentration ratio in China too high?

This paper challenges the viewpoint that fiscal revenue concentration ratio in China is too high. First, this paper estimates China's nominal and real fiscal revenue concentration ratios at both budgetary and full‐calibre levels, and makes an international comparison using all available data of the IMF's GFS database for both developed and developing countries, revealing five stylised facts that expresses serious doubts about the statement that fiscal revenue concentration ratio in China is too high. Second, the paper proposes four indicators to measure asymmetric degree of China's central fiscal revenue concentration ratio and expenditure concentration ratio to identify whether fiscal revenue concentration ratio in China is too high. The results show that: (i) central fiscal revenue concentration ratio is lower and (ii) compared with asymmetric degree of China's central budgetary fiscal revenue concentration ratio and expenditure concentration ratio, asymmetric degree of China's central full‐calibre fiscal revenue concentration ratio and expenditure concentration ratio is more serious, indicating that the central full‐calibre revenue concentration ratio is much lower. Therefore, this paper not only disproves the view that China's fiscal revenue concentration ratio is too high, but also shows that China's fiscal revenue concentration ratio, especially at a full‐calibre level, is much lower. Further international comparison shows that asymmetric degree of China's central fiscal revenue concentration ratio and expenditure concentration ratio is ranked third in the world, and Chinese central government has the lowest ability to undertake full‐calibre fiscal expenditure among the world's countries. Finally, following the State Council's guidance on properly increasing central authority, the paper argues that it is necessary for the central government to improve central fiscal revenue concentration ratio, especially at the full‐calibre level.     

Investigating China's Disaggregated Processed Exports: Evidence that Both the RMB and Exchange Rates in Supply Chain Countries Matter

China's trade surplus is entirely in processing trade. Processed exports are final goods produced using parts and components coming from supply chain countries. Many claim that because much of the value added of China's processed exports comes from other countries, the renminbi should not affect China's processed exports. To investigate these issues, this paper disaggregates processed exports into their two main categories, processing with imported materials (PWIM) exports and processing and assembly (PAA) exports. For PWIM exports, much of the value added comes from China while for PAA exports most of the value added comes from supply chain countries. DOLS results indicate that exchange rates in supply chain countries affect both types of exports and that the renminbi significantly affects PWIM exports, but not PAA exports. These results indicate that both the renminbi and exchange rates in supply chain countries matter for processed exports.