Who should rescue subsidiaries of multinational banks?

This paper asks whether a single resolution authority for multinational banks is desirable. Such an authority was recently established within the European Monetary Union, where the resolution power for large banks was transferred to a Single Resolution Board. To address this issue, we consider the risk incentives of a multinational bank in the presence of different resolution frameworks and determine the welfare-efficient structure which prevents banks from excessive risk-taking. We argue that a single resolution authority is not always welfare-efficient, because it is the heterogeneity of bank resolution power which induces multinational banks to behave prudently. In severe solvency crises, the multinational authority should have the resolution power, whereas in less severe crises national resolution authorities are more efficient in avoiding excessive risk-taking on the part of multinational banks.     

提升监管强度具有风险抑制效应吗?——来自中国银行业的经验证据

本文从事前、事中和事后监管的监管流程角度出发,运用我国71家商业银行 2003年至2013年的非平衡面板数据,实证检验了监管强度提升对商业银行风险承担行为的影响。研究表明,相较于事中现场审查而言,银行业监管部门事前发布监管公文和事后违规惩戒措施实施强度提升的风险抑制效应更为明显。监管强度提升的风险抑制效应对大银行和国有控股商业银行的作用普遍更强。但对于上市银行和非上市银行的影响则存在差异,其中,监管公文发布对上市银行风险承担的抑制效应要弱于非上市银行,而违规惩戒措施的效果与之相反,现场审查对上市、非上市银行的影响则不存在显著差异。     

Do capital buffers matter? Evidence from the stocks and flows of nonperforming loans

This paper investigates the determinants of the stocks and flows (both in- and outflows) of nonperforming loans (NPLs) by considering a bank-specific factor that is not adequately analysed in the literature, namely, bank capital buffers. Using unbalanced panel data with 6,087 bank-year observations for the 2006–2018 period and a two-step system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation, we find that banks with higher levels of capital buffers (both in terms of Tier 1 and total capital) have fewer NPL stocks and generate fewer NPL inflows. When we control for the characteristics of the loan portfolio, real guarantees collected by the bank increase the stocks and flows of new, impaired loans, while personal guarantees favour the outflow of bad loans.     

Do negative interest rates affect bank risk-taking?

We offer early evidence on the impact of negative interest rate policy (NIRP) on banks’ risk-taking. Our primary result shows banks in NIRP-adopter countries reduce holdings of risky assets by around 10 percentage points following implementation of NIRP in comparison to banks in non-adopter countries. We augment this result by identifying NIRP’s impact on other aspects of banks’ risk-taking behaviour; NIRP is associated with reductions in banks’ loan growth and average loan price (by 3.7 percentage points and 59 basis points) and a rebalancing of asset portfolios towards safer assets. Secondly, we find the NIRP-effect is heterogeneous; post-NIRP risk-taking increases at strongly capitalised banks and at banks operating in less competitive markets that exploit market power to insulate net interest margins and profitability. Our robust empirical evidence supports the “de-leverage” hypothesis which suggests that banks acquire safer, liquid assets to bolster their capital positions rather than searching for value by acquiring riskier assets. We base our evidence on a sample of 2,584 banks from 33 OECD countries across 2012 to 2016, and from models that employ a difference-in-differences framework.     

金融机构高管薪酬存在风险敏感性吗？——基于中国上市金融机构的经验证据

基于中国上市金融机构2008-2016年的非平衡面板数据,研究金融机构高管薪酬风险敏感性问题.结果表明:金融机构的风险承担与高管薪酬呈显著的正相关关系,意味着金融机构高管薪酬契约存在风险敏感性;相较于非国有金融机构,国有金融机构高管薪酬风险敏感性较低;以监事会人数、监事会会议次数、独立董事占比与第一大股东持股比例作为代理变量,管理层权力在一定程度上影响风险承担与高管薪酬之间的关系.     

How do IMF announcements affect financial markets in crises?: Evidence from forward exchange markets

We employ a theoretical model to interpret the liquidity and moral hazard effects of IMF support during a financial crisis. We then estimate the response of forward exchange markets to IMF-related announcements, using data on the 3-, 9-, and 12-month forward exchange rates. Our results indicate that the announcement of IMF negotiations is associated with a premium on the baht and the rupiah, where the premium is much larger on the latter. This result is largely consistent with the responses of stock and bond markets, especially when country-specific data are employed.     

银行危机救助策略的分析

银行危机的救助策略一直是理论界关注的焦点。本文通过构建一个两期模型,以银行危机是否会引发货币危机为评判标准,探讨政府在面对商业银行清偿能力危机时救助与不救助的抉择。经研究发现:当商业银行的不良资产率高,或商业银行在经济中起重要作用,抑或产出的价格弹性较小时,为了避免货币危机的发生,政府应该出手对商业银行提供救助。在相反的情况时,固定汇率制度下,政府为了维护其固定汇率的信誉应该出手对商业银行提供救助;浮动或管理浮动汇率制度下,考虑到商业银行的道德风险问题,政府应该不予以救助。     

The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquidity and risk taking over the business cycle

We examine how the banking sector could ignite the formation of asset price bubbles when there is access to abundant liquidity. Inside banks, to induce effort, loan officers are compensated based on the volume of loans. Volume-based compensation also induces greater risk taking; however, due to lack of commitment, loan officers are penalized ex post only if banks suffer a high enough liquidity shortfall. Outside banks, when there is heightened macroeconomic risk, investors reduce direct investment and hold more bank deposits. This ‘flight to quality’ leaves banks flush with liquidity, lowering the sensitivity of bankers’ payoffs to downside risks and inducing excessive credit volume and asset price bubbles. The seeds of a crisis are thus sown.     

Connected lending and concentrated control

Banks’ controlling owners may exploit business relationships with other firms so as to tangibly or intangibly benefit themselves. This paper uses data from more than 2600 firms across 25 countries to study whether the control rights of the banks’ controlling owners are associated with whether firms need special connections with banks in order to obtain loans. I find that the control rights of the controlling owners increase the need for special connections. I also find that supervisory power raises the need for special connections and intensifies the adverse effect induced by concentrated control. No evidence is found that shareholder rights protection reduces the need for special connections, nor that bank officials become less corrupted as the control rights of the controlling owners increase. The results thus indicate that an increase in the control rights of the banks’ controlling owners only reduces the integrity of bank lending.