Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults,self-cures and securitization

A leading explanation for the lack of widespread mortgage renegotiation is the existence of frictions in the mortgage securitization process. This paper finds similarly small renegotiation rates for securitized loans and loans held on banks' balance sheets that become seriously delinquent, in particular during the early part of the financial crisis. We argue that information issues endemic to home mortgages, where lenders negotiate with large numbers of borrowers, lead to barriers in renegotiation. Consistent with the theory, renegotiation rates are strongly negatively correlated with the degree of informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders over the course of the crisis.     

Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy

This paper investigates the ex ante determinants of bank loan securitization by using different econometric methods on Italian individual bank data from 2000 to 2006. Our results show that bank loan securitization is a composite decision. Banks that are less capitalized, less profitable, less liquid and burdened with troubled loans are more likely to perform securitization, for a larger amount and earlier.     

Managing specific accruals vs. structuring transactions: Evidence from banking industry

This study investigates earnings management through managing specific accruals vs. structuring transactions in the banking industry. This paper explores the circumstances under which banks manipulate loan loss provisions vs. circumstances that lead banks to structure loan sales and securitizations for the purpose of achieving earnings benchmarks. Empirical results show that banks manage earnings through loan loss provisions, before resorting to structuring transactions, to avoid small earnings decreases and or just meet or beat analysts' forecasts. The findings imply that structuring loan sales and securitizations is more likely to be used as a secondary instrument. In addition, I find that the earnings of banks with lower discretionary loan loss provisions and higher discretionary gains from loan sales and securitizations are priced more negatively, suggesting that investors impose incremental penalties on the joint use of loan loss provisions and gains from loan sales and securitization to meet or beat earnings benchmarks.     

土地资产价格波动与经济中的流动性供给——基于以地融资视角的研究

本文通过构建理论模型探讨土地资产价格波动与流动性供给之间的关系。在本文模型中,土地兼具生产资本与抵押资产属性,银行贷款同时受到投资需求、抵押品价值与信贷额度的约束。本文主要结论是:(1)土地资产价格在低于一个由基础货币供给决定的临界值后,能影响企业的抵押品价值并反映投资需求变化,故而与存款货币流动性供给正相关。这也使土地资产价格变化与企业杠杆周期一致且具有“预期自我实现”特征。(2)基础货币供给能够通过影响土地的流动性价值的方式来引导土地资产价格,前提是央行可掌握土地资产价格外生变化的原因。(3)信贷资产证券化会提高存款货币供给与土地价格的关联度,但也会削弱基础货币供给对土地价格的引导能力。本文的研究有助于认识土地资产价格与货币政策效果以及系统性金融风险的关联机制,为房地产调控政策提供启示。     

浅议借贷管制与金融自由

在商业银行贷款行为日益市场化的今天,贷款仍是商业银行最主要的资产业务之一.随着现代经济与金融的飞速发展,各个金融机构的信贷规模迅速发展扩大,但同时带来的负面影响则是其贷款的风险越来越大,安全系数越来越小.随着全球金融一体化的发展和我国加入WTO,我国金融市场上的不确定因素急剧增加,特别是商业银行的经营管理将面临越来越严峻的考验.是继续加强对贷款的管制,还是顺应金融自由化的浪潮而放松管制,很难有明确划一的答案.本文拟通过对现行商业银行贷款在实体与程序方面所作限制的介绍与分析,找出借贷管制与金融自由化的连接点.     

Payday lenders: Heroes or villains?

Does access to high-interest credit (payday loans) exacerbate or mitigate individual financial distress. Using natural disasters as an exogenous shock, I apply a propensity score-matched, triple-difference specification to identify a causal relation between welfare and access to credit. California foreclosures increase by 4.5 units per 1,000 homes after a natural disaster. The existence of payday lenders mitigates 1.0-1.3 of them, with the caveat that not all payday loans are for emergency distress. Payday lenders also mitigate larcenies (but not burglaries or vehicle thefts). In a placebo test of disasters covered by homeowner insurance, payday lending has no mitigation effect.     

The choice between informal and formal restructuring: The case of French banks facing distressed SMEs

This empirical paper investigates the paths leading to the resolution of financial distress for a sample of small and medium-sized French firms in default, focusing in particular on their decisions between bankruptcy and informal (out-of-court) renegotiations. The procedure is depicted as a sequential game in which stakeholders first decide whether to engage in an informal renegotiation. Second, conditional on opting for renegotiation, the debtor and its creditors may succeed or fail in reaching an agreement to restructure the firm’s capital structure. We test different hypotheses that capture (i) coordination and bargaining power issues, (ii) informational problems, (iii) firm characteristics, and (iv) loan characteristics. The empirical implementation is based on sequential LOGIT regressions. First, we find that the likelihood of informal renegotiations increases with loan size and the proportion of long-term debt. These two results support the argument that size matters when deciding whether to opt for informal renegotiation. Second, the probability of a successful renegotiation decreases when (i) the bank in charge of handling the process is the debtor’s “main” creditor and when (ii) the firm is badly rated and its management is considered faulty. Third, the estimations show that collateral plays a significant role in the first stage of the renegotiation process. However, it does not impact the likelihood of success in reaching a renegotiated agreement. Finally, some banks are clearly better than others at leading successful renegotiation processes.     

现金贷果如洪水猛兽?——来自断点回归设计的证据

现金贷具有高利率、无抵押、无场景、线上放款的特性,近两年来饱受争议。一方面,现金货因其服务对象为中低收入者和弱势群体而具有一定的普惠特性,但另一方面,部分从业者无节制放贷则让行业逐步成为监管严管的对象。为了衡量现金贷利率对于贷款者贷款数量与逾期表现的影响,本文使用某现金贷公司2017年6月-9月全部贷款数据,利用其使用连续信用分对申请者进行分级、对不同信用等级赋予不同利率的特性,进行断点回归设计。研究发现贷款申请人对于利率有稳健的敏感性,同时道德风险并不明显,之后进一步从不同角度分析影响贷款人利率敏感性的因素,并依据实证结果提出相关政策建议。     

Asymmetric information in securitization: An empirical assessment

Asymmetric information in securitization deals is analyzed based on a unique dataset comprising a million mortgages, both securitized and not, and using a methodology, previously applied to insurance data, that looks at the correlation between risk transfer and default probability. The main finding is that, for given observable characteristics, securitized mortgages have a lower default probability than non-securitized ones. We show that this finding is consistent with banks caring about their reputation for not selling lemons.     

试析资产证券化在我国的应用取向

从投资者的角度出发,资产证券化为投资者提供了一种优良的投资品种:资产支持证券,在投资者和融资者之间建立了一种新的资金融通渠道.开展资产证券化业务,必须遵循严谨的运作规范,如破产隔离、真实销售等.金融资产证券化具有广泛发展前景,但不良资产资产证券化,在我国当前的市场环境下,不宜规模化展开.     

Determinants of loan securitization in European banking

Analyzing 75 securitizing and non-securitizing stock-listed banks in the EU-13 plus Switzerland over the period from 1997 to 2010, this paper provides empirical evidence that loan securitization in Europe is a composite decision based on bank-specific as well as market- and country-specific determinants. In addition, we find that these determinants remarkably change when separately investigating securitization transactions during the pre-crisis and crisis period. Moreover, results from several subsample regressions reveal that determinants of loan securitizations in Europe depend on the transaction type, the underlying asset portfolio and the regulatory and institutional environment under which banks operate.     

谨慎实施住房抵押贷款证券化

尽管推行住房抵押贷款证券化有助于拓展房地产金融业务，促进房地产市场发展，但我国实施这一举措的基础环境尚待改善，因此，有必要审慎，渐进地推行住房抵押贷款证券化，切忌操之过急。与此同时，应切实，有效地推行有助于个人住房贷款发展的政策措施，培育个人信用制度，建立和健全相关法规体系，为实行住房抵押贷款证券化奠定坚实基础。     

基于合同能源管理项目的资产证券化分析

我国EPC项目融资难的原因之一是节能服务企业信用水平不足。资产证券化可以实现项目信用与企业信用分离,是一种值得探索的融资模式。本文尝试设计了基于EPC项目证券化融资的交易结构和交易流程,讨论了基于EPC项目进行证券化融资的要点。     

我国住房抵押贷款证券化的路径选择

本文通过对商业性住房抵押贷款和政策性住房抵押贷款的比较分析,总结了政策性住房抵押贷款实施证券化的必要性和优势条件,并在此基础上提出了我国住房抵押贷款证券化的发展路径,即按照先政策性住房抵押贷款,再到商业性住房抵押贷款的路径逐步推进证券化工作,在此基础上积累经验,总结技术,为全面推进信贷资产证券化工作打下良好的基础.