How Does the Largest Shareholder Affect Dividends?

Focusing on the legal protection of minority shareholders in Japan, which suggests that manager‐owned firms are better governed than corporation‐owned firms, this study presents a new test of two dividend models: the substitute model and the outcome model. In support of the latter, I find that manager‐owned firms pay higher dividends than corporation‐owned firms. The paper also examines the association between ownership by the largest shareholder and dividend payments. I find an inverted U‐shaped relationship for manager‐owned firms and a U‐shaped relationship for corporation‐owned firms between them. These results can be explained by the benefits and drawbacks of concentrated ownership.     

Determinants of dividend smoothing in emerging market: The case of Korea

Dividend smoothing is a well-established empirical fact in developed countries. This paper investigates the dividend smoothing behavior in Korea where the tax regime and institutional settings of the financial market are different from those of developed countries. The empirical evidence shows that the dividend smoothing decision is influenced not only by a firm's characteristics, but also by macroeconomic factors such as tax and interest rates. Detailed results are as follows. First, application of the Lintner model shows that the extent of dividend smoothing in Korean firms is found to be less than that in the U.S. firms. Second, size, risk, growth and large shareholder ownership are found to be important determinants of dividend smoothing. Larger firms and lower growth firms smooth dividends more. Riskier firms tend to smooth more during the sample period while safer firms smooth dividends more for the post-liberalization period. These results are not consistent with the predictions of information asymmetry models. In addition, contrary to the agency theory based explanations of dividend smoothing, firms with concentrated ownership smooth dividend more. Finally, as for the effect of macroeconomic factors on dividend smoothing, both tax and interest rates are found to have significantly positive relationships with the degree of dividend smoothing. These findings suggest that institutional factors of financial market can play a critical role in understanding the dividend behavior in emerging markets.     

Dividends Behavior in State- Versus Family-Controlled Firms: Evidence from Hong Kong

This study comparatively examines the dividends behavior in state-controlled firms versus family-controlled firms. With the sample of large industrial firms listed on the Main Board of Hong Kong Stock Exchange, we investigate the dividends payment rates, stability of dividends payment, the effects of firm size, profitability and growth opportunity on likelihood to pay dividends, as well as the concentration of dividend in state-controlled versus family-controlled firms. Based on the findings, we derive some ethical implications of dividends policy regarding the differences in business ethical behavior, corporate social responsibility, corporate governance, business sustainability, and shareholder activism in state-controlled versus family-controlled firms, as well as the improvement in these respects through cross-listing in Hong Kong.     

Does corporate diversification create value in emerging markets? New evidence from Chile

Using a sample of 85 Chilean firms listed in the Santiago Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2013, we analyze the impact of corporate diversification on firm value. We consider voting rights of the main shareholder and institutional investors’ influence on firm value. We report firm‐value destruction for diversified firms. Regarding ownership concentration, we report a negative relation between the largest shareholder ownership and firm value. Separation between voting rights and cash flows rights of this shareholder is negatively related to firm value. While Pension Fund Administrators (AFP) mitigate firm value destruction in diversified firms, other institutional investors do not play an active role in controlling value destruction. Finally, if the largest owner is a family, we report firm‐value creation in diversified firms. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

现金股利与控股股东的利益输送行为研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

在存在控股股东的情况下,大股东的利益输送通常会造成对中小股东利益的侵犯,进而对资本市场的有效性造成影响。本文认为现金股利发放在中国上市公司中是作为控股股东利益输送的一种重要手段,对此的实证结果表明大股东的持股比例与公司发放现金股利的多少呈明显正相关关系;第二大股东和第三大股东不能对大股东利用现金股利转移现金进行监督;机构投资者的作用尚不明显。     

How may the nature of family firms explain the decisions concerning international diversification?

This study explores how the ownership structure of family firms gives these organizations a distinctive nature in terms of international diversification. We argue that the heterogeneity of family firms may cause variations in the degree of international diversification among these types of businesses. We have studied three factors related to ownership structure: the degree of family ownership and the type and degree of ownership of the second largest shareholder (another family or a financial company). The empirical evidence is provided by a sample of European and Asian family firms (2004–2008). Our results show that the degree of family ownership has a negative impact on the degree of international diversification. However, the presence and ownership share of a financial company as the second largest shareholder in a family firm favor this diversification. This study also reveals the importance of the financial company as a second owner in the preference family firms show for growth in international markets.     

Ownership Structure and Insider Trading: Evidence from China

In this paper, we examine the information content of insider transactions in China and analyze how ownership structures shape market reaction to these transactions. We find that the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to insider purchases is a convex function of the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder. Further, the CAR to insider purchases is lower when the largest shareholder is government-related, or when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash flow rights. We also find that the market reaction to insider purchases is more positive for firms audited by Big4 auditors. However, we do not find a significant relationship between an ownership structure and the market reaction to insider sales. Our results are remarkably robust to alternative model specifications, corporate insider identities, and recent corporate news releases on price-sensitive events. Finally, we show that market reaction to insider purchases is larger for firms with less severe expropriations, as captured by the use of other receivables.     

Frequency and Motives for Stock Dividends in a Unique Environment

We investigate the possible differences in the information content of stock dividends between firms that distribute stock dividends frequently (frequent distributors) and firms that distribute stock dividends infrequently (infrequent distributors) using a unique data set from Oman where the market microstructure frictions are either absent or limited. We find that infrequent stock dividend distributors have higher postdistribution operating performance relative to frequent distributors. We also find that the illiquidity measure is significantly related to the announcement effect only for frequent stock dividend distributors, whereas short‐term performance is significantly related to the announcement effect only for infrequent distributors. Our findings indicate that infrequent stock dividends are used mainly to convey favorable private information about the firms’ future prospects, and frequent stock dividends are used to reduce stock price to an optimal trading range in order to improve trading liquidity. JEL classification: G14, G35.     

Disappearing and Reappearing Dividends in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Indian Companies

This article examines the empirical determinants of dividend payout policy for 947 sample firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) in India from 1995 to 2013. The author identifies three distinct trends in the propensity to pay dividends between 1995 and 2013. The regression analysis suggests that most of the decline is due to the dividend payout policies of smaller, less profitable, younger firms and firms with comparatively more investment opportunities, high financial leverage, high business risk, and high dividend distribution tax. The author finds significant positive impact of catering incentives on the propensity to pay dividends, thus supporting catering theory of dividends.     

Cultural Dimensions,Risk Aversion and Corporate Dividend Policy

ABSTRACT

How does risk aversion affect corporate dividend payout? Finance theories have long suggested a relationship between risk aversion and dividends but there is little empirical evidence on the extent of this relationship. In this paper we construct measures of risk based on two cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede (1983, 1991). Using over ten years of data for firms in 14 countries, this study is the first to provide evidence that firms in countries with higher risk aversion exhibit both lower dividend ratios and lower propensity to pay dividends.     

Why do countries combine the exemption system for the taxation of foreign profits with domestic double taxation relief?

Many European countries exempt foreign profits from domestic corporate taxation. At the shareholder level, however, all corporate profits are taxed, and double taxation relief is granted only for domestic corporate taxes. This paper attempts to rationalize this tax policy. In the presence of double taxation agreements which exempt foreign profits from domestic corporate taxation, countries may use shareholder taxes to tax these profits. The disadvantage of shareholder taxes is that they create incentives to sell domestic firms to foreigners. But double taxation relief for domestic profits may preserve domestic ownership. Our results imply that national dividend tax policies may be a factor contributing to the empirically observed home bias in investment.     

Ownership Concentration and CSR Policy of European Multinational Enterprises

This study investigates how ownership concentration in European multinational firms is associated with these firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). We employ factor analysis on responsibility data from EIRiS and use a regression analysis. Using firm-level data for almost 700 European firms, we find that shareholder concentration is significantly related to such policies. That is, more concentrated ownership goes hand in hand with poorer CSR policies. In our analysis, we control for size, leverage, profitability, industry, and country of origin. We use several indicators for ownership concentration. We also find that with more concentrated ownership, CSR of the firm gets worse. We suggest that especially with large shareholders, CSR would need to be included in their performance assessment.     

The Shareholder–Manager Relationship and Its Impact on the Likelihood of Firm Bribery

We examine the impact on firm bribery of two corporate governance devices heavily studied in corporate governance research—i.e., separation of ownership and control, and equity share of the largest shareholder. In addition, we investigate the impact of the principal–owner’s gender on firm bribery. From agency theory, we predict that firms with the owner also acting as a manager (owner–manager) are more likely to engage in bribery compared to their counterparts with separation of ownership and control. We argue that an increase of the equity share of the largest shareholder can either increase or decrease firm bribery likelihood depending on the net cost-benefit effect of such bribery actions. In addition, we predict that bribery is more likely to occur when the principal–owner is male rather than female. Using a rich dataset of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys of 2002–2005, we find that the equity share of the largest shareholder is negatively and male principal–owner is positively associated with the likelihood of firm bribery. Furthermore, we reveal that owner–manager is more likely to bribe when the principal–owner is male rather than female. We also observe that the effect of owner–manager is smaller as the equity share of the largest shareholder increases.     

Foreign institutional investors and dividend policy: Evidence from China

This study examines whether foreign institutional investment influences firms’ dividend policies. Using data from all domestically listed nonfinancial firms in China during the period of 2003–2013, we find that foreign shareholding influences dividend decisions and vice versa.Furthermore, changes in dividend payments over time positively affect subsequent changes in foreign shareholding, but the opposite is not true. Our study indicates that foreign institutional investors do not change firms’ future dividend payments once they have made their investment choices in China. Moreover, they self-select into Chinese firms that pay high dividends. Our evidence suggests that in an institutional setting where foreign investors have tightly restricted access to local securities markets and a relatively high risk of expropriation by controlling shareholders exists, firms can use dividends to signal good investment opportunities to foreign investors.     

Shareholder protection, ownership concentration and FDI

Host country's weaker legal shareholder protection may make it costlier for parent shareholders to monitor the foreign subsidiary and hold managers accountable in case of misconduct. This prospect may motivate the managers to invest in such foreign environments. However, the agency costs associated with such investments can increase as well. The latter would tend to discourage such FDI. We test this ex ante uncertain relationship using a sample of publicly quoted UK parents that established new, majority owned joint venture subsidiaries in Continental Europe. We find that host country's weak legal shareholder protection discourages FDI. This negative relationship, however, is less important for firms with higher ownership concentration, implying that parent's ownership concentration may be a substitute for host country's weak legal shareholder protection.     

An Examination of Dividend Policy in the U.S. Restaurant Industry

Abstract

We examine the potential role that agency costs have on dividend payout policy in the restaurant industry. Specifically, we hypothesize that dividends serve to constrain the actions of management. Interest payments also have the same effect, and in a sense, may act as an effective substitute for dividend payments. Furthermore, the larger number of firm owners, the greater the need for dividends to control agency costs. Our findings show significant differences in debt ratios and the number of shareholders between restaurant firms that pay dividends and those that do not.     

股权结构与企业股利政策选择关系:理论与实证分析

本文从公司治理视角出发,以中国上市公司为样本,对股权结构与企业股利政策关系进行了理论与实证分析。结果表明,管理者持股比例、股权集中度(包括第一大股东持股比例)与现金股利支付率显著正相关;国有股比例与现金股利支付率正相关;法人股比例和流通A股比例对现金股利支付率的影响可能是负向的,且极不显著。     

Dividend Policy and Informativeness of Reported Earnings: Evidence from the MENA Region

This paper documents that informativeness of reported earnings, measured by earnings–return relation, is an increasing function of dividend payout ratio in the Middle East and North Africa region during the period between 2003 and 2014. We argue that higher dividends reduce agency conflicts. Lower agency problems lead firms to disclose information more truthfully, thereby improving credibility of reported earnings. We also show that our results hold for various proxies of dividend policy.     

Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management

The widespread practice of earnings management adversely impacts the quality of financial reports and increases information asymmetries between owners and managers. The present study investigates the effect of shareholder activism (as expressed by the proxy proposals sponsored by shareholders), and monitoring by the largest institutional owner on earnings management. Our longitudinal analyses indicate that the number of shareholder proposals received by firms is positively related to subsequent earnings management, yet concurrently, monitoring by the largest institutional owners is negatively related to earnings management. Our findings shed light on the equivocal results reported by prior research regarding the impact of shareholder activism on firm performance, on one hand, and ownership monitoring and performance, on the other.     

现金股利政策:法律保护的结果还是法律保护的替代——来自我国上市公司的证据

与LLSV横向研究不同,本文从纵向检验了现金股利法律保护替代模型与结果模型在我国的适用性。首先,纵向分阶段的回归分析和差异检验表明:两模型在我国的适用性呈现出阶段性特征,在法律保护较弱的阶段,法律保护替代模型具有一定的适用性,随着法律保护程度的提高,法律保护结果模型对我国上市公司的现金股利政策更有解释力。其次,检验了我国交叉上市公司与无交叉上市公司现金股利支付率的差异,进一步证明了现金股利法律保护结果模型的适用性。同时,我们也发现一个有趣的问题,现金股利支付率与每股收益显著负相关,与增长机会不具有显著负相关性,说明公司的现金股利政策不是根据盈利状况和增长机会做出的。