Union growth in The Netherlands 1961–1989

An empirical analysis is presented of union growth in The Netherlands over the past decades. The analysis shows that the effect of changes in the industrial structure is very small. It appears that union growth is influenced by wage growth and by unemployment. If real wages increase more than labour productivity or if unemployment declines union membership increases.     

Union Wage Effects in the Presence of Enterprise Bargaining

Previous research on union wage effects has underestimated the potential for unions to raise member wages since the data used do not enable differences across bargaining units to be properly accounted for. This study addresses this deficiency by utilizing matched employer–employee data that permit workplace-specific union wage effects to be identified. Results from the estimation of wage equations indicate that, while there is only a very small intra-workplace union wage effect, differences across workplaces are considerable. This differential, however, only exists at workplaces where there is substantial coverage by collective agreements.     

A Quantile Regression Analysis of Wages in Panama

Differences in the effects of worker characteristics on wages in Panama at different points of the conditional wage distribution are investigated. Public sector employment increases wages relatively more at lower quantiles. Within the public sector, employment in that sector increases wages of the median worker and reduces wage inequality. Presence of a labor union increases relatively more private sector wages at lower quantiles. Unions reduce wage inequality within the union private sector and increase average wages within that sector. In the public sector, the presence of a labor union increases wages of men at lower quantiles at a lower rate than in the private sector. Self-employment decreases wages at lower quantiles and increases wages at higher quantiles. Urban location affects wages in a U-shaped pattern as one moves from lower to higher quantiles. Rates of return to experience are higher for men at higher quantiles. Experience increases men's wage inequality.     

Wage restraint and monetary union

Existing work on wage bargaining predicts more aggressive wage setting under monetary union. This is exemplified by Cukierman and Lippi (2001) who postulate that wages are set having area-wide prices in mind. The insight of aggressive wage behaviour has not been confirmed by the EMU experience, which has been characterised by wage moderation. The present paper investigates the possibility of wage restraint using a monetary union model which, realistically, assumes that trade unions set wages with national prices in mind. Drawing on plausible ranges for all parameter values (and macroeconomic shocks), our simulations show that a monetary union elicits real wages that are broadly comparable to those obtained under monetary autonomy. The confidence bounds around these results are rather wide, in particular including scenarios of wage restraint.     

The Interaction between the Central Bank and a Single Monopoly Union Revisited: Does Greater Monetary Policy Uncertainty Reduce Nominal Wages?

Previous papers modelling the interaction between the central bank and a single monopoly union demonstrated that greater monetary policy uncertainty reduces the union's nominal wage. This paper shows that this result does not hold in general, since it depends on peculiar specifications of the union's objective function. In particular, I show that greater monetary policy uncertainty raises the nominal wage whenever union members tend to be more sensitive to the risk of getting low real wages than to the risk of remaining unemployed. This conclusion appears consistent with the evidence showing that greater monetary authority's transparency reduces average inflation .     

International trade and unionization: Evidence from India

We exploit exogenous variation in tariffs to examine the impact of import competition on unionization and union wages in a developing country. Using a combination of nationally representative household data (National Sample Survey Organization) and nationally representative industry‐level data (Annual Survey of Industries) from India, we find that net‐import industries that experienced larger cuts in tariffs also experienced larger declines in unionization. In addition, we find that these industries also experienced larger increases in union wages. These results are consistent with the predictions of an efficient bargaining framework that we extend to endogenize the union formation decision by allowing for a fixed cost of union formation. We also conduct a back‐of‐the‐envelope calculation to show that the total wage gains to unionized workers marginally exceed the total wage losses to deunionized workers.     

Sick pay reforms and health status in a unionised labour market

We theoretically analyse the effects of sick pay and employees' health on collective bargaining, assuming that individuals determine absence optimally. If sick pay is set by the government and not paid for by firms, it induces the trade union to lower wages. This mitigates the positive impact on absence. Moreover, a union may oppose higher sick pay if it reduces labour supply sufficiently. Better employee health tends to foster wage demands. If the union determines both wages and sick pay, we identify situations in which it will substitute wages for sick pay because adverse absence effects can be mitigated.     

Privatization and efficiency wages

The impact of privatization is investigated in a shirking model of efficiency wages. Without trade unions, privatization — modeled as a stricter control of employees — lowers wages and raises employment, output, and profits, while effort and productivity effects depend on the employees' risk aversion. However, for a utilitarian monopoly union, facing a company characterized by a constant-elasticity labor-demand schedule, privatization raises efficiency wages. If privatization is modeled as a stronger profit orientation, wages, effort, and labor productivity will rise, while employment will shrink in a wage-setting firm. Again, wage and employment effects can be reversed in the case of wage negotiations.     

Lower coverage but stronger unions? Institutional changes and union wage premia in Central Europe

In this paper we use the national samples from the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) to analyze the evolution of the wage premium of firm- and industry-level agreements in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (the CE3) around the time of their accession to the EU. We find that despite a generalized reduction in union coverage in these countries, the union wage premium after accession to the EU became bigger and statistically more significant for Poland and Hungary, particularly for industry-level agreements. We interpret these findings in terms of the institutional reforms that occurred in the CE3 between 2002 and 2006. These reforms, which were prompted by the EU Commission's requirements for EU accession, increased the social partners' ability to bargain and enforce wage agreements, and made industry-level unions more effective in guaranteeing the protections provided by labor standards. Results are less conclusive for the Czech Republic, probably due to factors that attenuate the effect of bargaining coverage upon wages, e.g. a smaller effect of institutional reforms, a greater use of mandatory extension mechanisms, the more radical firm restructuring during transition in that country.     

Temporary and Permanent Immigration under Unionization

This paper investigates permanent and temporary immigration and remittance under the coexistence of unionized and non‐unionized manufacturing firms in a two‐sector economy. The impacts of immigration and remittance on respectively wages, employment, the union–non‐union wage gap and national welfare are analyzed. It is found that both permanent immigration (economy‐wide) and temporary immigration in agriculture bring positive effects on most variables (except the competitive wage), but widens the wage gap and causes income redistribution in the host country. However, if temporary immigrants work in manufacturing only, then all wages and the union–non‐union wage gap fall. That is, workers become more equally paid but poorer. In addition, remittance and globalization cause negative effects on union workers and employers. It is perhaps such consequences and the income redistribution effect of immigration that cause the media to paint a negative image of immigration.     

The role of supervisors in the determination of wages and wage gaps

This article considers labour market discrimination by supervisors as a potential contributor to racial and gender wage gaps. Empirical analysis reveals evidence that all workers, except Hispanic males, earn significantly higher hourly wages when working for a supervisor of the same race and sex as themselves. Furthermore, the results suggest that sex has a larger impact on wages than race for workers with white supervisors, while race has a larger impact on wages than sex for workers with minority supervisors. Based on past research, we theorize that the degree of labour discrimination workers face may also be dependent upon the location and size of the firm in which they are employed. However, decomposing the samples by firm location and size suggests that these two factors cannot adequately explain the observed matched supervisor–worker wage effects, which supports the notion that these wage effects are largely driven by factors other than supervisor discrimination.     

Wage inflation and labour conflicts in the Netherlands : An empirical investigation using the co-integration approach

The ‘wage space’, which is defined as the sum of price inflation and labour productivity growth, has played a major role as an indicator of allowable wage increases in the post-war wage negotiations in the Netherlands. This paper shows that: (a) wages and the wage space are co-integrated; (b) the deviation between wages and the wage space may act as an error correction term in the wage equation when both variables are identified as I(2); and (c) political consensus and the threat of labour conflicts (rather than actual strike activity) may be identified as the ‘mechanism’ behind this error correction in the wage equation.     

Why Unions Reduce Wage Inequality: A Theory of Domino Effects*

Numerous empirical studies show that unions reduce wage differences. I demonstrate that their motive might be a mix of fairness and strategy, maximizing the use of union bargaining power in the presence of efficiency wages. Unions can push primarily for raising the lowest wages, and still not sacrifice higher wages much, if the employers themselves increase higher wages to protect efficiency-enhancing wage differences. If these “domino effects” are strong enough, then an egalitarian wage policy might even increase the median wage.     

Technology, demand and distribution: a cumulative growth model with an application to the Dutch productivity growth slowdown

This paper argues that the case for real wage growth restraint,and the consequent restoration of profitability, which the mainstreamconsensus regards as a necessary condition for sustained outputand productivity growth, is based on weak foundations, becauseit neglects the negative impact of wage moderation on productivitygrowth. Using a general Keynesian growth model, which integratesa (wage-led or profit-led) demand regime and a productivityregime (incorporating the productivity-growth enhancing effectsof higher demand and higher real wages), the conditions areidentified under which real wage restraint fails to raise outputand productivity growth. The model is applied empirically tothe Netherlands (1960–2000).     

Public or Private Sector Wage Leadership? An International Perspective*

Whether a government acts as a wage leader, placing pressure on private‐sector wages (more open to competition), or whether it plays a passive role and merely follows wage negotiations in the private sector, there are important implications for macroeconomic development, particularly in small open economies and/or countries that are members of a monetary union, such as those of the European Monetary Union. With the notable exception of the case of Sweden, opinion on this issue is still divided. In this paper, we look at public‐ and private‐sector wage interactions from an international perspective (18 OECD countries). We focus on the causal two‐way relationship between public and private wage setting, confirming that the private sector, on the whole, appears to have a stronger influence on the public sector, rather than vice versa. However, we also find evidence of feedback effects from public wage setting, which affect private‐sector wages in a number of countries. When the private sector takes the lead on wages, there are few feedback effects from the public sector, while public wage leadership is typically accompanied by private‐sector feedback effects.     

Rent-sharing and collective wage contracts–evidence from German establishment-level data

Using German establishment-level data, this article analyses whether wages respond to firm-specific profitability conditions. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the extent of rent-sharing varies with collective bargaining coverage. In this context, two conflicting hypotheses are tested. The first one asserts that unions exploit their bargaining power at the firm level and appropriate a larger share of rents than the bargaining parties in uncovered firms. The second one states that unions favour a compressed intra-industry wage structure and suppress the responsiveness of wages to firm-specific profitability conditions. The empirical analysis provides strong support for the second hypothesis. While Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) estimates yield positive estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient in covered establishments, dynamic panel data estimates accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of rents point to a rent-sharing coefficient of zero.     

THE WAGE IMPACT OF TEACHERS UNIONS: A META‐ANALYSIS

The literature examining the impact of teachers unions on education is very large and diverse. We meta‐analyze the literature on the wage impacts of teachers unions to try to draw out general findings, the importance of empirical model specification, and samples. A key finding of this study is that the average wage impact estimated by the included papers is modest, around 2%–4.5%. Our findings also suggest that the quality of an empirical strategy significantly affects the size of the estimated impact. We find that teachers union wage impacts have varied over time. The largest impacts appear to be following the rapid expansion of teacher unionism in the 1970s. Finally, we gain new insight into the goals of teachers unions by using the increased statistical power of meta‐analytic techniques to show that unions increase the wages of new teachers and not just senior teachers. (JEL J51, I21, I30)     

Influence Factors on Gender Wage Gap: Evidences from Chinese Household Income Project Survey

By constructing a gender wage gap evolution model, this paper examines the source and evolutionary process of gender wage inequality from a theoretical perspective. The purpose of this study is thoroughly investigating the factors affecting the gender wage inequality from the perspective of gender discrimination and variations in non-gender endowments. Based on the Chinese Household Income Project Survey Data, this study indicates that: (1) since companies continue to re-evaluate the gender endowment value of gender, the gender wage inequality exhibits an endogenous sustainability and self-reinforcing effect. (2) The gender wage gap of urban residents is derived mainly from the top tier of wages, while the gender wage gap of the migrant people is mainly determined from the bottom rung of wages. (3) Female age has a ‘U-curve’ impact on gender wage inequality from the standpoint of non-gender endowment differences, and the female age has an ‘inverted U-curve’ impact on gender wage inequality as a result of discrimination. (4) Female appearance and actual work hours are insufficient to affect the changing trend of gender wage inequality; however, h-register location and marital status are still considered to be very important.     

Deunionization and pay inequality in OECD Countries: A panel Granger causality approach

The impact of unionization on wage inequality has been examined by a vast literature. Focusing mostly on the US and the UK in time series analyses or on OECD countries in panel data analyses, a bulk of these studies have found a negative impact of deunionization (i.e. decline in the union density rate) on distribution of wages. By utilizing two inequality data sets both provided by the University of Texas Inequality Project and the union density data set provided by OECD this paper contributes to the literature, analyzing the causality relationship between deunionization and pay inequality for 24 OECD countries for the 1963–2000 period within a panel Granger structure. Our findings show not only that there is causality from union density to income inequality but also, perhaps more importantly, point out that there is causality running from income inequality to union density for various set of countries and time periods.     

Long-run impact of increased wage pressure

An unanticipated permanent increase in wage pressure is analyzed in a dynamic general-equilibrium model combining standard theory of capital accumulation and monopolistic wage setting. The long-run (steady-state) implications are identical percentage reduction in employment, consumption, and capital stock whereas wages and the real interest rate are unchanged. The reduction in employment on impact is larger than the steady-state reduction whereas wages rise and the real interest rate declines on impact.