Merger statistics and merger policy

It is widely believed that the 1950 amendment of Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act has diverted merger activity away from horizontal and into conglomerate forms. Examination of the Federal Trade Commission Large Merger Series replicates existing substantiation of this belief, but only up until 1968. Further examination of the data shows a perceptible weakening of the horizontal-merger deterrent in the following eight years. One possible explanation is that all the attention devoted to the “conglomerate problem” after 1968 implied that horizontal mergers were neither as bad nor as illegal as existing case law had made them.     

Merger law,policy, and enforcement guidelines in Canada

The paper describes Canada's merger law, policy, and enforcement activity. The contents of Canada's recently issuedMerger Enforcement Guidelines are explained, analyzed, and compared to the U.S. Merger Guidelines. The roles of concentration, market share, entry conditions, and efficiency defenses in Canadian merger cases are assessed. Reference is made to some recent decisions of Canada's Competition Tribunal, a body created as a part of the major competition policy reforms contained in the 1986 Competition Act.     

Comment on Dewey's “Merger Policy Greatly Simplified/Building on Keyes”

Professor Dewey's mock proposal for a new merger policy differs from Keyes' serious proposal in at least two important respects. First, the Dewey plan would accord different treatment to mergers which result in the growth of “large” industrial companies as compared with mergers which do not. No such size discrimination is recommended by Keyes. Second, the Dewey plan would allow even the former class of mergers to go forward after passing a purely procedural “test”. No genuine “efficiencies defense” would be required.     

U.S. merger policy and the 1992 Merger Guidelines

This article reviews the empirical evidence regarding the effects of mergers on corporate efficiency. In light of this evidence it then evaluates the effectiveness of U.S. merger policy as articulated in the 1992 Guidelines of the Department of Justice. It argues that the 1992 Guidelines and the U.S. Government's policies toward business more generally over the past 12 years have been characterized by a bias for bigness. It concludes that this bias will only be eliminated when government authorities in charge of merger policy recognize that many mergers lower economic efficiency and design and enforce their policies accordingly.     

Applying “Merger Guidelines” market definition to (de)regulatory policy: Pros and cons

Since initially presented in the 1982 Department of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines, market definition has been adopted nearly worldwide as a framework to see if a merger would substantially lessen competition. This framework is useful for addressing the similarly counterfactual question of whether forbearance from regulation would lead to an increase in prices. In this context, however, the usefulness of a merger-based market definition is limited. Because the alternative to forbearance is regulation, and since some regulated rates may be below competitive levels, finding that deregulation would lead to market power as defined for mergers need not justify continued regulation. Forbearance in telecommunications highlights market definition questions regarding gross vs. marginal substitutes, dynamic efficiencies, and service bundling. It also reveals ambiguities in the meaning of “geographic market.” Market definition also has limited applicability if regulation exists not to prevent high prices but the abuse of dominance through predatory pricing.     

Effects of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines on Merger Review: Based on Ten Years of Practical Experience

Review of Industrial Organization - We assess how the 2010 Merger Guidelines have been applied by agencies and courts. We conclude that:     

关于企业并购的三个理论问题

众所周知，企业的成长模式主要有两种，一种是所谓的内涵发展模式，即主要通过企业自身所经营的产品或服务市场份额的扩大来达到企业成长的目的；另一种是所谓的外部扩张模式，即在企业自身产品经营的基础上有意识地实施对外的收购兼并来达到迅速成长的目的。与上述两种成长模式相对应，我们可以把第一种模式下的企业经营方式称之为产品经营，而把第二种模式下的企业经营方式称之为资本经营。     

公司并购中的情报保密-- 并购成功的关键

本文试图通过米塔尔钢铁公司收购美国国际钢铁集团、联想收购IPM PC业务过程中采取的情报保密措施，就公司并购过程中的情报保密做一粗浅探讨。     

Merger Policy in the United States: A Reconsideration

Review of Industrial Organization -     

The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: A brief critique

The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission represent an improvement over previous horizontal merger guidelines in certain respects especially in the treatment of entry. However, the 1992 Guidelines continue to suffer from problems with market definition methodology. Also, the softening of HHI presumptions and burdens and the incorporation of an increased competitive effects section seem to reduce the effectiveness of the Guidelines.The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and not of any state or federal agency.     

Potential Competition: The Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger

Review of Industrial Organization -     

Economics at the FTC: Retrospective Merger Analysis with a Focus on Hospitals

Economists at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) support the agency’s competition and consumer protection missions. In this year’s essay we discuss efforts at the FTC and elsewhere to examine empirically the competitive effects of mergers. This work has ranged from subjective interview-based reports on post-merger behavior to more objective analyses of post-merger performance based on rigorous empirical analysis of prices. In this essay we discuss the merger retrospective literature generally, and focus on the FTC staff’s recent empirical analyses of consummated hospital mergers.     

Effect of Merger on Market Price and Product Quality: American and US Airways

Review of Industrial Organization - In this paper, I analyze the effect of the merger between American Airlines (AA) and US Airways (US) on market price and product quality. I use...     

State broadband policy: Impacts on availability

We use a county-level panel dataset from 2012 to 2018 to assess the impacts of various state policies on total and rural broadband availability in the United States. The primary dependent variable is the percentage of residents with access to 25 Megabits per second (MBPS) download and 3 MBPS upload speeds via a fixed connection, with alternative specifications considering other aspects of availability such as technology type and competition. We control for the main determinants of Internet availability such as income, education, age, and population density. Our policy variables come from the newly released State Broadband Policy Explorer from the Pew Charitable Trusts and individual contacts from the nationwide State Broadband Leaders Network. Our primary policies of interest are those related to: (1) availability of state-level funding, (2) existence of a state-level broadband office/task force with full-time employees, and (3) restrictions on municipal/cooperative broadband provision. We find a positive and significant impact of state-level funding programs on general (and fiber) broadband availability, and a negative impact of municipal/cooperative restrictions. The findings are similar when the analysis is restricted to the rural portions of counties.     

A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis

I analyze horizontal mergers in procurement settings in which sellers incur costs to participate. Considering existing sellers’ contest-level entry differs from antitrust authorities’ typical emphasis on new sellers’ market-level entry to counteract a merger’s anticompetitive harm. I show that profitable mergers can increase consumer and total surplus by inducing more and stronger contest-level entry by the merged seller, which echoes common claims from merging parties that their merger is beneficial because it creates a stronger competitor. This finding suggests caution by antitrust authorities: when contest-level entry costs matter, standard models that ignore those costs prescribe blocking procompetitive mergers.

     

Antitrust Versus Regulatory Merger Review: The Case of Electricity

This paper focuses on the implications of multi-agency review of electricity mergers. It highlights fundamental differences between regulatory and antitrust merger enforcement procedures–ranging from standards of review to data collection, economic analysis, and remedies. Such disparities potentially introduce costly and potentially conflicting redundancy into the merger review process. Illustrative examples are drawn from a number of cases, including apparent inconsistencies across applicant-filed analyses in FERC merger cases. Absent the delegation of competition analysis to the antitrust agencies, the paper makes the case for harmonizing review across regulators and antitrust enforcers.     

Non-competition Goals and Their Impact on South African Merger Control: An Empirical Analysis

Review of Industrial Organization - Merger control regimes in various jurisdictions—especially in Africa—feature non-competition objectives in addition to conventional goals, such as...     

The 1968 Merger Guidelines: In Praise of Committing to Restraint

The 1968 Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice remain a model for competition agencies around the world because they courageously articulated when the Department would exercise its prosecutorial discretion by not challenging a horizontal merger.     

Department of justice and federal trade commission: Horizontal Merger Guidelines

Department of justice and federal trade commission: Horizontal Merger Guidelines