Market Transparency and the Accounting Regime

We model the interaction of financial market transparency and different accounting regimes. This paper provides a theoretical rationale for the recently proposed shift in accounting standards from historic cost accounting to marking to market. The paper shows that marking to market can provide investors with an early warning mechanism while historical cost gives management a “veil” under which they can potentially mask a firm's true economic performance. The model provides new explanations for several empirical findings and has some novel implications. We show that greater opacity in financial markets leads to more frequent and more severe crashes in asset prices (under a historic‐cost‐accounting regime). Moreover, our model indicates that historic cost accounting can make the financial market more rather than less volatile, which runs counter to conventional wisdom. The mechanism shown in the model also sheds light on the cause of many financial scandals in recent years.     

Charity performance reporting,regulatory approaches and standard-setting

Internationally, there are strong calls for charities’ formal annual reporting to include non-financial performance information. Without the international standards common in other sectors, national accounting standard-setters often regulate charities’ reporting. Lacking evidence on approaches to encouraging/mandating charity performance reporting, and the effectiveness of these approaches, we ask: “How have different jurisdictions responded to calls for increasing performance reporting?”We conduct a benchmarking study that indicates differences in current reporting practices between Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. By discussing both current regimes and proposed projects, we develop and illustrate a typology of regulatory approaches to performance reporting. These range from command and control, where standard-setters mandate specific performance reporting standards, through to market regulation, where charities and/or sector bodies acting as regulatory entrepreneurs determine what is to be reported. Between these extremes, the typology describes new governance approaches, with standard-setters partnering and collaborating with other actors. These approaches lead to different requirements with potentially significant implications for performance accountability in the respective jurisdictions. We argue that our regulatory typology contributes useful insights for the many jurisdictions grappling with how to regulate their charity sector and encourage performance reporting.     

Corporate Scandals and Regulation

Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre‐empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent corporate misbehavior from occurring or quickly rectify transgressions. However, regulators are also self‐interested and may be captured, uninformed, or ideological, and become less effective as a result. In this registered report, we develop a historical time series of corporate (accounting) scandals and (accounting) regulations for a panel of 26 countries from 1800 to 2015. An analysis of the lead‐lag relations at both the global and individual country level yields the following insights: (1) Corporate scandals are an antecedent to regulation over long stretches of time, suggesting that regulators are typically less flexible and informed than firms. (2) Regulation is positively related to the incidence of future scandals, suggesting that regulators are not fully effective, that explicit rules are required to identify scandalous corporate actions, or that new regulations have unintended consequences. (3) There exist systematic differences in these lead‐lag relations across countries and over time, suggesting that the effectiveness of regulation is shaped by fundamental country characteristics like market development and legal tradition.     

Financial Management Association Roundtable on Stock Market Pricing and Value‐Based Management

A group of academics and practitioners addresses a number of questions about the workings of the stock market and its implications for corporate decision‐making. The discussion begins by asking what the market wants from companies: Is it mainly just steady increases in earnings per share, which are then “capitalized” by the market at the current industry P/E multiple to produce a higher stock price? Or does the market pay attention to the “quality,” or sustainability, of earnings? And are there more revealing measures of annual corporate performance than GAAP earnings—measures that would provide investors with a better sense of companies' future cash‐generating capacity and returns on capital? The consensus was that although many investors respond uncritically to earnings numbers, the most sophisticated and influential investors consider far more than current earnings when pricing stocks. And although the stock market is far from omniscient, the heightened scrutiny of companies resulting from the growth of hedge funds, private equity, and investor activism of all kinds appears to be making the market “more efficient” in building information into stock prices. The second part of the discussion explored the implications of this view of the market pricing process for corporate strategy and the evaluation of major investment opportunities. For example, do acquisitions have to be “EPS‐accretive” to be value‐adding, or is there a more reliable means of assessing an investment's value added than pro forma EPS effects? Does the DCF valuation method always offer a better guide to value than the method of comparables used by many Wall Street dealmakers? And under what circumstances are the relatively new real options valuation approaches likely to provide a significant advantage over conventional methods? The main message offered to corporate practitioners is to avoid letting cosmetic accounting effects get in the way of value‐adding investment and operating decisions. As the corporate record on acquisitions makes painfully clear, there is no guarantee that an accretive deal will turn out to be value‐increasing (in fact, the odds are that it will not). As for choosing a valuation method, there appears to be a time and place for each of the major methods—comparables, DCF, and real options—and the key to success is understanding which method is best suited to the circumstances.     

美国金融科技最新立法监管动态及对我国的启示

金融科技有助于降低交易成本、提高市场效率,但同时也因其“空白型金融创新”的特质给传统金融监管方式带来严峻挑战。美国在金融科技的立法方面,强调“建章立制,立法先行”,创制法律规范具有前瞻性;在监管方面,秉持“负责任的创新”的监管理念,创新监管范式,力求实现金融创新与合法合规之间的动态平衡。我国可合理借鉴美国的立法和监管经验,加强金融科技的顶层设计和立法建设,创制新的专门性立法,构建有利于金融科技发展的监管协调机制,研究以行为监管为导向的监管范式,构建包容性监管制度,探索完善中国式“监管沙箱”机制,最终建构“技术驱动型”的金融监管体系。     

Earning investor trust: The role of past earnings management

Does earnings management, even though legal, hinder investor trust in reported earnings? Or do investors regard earnings management as a way for firms to convey private information, or simply as a neutral feature of financial reporting? We find that past abstinence from earnings management increases investor responses to future earnings surprises. Importantly, this effect occurs in industries where investor trust has recently been violated, and where managers would in the past have had incentives and opportunities to misrepresent earnings. Overall, investors seem to interpret the extent to which management resists temptations for misreporting as a “litmus test” of trustworthiness.     

BAYLOR UNIVERSITY ROUNDTABLE ON INTEGRITY IN FINANCIAL REPORTING

At the center of the U.S. corporate governance controversy are questions about the integrity of the U.S. financial reporting system. Can investors trust the numbers now being reported in corporate financial statements? And, if not, what steps are being taken to bring about the return of investor trust and confidence? The academics and practitioners who took part in this discussion began by expressing their reluctance to describe the current situation as a “crisis.” The consensus was that the recent governance failures are not the reflection of a general decline in corporate moral standards, but rather the work of a handful of opportunists who found ways to exploit some weaknesses in the present system. Part of the discussion focused on the expected benefits (and costs) of the heightened regulatory scrutiny provided by the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act and the newly formed Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. But most of the panelists placed greater emphasis on the role of self‐regulation in resolving problems such as the conflicts of interest within auditing and brokerage firms that played a major role in scandals like Enron and WorldCom. And rather than relying on more vigorous SEC oversight of financial statements, a number of panelists argued that top priority should be given to comprehensive reform of U.S. accounting standards, which are said to be a major source of confusion for both managers and investors.     

The regulatory framework for financial reporting and auditing in the United Kingdom: the present position and impending changes

This paper provides an overview of the current regulatory framework for financial reporting and auditing in the United Kingdom. The framework remained stable for 10 years following significant reforms in 1990-1991. A further process of change is now taking place. These changes arise from three sources: refinements in the UK's regulatory framework, the European Commission's drive for a single capital market, and political interest in accounting regulation following the Enron collapse. The present position is explained and the future implications of recent and impending changes are considered.     

TO PURCHASE OR TO POOL: DOES IT MATTER?

The recent decision by the Financial Accounting Standards Board to eliminate pooling accounting for acquisitions raises several important questions: Does the choice of “purchase” or “pooling” affect firm valuations? How do differences in goodwill and its amortization affect cash flow and price/earnings multiples? How has the market reacted to purchase and pooling acquisition announcements? The authors' new research suggests that the market already judges mergers and acquisitions based on fundamental economics, not on GAAP earnings. In a study of 1,442 large acquisitions in the 1990s, the authors find that, in the first month after the announcement of pooled transactions, the acquirer's stock fell by an average of almost 4%. By contrast, the market reaction to purchase acquisitions was extremely favorable, with a 3% positive abnormal return in the first month. But what about the ongoing effect of goodwill amortization on values? In the second part of their two-part study, the authors report that the P/E multiples of acquirers reporting increases in goodwill amortization increase significantly following the acquisitions, and that the increases in P/E are large enough to offset the negative impact of goodwill amortization on earnings. Moreover, the authors also tested for and were unable to find any evidence of a market bias against balance sheet goodwill as an indicator of future amortization charges. The authors thus conclude that changes in accounting for acquisitions should not be a concern for acquirers, and that the elimination of pooling should have no lasting impact on corporate strategic decisions or M&A activity. Nevertheless, they do suggest that companies with significant goodwill would benefit from making their amortization transparent in their financial statements by, for example, breaking out amortization from depreciation on their income statements.     

Financial reporting and firm valuation: relevance lost or relevance regained?

In this study, I examine whether balance sheet and income statement numbers have lost or regained their relevance over the last 30 years. Institutional and macroeconomic factors like the global trend towards strengthening regulation and harmonising financial reporting, the extended use of fair values over historical cost, and the recurring occurrence of accounting scandals, market bubbles, and financial crises make it likely that the role of financial reporting for firm valuation has changed. Following prior research, I estimate four models for the concurrent relation between market value and accounting numbers, and then examine the pattern in explanatory power over time. I find that the loss in relevance of the income statement continues in recent years and is present in a large international sample, in particular in countries with strong institutions. While the overall relevance of the balance sheet remains stable, I find a downward trend during the first sample half, which reverses in the second half, especially in common law countries with strong investor protection, strict disclosure requirements, and integrated markets. Even though several caveats apply, the results suggest that changes in the economy, the institutional environment, and in how firms operate affect the relative importance of accounting information for the use in firm valuation by outside stakeholders.     

Issues in the Drive to Measure Liabilities at Fair Value

This paper compares the discussion on liability measurement in Accounting The0y Monograph 10 with the liability measurement requirements in recent international proposals on accounting for financial instruments. Rather than conducting a detailed review of the Monograph, the paper examines three major issues which wawant amplifjing, extending or criticising: What is “fair value”? Why fair value liabilities? Should fair value include an entity's own credit risk? The focus is on financial liabilities such as “plain vanilla” debt; other financial liabilities, such as insurance obligations, pensions, wawanties and environmental damage restoration involve additional considerations and are therefore not considered.     

Management of operating cash flows before and after the scandals in the early 2000s: An examination of meeting or beating analyst cash flow forecasts*

We examine whether the stock market premium assigned to meeting or beating analyst estimates of cash flows from operations (hereafter, “CFO”) has changed after the publicized accounting scandals in the early 2000 s (“post-scandals period”). We also examine whether firms’ CFO management behavior associated with meeting or beating analyst CFO forecasts has changed after the scandals. We find that the market reward for firms that meet or just beat analyst CFO forecasts (“small beaters”) has increased in the post-scandals period, especially when the accuracy of CFO forecasts is relatively high. We also find that the extent of CFO management engaged in by small beaters has increased after the accounting scandals and that these firms appear to resort to the timing of CFO. Further, we find evidence that the “underpricing” of CFO is weaker in the post-scandals period that exhibits a greater extent of CFO management than before, suggesting that the reduction in the underpricing of CFO in the post-scandals period is at least partially due to CFO management. Overall, our findings suggest that firms responded to the rising importance of cash flow information after a series of accounting scandals by inflating reported CFO to a larger extent than they did before.     

ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATES: BACK TO BASICS

Public accountants have had a hard time deciding how to account for derivatives that are used to hedge risks, which in turn has given derivatives users and others a hard time. For about six years, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has struggled with several, often diametrically opposed procedures, ranging from showing all derivatives at “fair” values to deferring realized losses or gains on derivatives until related gains or losses on the hedged transactions have been realized (a practice known as “hedge accounting”). What is behind the FASB's inability to come up with a decisive and authoritative ruling? Although the politics of self-interest has fueled much of the debate, there is more to the problem than politics. The author argues that the underlying cause of the FASB's inability to reach a satisfactory and acceptable solution is not politics, but rather a flawed basic concept of how financial accounting should be done. In this article, the author recommends a procedure for derivatives accounting that was endorsed by the Financial Economists Roundtable in its 1995 “Statement on Accounting Disclosure about Financial Derivative Instruments.” The proposal, in brief, is this: Provided a company can satisfy its auditors that it is using derivatives primarily to hedge an offsetting price exposure, the firm should be given the option to use hedge accounting for that part of its derivatives position that is functioning as a hedge. All other investment or speculative uses of derivatives should be treated like other financial instruments and marked to market or fair value. Such a procedure, the author argues, is far more consistent than the FASB's recent proposals with fundamental principles of accounting that have been developed by accounting practitioners and scholars over several centuries.     

Recent Changes in the Regulation of Financial Markets and Reporting in Canada*

The regulation of financial reporting and financial markets has undergone significant change in both the United States and Canada since 2000. In Canada, the regulatory regime is particularly complex and politically controversial, with much speculation about possible future directions. This paper's purpose is to explain the current regulatory environment as it stands in mid‐2006 to assist those who teach or conduct research in this domain. On the basis of a review of existing regulations and related studies, this paper first provides an explanation of the major jurisdictional issues that affect financial reporting and regulation in Canada, including identifying the roles of the key players. Second, it identifies specific reporting changes that might be of particular relevance to prospective capital market researchers. Where relevant, comparisons are made with regulatory provisions in the United States, because the majority of capital markets research concerns U.S. securities exchanges regulation, and the Canadian regulations themselves often refer to U.S. regulations as a point of comparison. We find that the lack of a single national securities regulator in Canada and overlaps in federal and provincial jurisdiction and among regulatory bodies mean there is a large range of players involved in financial markets regulation. Ongoing efforts to improve integration include the new passport system, improved harmonization of securities regulation, and consideration of mergers between some of the involved organizations. Other changes have led to a greater emphasis in Canada on the regulation of continuous disclosure and corporate governance than was previously the case. Changes in specific reporting regulations and guidelines since 2002 have generally increased the amount of disclosure.     

CHOOSING THE RIGHT FINANCIAL SYSTEM FOR GROWTH

Well‐functioning financial systems promote economic growth by channeling funds from those who save to those who invest in the productive capacity of economies. What are the main features of a well functioning system? Are well developed capital markets essential to the process? Or are commercial banks and other “private” sources of capital capable of bringing about the same levels of growth and prosperity? In this article, the authors use information about the financial systems of a large number of both developed and developing countries to examine various relationships between a country's financial structure and its overall economic performance. Perhaps most important, the authors report a significantly positive correlation, using data for 34 countries, between the size of a country's financial system—measured by the total of commercial bank assets, equity market capitalization, and bonds outstanding—and economic development (as measured by GDP per capita). At the same time, the authors also provide evidence that banks (or loans) and capital markets (or securities) are complements, not substitutes, in promoting economic development, and that the presence of foreign‐owned banks (though not state‐owned banks) has a positive association with growth. In other words, both private banks and capital markets are likely to play important, though different roles in channeling funds from savers to investors.     

Batten Down The Hatches! U. S. Accounting Scandals and Lessons for Australia

This paper warns the Australian accounting profession about the threat of fallout similar to that experienced in the US following major accounting scandals. This US fallout has included a significant loss of public faith in the accounting profession, reduced autonomy for auditors with the formation of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board, and the stringent Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Australian accounting profession must maintain high-quality auditing and corporate financial reporting or risk greater regulatory intrusions and additional threats to its relatively high levels of autonomy.     

Spacek's Contributions to Accounting Thought Revisited

While he was managing partner and chair of Arthur Andersen in the l950s and 1960s, Leonard Spacek was an outspoken critic of public accounting, complaining about its failure to establish a coherent set of objectives for financial statements, its illogical principles and methods, and its principle-setting process. He was the conscience of the public accounting community during this time period, a critic from within. As far as Spacek was concerned, 'fairness' was the central objective of financial reporting, though he never specifically defined the term. In light of the recent high-profile corporate and accounting scandals, including Enron and World.com, both of which were audited by Arthur Andersen, it is useful to analyse Spacek's ideas on the public role of accounting from his speeches and writings with emphasis on the theme of fairness. Given the firm's long-term commitment to quality audits, it was ironic that Andersen fell victim to these scandals.     

An examination of the perceptions of auditors and chief financial officers regarding principles versus rules based accounting standards

The debate over the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by United States issuers, or its convergence with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) has been going on for several years now. However, as of this writing, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has still not taken a definitive position on the issue. This is in part due to issues involving the cost of adoption, independence concerns relating to the IFRS promulgation body, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and the debate over which type of accounting standards is superior for financial reporting: IFRS, which are said to be “principles-based,” or U.S. GAAP, which are said to be “rules-based.” In this paper we examined the views of two stakeholders in the U.S. financial reporting system, auditors in large public accounting firms and Chief Financial Officers in the Fortune 1000. We elicited their perceptions involving ten situations where specific rules are incorporated in U.S. GAAP. We asked if the elimination of the specific rule would be likely to better achieve the “qualitative characteristics of useful financial information” as defined by the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in 2010 (FASB 2010) and the similar document adopted by the IASB at the same time (IASB 2010). We found that in eight of the ten situations both groups preferred the rules-based accounting regime (the current U.S. GAAP rules) over a principles-based approach.     

The Primacy of “Present Fairly” in the Auditor's Report*

In this paper, the author examines the historical evolution in the United States of the use of the term “present fairly” in the auditor's report, as well as the experience and arguments in the United States and Canada regarding the use of a “two‐part” opinion in the report. He then develops an argument for the adoption of a “two‐part” opinion, decoupling “present fairly” from conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, which would place primary emphasis on “present fairly".     

Financial scandals: a historical overview

I examine the incidence of fraud from c.1720 to 2009 and relate it to the occurrence of significant financial scandals. Focusing on the UK, and US prior to Enron, and using a detailed dataset of significant events and news content, underpinned by examination of specific watershed scandals, the paper highlights the regulatory response to scandals and the implications for accounting and financial reporting. The evidence reveals the incidence of fraud and financial scandal to be historically contingent and skewed towards certain sectors, particularly banking and finance, facilitated by complex group structures and international capital mobility, and mediated by managerial incentives and ownership concentration. Financial reporting and auditing can mitigate fraud opportunities in all sectors and businesses without complex group structures, and the accounting profession achieved some success in this respect up to the mid-1970s. Since then, the profession has been increasingly challenged by, and to some degree implicated in, the development of interconnected and international business networks, which, combined with wider financial deregulation, has led to a resurgence of fraud and financial scandal not previously experienced since the mid-nineteenth century.