Cooperative R&D ventures: Strategic behavior versus transactional efficiency

This paper examines a sample of 48 cooperative R&D ventures announced in the period 1983–1990 to determine their impact on the stock price of the announcing firms. It finds that the venturing firms earn statistically significant positive abnormal returns over periods surrounding the announcement date. These gains are greater than those that result from announcements of increases in expenditures on in-house R&D. The cross-sectional analysis reveals that abnormal returns to the venturing firms are independent of industry concentration, larger in international ventures than in domestic ventures, and equal in cooperative agreements and equity joint ventures. These results support the transactional efficiency perspective of cooperative R&D ventures and suggest that the relaxation of antitrust laws as they apply to cooperative R&D ventures in 1984 is a welfare-improving policy.     

Cooperative R&D with Endogenous Technology Differentiation

We study a nontournament R&D duopoly. Before the standard R&D investment and quantity-setting stages, we consider a stage in which firms choose their R&D technologies. Spillovers negatively depend on R&D technology differentiation. We show that, in equilibrium, firms will choose identical or very similar R&D processes. Such equilibria may entail less differentiation than would be dictated by social welfare maximization.     

Dynamics in research joint ventures and R&D collaborations

We investigate the short- and long-term effects of different types of R&D collaborations on firms, consumers, and the industry. To that end, we consider a differentiated-product market in which firms compete à la Bertrand and invest in process innovation in order to lower the production cost over time. Investments are stochastic and there can be cartelization or competition strategies among firms at the moment of making the decision on the amount to invest in R&D. Our results show that in equilibrium, the long-run welfare is larger under a research joint venture than under other environments. Discounted present value profits increase with the level of the spillover but there are asymmetries that depend on the firms’ asymmetry on marginal costs.     

An economic analysis of cooperative research

The U.S. government's most recent policy initiative to increase industrial research activity is the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984. Since its passage much attention has been given to this new organizational research form, but to date there has not been any systematic investigation of the participants in cooperative research. This paper is an initial attempt to fill that void. First, a classification scheme is presented to describe the research activity of firms currently engaged in cooperative endeavors, as evidenced by mandated filings reported in the Federal Register. Then, a model of inter-firm differences in cooperative research activity is posited and tested using survey-based data for a sample of R&D active firms in the U.S. manufacturing sector. We conclude that market power is the principal determinant of involvement in cooperative research.     

Competing Research Joint Ventures

Research and development (R&D) competition among firms has recently been extended to R&D competition involving research joint ventures. It was previously shown that in an industry conducting cost-reducing R&D followed by competition in the product market, if all firms both fully share R&D information and coordinate investments to maximize pint profits, final products prices are lower, and firms' profits are higher than with information shriving alone, joint profit maximization alone, or no cooperation. In this paper we question whether a single research joint venture (RJV) cartel is the best form of industry R&D coordination. We show that there are circumstances in which splitting a single RJV cartel into several competing ones yields lower product prices. Moreover, we show that in these circumstances, splitting the industry into exactly two competing RJV cartels would be best.     

Product market objectives and the formation of research joint ventures

In this paper we extend the existing literature on research and development (R&D) investments and research joint ventures (RJVs) in two important ways. First, we analyze and compare the case where firms collude in the product market to the benchmark case of competition in the output market. Second, we allow firms to form coalitions endogenously as a separate stage in the game. We develop profit functions that depend on the partition of firms into joint ventures and the nature of product competition between venture partners. Our results illustrate the restrictive nature of some assumptions made in the literature. Typically multiple RJVs of different sizes form in equilibrium. In general, RJVs should not be promoted if they entail product market collusion. Given the information available to policy‐makers, it is unlikely that an R&D policy more refined than analyzing and allowing RJVs on a case‐by‐case basis is feasible. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cooperative and noncooperative R&D with spillovers: The case of labor-managed firms

This research focuses on the behavior of not-for-profit enterprises. In particular, using a familiar model of cost-reducing R&D with spillovers, we examine strategic interactions between labor-managed firms in a duopoly. Research spillovers have not been previously considered in the context of labor-managed firms. Among four market scenarios involving (i) competition in research and production; (ii) cooperation in research and production; (iii and iv) competition or cooperation in research and the reverse in production, our results show that research is greatest under full cooperation, while output is greatest under full competition. Output and R&D are the lowest in the case when firms compete in research, but form a production cartel. The degree of research spillovers has a crucial bearing upon these rankings. Some of these results differ from those for profit-maximizing firms. The effects of changes in research spillovers on employment (output) are shown to depend upon the nature of the underlying production technology. Policy implications are discussed.     

R&D in a strategic delegation game

This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management affects firms' R&D and production decisions in Cournot quantity competition. It is found that when R&D spillovers are small, owners strategically direct their managers away from profit maximization towards sales. Consequently, managerial firms invest more in R&D and have higher output and lower prices compared to their entrepreneurial counterparts. On the other hand, when spillovers are large, owners ‘penalize’ managers for sales. In this case, managerial firms have lower R&D, lower output and higher prices. Nonetheless, managerial firms have lower profits than their entrepreneurial counterparts regardless of spillovers. This paper also examines the welfare effects of a separation of ownership and management. It is found that in terms of first-best social welfare, managerial firms are more (less) efficient than their entrepreneurial counterparts with low (high) spillovers. However, in terms of second-best social welfare, managerial firms are less efficient with all spillovers. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

R&D investment under spatial price discrimination

This paper uniquely examines an R&D rivalry under spatial price discrimination and compares two alternative timings. When firms invest first, they locate efficiently but overinvest in cost‐reducing R&D if spillover is modest. When firms locate first, they locate inefficiently and always underinvest in cost‐reducing R&D. Although the R&D investment improves social welfare under either timing, profit always declines and so it would never be undertaken if firms cooperate. Both timings are relevant as we identify circumstances under which each will endogenously be chosen in a premarket stage. Critically, the equilibrium timing is often not the socially beneficial timing.     

Effects of One-Way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R & D Cooperation

With one-way spillovers, the standard symmetric two-period R&D model leads to an asymmetric equilibrium only, with endogeneous innovator and imitator roles. We show how R&D decisions and measures of firm heterogeneity—market shares, R&D shares, and profits—depend on spillovers and on R&D costs. While a joint lab always improves on consumer welfare, it yields higher profits, cost reductions, and social welfare only under extra assumptions, beyond those required with multidirectional spillovers. Finally, the novel issue of optimal R&D cartels is addressed. We show an optimal R&D cartel may seek to minimize R&D spillovers between its members.     

National Cooperative Commercial Banking and Development Strategy in Guyana

Abstract . The evolution of the cooperative movement in Guyana resulted in the adoption of a new development strategy. In it a leadership role is given to a new type of government bank, the Guyana National Cooperative Bank. Its mission is to protect and nurture the developing country's cooperative societies, organized mostly on Rochdale principles or on those of the Scandinavian marketing cooperatives. Basically a development savings bank, the GNCB is also an organ through which the Government is minimizing the role of foreign banks in the export sector of the national economy.     

Endogenous R&D Networks among Upstream Firms

This paper studies the endogenous formation of R&D networks among upstream firms and the welfare implications thereof. Both under an upstream price setting and an upstream quantity setting, it is shown that the complete R&D network emerges in equilibrium but only if spillovers are sufficiently low. Yet, under a quantity setting, the complete network arises within a larger range of spillovers. In both cases, however, there is a potential conflict between private incentives for R&D collaboration and societal ones. We discuss policy measures that may help to steer firms towards a more socially desirable outcome. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Joint ventures for entry deterrence

The literature of joint ventures has not discussed whether joint ventures may be used to deter entry. This paper then addresses how joint ventures may be used strategically for this purpose. Under the assumptions of linear demand and linear cost, as well as Stackelberg–Cournot interactions between incumbents and their joint venture firms, it is found that the incumbents can deter entry by creating independent joint ventures. Furthermore, it is shown that the optimal number of the joint ventures for the deterrence and the optimal deterrence strategies are functions of the number of potential entrants. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Joint Ventures in the U.S. Steel Industry:

A bstract . In 1958 Daniel Fusfeld examined the role of joint ventures in the U.S. steel industry and concluded that joint ventures served as a substitute for mergers forbidden by the Justice Department. Since the Fusfeld study, things have changed drastically for integrated domestic producers. Competition from imports and domestic mini- mills have forced steel firms into bankruptcies and missive plant closings. The contemporary industry's participation in joint ventures is examined in an attempt to understand steel's restructuring. Today's integrated producers jointly may hold tighter control over raw materials, participate in growing numbers of horizontal Joint ventures , and engage in numerous cooperative enterprises with foreign competitors, particularly the Japanese. Contemporary U.S. producers are becoming increasingly absorbed in the global economy.     

On the optimal mix of patent instruments

A special characteristic of the patent system is that it features multiple patent-policy levers that can be employed by policymakers. In this note, we develop an R&D-based growth model to analyze the optimal mix of patent instruments by considering patent breadth and the division of profit in research joint ventures. Our results are as follows. First, we analytically derive the optimal mix of patent breadth and the profit-division rule. Then, we calibrate the model to quantitatively evaluate the welfare gain from optimizing both patent instruments versus optimizing only patent breadth. We find that the welfare gain can be quantitatively significant.     

A micro-econometric analysis of the role of R&D spillovers using a nonlinear translog specification

This paper assesses the impact of Research and Development (R&D) spillovers on production for a panel of 1,203 Italian manufacturing firms over the period 1998–2003.The estimations are based on a nonlinear translog production function augmented by a measure of R&D spillovers which combines the geographical distance between firms, the technological similarity within each pair of firms and the technical efficiency of each firm. The estimation method takes into account the endogeneity of regressors and the potential sample selection issue regarding the decision by firms to invest in R&D. Results show that the translog production function is more suitable than the Cobb-Douglas for modelling firm behaviour and that returns to scale are increasing. Moreover, the internal and external stocks of technology exert a significant impact on firms’ production. Finally, it emerges that, for Italian manufacturing firms, R&D capital and R&D spillovers are highly substitutes.     

Internal and External R&D: A Sample Selection Approach*

This study underlines that the decision to enter into an external R&D relationship is related to an antecedent decision to carry out R&D. This calls for an empirical approach that permits the joint analysis of the determinants of the two decisions, correcting for sample selectivity. Based on a sample of Italian manufacturing firms, the results confirm the need to adopt this approach. Another contribution made by this study is the managerial implications that can be derived from its empirical model, which provide a better understanding of the factors associated with a firm's decision to engage in R&D both independently and with external partners.     

Cooperative Goals,Leader People and Productivity Values: Their Contribution to Top Management Teams in China*

abstract This study proposes that when top management team members are convinced that their leader is committed to people and productivity, they conclude that their leader is effective and contribute to making their organization innovative. Cooperative goals among top management team members may be credible evidence that their leader has people and production values. Executives from over 100 organizations in China completed measures of their cooperative, competitive, and independent goals, their leader's people and production values, and their leader's effectiveness. CEOs from these firms rated their organization's innovativeness. Structural equation analysis suggested that cooperative goals among top management teams convince them that their leader values people and production and that these values in turn result in leader effectiveness and organizational innovation. Results, coupled with previous research, were interpreted as suggesting that cooperative goals and leader people and production values are foundations for leader and top management team effectiveness in China.     

Management of Sino-Sino Joint Ventures

Abstract

Since China's implementation of its open-door policy in 1979, the most effective way to obtain a foothold has proved to be to create joint ventures (JV) with a Chinese business partner. The foreign partner provides the transfer of technology, management skills, financing and access to international markets, whilst the Chinese partner contributes a production base with cheap land and labor, contacts with central and local government officials and access to the domestic Chinese market. The Chinese economy has benefited to a large extent from the creation of joint ventures in the past two decades. Hong Kong firms have used China as a production base for many years, usually with great success and to the mutual benefit of both. However, although Hong Kong firms had considerable experiences in running business and manufacturing operations in China, several have suffered substantially from their investment in joint ventures with Chinese partners. This paper evaluates various issues relating to the performance of equity joint ventures in China. The evaluation is based on a case study of four Sino-Hong Kong joint venture manufacturing firms in the electronics industry, and the findings of this paper indicate that there are number of important factors affecting the stability of joint ventures in China. Foreign investors' experiences in other areas may not be applicable to their investment in China because the operation of a joint venture in China is inevitably faced with a variety of problems that the foreign firms may not have encountered before.     

Endogenous R&D spillovers and locational choice with discriminatory pricing

We present a model of spatial price discrimination where R&D spillovers are endogenous as they depend on firms' location. We establish that both the distance between locations and R&D efforts are an increasing function of the transportation cost coefficient and show that there is a continuum of cases where firms will choose an intermediate location. The managerial implications from the model are discussed using examples of marketing behavior by Internet retailers. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.