谱写产权市场大发展的新篇章——2021年第9期封面回眸

上海联交所要紧紧抓住新一轮国资国企深化改革和推进落实要素市场化配置体制机制改革、构建全要素、全资源一体化大市场的重大历史机遇,发扬与时俱进、努力拼搏的精神,以全面深化改革为动力,以创新发展为主线,谱写产权市场新一轮大发展的新篇章。在《中国金融家》2021年9月刊上,上海联合产权交易所党委书记'董事长周小全作为封面人物,发表署名文章,为读者讲述中国产权市场在“十四五”规划下的新发展机遇。     

REFORMING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LAND AND TENANCY

This article examines the nature and distribution of propertyrights in land and how they are changing under economic anddemographic pressures. It also analyzes the practical chancesof success of several alternative forms of policy interventionto redistribute property rights and regulate tenancy. This analysisbegins with the political economy of land reform in the twentiethcentury. It draws a distinction between reforms precipitatedby social upheaval (defeat in war, social revolution, or nationalliberation) and those that occur in "normal" times, when thesocial and political order is more secure. It is argued thatthe former have been much more important and, drawing on examples,that the latter face formidable obstacles. In this connection,it is proposed that a tax reform which does away with the highlyselective subsidies and exemptions that benefit the rich andinflate the price of land should be undertaken first. Then,when land prices have fallen, compulsory purchase of land forredistribution, at close to fair market value to ensure itspolitical acceptability, would not entail an intolerable fiscalburden. Where tenancy is concerned, it is argued that this institutionis commonly a socially useful market response, which providesopportunities for the fuller employment of family resourcesand, over the long run, for individual mobility. Thus interventionsdesigned to inhibit tenancy directly or to transfer ownership-likerights to existing tenants may result in heavy costs, especiallyfor future cohorts of would-be tenants.      

权利质押及其在商业银行信贷管理中的应用

权利质押是与财产抵押并行的物权担保方式.与抵押相比,权利质押具有价值量大且较稳定、操作简便、易于控制且可变现程度高等优点,更乐于为债权人所接受.商业银行等金融机构在经营管理过程中正确地运用这种担保方式,对防范和化解金融风险,提高资产质量和经济效益等具有重要意义.本文从分析权利质押的基本特征入手,重点剖析了权利质押的构成要件、种类、设定及权利质权的实现方式以及在商业银行信贷管理中的重要作用,并对理论和实践中存在的一些疑难问题提出了自己的见解,尤其对国库券代保管凭证、公法上的财产权作质押等问题进行了探索.     

郭树清:提高市场透明度 促进股市长远发展

这一年,证监会各个部门的处长们很忙,各地的证监局局长们很忙;这一年,券商们很忙;这一年,关注资本市场的记者也很忙。他们的忙碌都事起同样一个原因,那就是郭树清提出的一系列施政措施。其中,最为外界津津乐道的就是今年五一小长假,证监会四政连发,充当了不折不扣的劳模:降低期货交易手续费,公布新股发行改革指导意见,     

实现企业“知产”变“资产”——2021年第12期封面回眸

中国银行作为国有大型商业银行,近年来一直聚焦“专精特新”客群,构建起“银政协作+专属产品+专项服务”的一体化综合金融服务体系,助力“专精特新”中小企业转型升级、实现高质量发展。中央经济工作会议提出,要提升制造业核心竞争力,激发涌现一大批“专精特新”企业。作为国有大行,中国银行为“专精特新”企业提供了哪些差异化的金融服务?     

CAPITAL STRUCTURE,SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS,AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

We show how capital structure is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. Our empirical evidence shows an inverse relation between leverage and shareholder rights, suggesting that firms adopt higher debt ratios where shareholder rights are more restricted. This is consistent with agency theory, which predicts that leverage helps alleviate agency problems. This negative relation, however, is not found in regulated firms (i.e., utilities). We contend that this is because regulation already helps alleviate agency conflicts and, hence, mitigates the role of leverage in controlling agency costs.     

MARKET POWER IN THE PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY

Abstract: Pro-consumer groups have charged that insurance firms are able to exercise market power to reduce coverage and/or increase rates. The ability of firms to earn economic rents (abnormal profits) is a factor in banks' interest in entering insurance markets. In classical economics such collusion is usually only possible with cartels. Recent work, examining the relationship between industry structure indicates that the power that can be exercised by cartels may be more limited than under the classical paradigms. We examine the ability of insurers to exercise market power in light of these modern theories.     

THE LEGALITY OF THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS BY-LAW IN DELAWARE: PRESERVING THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

Just as some lawyers almost killed the takeover market with the invention of the poison pill in the 1980s, others are now about to reinvigorate it with another legal invention. The “shareholder rights bylaw,” which promises to be the next major legal battleground in the market for corporate control, aims to eliminate the current ability of target company boards of directors to block changes of control by keeping their poison pill defenses in place. The new bylaws require the poison pill (and other defensive measures) to expire automatically whenever the firm receives an allcash offer for 100% of the firm's stock at a price at least 25% above the prebid market price. The firm can keep its poison pill, but only if shareholders vote to keep it after receiving the offer. Although the legality of the share-holder rights bylaw has been challenged as an undue infringement on boards of directors' power to run companies, this article argues that their legality will be upheld for three reasons:

• ? First, shareholder rights bylaws merely reinforce the corporate manager's responsibility to manage the firm to maximize shareholder value.
• ? Second, Delaware and most other jurisdictions give shareholders the specific right to amend the bylaws of a corporation; and the shareholder rights by-law is a straightforward exercise of this explicit right granted to shareholders.
• ? Third, the adoption of shareholders rights by-law does not prevent the board of directors from advising share-holders to vote to reject a takeover bid, nor does it prevent shareholders from giving management the authority to use defensive mechanisms such as the poison pill.

As the article concludes, upholding this right of shareholders to choose whether a poison pill is used to block a takeover is critical to the vitality of the takeover market and, hence, to the preservation of the agency relationship between directors and shareholders. Upholding this right may also prove critical to Delaware's ability to maintain its predominance in the market for corporate chartering.     

LIFO-FIFO, ACCOUNTING RATIOS AND MARKET RISK: A RE-ASSESSMENT

This paper re-examines the effect of the inventory costing method on the association between accounting risk measures (ARMs) and market risk, and extends earlier research in several respects. The groups of FIFO and LIFO firms are matched on the basis of various financial characteristics to reduce selfselection bias, and the effect of inventory costing methods on the usefulness of ARMs in predicting market risk is investigated. The findings indicate that predictions based on FIFO show an improvement on market based predictions, but predictions based on LIFO fail to show such an improvement.     

“转融通”引来的资金活水：有效对接货币市场与证券市场

在过去,证券公司只是单纯地凭经纪业务取胜,靠天吃饭,而转融通业务的推出标志着—个全新的金融创新时代的到来。     

ERODING MARKET IMPERFECTIONS,REINTERMEDIATION, AND DISINTERMEDIATION

In this paper a search model of a financial market, generalized to include costly contracting, is employed to demonstrate that: (i) relative cost efficiency for an intermediary is not sufficient to explain a role for intermediation services, and (ii) eroding market imperfections do not produce hypothesized effects on “reintermediation” from traditional depository-type intermediaries to brokerage-type intermediaries and on “disintermediation” from indirect financing to direct financing under a set of justifiable assumptions.