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1.
Summary. Boldrin and Montrucchio [2] showed that any twice continuously differentiable function could be obtained as the optimal policy function for some value of the discount parameter in a deterministic neoclassical growth model. I extend their result to the stochastic growth model with non-degenerate shocks to preferences or technology. This indicates that one can obtain complex dynamics endogenously in a wide variety of economic models, both under certainty and uncertainty. Further, this result motivates the analysis of convergence of adaptive learning mechanisms to rational expectations in economic models with (potentially) complicated dynamics. Received: June 21, 1996; revised version: October 31, 1996  相似文献   

2.
Summary. Using a mixed market model for analyzing imperfectly competitive economies, we maximize the oligopolists' Welfare Function, given individual rationality and feasibility constraints. We prove that solutions belong to the core for a large class of economies. This class includes, in particular, every monopoly having a single type of small traders. Note that all such solutions yield the large trader, utility-wise, strictly more than at any monopoly solution, where the monopolist plays strategically, and the ocean of small traders act as being as price-takers. Received: March 4, 1996; revised version July 7, 1996  相似文献   

3.
Summary. Convergence of the cores of finite economies to the set of Walrasian allocations as the number of agents grows has long been taken as one of the basic tests of perfect competition. The present paper examines this test in the most natural model of commodity differentiation: the commodity space is the space of nonnegative measures, endowed with the topology of weak convergence. In Anderson and Zame [12], we gave counterexamples to core convergence in L 1, a space in which core convergence holds for replica economies and core equivalence holds for continuum economies; in addition, we gave a core convergence theorem under the assumption that traders' utility functions exhibit uniformly vanishing marginal utility at infinity. In this paper, we provide two core convergence results for the commodity differentiation model. A key technical virtue of this space is that relatively large sets (in particular, closed norm-bounded sets) are compact. This permits us to invoke a version of the Shapley-Folkman Theorem for compact subsets of an infinite-dimensional space. We show that, for sufficiently large economies in which endowments come from a norm bounded set, preferences satisfy an equidesirability condition, and either (i) preferences exhibit uniformly bounded marginal rates of substitution or (ii) endowments come from an order-bounded set, core allocations can be approximately decentralized by prices. Received: July 29, 1996; revised version: January 14, 1997  相似文献   

4.
Summary. This paper generalizes Segerstrom [5], a dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous growth through quality improvements in which innovation and imitation are modeled as the outcomes of research and development (R&D) races. Specific factors introduced into the technologies of both R&D activities achieve diminishing returns to scale in R&D. The comparative-static results of subsidies to R&D activities depend on the degree of diminishing returns to scale in R&D. When there is (is not) a sufficient degree of diminishing returns to R&D, a subsidy to innovative activity increases (decreases) innovative activity. Received: July 8, 1994; revised version: June 9, 1997  相似文献   

5.
Summary. This article reexamines the role of consumption in growth and emphasises the external effects of aggregate consumption, viewed as consumption standards, as an additional impediment in the growth process. These external effects raise the productivity of the individuals and are positively related to their valuation of the future. Conditions are established under which this results in a marginal value of wealth that is an increasing function of consumption. This brings new types of multiple steady states, local indeterminacies and cyclical motions. Imposing extra homogeneity restrictions, balanced growth solutions with endogenous impatience emerge. The possibility of multiple convergent paths is univocally related to endogenous discount effects. A comparison with a benchmark planning economy indicates an excessive value for the rate of time preference and emphasises its insufficient adaptation to future utility in a stationary setting. Discrepancies along the transition path that rest on endogenous impatience versus fixed discount appear in a non-stationary environment when the competitive balanced growth solution is indeterminate. Received: May 5, 1996; revised version: May 19, 1997  相似文献   

6.
Summary. If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y). Received: August 29, 1996; revised version: March 24, 1997  相似文献   

7.
  总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Summary. This paper studies conditions under which the price of an asset is uniquely determined by its fundamental value – i.e., no bubbles can arise – in Lucas-type asset pricing models with unbounded utility. After discussing Gilles and LeRoy's (1992) example, we construct an example of a two-period, representative agent economy to demonstrate that bubbles can arise in a standard model if utility is unbounded below, in which case the stochastic Euler equation may be violated. In an infinite horizon framework, we show that bubbles cannot arise if the optimal sequence of asset holdings can be lowered uniformly without incurring an infinite utility loss. Using this result, we develop conditions for the nonexistence of bubbles. The conditions depend exclusively on the asymptotic behavior of marginal utility at zero and infinity. They are satisfied by many unbounded utility functions, including the entire CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) class. The Appendix provides a complete market version of our two-period example. Received: January 22, 1996; revised version: February 18, 1997  相似文献   

8.
Summary. This paper reports on the use of laboratory experimental techniques to create relatively complete economic systems. The creation of these market systems reflects a first attempt to explore the nature of inherently interdependent environments and to assess the ability of simultaneous equations equilibrium models like the classical static general competitive equilibrium model, to predict aspects of system behaviors. In addition, the impact of the quantity of a fiat money was studied. The economies were successfully created. Classical models capture much of what was observed. Received: May 21, 1996; revised version: May 21, 1997  相似文献   

9.
Ed Nosal 《Economic Theory》1997,10(3):413-435
Summary. When players are unable to write complete state contingent contracts it is shown, within the context of a non-cooperative contracting-renegotiation game, that the only subgame perfect equilibrium allocations are those that correspond to the set of first-best allocations. Players are able to implement this set of allocations by signing an initial contract that is subsequently renegotiated in all states of the world. The contracting-renegotiation problem is complicated in an interesting way by assuming that the state space is continuous. The issue of the existence of an initial contract, that is subsequently renegotiated to the set of first-best allocations, must be resolved. Unlike Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey [1994], the results here do not require nor depend upon the comonotonicity of the objective functions. Received: January 27, 1995; revised version July 1, 1996  相似文献   

10.
Consumption choice and asset pricing with a non-price-taking agent   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Summary. This paper develops a pure-exchange model to study the consumption-portfolio problem of an agent who acts as a non-price-taker, and to analyze the implications of his behavior on equilibrium security prices. The non-price-taker is modeled as a price leader in all markets; his price impact is then recast as a dependence of the Arrow-Debreu prices on his consumption, allowing a tractable formulation. Besides the aggregate consumption, the endowment of the non-price-taker appears as an additional factor in driving equilibrium allocations and prices. Comparisons of equilibria between a price-taking and a non-price-taking economy are carried out. Received: March 29, 1996; revised version October 29, 1996  相似文献   

11.
Summary. In the model presented, a buyer uses competitive bidding to facilitate her purchase of a good (the primary good of the exchange). Not included in the original purchase is the possible procurement of a good related to the original purchase: the supplementary good. The primary and supplementary goods are closely related; knowing a bidder's cost of producing the primary good implies that the buyer can infer the bidder's cost of producing the supplementary good. I show that a bidding mechanism for the primary good will fail to ensure an efficient allocation if the buyer learns the bid of the winner and the price of the supplementary good is determined through sequential bargaining. Received: August 22, 1996; revised version: June 23, 1997  相似文献   

12.
Summary. We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.Received: January 22, 1996; revised version: September 24, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.  相似文献   

13.
Summary. We study sunspot immunity in a dynamic monetary economy in which consumers are allowed to trade put and call option contracts on the general price level. We define the concept of strong sunspot immunity to characterize economies that have no sunspot equilibria regardless of the number of extrinsic states and their probabilities of occurrence. We show that a small number of option contracts can make an economy strongly sunspot immune. In addition, we demonstrate how asset re-trading opportunities, and the associated capital gains and losses, reduce the number of options needed for this result to obtain. Received: August 13, 1996; revised version: January 20, 1997  相似文献   

14.
Summary . This note extends the example of Gale (1963) by considering the continuous time tatonnement process for a class of two agent, two commodity exchange economies, parametrized by a number μ∈(0,1). We demonstrate that as the parameter passes a threshold value μ* the unique, globally stable competitive equilibrium loses local stability while two new locally stable equilibria appear. Intuitively, as μ increases the income effect become increasingly more important relative to substitution effect, and eventually overwhelms the latter. As the parameter μ approaches 1, the economy tends to the example considered by Gale, as does the limiting behavior of the tatonnement. Received: February 28, 1996; revised version August 5, 1996  相似文献   

15.
Summary. The main requirements for equivalence of the core of an economy and the Walrasian equilibrium allocations are largeness and the freedom to form almost arbitrary coalitions in the Edgeworthian barter processes. We investigate whether constraints on coalition formation and coalitional barter alter these insights. Our notion of the semi-core imposes a restriction on the collection of formable coalitions that does not affect the fundamental equivalence property. Using our concept of the contract-core we show that additional constraints on coalitional barter can only be alleviated within an environment with sufficiently many formable coalitions: besides a contract-core equivalence theorem we show certain non-equivalence results.Received: December 11, 1995; revised version: September 17, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.  相似文献   

16.
Summary. This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment. Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: May 28, 1997  相似文献   

17.
Summary. In this paper we re-examine generic constrained suboptimality of equilibrium allocations with incomplete numeraire asset markets. We provide a general framework which is capable of resolving some issues left open by the previous literature, and encompasses many kinds of intervention in partially controlled market economies. In particular, we establish generic constrained suboptimality, as studied by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, even without an upper bound on the number of households. Moreover, we consider the case where asset markets are left open, and the planner can make lump-sum transfers in a limited number of goods. We show that such a perfectly anticipated wealth redistribution policy, though consistent with the assumed incomplete financial structure, is typically effective. Received: August 14, 1995; revised version: April 11, 1997  相似文献   

18.
    
Summary.  This paper contributes to the recent focus on dynamics in noncooperative games when players use inductive learning. The most well-known inductive learning rule, Brown’s fictitious play, is known to converge for games, yet many examples exist where fictitious play reasoning fails to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Building on ideas from chaotic dynamics, this paper develops a geometric conceptualization of instability in games, allowing for a reinterpretation of existing results and suggesting avenues for new results. Received: October 27, 1995 revised version May 2, 1996  相似文献   

19.
Summary. We consider the problem of reallocating the total initial endowments of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. With the uniform reallocation rule we propose a solution which satisfies many appealing properties, describing the effect of population and endowment variations on the outcome. The central properties which are studied in this context are population monotonicity, bilateral consistency, (endowment) monotonicity and (endowment) strategy-proofness. Furthermore, the uniform reallocation rule is Pareto optimal and satisfies several equity conditions, e.g., equal-treatment and envy-freeness. We study the trade-off between properties concerning variation and properties concerning equity. Furthermore, we provide several characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule based on these properties. Received: August 29, 1995; revised version June 26, 1996  相似文献   

20.
Summary. We offer an alternative approach to the study of representability of choice behavior in a competitive framework that is based on recent advances in utility theory (cf. Alcantud and Rodrí guez-Palmero (1999)). Our technique enables us to tackle this classical problem efficiently in fairly general situations, thus obtaining alternative sufficient conditions as well as different proofs and generalizations of prior results. Received: July 14, 1999; revised version: February 15, 2001  相似文献   

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