Dynamic labor contracts with temporary layoffs and permanent separations

Summary. We study the implications of optimal dynamic contracts in private information environments for fluctuations in effort and employment across time and productivity states. To this end, we incorporate temporary layoffs and permanent separations as well as on-the-job effort variations into a dynamic model of moral hazard. We consider two different “commitment” environments. In a “full commitment” environment, although the firm can temporarily lay a worker off, neither party can dissolve the contractual relationship once it has been initiated. On the other hand, in a “limited commitment” environment, both parties can dissolve the relationship at the beginning of any period in order to pursue an outside option. We use our model to study the implications of optimal contracts for incentives, employment histories, layoffs and separations across full information, full commitment and limited commitment settings. We compute solutions to the relevant principal-agent problems, endogenously determining the set of states in which separations occur and the domain of the firm's value function, as well as the value function itself. Received: February 28, 2000; revised version: January 21, 2001     

The dynamics of financial development,globalisation, economic growth and life expectancy in sub‐Saharan Africa

The importance of life expectancy is recognised in the development economics literature because of its increasing effects on labour productivity and economic growth in long‐run. However, no published study to date empirically examines the nonlinear relationships between globalisation, financial development, economic growth and life expectancy in sub‐Saharan African (SSA) countries. Therefore, our study intends to fill this gap by using non‐parametric cointegration test and multivariate Granger causality test towards a non‐linear empirical understanding of the factors affecting the life expectancy. We consider the case of 16 sub‐Saharan African economies using annual data over the period 1970–2012. The empirical analysis indicates that financial development, globalisation and economic growth appear to have a positive impact upon life expectancy in sub‐Saharan African economies, except for Gabon and Togo. Our empirical findings may provide insightful policy implications towards improving population health conditions which are vital for promoting the productivity of labour force and long‐run economic growth in sub‐Saharan African countries. In light of these policy implications, governments should incorporate globalisation, financial development and economic growth as key economic instruments in formulating sustainable developmental policy to promote life expectancy for the people in sub‐Saharan African countries.     

Fixed-term contracts as a source of labour demand fluctuations

Employment fluctuations are one of the central issues in the business cycle literature. The fluctuations depend crucially not only on the economic conditions but also on the labour market institutions. Since most previous studies have assumed indefinite-term contracts (ITC) implicitly, the implications of fixed-term contracts (FTC) on dynamic labour demand have been rather overlooked. This article investigates dynamic labour demand of a firm with FTC to show that the employment fluctuations under FTC can be totally different from those under ITC. In particular, a productivity shock that takes place at a future date generates the current fluctuations in employment under FTC, while it does not under ITC.     

Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments

It is well known that signing publicly observable contracts with third parties is a means of credibly committing to certain actions and hence may yield strategic advantages. Previous work on the commitment value of unobservable contracts has been limited to normal form games and extensive form games in which only one party has the option to sign a contract. In this paper, we extend the analysis to extensive form games in which both players can sign contracts, and characterize the set of sequential equilibria. We show that any Nash equilibrium outcome of the original game in which both players receive more than their individually rational payoffs can be supported as a sequential equilibrium outcome. Therefore, delegation acts not only as a commitment device to gain advantage over the opponent, but also as a cooperative device to attain Pareto improvements over the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. I would like to thank Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Jean-Pierre Benoit, Alberto Bisin, Boyan Jovanovic, Ehud Kalai, Giuseppe Lopomo, George Mailath, Efe Ok, Ariel Rubinstein, Andy Schotter, seminar participants at various universities and conferences, and anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and Program for Economic Research at Columbia University is also gratefully acknowledged.     

Imperfectly competitive cycles with Keynesian and Walrasian features

We consider a multi-sector overlapping generations model with oligopolistic firms in the output markets and wage-setting trade unions in the labour markets. A coordination problem between firms creates multiple temporary equilibria which are either Walrasian or of the Keynesian unemployment type. There exist many deterministic and stochastic equilibrium cycles fluctuating between Keynesian recession and Walrasian boom periods with arbitrarily long phases in each regime. The cycles are in accordance with certain empirical regularities. Money is neutral and superneutral, but appropriate countercyclical fiscal policies stabilize the cycles in a textbook Keynesian way.     

Informality in an economy with active labour courts

Job regulations and the justice branch interfere on several aspects of labour contracts. We build a model which explores the role of labour courts on the wage distribution in both formal and informal sectors. We obtain that the presence of active labour courts produces a negative relation between the wage gap and the productivity of the worker, a regularity documented in the empirical literature. Active labour courts also reduce informality of unskilled workers but do not have an impact on informality of skilled workers. Some elements and implications of our model are tested using Brazilian data.     

Does Price Stability Exacerbate Labour Market Rigidities in the EMU?

How will the commitment to price stability affect labour market rigidities in the European Monetary Union? I explore a model where firms choose between fixed wage contracts (where the employer cannot lay off the worker, and the wage can only be changed by mutual consent), or contracts where employment is at will, so that either party may terminate employment (with strong similarities to temporary jobs). A fixed wage contract provides better incentives for investment and training, while employment at will facilitates efficient mobility. Inflation erodes the real value of a fixed contract wage over time, and badly matched workers are more likely to quit for other jobs. Disinflation has opposing effects on labour market rigidity: fixed wage contracts become more rigid in real terms, but fewer firms will choose fixed wage contracts.     

Strategic Innovation with Complete and Incomplete Labour Market Contracts

In a model of strategic R&D competition between two firms that negotiate with independent unions we show that: (i) incomplete labour market contracts may Pareto-dominate complete labour market contracts (ii) even when complete contracts Pareto-dominate incomplete contracts, economies can get stuck in the incomplete contract equilibrium. These conclusions provide additional strategic reasons why complete labour market contracts may not be used—even if they were feasible. We propose two testable predictions to discriminate between complete and incomplete contracts: (i) the variance of wages is lower with complete contracts; (ii) the variance of employment is higher under complete contracts.     

Domestic institutions,agglomerations and foreign direct investment in Europe

Recent developments in the economics of location emphasise the endogeniety of locational advantages during the process of European integration. We explore the relative importance of host country labour institutions and agglomerations using an industry-level panel data set on the location of investments by US multinational firms in Europe. The results indicate that centripetal and centrifugal forces are both important. New growth theories also suggest that international transfers of technology and knowledge through FDI may affect the performance of host economies. We consider the benefits from inward investment in four EU economies and present empirical evidence of significant spillovers from inward investment on technical progress. The potential for agglomerations to attract new investments which then influence the growth process has important implications for national policies, as it means that the size of nations is to be determined in the process of European integration, not just taken as given.     

Labour market implications of EU product market integration

European labour markets are in a state of flux due to the changing market situation induced by international integration. This process affects wage formation through more fierce product market competition and increased mobility of jobs. This development is by some observers taken to enforce labour market flexibility, while for others it signals an erosion of social standards and in turn possibly the welfare society. Since labour is not very mobile in Europe, the effects of international integration on labour markets are mostly indirect via product market integration. We review the channels through which product market integration affects labour markets and perform an empirical analysis of the convergence and interdependencies in wage formation among EU countries. We find that integration is changing labour market structures and inducing wage convergences as well as stronger wage interdependencies, but it is a gradual process. Moreover, the present study does not support the view that international integration will lead to a 'race to the bottom' and rapidly erode domestic labour markets standards, nor that it will relieve politicians of the need to consider labour market reforms to improve labour market performance.     

Individual accountability in teams

We consider a model of team production in which the principal observes only the team output, but agents can monitor one another (at a cost) and provide reports to the principal. We consider the problem faced by a principal who is prevented from penalizing an agent without evidence showing that the agent failed to complete his assigned actions. We show the first-best (high effort but no monitoring) can be achieved, but only if the principal assigns second-best actions. The principal requires monitoring, but agents do not monitor, and as long as output is high, the principal does not penalize agents who fail to monitor. If the principal has the responsibility for monitoring, the first-best outcome cannot be achieved, thus we identify an incentive for delegated monitoring even when agents have no informational advantage.     

Institutions,capital stock and wage setting in Spain

This article confronts two distinct perspectives of the labour market: the institutionalist view?–?highlighting equilibrium and labour market institutions?–?and the Chain Reaction Theory?–?emphasizing dynamics and the growth drivers’ role in labour market performance. We consider the ratio of public to private capital stock as a growth driver relevant to the labour market; provide different economic rationales for this ratio to exert a negative influence in wage setting; and explore its empirical relevance in the context of a wage setting curve for Spain comprising the standard variables. There are two main results. First, several institutional variables taken to be critical to explain unemployment in the mainstream literature are not relevant for the Spanish wage setting curve. Second, there is a negative and significant influence of the ratio of public to private capital stock, which is robust to different specifications of the wage setting equation.     

Temporary Migration, Human Capital, and Language Fluency of Migrants

This paper investigates human capital investment of immigrants whose duration in the host country is limited, either by contract or by their own choice. The first part of the paper develops a model which distinguishes between temporary migrations where the return time is exogenous or optimally chosen. The analysis has a number of interesting implications for empirical work, some of which are explored in the second part of the paper. The analysis focuses on language capital and tests the hypothesis that country specific human capital investments are sensitive to the duration in the host country's labour market. The results show that the acquisition of language capital is sensitive to the intended duration in the host country.     

Individual labour income,stock prices and whom it may concern

In this paper, a panel model which describes the relationship between individual labour income and stock prices in Germany is estimated. The specification allows the individuals to cluster concerning the model parameters that describe first the individual labour income dynamics and second the relationship between the individual labour income and financial markets. Methodically, a Bayesian model-based non-Gaussian panel data approach, proposed by Juarez and Steel (2010a), is used. A group of individuals with a high cluster assignment probability is found. The characteristics of this group, whose individuals share the same autoregressive dynamics and a common, relatively high dependence on financial markets, are investigated further. It can be shown that this group has a statistically significantly different partition of the major occupational groups. This leads to implications for various branches of the literature, such as the pricing of human capital contracts, the hedging of individual income risk, portfolio optimization or asset pricing.     

Testing for separability between commodity demand and labour supply in West Germany

In this paper we use a methodology for testing for separability of commodity demands from male and female labour supply on a single cross section. In the empirical section of our paper we apply the methodology to a representative micro data base for West Germany. We estimate the corresponding demand systems for nine goods, analyse their economic properties and test the hypothesis that male and female leisure are separable from commodity demand. We reject the hypothesis that goods are separable from male and female time. Moreover, we show the implications of our results for optimal taxation of goods and labour supply.     

Unemployment,long-term employment relations and the determination of unit labour cost growth in US manufacturing industries

This paper examines the effect that unemployment and long-term employment relations exert on the determination of unit labour costs. The paper proceeds in three sections. Section one analyses the relationship between labour market conditions and unit labour costs by developping a simple model of a firm that relies upon dismissal threats to elicit work effort. The comparative static properties of this model suggest that a tightening of labour markets may result in an increase in unit labour costs. In addition, it is argued that the labour market disequilibrium that occurs at full employment levels of unemployment will likely result in an increase in the growth rate of unit labour costs. The second section of the paper reviews diverse theories of long-term employment relations (LTERs), each of which suggest that the presence of LTERs ought to reduce the effect that labour market conditions exert on unit labour costs. The third section of the paper presents empirical estimates of the effect unemployment and LTERs exert on unit labour costs. The central empirical findings can be briefly summarized. First, movements towards full employment increase the growth rate of wages, reduce the growth rate of labour productivity and increase the growth rate of unit labour costs. Secondly, where long-term employment relations are prevalent, the effect of unemployment on wage, labour productivity, and unit labour cost growth is diminished. The paper concludes by discussing the implications these findings have for effort regulation models and the macroeconomic foundations of microeconomic labour market structures     

New forms of labour contract and labour flexibility in Russia

This paper assesses the claims that employment in the new Russian private sector relies heavily on informal and unregistered labour agreements and that the violation of existing labour law by new private employers is driven by their need for more flexible working arrangements.
The paper shows that these claims are unsupported on every count. The new private sector does not rely heavily on informal or illegal forms of employment and there is no evidence that it uses labour more flexibly, in any of the usual senses of the term, than the traditional sectors of the economy. The conclusion is that there is no economic justification for the systematic violation of the existing labour legislation. It is suggested, therefore, that enforcement of the existing law is a precondition for its effective reform in those areas in which it might be a barrier to restructuring.     

Effect of the Tax System ON R&D Intensity,Growth, Wages and Consumption Share

We propose a general equilibrium knowledge‐driven (semi‐)endogenous‐growth model with horizontal R&D, which is extended to consider two types of labour, skilled and unskilled, and exogenous government expenditure, financed through taxes on financial assets and on labour income, to analyse the implications of the tax system on R&D intensity, economic growth, wage inequality and consumption share in the output. In particular, we show that: (i) taxes have negative influence in the consumption share, being higher the marginal effect of the labour‐income tax; (ii) for any given government expenditure share, an increase (a decrease) in financial‐assets tax decreases (increases) the labour‐income tax; (iii) only the financial‐assets tax affects negatively the R&D intensity and the skill‐premium; thus, to reduce the skill‐premium the financial‐assets tax must increase; (iv) ignoring the effect on wage inequality and on R&D intensity, taxes are substitutes.     

Barriers to network-specific investment

We examine incentives for network-specific investment and consider the implications for network governance. We model a two-sided market in which participants making payments over a network platform can invest in a technology that reduces the marginal cost of using the platform. A network effect results in multiple equilibria—either all agents invest and use of the platform is high or no agents invest and use of the platform is low. The high-use equilibrium can be implemented if commitment is feasible. When the platform cannot commit to usage fees, investment in the platform-specific technology will be held up, thus implementing the low-investment equilibrium. As a result, governance structures necessary to achieve commitment will be preferred to those necessary merely to achieve coordination. For example, mutual ownership by users of a network platform may emerge where users face risk of ex post renegotiation. Such a governance structure will also be sufficient to avoid low investment attributable to the network effect.     

Employment protection and productivity: evidence from firm-level panel data in Japan

Recent developments in the literature on Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) have revealed that changing the stringency of employment protection can lead to extensive consequences outside the labour market, by affecting firms’ production decisions or workers’ commitment levels. This article provides the first empirical evaluation of the comprehensive effect of restrictions on firing employees in Japan, by exploiting the variations in court decisions. We find that judgements lenient to workers significantly reduce firms’ total-factor productivity growth rate. The effect on capital is mixed and inconclusive, although we obtain modest evidence that an increase in firing costs induces a negative scale effect on capital inputs.