经济政策不确定性对市场定价效率影响研究——股票论坛应用下的互联网社交媒体调节作用北大核心CSSCI

经济政策不确定性影响着资本市场参与者的行为,进而影响资本市场信息环境。互联网的产生与发展显著改变了个体的信息获取与决策方式,作为信息技术应用最广泛的领域之一,互联网社交媒体对投资者行为的影响不断扩大。本文基于2008—2018年A股上市公司年度数据,从股价信息含量角度,探究了经济政策不确定性对资本市场定价效率的影响。在此基础上,检验了以股吧为代表的互联网社交媒体对该影响的调节作用。研究表明:经济政策不确定性增大了资本市场信息不对称,降低了股价信息含量;互联网社交媒体的应用有助于减小经济政策不确定性的负面影响,提高股价信息含量,从而有助于提高资本市场定价效率。进一步探究表明,经济政策不确定性对不同会计信息质量及投资者结构的企业均具有负面影响,但互联网社交媒体的调节作用在会计信息质量较低及机构投资者比例较低的企业更加突出。     

关于当代金融理财市场发展方向的探讨

随着我国市场经济的发展,国民收入分配体制的改革和完善,我国居民的家庭收入和个人收入逐渐增加。同时,由于生活中的不确定性增多,个人理财需求增长迅速,发展金融理财市场,在微观上看有利于提高家庭收入水平,在宏观上看,可以实现我国的资源的有效配置,加强金融理财市场的管理,促进其有效发展对促进我国经济和谐发展意义重大。本文阐述了金融理财市场的相关概念,深入分析了金融理财市场的发展过程,并对金融理财市场的发展方向进行了相应的探讨和思考。     

证券承销商声誉机制初探

承销商是证券发行市场中最为重要的信息生产者,然其信息生产功能和“第三方认证中介”功能是建立在承销商声誉基础之上的。规模、定价水平、业绩记录、专业资格、长期绩效等是证券承销商声誉机制的约束因素。建立声誉机制有一系列基本条件,声誉状况的信号显示和传递机制、失信行为的惩罚机制、长期预期形成机制等是承销商声誉形成机制的重要条件。     

证券承销商声誉机制初探

承销商是证券发行市场中最为重要的信息生产者,然其信息生产功能和“第三方认证中介”功能是建立在承销商声誉基础之上的.规模、定价水平、业绩记录、专业资格、长期绩效等是证券承销商声誉机制的约束因素.建立声誉机制有一系列基本条件,声誉状况的信号显示和传递机制、失信行为的惩罚机制、长期预期形成机制等是承销商声誉形成机制的重要条件.     

我国商业银行理财市场定价效率研究

我国商业银行理财市场的定价效率也称为信息效率,是指理财产品价格反映信息的能力,或者说是价格反映全部相关信息的速度和准确性。本文首先阐述了研究我国银行理财市场效率的重要性与意义,然后介绍了前人对定价效率进行实证分析的几种常用方法,指出其中的不足。在此基础之上,以四大商业银行为例,使用数据包络分析方法 (DEA)对我国商业银行理财市场的定价效率进行了实证分析,表明2004年至2013年总体上我国银行理财市场定价效率较高,说明银行理财产品在推动国内存款利率市场化的过程中发挥了非常重要的先导作用。2008年与2009年度由于宏观经济的波动,各行的理财产品定价也出现了比较区间内最大的波动现象,这说明产业层面的环境变动对理财产品的定价效率有着显著的影响。     

电子商务环境下的中介问题研究

在Internet商务中，一般认为买卖双方的交易将不再需要中介。然而柠檬问题的解决需要依靠能给顾客提供可靠信息的可信赖的中介。当电子商务市场中有多重的买主和卖主时，买主很难靠名字辨别出卖主。特别是购买一次性的小件物品时，搜索和了解所有的潜在卖主的花费太大了。在卖方和公共第三方都不能充分解决质量不确定性的市场中，以中介为基础的市场机制可以比没有中介或规则的制度下的市场机制更有效，它们通过传送产品信息，成功高效地调节贸易。虽然，中介的主要经济作用是提高交易效率来降低产品生产成本和交易成本，但正像柠檬问题的存在会导致市场崩溃一样，中介的最重要的作用在于；如果没有它们，市场将无法运作。     

个人理财求新求变不断成长

银行的个人理财业务是银行利用自身的网点、业务、信息等各方面优势,接受居民个人委托而代为其理财的中介服务活动.随着储蓄存款利率的降低、社会保障制度的建立、居民资产的增加和各种投资渠道的不断丰富,个人理财活动具备了现实的前提和基础,形成了集中的专家式理财服务的广阔市场.     

24 个人理财求新求变不断成长

银行的个人理财业务是银行利用自身的网点、业务、信息等各方面优势,接受居民个人委托而代为其理财的中介服务活动。随着储蓄存款利率的降低、社会保障制度的建立、居民资产的增加和各种投资渠道的不断丰富,个人理财活动具备了现实的前提和基础,形成了集中的专家式理财服务的广阔市场。     

城市创新创业环境有助于企业创新效率提升吗——来自科创板上市公司的经验证据

运用三阶段DEA模型对已注册通过的65家科创板企业创新效率进行测度与评价,然后利用fsQCA方法探讨创新效率提升的前因条件组合。结果表明,我国科创板上市企业创新效率整体表现欠佳,城市创新创业环境中的政策环境、人才环境和金融支持正向促进企业创新效率提升,产业环境和金融中介市场对企业创新效率的提升作用具有不确定性,城市经济发展水平、政府补贴和城市研发环境导致企业创新投入冗余增加,不利于企业创新效率提升;科创板上市企业创新效率实现路径由政策环境主导型和中介市场主导型构成,城市创新环境失衡、产业环境与金融支持缺失是造成部分企业创新效率相对偏低的主要原因。通过系统分析外部环境规制对科创板上市企业创新效率的影响,并基于组态视角解释企业提高创新效率的内在逻辑和路径,为进一步提升我国科创企业创新效率提供决策参考。     

货币政策不确定性、双重金融摩擦与企业创新

文章考虑信贷市场和股票市场的双重金融摩擦，研究货币政策不确定性对企业创新的影响以及双重金融摩擦的中介效应。结果表明：货币政策不确定性对企业创新具有显著的抑制作用，非国有企业、小规模企业以及高科技企业受到的抑制作用更强；货币政策不确定性上升通过加剧信贷市场摩擦和股票市场摩擦进而抑制企业创新；国有企业和高科技企业存在着显著的双重金融摩擦中介效应，而非国有企业和非高科技企业仅存在信贷市场摩擦中介效应；在双重金融摩擦中介效应中，信贷市场摩擦占比更大。     

Pricing Monitoring Uncertainty in Climate Policy

This article assesses the environmental and economic efficiency of three different approaches to treat monitoring uncertainty in climate policy, namely prescribing uncertainty, setting minimum certainty thresholds and pricing uncertainty through a discount. Our model of the behavior of profit-maximizing agents demonstrates that under the simplest set of assumptions the regulator has no interest in reducing monitoring uncertainty. However, in the presence of information asymmetry, monitoring uncertainty may hamper the economic and environmental performance of climate policy due to adverse selection. In a mandatory policy, prescribing a reasonable level of uncertainty is preferable if the regulator has enough information to determine this level. For voluntary mechanisms, such as carbon offsets, allowing agents to set their own monitoring uncertainty below a maximum threshold or discounting carbon revenues in proportion to monitoring uncertainty are the best approaches for the regulator to mitigate the negative effects of information asymmetry. These conclusions are much more pronounced when agents do not accrue revenues from their mitigation action, other than carbon. Our analysis of monitoring uncertainty under information asymmetry, which results in heterogeneity in the agents’ benefits from abatement, generalizes the classical trade-off between production efficiency and information rents.     

关于保险市场道德风险的微观经济学问题研究

保险市场是一个典型的信息不对称市场,主要表现为道德风险问题,这种对信息占有的不对称状况,很容易被保险市场参与者所利用,并导致保险市场运行的低效率。目前,中国保险市场上保险公司和投保人之间的道德风险问题表现得比较突出,已经成为制约保险业可持续发展的一个重要因素。本文从理论角度研究道德风险问题产生的机制,梳理信息不对称问题在理论上的解决方法,并从中得到保险市场应对道德风险问题的建议。     

信息不对称对保险业的影响及治理措施

保险市场是一个典型的信息不对称市场,保险市场的不对称信息主要包括逆向选择和道德风险。保险市场信息不对称将导致保险市场资源配置的低效率,因此要加强保险市场信息披露,完善和发展保险技术,整顿市场秩序,以促进保险市场的健康发展。     

Information asymmetry,cluster trading,and market efficiency: Evidence from the Chinese stock market

This study investigates the effect of asymmetry information and illiquidity related to cluster trading on information integration efficiency in the Chinese stock market. The results show that information asymmetry and illiquidity related to cluster trading both negatively affect market efficiency in the Chinese stock market. While the effect of information asymmetry on market efficiency dominates in the informational period, the effect of illiquidity related to cluster trading dominates in other periods, when trading is less concentrated. Noise trading has a positive effect on market efficiency by greatly reducing the illiquidity related to cluster trading; however, its effect on information asymmetry is not significant. Our results provide insight into investors’ trading strategies.     

Sequential location under one-sided demand uncertainty

In entering a new market, firms face demand uncertainty. We depart from the usual Hotelling duopoly model with sequential entry. We allow firms to locate outside of the city and assume that market conditions are common knowledge. We then introduce one-sided demand uncertainty. We find that demand uncertainty can be seen as a differentiation force when faced by the first entrant and as an agglomeration force when faced by the second entrant. Finally, the second firm’s imperfect information implies higher welfare losses.     

中国劳动力市场就业信息机制的完善

劳动力市场是要素市场的重要组成部分,其发展程度直接影响着经济的发展和社会的稳定。由于信息不对称,导致劳动力市场运行效率低下,社会运行成本加大,为此,需要从政府、劳动力市场、企业、求职者四个方面优化劳动力市场就业信息传播机制。     

A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States

We analyse a market where (i) trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining; (ii) agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good; and (iii) no new entrants are allowed once the market is open. We show that information revelation and efficiency never obtain in equilibrium, even as discounting is removed. This holds whether the asymmetry is two-sided or one-sided. In some cases there exist equilibria where a substantial amount goes untraded. This contrasts with the earlier literature, which was based on the steady-state equilibria of a model where agents enter the market every period.     

Alternative intertemporal permit trading regimes with stochastic abatement costs

We examine the social efficiency of alternative intertemporal permit trading regimes. The role of uncertainty and information asymmetry is discussed. For banking to be welfare improving, uncertainty itself does not matter, while information asymmetry does. Three effects of banking are identified: externality effect, information effect, and total permit effect. In the absence of total permit effect, banking is welfare improving if information effect is positive and dominates the externality effect. The relative efficiency of banking regimes with different intertemporal trading ratios is affected by the slope of the benefit and damage functions and the covariance of the shocks.     

Water quality trading with asymmetric information,uncertainty and transaction costs: A stochastic agent-based simulation

We examine the efficiency of emissions trading in bilateral and clearinghouse markets with heterogeneous, boundedly rational agents making decisions under imperfect and asymmetric information, and transaction costs. Results are derived using a stochastic agent-based simulation model of agents’ decision-making and interactions. Trading rules, market structures, and agent information structures are selected to represent emerging water quality trading programs. The analysis is designed to provide a strong test of the efficiency of trading occurring through the two market structures. The Differential Evolution algorithm is used to search for market trade strategies that perform well under multiple states of the world. Our findings suggest that trading under both bilateral and clearinghouse markets yields cost savings relatively to no trading. The clearinghouse is found to be more efficient than bilateral negotiations in coordinating point–nonpoint trading under uncertainty and transaction costs. However, the market under both structures is unlikely to achieve or even approximate least-cost pollution control allocations. Expectations of gains from water quality trading should, therefore, be tempered.     

Estimating IPO pricing efficiency by Bayesian stochastic frontier analysis: The ChiNext market case

Based on the Bayesian stochastic frontier analysis (BSFA), this paper empirically studies the pricing efficiency of initial public offering in the ChiNext market from October 2009 to January 2014. The average pricing efficiency calculated by the BSFA model is 0.5908, suggesting that most of the information about the issuers is not reflected in the offering price. Meanwhile, Fundamentals of issuers, Information asymmetry, Issue characteristics, and Market environments have different effects on IPO pricing.