Transboundary water management Game‐theoretic lessons for projects on the US–Mexico border⋆

Of the twelve million people who live within 100 km of the US–Mexico border, 90 percent are clustered in transboundary sister cities that share common water sources and pollution problems. New institutions created to address environmental concerns over NAFTA offer the promise of greater financial and technical assistance for water management in border cities. This paper reviews US–Mexico border water issues and institutions. Using insights from game theory, it draws policy lessons for institutions funding border water projects. We examine how the design of assistance programs, technical support, and pre‐existing water rights and regulations affect project outcomes. The diversity and geographic dispersion of water conflicts suggests potential for applying the interconnected game approach to US‐Mexico water negotiations.     

MANAGEMENT GAMES AND THE TEACHING OF FARM MANAGEMENT*1

The concept of a farm management game is explained, and the relationships between simulation, games and Monte Carlo techniques are discussed. The potential role of farm management games in improving the teaching of farm management is reviewed. The management game is presented as a dynamic case study.     

Challenges in quantitative economic analysis in support of multilateral trade negotiations

A wide range of economic analysis of agricultural trade liberalization was performed prior to and during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. Views differ as to the effectiveness of this research, although most would agree that it became less relevant as the negotiations progressed. This paper reviews the contributions of economists to the trade liberalization debate, with an emphasis on the quantitative assessment of multilateral agricultural trade liberalization. With a new round of agricultural trade negotiations scheduled to begin in 1999 it is crucial that the quantitative work required to support these negotiations begin in the near future. The authors conclude that the Uruguay Round outcome provides numerous challenges and opportunities in analyzing the traditional agenda of agricultural trade liberalization. In addition, new issues will be added to the agenda of the next round of negotiations. These include: trade and the environment, competition policy and intellectual property rights. It is important that economists begin to develop a research agenda that can address these issues and become activists in addressing these topics in public forums.     

Agricultural trade negotiations as a strategic game

This study views multilateral trade negotiations as a strategic game among nations or regions, including taxpayer, consumer, and producer components. Payoffs are calculated from an intermediate-run international trade model initialized with 1989 data. For the public at large, the Nash equilibrium and socially optimal outcome is liberalization of trade – unilateral or multilateral. Maintenance of the status quo of market distortions costing the world billions of dollars each year is rational only if producer payoffs are sovereign so that strategies optimal for producers are considered optimal for nations. Remedial policies are discussed, including opportunities for economic education, political system reform, and less incentives for producers to scuttle multilateral trade negotiations.     

气候大会碳排放谈判的博弈分析

联合国气候变化大会是目前全球范围内最为重要的气候环境会议之一,其关注的重点是参与国的碳排放谈判和碳限制。基于博弈的思想,构建出一个气候大会碳排放谈判的博弈模型。并基于该模型,采用中国的相关数据来解释目前的谈判现状。结果发现,这一模型符合IPCC对发展中国家的要求。其次根据对比结果可知,中国目前在碳排放博弈中尚未完全掌握主导权。建议中国在全球碳排放谈判中要坚持以单位GDP碳排放作为减排指标,同时动态调整减排目标和路径。     

Will WTO Domestic Support Provisions Constrain Domestic Agricultural Policies?

For the first time, the agricultural trade negotiations in the Uruguay Round imposed disciplines on the domestic support programs of Canada and other members of the World Trade Organization. This paper describes the principal domestic support provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture and Canada's notification of compliance for 1995. It discusses the implementation of the disciplines and emerging issues for further negotiations to begin in late 1999, and assesses their implications for Canadian domestic policies. The paper concludes that the disciplines have been a factor in Canadian farm policy formulation, and their influence is expected to continue and be strengthened through further trade negotiations.     

Negotiation issues in forming public–private partnerships for brownfield redevelopment: Applying a game theoretical experiment

The redevelopment of a brownfield can provide a range of societal, environmental but also economic benefits for a number of entities. In the Netherlands (and elsewhere), public–private partnerships are common practice for such projects, because of two main reasons. First, limitations to public funding have led governments to invite the private sector into various long-term arrangements for capital-intensive projects. Second, a comprehensive approach for the whole brownfield area may be more efficient and profitable, compared to piecemeal development via interventions by individual owners. This article investigates, with respect to brownfield redevelopment, the interaction behavior of two key parties in forming partnerships: the municipality and a private developer. It is assumed that, apart from their mutual interest to redevelop the brownfield area, they will have different interests as well. In order to indicate their specific interest and the negotiation outcome regarding the forming of a public private partnership, this paper makes use of an experimental game theory approach. Three specific negotiation issues were analyzed in our research: a building claim, future land use and reparcelling of the land. In addition, this paper suggests an eight-step procedure to conduct a game theoretical experiment. A survey was conducted in order to gather the required data for the experiment. The data have been used to estimate the payoffs variations between the two key parties in the mentioned negotiation games. Finally, by comparing sub game perfect Nash equilibrium generated game outcomes and direct expected outcomes of respondents, this paper experimentally proves that the game theoretical analysis provides a valid representation of a real world brownfield redevelopment negotiation within the Dutch institutional-economic context. The outcome of the experiment confirms the Dutch tradition of public private partnerships in urban development practice, with public and private bodies willing to share financial risks and returns in these projects.     

Agricultural trade reform under the Doha Agenda: some key issues*

A successful agreement on agriculture is essential for an overall agreement under the WTO's Doha trade negotiations. Reaching agreement has been difficult, and as of August 2007, much still remains to be done if a successful agreement is to be reached. We consider three of the most controversial areas of the agricultural negotiations: the relative importance of domestic support, market access and export subsidies; three market access issues of sensitive‐product exceptions sought for all countries and, the additional special product exceptions sought for developing countries, the proposed special safeguard mechanism; and the domestic support issue. We show that decisions made on reform in these areas will have a critical influence on whether the negotiations achieve their objectives of promoting trade reform and reducing poverty.     

劳工标准之争的博弈分析及应对策略

随着发展中国家经济的迅速崛起,发达国家正极力寻找各种形式的非关税壁垒。其中，发展中国家的劳工标准问题受到发达国家的广泛重视。在概述劳工标准的基础上，阐述了发达国家和发展中国家对于劳工标准的两种态度,并从短期和长期的角度分别进行了博弈分析，提出了发展中国家在劳工标准问题方面的应对策略。     

我国近海捕捞业中的利益博弈研究

文章首先界定了我国近海捕捞业中的三个利益相关者——中央政府、地方政府和捕捞者;其次对各利益相关者之间的博弈分别进行了分析,认为中央政府与地方政府之间存在委托代理关系,它们的博弈形式是有限次重复博弈,地方政府与捕捞者之间的博弈是不完全信息动态博弈并存在混合战略纳什均衡,而捕捞者之间博弈则类似于"公地悲剧";最后,基于利益协调思想对各个利益相关者分别提出了近海渔业资源保护的相应措施,为我国近海渔业资源可持续利用制度的完善提供科学依据。     

Determinants of a social clause in international trade negotiations

Survey data are used to examine the determinants of a “social clause” in international trade negotiations. Proponents of such a clause argue that the inclusion of labor laws, environmental impacts, and other social issues in international trade negotiations would ensure fair competition, an equitable distribution of the benefits of free trade, and, in the case of labor, protect the basic rights of workers. Opponents see these arguments as a disguised form of protectionism and self‐interest based on the protection of labor‐intensive industries in developed countries. Results from a logit model indicate a decreased likelihood for the inclusion of a social clause in international trade negotiations across farm sizes. In particular the results suggest that agricultural producers with annual gross sales including government payments between US$500,000 and US$999,000, are 40% less likely to want labor laws, environmental impacts, and food safety standards to be included as part of international trade negotiations. The results also show that agricultural producers with college experience or college degrees are less likely to want these social interventions while second generation farmers and first generation farmers with a master's degree want labor laws, environmental impacts, and food safety standards to be included as part of international trade negotiations.     

The emergence of zoning policy games in exurban jurisdictions: Informing collective action theory

Theoretical urban policy literature predicts the likelihood of free riding in the management of common goods such as forested open space; such outcome is often characterized as a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Numerous cases exist in which neighboring jurisdictions cooperate to maintain public goods, challenging the expected results, yet theoretical explanations of these cases have not been fully developed. In this paper, we use an agent-based model to explore how underlying micro-behaviors affect the payoffs obtained by two neighboring municipalities in a hypothetical exurban area. Payoffs are measured in terms of regional forested space and of local tax revenue at the end of the agent-based simulations; the municipalities affect these payoffs through their choice of residential zoning policies and the spillover effect between the neighboring jurisdictions. Zoning restrictions influence the conversion of farmland into residential subdivisions of different types, and consequently the location of heterogeneous residential households in the region. Developers and residents respond to the changing landscape characteristics, thus establishing a feedback between early and future land-use patterns. The structure of the simulated payoffs is analyzed using standard game theory. Our analysis shows that a variety of games, in addition to Prisoner's Dilemma, can emerge between the neighboring jurisdictions. Other games encourage coordination or subsidization, offering some explanations for the unexpected observations. The game realized in any given context depends on the initial characteristics of the landscape, the value given to the objectives each township seeks to maximize, and the income distribution of the population.     

FROM WAR-CHESS TO FARM MANAGEMENT GAMES*

Management games offer a new approach to management education, extension and research. This paper reviews the evolution of the gaming concept from war-chess to business management games; discusses the three broad classes of business games now available; reviews the range of farm management games available in America; and outlines an Australian farm management game recently developed and successfully operated at the University of Sydney. DES JEUX D'ECHECS JUSQU'AUX JEUX D'ENTREPRISES AGRICOLES – Les jeux d'entreprises off rent une nouvelle approche pour la recherche, la diffusion et l'enseignement de la gestion. Cet article passe en revue l'évolution de ce concept à partir du jeu d'echecs jusqu'aux jeux d'entreprises; discute les trois grandes categories de jeux d'entreprises agricoles maintenant disponibles; analyse I'elendue des jeux d'entreprises agricoles disponibles en Amérique; et souligne un jeu d'entreprise agricole Australien récemment mis au point et utilise avec succès à l'Université de Sydney.     

Agreement on agriculture in the Uruguay Round of GATT: from Punta del Este to Marrakesh

To help appreciate the outcome of the negotiations, this paper will attempt to provide answers to the following questions. Why did the agreement take as long as 7 years to negotiate? What were the major obstacles to reaching an agreement? How did the negotiators reconcile differing points of view on issues such as the role of border measures and domestic policy measures in agriculture? What has been accomplished during the negotiations? Was the agreement successful in reforming agriculture? What are the likely effects on agricultural commodity prices in implementing the agreement?     

SPS and TBT agreements and international agricultural trade: retaliation or cooperation?

In this article, we investigate whether the Brazilian notifications to the TBT and SPS agreements are characterized as retaliation or as cooperation in international agricultural trade in the period 1996–2008. A Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model is used to estimate game models of bilateral trade between Brazil and its major partners (United States, European Union, and Japan). From the viewpoint of strategic games, the results suggest that the Brazilian notifications are forms of retaliation against the United States, and, regarding the European Union, the best result for Brazil was conciliation. On the other hand, if the results are interpreted as equilibria of bargaining games, they suggest that Brazil has great bargaining power in trade with the United States and that cooperation characterized agricultural trade between Brazil and the European Union in the period analyzed. In the case of agricultural trade between Brazil and Japan, only Japan has characteristics of a country with significant bargaining power.     

State land policy,land markets and geographies of manufacturing: The case of Beijing,China

The aim of this article is to explore the relationship between state land policies, land markets and geographies of manufacturing in Beijing. Industries have decentralised moving from the centre, and agglomerating in various types of development zone in the outer city. The new patterns of industrial location in Beijing are to a significant extent due to state land policies that impact on manufacturing geographies through land prices, the land supply system and land property reforms. However, industrial relocation involves not only negotiations between government and firms, but is also a game played among different levels of government. National, provincial, municipal, county and even rural level governments bargain with each other to shape and gain from the relocation of industries.     

改革开放以来集体林权制度改革的分权演化博弈分析

在维护国家生态安全和农户生计等方面,中国集体林发挥着不可或缺的重要作用。改革开放以来,中国政府启动了多轮集体林权制度改革,本文采用分权多中心决策主体演化博弈理论,研究了集体林权制度变迁的动态过程。分权多中心决策主体的观念改变是集体林权制度改革的前提,分权多中心决策主体采取功能、权力、自适应学习和同构等形式,开展了集体林权制度改革的重复演化博弈,中央政府为多轮集体林权制度改革的主要介入者,集体林权制度改革所呈现的间歇性均衡和多重均衡是分权多中心决策主体持续演化博弈的结果。     

国际气候制度下的林业政策研究

围绕国际气候谈判中已经出现的一系列与林业议题相关的国际和国家林业政策,结合各国为实施国家低碳发展战略而制定的林业政策,对目前国际气候制度下的林业政策存在的问题及其发展趋势可能对我国的潜在影响进行了分析,从宏观政策、项目管理政策等方面对我国现有林业政策与应对全球气候变化战略的适应性进行了研究,提出了我国参与国际气候林业议题谈判及实施国家适当减缓行动框架的林业政策建议。     

林业碳汇供给稳定性的演化博弈分析

通过构建演化博弈模型详细地剖析了林业经营者和地方政府博弈系统的演化稳定策略及其演化过程。研究结果表明:林业碳汇项目的前期和后期成本、相关扶持政策的有效性以及扶持成本等因素会影响博弈系统的演化方向,进而影响林业碳汇供给的稳定性。为提高林业碳汇供给的稳定性,地方政府应制定切实有效且精简的林业碳汇扶持政策,林业经营者应有效发挥其自主能动性。     

大型水利水电工程信息共享机制研究

针对大型水利水电工程建设中的信息共享问题,从供应商和工程总承包商的角度出发,建立供应商和总承包商信息共享演化博弈模型,并进行数值仿真。Matlab仿真结果表明:博弈主体都选择进行信息共享的演化结果受可共享信息量、信息收益系数、"搭便车"收益系数、信息共享成本系数影响;且业主单位可以通过奖惩措施使得博弈主体都选择进行信息共享决策,从而提高工程建设效率,缩短工期,降低工程建设成本。