ENVY-FREENESS AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A REPLY TO KOLM'S COMMENT

Abstract. This reply takes up specific points raised by Professor Kolm over which there persists some disagreement between us. It offers a rather broad, philosophically oriented discussion of the issues. I explain why I think Kolm is right in preferring the term 'equity'to that of 'envy-freeness,'but I express moral doubts concerning the interpretation proposed by Kolm of equity as a criterion of equal liberty. On this basis, I then defend my own specific interpretation of equity as a welfarist-egalitarian criterion, and express some reluctance as to the alleged 'moral irrelevance'of individual preferences in the theory of equity. I also briefly discuss the conceptual role played by counterfactuals and try to mitigate somewhat Kolm's critique of the use of axioms involving 'imaginary' situations.