Monetary integration,soft budget constraints,and the EMU sovereign debt crises

One possible explanation for the European sovereign debt crises is that the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) gave rise to consolidation fatigue or even deliberate over‐borrowing. This paper explores the validity of this explanation by studying how three decisive stages in the history of the EMU affected public borrowing in EU member states: the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the introduction of the Euro, and the suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The methodology relies on difference‐in‐difference regressions for 26 OECD countries over the 1975–2009 period. The findings indicate that the Maastricht treaty reduced deficits especially in traditionally high‐deficit countries. In contrast, the introduction of the Euro and the watering down of the original SGP led on average to higher borrowing. These results indicate that the introduction of the Euro and the suspension of the SGP led to soft budget constraints in the EMU.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy-Makers in the European Economic and Monetary Union: Allies or Adversaries?

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are determined by simulating a global model under alternative assumptions about the objective function of the European Central Bank (ECB) and about cooperation vs. non-cooperation between monetary and fiscal policy-makers and among the latter. The results show the high effectiveness of fixed rules in the presence of supply-side shocks and the usefulness of cooperative discretionary measures against demand-side shocks. More generally, cooperation among fiscal policy-makers in the EMU is nearly always superior to non-cooperative equilibrium solutions, yielding a strong case for the coordination of fiscal policies.     

不同汇率制度下的货币政策、财政政策与最优货币区

本文讨论了１９９９年度诺贝尔经济学奖获得者－芒德尔的主要理论贡献及其现实意义,芒德尔的开放经济中的稳定政策理论认为：稳定政策的效果取决于汇率制度。在浮动汇率制度下,货币政策是有力的而财政政策是无力的;在固定汇率制度下,财政政策是有力的而货币政策是无力的。最优货币区的判别理论为研究欧洲货币联盟（ＥＭＵ）优缺点的研究人员提供了起点。     

Federal Monetary Policy

What is the optimal institutional structure for a federal central bank? The framework developed in this paper is used to analyze under what conditions an individual region will prefer a monetary union to be organized according to regional or common influences and how a combination of both can be rationalized. The implications of an enlargement of a monetary union for changes in its institutional setup are also derived.     

Federal Monetary Policy: A Comment

We comment on an article published in this journal by Hefeker (2003) and reveal an inconsistency in his analysis of monetary policy in federal monetary unions. We clarify an implicit assumption in his model and show that even when this further assumption is met, Hefeker's (2003) claim that a pure majority vote by the regions and the central government results in a monetary authority consisting solely of regionally appointed governors is not generally valid in the context of his model.     

On the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy and of Fiscal Policy

There has been a major shift within macroeconomic policy over the past two decades or so in terms of the relative importance given to monetary policy and to fiscal policy in both policy and theoretical terms. The former has gained considerably in importance, with the latter being rarely mentioned. Furthermore, the nature of monetary policy has shifted away from any attempt to control some monetary aggregate (prevalent in the first half of the 1980s), and instead monetary policy has focused on the setting of interest rates as the key policy instrument. There has also been a general shift towards the adoption of inflation targets and the use of monetary policy to target inflation. This paper considers the significance of this shift in the nature of monetary policy. This enables us to question the effectiveness of monetary policy, and to explore the role of fiscal policy. We examine these questions from the point of view of the "new consensus" in monetary economics and suggest that it is rather limited in its analysis. When the analysis is broadened out to embrace empirical issues and evidence the clear conclusion emerges that monetary policy is relatively impotent. The role of fiscal policy is also considered, and we argue that fiscal policy (under specified conditions) remains a powerful tool for macroeconomic policy. This is particularly an apt conclusion under current economic conditions.     

我国财政货币政策作用关系实证研究--基于VAR模型的检验分析

文章通过构建一个真实GDP增长率、财政赤字占GDP比重、货币供给M2增长率、零售物价指数变化率等4个变量的VAR模型,对我国财政政策与货币政策相互作用的关系及其动态性进行了实证分析,通过模型设定、格兰杰因果关系检验、脉冲响应函数分析和预测方差分解,发现在我国不存在简单的财政货币政策的互补或替代关系,而是存在一种非对称性的关系,即扩张的货币政策伴随着收缩或稳健的财政政策,而扩张的财政政策导致被动扩张的货币政策,表现形式取决于具体宏观经济环境和经济冲击形式。同时,文章也得到其他一些结论,并认为,要增强政策的效率,必须强化央行的独立性,在现阶段需要严格控制赤字财政政策,以减少其对经济增长和经济波动的影响。     

基于流动性过剩的财政政策和货币政策协调性研究

流动性过剩是当前中国宏观经济中的突出矛盾，影响了中国经济健康有序的发展。要解决流动性膨胀问题，不应该仅仅从银行体系这个角度来考虑，而应该从整个宏观经济平衡这个更为广泛的视角去分析和研究。这意味着仅仅依靠货币当局，沿用提高存款准备金率和存贷款利率、向市场发行央行票据等现有的货币政策手段来应对流动性膨胀，难以根治问题。应在运用货币政策的同时，配合财政政策，通过两大政策的协调配合，建立起消费主导的良性经济发展模式和合理的国民收入分配格局，才是应对流动性膨胀的治本之策。     

Benefits and Dangers of EU Enlargement

A new macroeconomic evaluation of EU enlargement is undertaken with a world macroeconomic model taking into account all possible integration effects: trade effects, Single Market effects, factor movements (FDI, migration) and the costs of enlargement. Due to the differences in size of the regions involved, on average the CEEC – measured in terms of real GDP – will gain around 10 times more from enlargement than the EU. Hungary and Poland can increase their real GDP by around 8 to 9 percent over a 10-year period, the Czech Republic gains a little bit less (5 to 6 percent). The EU on average would gain around 0.5 percent of real GDP over a 6-year period. Although, on average enlargement is a win-win game, the impact is quite different in the separate EU member states, with Austria, Germany and Italy gaining the most and losses for Spain, Portugal and Denmark. Hence, EU enlargement may not only be beneficial but might be a risky undertaking. Due to the regional different impact, enlargement acts like an exogenous shock leading to asymmetric disturbances in the EU. This could pause the process of business cycle synchronisation and might impair monetary policy in Euroland at the beginning of the enlargement process. A two-step integration of the CEEC into the EU – first the participation in the Single Market and only later into the EMU – is therefore preferable under the aspect of macroeconomic stability in Euroland.     

Fiscal Policy,Monetary Policy and the Mechanics of Modern Clearing and Settlement Systems

Thomas Palley, Eric Tymoigne and Randall Wray recently debated neo-Chartalism in this journal. This article argues that the mechanics of modern clearing and settlement systems is important to understanding this debate. In the neo-Chartalist framework taxes and bond issuance function as part of monetary policy; it is an alternative method for draining reserves to obtain the overnight target rate. Abba Lerner’s Chartalist framework is much clearer on public finance, noting that the federal government can use alternative financing methods to pay for expenditures. Palley’s concerns with central bank ‘money financing’ and inflation are unpersuasive. The Old Keynesian ‘budget restraint– high-powered money relation’ offers limited insight into modern clearing and settlement systems. The article concludes that policymakers should embrace Lerner’s advice and view ‘money printing’ as a normal policy instrument to support functional finance.     

Monetary integration strategies and perspectives of new EU countries

The poor record of economic convergence between the euro area and those countries that joined the European Union (EU) in May 2004 raises serious doubts about the possibility for the latter countries to adopt the European single currency in the not too distant future. In fact, many new EU countries would have to make considerable efforts in order to fulfil all EMU criteria by the end of the present decade. These efforts could lead to output and growth losses in these countries, which would run counter to their catching‐up process with respect to the rest of the EU. To avoid a number of shortcomings elicited by the obligation to respect the convergence criteria in the short term, and also to avoid the financial instability risks implied by participation in the ERM II, this paper suggests an alternative plan for integrating the new EU countries monetarily. The plan consists in creating a European settlement agent in charge of the final payment of the new EU countries’ international transactions. These transactions would be settled using an international monetary standard whose creation would eliminate instability on the foreign exchange market by its being the yardstick that the current international monetary system lacks.     

Monetary policy design and transmission asymmetry in EMU: Does uncertainty matter?

In this paper, we consider how uncertainty affects the choice between federal monetary policy based on national and union-wide aggregate data under conditions of asymmetry in the transmission of monetary policy. We find that the uncertainty about the transmission process sustains (and, in some cases, even reinforces) the need to take into account information about national economies in the formulation of monetary policy. Also the forecasting process matters when uncertainty is additive: in particular, when union-wide forecasting is more accurate than national-based forecasting, this advantage can compensate for the welfare loss from using union-wide aggregation. There is, however, a strong case for using national information in the optimal design of common monetary policy.     

Monetary Shocks, Inflation and the Asymmetric Adjustment of EU Output

Empirical studies have suggested that price rigidities ensure that real output responds asymmetrically to monetary shocks. Models advanced by Tsiddon and Ball and Mankiw argue that the degree of asymmetry to demand shocks is sensitive to inflation. This study tests whether this is the case for a sample of EU economies. Maximum likelihood estimation offers confirmation of output asymmetry in the cases of Germany and Italy but no such evidence in France and the UK.     

The Role of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Sustaining Growth With Stability in India*

The performance of the Indian economy in recent years has attracted increasing international interest. This paper focuses on the role of fiscal and monetary policies in the evolution of the Indian economy over the years, with particular attention being given to the reforms undertaken in these policies since the early 1990s. The coordination of fiscal and monetary policies has been crucial in the sequencing of the economic reform process carried out since the early 1990s. Monetary policy aims to maintain a judicious balance between price stability and economic growth. With the opening up of the Indian economy and the spread of financial sector reforms aimed at functional autonomy, prudential strengthening, operational efficiency, and competitiveness of banks, considerations of financial stability have assumed greater importance in recent years alongside the increasing openness of the Indian economy. The biggest challenge facing the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy in India is to continue the accelerated growth process while maintaining price and financial stability. Therefore, the self‐imposed rule‐based fiscal correction at both the national and subnational levels has to be consolidated and carried forward. The existence of a high level of fiscal deficit also contributes to the persistence of an interest rate differential with the rest of the world, which then also constrains progress toward full capital account convertibility. The success achieved in revenue buoyancy through tax rationalization and compliance has to be strengthened further.     

Monetary policy before and after the euro: evidence from Greece

We model Greek monetary policy in the 1990s and use our findings to address two interrelated questions. First, how was monetary policy conducted in the 1990s so that the hitherto highest-inflation EU country managed to join the euro by 2001? Second, how compatible is the ECB monetary policy with Greek economic conditions? We find that Greek monetary policy in the 1990s was: (i) primarily determined by German/ECB interest rates, though still influenced by domestic fundamentals; (ii) involving non-linear output gap effects; (iii) subject to a deficit of credibility culminating in the 1998 devaluation. On the question of compatibility our findings depend on the value assumed for the equilibrium post-euro real interest rate and overall indicate both a reduction in the pre-euro risk premium and some degree of monetary policy incompatibility. Our analysis has policy implications for the new EU members and motivates further research on fast-growing EMU economies.     

Alternative Monetary Targets,Instruments and Future Monetary Policy Frameworks

ABSTRACT

This article expands on the debate of whether merely controlling inflation can be considered a good outcome in terms of monetary policy, discussing proposals for adopting alternative monetary targets (e.g., price level, nominal GDP), alternative instruments (e.g., monetary finance, central bank digital currencies), for enlarging central banks' mandates (e.g., incorporating employment, wages, inequality, environmental objectives) and for the design of future monetary policy frameworks.

We argue that in the coming years, central banks should not simply maintain their pre-2008 standards by de-implementing unconventional monetary policies. Instead, they must take advantage of their past and recent experiences in order to improve, under an evolutionary perspective, future monetary policy and financial stability frameworks. Based on this, measures implemented since the 2008 crisis would have three possible treatments in new frameworks: i) be discarded, due to their predominantly adverse effects; ii) not be regularly implemented, but be used as backstop mechanisms if needed; iii) be incorporated as regular measures of monetary policy/financial stability frameworks. Accordingly, monetary and financial stability authorities will increasingly need to evolve and engage in a continuously adaptive and innovative process in order to face challenges posed by financial markets that are becoming more dynamic, innovative, complex, interconnected and globalised.     

Money Quantity and Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy: A Quantitative Analysis

This paper quantitatively analyzes the impact of money stock on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a stochastic production economy with sticky prices. The numerical results indicate that a sufficient large quantity of money makes a noticeable difference in many aspects of optimal monetary and fiscal policy. They suggest that the volatile inflation in China may not be as bad as the existing theory would have implied if its large amount of money is taken into consideration.     

Fiscal Policy in Europe: How Effective Are Automatic Stabilisers?

It is largely recognised that fiscal policy will have largerresponsibilities for cyclicalstabilisation in EMU given the loss of the monetary instrument.At the same time, theEMU's budgetary framework emphasises the need to rely onautomatic fiscal stabilisers,rather than active policies in cushioning the business cycle.We show that automaticstabilisers are relatively powerful in the event of shocksto private consumption, but lessso in the case of shocks to private investment and exports.In the case of supply sideshocks, the automatic stabilisers are largely ineffective,but this may actually be a goodthing to the extent that supply-side disturbances call forstructural adjustment rather thancyclical stabilisation.     

Macroeconomic Performance and Wage Bargaining in a Monetary Union

Building on a micro-founded model of a two-region monetary union, this paperanalyses the macroeconomic impact of institutional reforms in labour marketsand central banking that may occur as a result of monetary unification. Thepaper shows that monopoly distortions in the labour market are a key factorin evaluating the effects of central bank's conservativeness and wagecentralisation on inflation and unemployment. Wage restraint is favoured ina highly decentralised wage bargaining setup as well as under a liberalcentral bank, provided competition is high in the labour market.