On Property Tax Coordination

This paper examines the welfare effects of inter-jurisdictional coordination of property taxes. Coordination in terms of compression, harmonization and radial changes of tax structure is considered. It is found that property tax coordination via uniform radial adjustments of taxes is in general welfare-superior to the other two types of tax changes. However, when there is a large disparity of initial tax rates between jurisdictions, harmonization of property taxes may lead to a larger welfare improvement.     

Imperfect competition,indirect tax harmonization and public goods

This paper shows that the welfare implications of indirect tax harmonization in a two-country imperfectly competitive framework, are, in general, indeterminate in the presence of public goods: Both countries can be made either worse off or better off. This holds under both the destination and origin principles of taxation and is in sharp contrast to existing results where revenue effects are not present. A consequence of this indeterminacy is that a precise evaluation of tax-harmonizing policies under both tax regimes requires an explicit consideration of the underlying preferences for private and public goods as well as the oligopolistic sectors’ relative cost structures. JEL code F15⋅ H21⋅ H41⋅ H87     

International tax competition with endogenous sequencing

This paper examines endogenous timing in an international tax competition model. Unlike existing studies, governments are assumed to decide not only tax rates but also whether they are set early or late. The Nash equilibrium provides four conclusions for alternative double tax allowances. First, tax deductions cause simultaneous tax competition, whereas tax credits yield sequential tax competition. Second, any double taxation relief would generate capital trade. Third, a credit system could maximize one country’s economic welfare but would lower another country’s economic welfare more than a deduction regime. Fourth, a home country’s government would choose credit regimes under a maximax rule, but select deduction methods under minimax and maximin rules, while all double tax allowances are indifferent to a host country. The findings resolve the question raised by Bond and Samuelson (Economic Journal 99:1099–1111, 1989) of why governments choose tax credits when tax deductions are clearly better. Namely, this paper shows that one country is better off but another is worse off with credits rather than deductions. Accordingly, we cannot clearly specify whether governments choose credit systems or deduction regimes. The possible double tax allowances employed by the governments depend on their own decision criterion.     

Harmonizing public sector accounting in Europe: thinking out of the box

A broad debate about the harmonization of public sector accounting standards in Europe is underway. The authors provide arguments in favour of harmonization, but they also acknowledge the existing pluralism and diversity by taking stock of the state of play in 14 European countries. The paper makes a proposal for a way forward for policy-makers and standard-setters, in which the benefits of harmonization can be obtained without obliging EU member countries to necessarily abandon their current public sector accounting systems.     

Restructuring economic and financial power : The potential role of a foreign exchange-transaction levy

National fiscal and monetary policies are dominated by financial markets, and the obsession of these markets with inflation is forcing governments to neglect other crucial economic and social goals such as growth of employment and reduction of poverty. Exchange rate volatility also adds to business costs and risk. Introduction of a small international levy on foreign exchange transactions would reduce short-term speculation and so the power of the markets to influence interest rates and to destabilize exchange rates. Revenue from the levy would be of benefit to both national governments and the UN for disaster relief, development and strengthened security programmes. Support for the levy is growing.     

税收优惠的国际竞争与影响

税收优惠竞争具有促进自由竞争、保障发展中国家的利益、保障外国投资者利益、对征税权力的约束的正面影响,也具有破坏生产效率、损害税收公平与社会福利、侵蚀其它地区的税基、破坏所得税的累进效果等负面影响。我国在新时期的税收优惠调整中,应该根据税收优惠竞争的正、负面影响综合考虑吸引投资与全民福利最大化双重因素。     

The Welfare State in a Changing Environment

We analyse how the welfare state, i.e., social insurance that works through redistributive taxation, should respond to increases in risks and to increases in the cost of operating the welfare state. With respect to risks, we distinguish between risks that can be insured and such that cannot (background risks). Insurable risks can be reduced by costly individual self-insurance and by costly social insurance. We show: (i) Self-insurance will be higher the more costly is the welfare state and the larger are background or insured risks. (ii) Full social insurance can only be optimal in a costless welfare state. (iii) The optimal welfare state is not necessarily larger the less costly it is. (iv) The welfare state need not optimally expand when risks increase that it insures. (v) It should, however, expand when risks increase that it does not insure.     

Games within borders: are geographically differentiated taxes optimal?

The discontinuous tax treatment of sales at borders creates incentives for individuals to cross-border shop. This paper addresses whether it is optimal for a state composed of multiple regions to levy differentiated commodity tax rates across the regions. In a model where states maximize social welfare, a state’s optimal commodity tax system is almost always geographically differentiated. The optimal pattern of geographic differentiation critically depends on fundamental parameters as well as whether the state has a preference for high or low taxes. Under the assumption that utility is linear in consumption and that the elasticity of cross-border shopping is less than unity in absolute value, high-tax states will find it optimal to set a tax rate that is lower in the border region than in the periphery region and low-tax states will find it optimal to set a tax rate that is higher in the border region than in the periphery region. Optimizing high-tax states will set a higher tax rate in the border region if the social welfare measure is sufficiently redistributive. With welfare maximization, it is possible for taxes to be higher in the region near the state border—an outcome that cannot arise when the government cares only about total tax revenue.     

Capital tax competition and social security

The classic capital tax policy externality is studied in the presence of a social security program where both the benefits and taxes depend on wages in an overlapping generations economy with many countries and mobile capital. We study the response and welfare implications of a coordinated capital tax rate increase across countries competing for the mobile tax base on the initial generations, the transition, and the steady state. The tax increase is initially completely capitalized, but some of the burden is shifted to labor on the transition path and in the steady state. Several new welfare effects are uncovered including an effect involving the parameters of the social security program. Sufficient conditions are provided so that all current and future generations are better off from the reform. However, social security may reduce the gain to capital tax reform.     

On the role and effects of IMF seniority

We analyze the IMF as a lender to countries in financial distress highlighting the fact that it is a senior creditor. An advantage of delegating senior lending in a single institution rather than on competitive markets is that it would be able to reach the socially optimal solution. This would require the IMF not to intervene when the crisis is severe enough. However, a commitment device might be needed to achieve the socially optimal solution. If IMF lending were done for all shocks, the country would be always ex-post better off but lenders would be worse off when the country situation is either good or weak, which is consistent with empirical evidence. Anticipation of senior lending might make the country better off by preventing inefficient liquidation. However it might actually hurt the country ex-ante and too much rescuing in the future could lead to too little lending in the present which is contrary to the moral hazard critique.     

On the consequences of demographic change for rates of returns to capital, and the distribution of wealth and welfare

This paper employs a multi-country large-scale Overlapping Generations model with uninsurable labor productivity and mortality risk to quantify the impact of the demographic transition towards an older population in industrialized countries on world-wide rates of return, international capital flows and the distribution of wealth and welfare in the OECD. We find that for the U.S. as an open economy, rates of return are predicted to decline by 86 basis points between 2005 and 2080 and wages increase by about 4.1%. If the U.S. were a closed economy, rates of return would decline and wages increase by less. This is due to the fact that other regions in the OECD will age even more rapidly; therefore the U.S. is “importing” the more severe demographic transition from the rest of the OECD in the form of larger factor price changes. In terms of welfare, our model suggests that young agents with little assets and currently low labor productivity gain, up to 1% in consumption, from higher wages associated with population aging. Older, asset-rich households tend to lose, because of the predicted decline in real returns to capital.     

Price Stability with Imperfect Financial Integration

This paper studies whether the international monetary system can be affected by asymmetries in the cross-country positions in the international financial markets, i.e., the fact that some countries are large debtors while others are creditors. An important channel that is explored is the interaction between international risk sharing and the stabilization role of monetary policy in each country. The main finding is that the welfare costs of incomplete markets and the gains of deviating from a policy of price stability are increasing with the cross-country asymmetries in the initial net international positions and in particular they become nonnegligible when the persistence of the shocks increases (1% of a permanent shift in steady-state consumption, for the welfare costs of incomplete markets, and 0.2%, for the gains of deviating from a policy of price stability). When global imbalances become larger, optimal monetary policy requires an increase in the volatilities of the real returns on assets and in particular of the nominal interest rates, which should happen to be more correlated across countries.     

Race to the top or bottom? Corporate governance,freedom of reincorporation and competition in law

Summary This paper investigates the governance structure choices of firms when there is competition between legal systems. We study the impact of the allocation of control over choice of governance and reincorporation on firms’ technologies and technological specialization of countries in the context of a model of the firm in which there are agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. We show that the allocation of control over firms’ reincorporation decisions determines the corporate governance choice ex ante and the outcome of the competition between legal regimes ex post. When managers have control over reincorporation then competitive deregulation and “runs to the bottom” ensue. When shareholders have partial or full control then there is diversity in governance structures. Runs to the bottom are not necessarily socially undesirable but they have a feedback effect on firms’ choices of technologies that may make the party in control worse off ex ante. We show that it is impossible for any country to achieve social welfare maximization of its existing and new enterprises. With competition between legal regimes, start-up and mature companies incorporate in different jurisdictions even when reincorporation is correctly anticipated.     

Comparing inequality aversion across countries when labor supply responses differ

We analyze to which extent social inequality aversion differs across nations when controlling for actual country differences in labor supply responses. Towards this aim, we estimate labor supply elasticities at both extensive and intensive margins for 17 EU countries and the US. Using the same data, inequality aversion is measured as the degree of redistribution implicit in current tax-benefit systems, when these systems are deemed optimal. We find relatively small differences in labor supply elasticities across countries. However, this changes the cross-country ranking in inequality aversion compared to scenarios following the standard approach of using uniform elasticities. Differences in redistributive views are significant between three groups of nations. Labor supply responses are systematically larger at the extensive margin and often larger for the lowest earnings groups, exacerbating the implicit Rawlsian views for countries with traditional social assistance programs. Given the possibility that labor supply responsiveness was underestimated at the time these programs were implemented, we show that such wrong perceptions would lead to less pronounced and much more similar levels of inequality aversion.     

Tradeoffs of foreign assistance for the weakest-link global public goods

Weakest-link global public goods, such as international security, communicable disease prevention or illegal trafficking control, create a strong incentive for rich countries to unilaterally compensate for insufficient supplies of the ‘weakest-link’ inputs by poor countries. We analyze how foreign assistance affects the donor and recipient countries, accounting for discontinuities and non-monotonicities originating from switches between structurally different equilibrium profiles. We show that voluntary foreign assistance improves provision of the public good and also welfare, but makes the donor country worse off for the medium level of income inequality. Unless inequality is large or small, a rich country may benefit from a commitment to the absence of assistance.     

开征燃油税对中国经济的影响:基于CGE观点

燃油税的开征无疑会对整个社会经济和居民福利带来重大影响。本文通过"可计算一般均衡模型"(CGE)模拟出我国开征燃油税前后的经济运行情况,在生产技术、社会福利、税负等几个方面进行前后对比,并通过模型计算结果对我国燃油税的开征方案提出了建议:开征燃油税的目标应该明确而集中,在考虑效率目标的同时应当充分考虑公平原则,处理好燃油税的征管问题。     

Free Immigration and Welfare Access: The Swedish Experience

With the expansion of the European Union from 15 to 25 member countries in 2004, fears of migrants’ excessive welfare use led 14 of the 15 older member countries to impose restrictions on the access of citizens of the new member countries – the A10 countries – to their welfare systems. Sweden was the only exception. This paper evaluates the net contribution of post‐enlargement A10 immigrants to Swedish public finances in 2007. On average, A10 immigrants generate less public revenue than the population on average, but they also cost less. The net result is a zero or small positive net contribution. In particular, A10 immigrants do not benefit more from basic social welfare than the population on average. The discounted net contribution over the A10 immigrants’ lifetimes may be positive or negative depending, for example, on their income assimilation rates and on future real interest rates.     

Taxation,imperfect competition,and discontinuities

Most work on taxation assumes that market adjustments to taxation will be small and continuous and so analyzes the effects of taxation using standard marginal methods. However, the world often changes in large and discontinuous ways. This paper looks at the effects of taxation when discontinuities in market adjustments are allowed because market structure is determined endogenously by the discrete entry and exit decisions of firms. The results indicate that the potential for discontinuities generates tax effects that are considerably different from those that emerge when adjustments are small and continuous. With discontinuities, taxes can have large and discrete effects, for example, by increasing prices far in excess of the tax itself or by changing utility in a highly nonmarginal way. Of more significance, with discontinuities taxes can actually increase welfare even when they lessen competition and raise prices. Taxes can also have markedly different effects on the income and welfare of different groups. Consumers are always made worse off by a tax, but a tax may be supported by the firms in an industry if the tax limits entry and thereby increases firm profits.     

Efficient Redistribution of Lifetime Income through Welfare Accounts*

Compared with a conventional tax–transfer system, individual welfare accounts can redistribute lifetime incomes at a lower efficiency cost. These welfare accounts employ mandatory contributions rather than taxes to finance social transfers to people of working age. We describe a design for welfare accounts that guarantees a Pareto improvement if behavioural responses to the accounts improve the public budget. We also develop a formula for quantifying the impact of welfare accounts on the government budget and economic efficiency. Applying the formula to Danish data, we find that the proposed welfare accounts would generate a Pareto improvement, thus improving the trade‐off between equity and efficiency. We discuss how the gains from welfare accounts can be distributed in an equitable manner.     

Purpose,profit and social pressure

We develop a model in which there are firms and employees who care about profit-sacrificing higher purpose (HP) and those who do not. Firms and employees search for each other in the labor market. Each firm chooses its HP investment. When there is no social pressure on firms to adopt a purpose, HP dissipates agency frictions, lowers wage costs, yet elicits higher employee effort in firms that intrinsically value the purpose. However, social pressure to invest in HP can distort the HP investments of all firms and reduce welfare by making all agents worse off. Applications of these results to banking are discussed.