徐和谊:CEO与CFO相处之道

翻遍管理教科书,都无法找到标准的CEO与CFO成功相处之道。的确,没有可套用的模式,因为,这是一门艺术。熟悉中国汽车行业的人,无人不知徐和谊这个名字。徐和谊现任北京汽车集团有限公司(以下简称"北汽     

最优秀CEO评选

在过去的两年里,由于全球经济危机的冲击我们从媒体中读到最多的是企业陷入困境,甚至破产。虽然经济大衰退,企业生存环境恶劣,但是也有一部分企业在经济危机下不但没有倒下,反而得到了发展。     

谷歌CEO道德为王

“不作恶是一种文化规则,一种强制大家讨论的方式,谷歌的目标不是把一切都变成赚钱的工具,而是改变这个世界……”     

女性领导的领导魅力——以惠普前CEO卡莉·菲奥莉娜为例

本文采用道理论证和事实论证的方法，以领导魅力的概述和女性领导的领导魅力为契机，分析惠普前女CEO卡莉·菲奥瑞娜所展现出的独特的领导魅力。     

拒贿之道

唐代德宗时的宰相陆贽清廉正派，连德宗都认为他“清慎太过”，暗地派人向他送“秘旨”：对别人的馈赠一概拒绝，办事恐怕不大方便，要他重礼可以不收，但象马鞭、鞋靴之类的“薄礼”，收亦无妨。然而陆贽一直坚守自己的信条。他认为，“贿道一开，展转滋甚，鞭靴不已，必及衣裘，衣裘不及，必及金壁。”他是深知“轻者重之端，小者大之源”之理的。看来不因“轻者”而心动，不为“小者”而收、受，是一条防线。     

进退之道

近两年来,农行系统撤销了一部分农村网点。全国一大批乡镇分理处被撤并,大部分支行的营业机构被砍掉三分之一,一部分支行的营业机构被削掉一半,少数支行甚至仅留三成机构维持运转。但两年来的实践证明:农行系统的“减员”并没有产生预期的“增效”效应。“撤点”则是实实在在地产生了“减     

理财之道

随着经济的发展和社会进步,理财观念虽然已经深入人心,但真正受过理财教育的人少之又少. 一般,人们有了闲钱之后,注册成为网站会员,购买网站上的理财产品,例如基金、股票、贵金属、外汇、P2P 理财.时间久了,无论亏损还是获利,便有了理财的经验.     

理财之道

买保险六要六不要要放下成见,不要偏听偏信。保险公司是有经营风险的金融企业。《保险法》规定保险公司可以采取股份有限公司和国有独资公司两种形式,除了分立、合并外,都不允许解散。所以,大可放下门第之见入保险,但重点要看公司的条款是否更适合自己,售后服务是否更值得信赖。要比较险种,不要盲目购买。每个人在购买贵重商品时,都会货比三家,买保险也应如此。尽管各家保险公司的条款和费率都是经过中国保险监督管理委员会批准的,但比较一下却有所不同。如领取生存养老金,有的是月月领取,有的是定额领取;同是大病医疗保险,有的是包10种大病…     

养牛之道

一天，阿愚下乡看到一位老农喂牛时，把草料铲到一间小茅屋的屋檐上。他感到很奇怪，于是就问遗“老公公，你为什么不把草料放在地上让牛吃?”     

CEO power and the structure of CEO pay

This paper fleshes out the rent extraction view of CEO compensation put forward by the managerial power theory (Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002), and tests its main implications on the relation between CEO power and the structure of CEO pay. For a measure of CEO power most relevant to managerial power theory, we use the CEO pay slice due to Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011). Based on the sample of S&P 500 firms for the period of 1999–2008, we find that the implied relation between power and pay is largely supported. Our findings suggest that the managerial power theory has relevance in explaining the relation between power and pay when the focus is on managerial bargaining power. Given the multiple dimensions of CEO power, however, the scope of power may need to be broadened for a better understanding of how managerial power affects firm performance.     

CEO行踪

<正>高瑞彬出席移动商务应用实验室启动仪式12月3日,摩托罗拉(中国)电子有限公司总裁高瑞彬先生出席移动商务应用实验室启动仪式。该实验室由摩托罗拉与     

CEO行踪

<正>花旗中国首席执行官欧兆伦论金融教育11月25日,花旗中国首席执行官兼花旗银行(中国)有限公司董事长欧兆伦(中)先生在花旗—《金融时报》金融教育峰会(2008)上表示:全球经济危机尚未平息,金融教育比以往任何时候都更为重要。     

CEO动态

<正>美CEO年薪榜出炉,百仕通老总7亿美元问鼎美国独立研究机构CorporateLibrary最新发布的报告称,2008年,美国私人股权基金百仕通集团CEO StephenS chwarzman获得了总额高达7.02亿美元的天价薪酬,排在     

The curse of the superstar CEO

When struggling companies look for a new chief executive today, the one quality they prize above all others is charisma. But once they've recruited a larger-than-life leader, they often find that their troubles only get worse. Indeed, as the author's new research painfully reveals, the widespread belief in the powers of charismatic CEOs can be problematic. Why? First, Khurana says, there's no conclusive evidence that charismatic leadership affects an organization's performance. And yet--as Kodak's story over the past decade reveals--when a company is faltering, boards feel compelled to oust the incumbent chief executive and bring in a corporate savior. Second, the insistence on finding a charismatic leader, combined with the undefinable nature of charisma, results in selection processes that are overly conservative and even irrational. Boards end up considering only candidates who have already achieved the rank of CEO or president at a high-performing, high-profile company, even if they are not right for the job. Third, charismatic leaders deliberately destabilize organizations. This can result in a more vibrant company, as it did at General Electric during Jack Welch's tenure, but it can also leave a troubled legacy for the organization to overcome, as GE, Ford, and Enron have all found. Faith in a company, a product, or an idea can unleash tremendous innovation and productivity. But the extravagant hopes invested in charismatic CEOs resemble not mature faith but a belief in magic. If we are willing to reconsider our notion of leadership, this age of faith can be followed by an era of faith and reason.     

Don't hire the wrong CEO

A disturbing trend is going on in corporate America--CEO churning. Top executives are rapidly coming and going, keeping their jobs for increasingly shorter periods of time. The reason? Most boards are so unclear about the definition of leadership, they are picking the wrong people. CEO churning needn't be, say leadership experts Warren Bennis and James O'Toole. Boards can reverse the trend by following several guidelines. First, boards must come to a shared, accurate definition of leadership. Simply put, leaders must be able to move human hearts--to challenge people and make them want to scale steep peaks. Second, boards should strengthen the CEO selection process by resolving strategic and political conflicts amongst themselves. An agreed-upon strategic direction will make choosing the CEO with the right vision for the company that much easier and can clarify the job for the new CEO. Third, the board needs to measure every CEO candidate's soft qualities. Economic measures are important, but integrity, the ability to provide meaning, and the talent for creating other leaders are critical. Fourth, boards should beware of candidates who act like CEOs. Charisma and glossy pitches can be enticing, but they're rarely the stuff of true leadership. Fifth, boards should accept that real leaders will more than likely overturn the status quo. Sixth, boards need to know that insider heirs usually aren't apparent, and finally, boards should always avoid making a hasty decision. Hiring the right CEO is a slow process at best. Ultimately, the surest way for boards to pick the right CEO is to cultivate and nurture talent in the making.     

Ending the CEO succession crisis

The CEO succession process is broken. Many companies have no meaningful succession plans, and few of the ones that do are happy with them. CEO tenure is shrinking; in fact, two out of five CEOs fail in their first 18 months. It isn't just that more CEOs are being replaced; it's that they're being replaced badly. The problems extend to every aspect of CEO succession: internal development programs, board supervision, and outside recruitment. While many organizations do a decent job of nurturing middle managers, few have set up the comprehensive programs needed to find the half-dozen true CEO candidates out of the thousands of leaders in their midst. Even more damaging is the failure of boards to devote enough attention to succession. Search committee members often have no experience hiring CEOs; lacking guidance, they supply either the narrowest or the most general of requirements and then fail to vet eitherthe candidates or the recruiters. The result is that too often new CEOs are plucked from the well-worn Rolodexes of a remarkably small number of recruiters. These candidates may be strong in charisma but may lack critical skills or otherwise be a bad fit with the company. The resulting high turnover is particularly damaging, since outside CEOs often bring in their own teams, can cause the company to lose focus, and are especially costly to be rid of. Drawing on over 35 years of experience with CEO succession, the author explains how companies can create a deep pool of internal candidates, how boards can consistently align strategy and leadership development, and how directors can get their money's worth from recruiters. Choosing a CEO should be not one decision but an amalgam ofthousands of decisions made by many people every day over years.     

共享CEO峰会--专访中国国际贸易促进委员会会长俞晓松

关于今年APEC CEO峰会的主题确定问题 今年的APEC大会及APECCEO峰会是人类刚刚跨入21世纪后举行的,这就使今年的会议具有了不同寻常的意义.结合今年APEC大会的主导思想:"新世纪、新挑战:参与、合作、促进共同繁荣",我们确定了本次APEC CEO峰会的主题:"新世纪、新经济:在全球化中发展".目的是与参会的亚太地区工商企业领导人探讨在跨入新世纪的历史时刻,如何应对新技术革命推动下不断加快的经济全球化进程,在竞争日益激烈、机遇和挑战共存的情况下,如何趋利避害,开拓发展机遇,加强合作,使亚太地区经济得以在合理、有序、合作、共赢原则下健康发展.     

Dynamic CEO Compensation

We study optimal compensation in a dynamic framework where the CEO consumes in multiple periods, can undo the contract by privately saving, and can temporarily inflate earnings. We obtain a simple closed‐form contract that yields clear predictions for how the level and performance sensitivity of pay vary over time and across firms. The contract can be implemented by escrowing the CEO's pay into a “Dynamic Incentive Account” that comprises cash and the firm's equity. The account features state‐dependent rebalancing to ensure its equity proportion is always sufficient to induce effort, and time‐dependent vesting to deter short‐termism.