Incentive Effects of Stock and Option Holdings of Target and Acquirer CEOs

Acquisitions enable target chief executive officers (CEOs) to remove liquidity restrictions on stock and option holdings and diminish the illiquidity discount. Acquisitions also enable acquirer CEOs to improve the long‐term value of overvalued holdings. Examining all firms during 1993 to 2001, we show that CEOs with higher holdings (illiquidity discount) are more likely to make acquisitions (get acquired). Further, in 250 completed acquisitions, target CEOs with a higher illiquidity discount accept a lower premium, offer less resistance, and more often leave after acquisition. Similarly, acquirer CEOs with higher holdings pay a higher premium, expedite the process, and make diversifying acquisitions using stock payment.     

The 2008 short sale ban: Liquidity, dispersion of opinion, and the cross-section of returns of US financial stocks

This study examines the cross-sectional impact of the 2008 short sale ban on the returns of US financial stocks. Motivated by the large cross-sectional variation in the extent to which banned stocks suffer an illiquidity shock, we hypothesize that stocks with larger liquidity declines are associated with poorer contemporaneous stock returns. The evidence supports this hypothesis and suggests that this effect is stronger for more liquid stocks, as predicted by Amihud and Mendelson (1986). Moreover, consistent with Miller’s (1977) model, we report a valuation reversal whereby stocks with higher abnormal returns at the onset of the ban have lower abnormal returns at its removal. Our findings are robust when we control for firms most affected by TARP, include non-banned matched firms, and compare banned firms’ stock returns with their bond returns. From a policy standpoint, the ban reduced valuations, ceteris paribus, of the stocks that were hardest hit by illiquidity.     

Institutional trading and stock resiliency: Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis

We examine the impact of institutional trading on stock resiliency during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We show that buy-side institutions have different exposure to liquidity factors based on their trading style. Liquidity supplying institutions absorb the long-term order imbalances in the market and are critical to recovery patterns after a liquidity shock. We show that these liquidity suppliers withdraw from risky securities during the crisis and their participation does not recover for an extended period of time. The illiquidity of specific stocks is significantly affected by institutional trading patterns; participation by liquidity supplying institutions can ameliorate illiquidity, while participation by liquidity demanding institutions can exacerbate illiquidity. Our results provide guidance on why some stocks take longer to recover in a crisis.     

Disclosing to Informed Traders

We develop a model in which a firm's manager can voluntarily disclose to privately informed investors. In equilibrium, the manager only discloses sufficiently favorable news. If the manager is known to be informed but disclosure is costly, the probability of disclosure increases with market liquidity and the stock trades at a discount relative to expected cash flows. However, when investors are uncertain about whether the manager is informed, disclosure can decrease with market liquidity and the stock can trade at a premium relative to expected cash flows. Moreover, contrary to common intuition, public information can crowd in more voluntary disclosure.     

Hedge fund liquidity and performance: Evidence from the financial crisis

We investigate how share restrictions affect hedge fund performance in crisis and non-crisis periods. Consistent with prior research, we find that in the pre-crisis period more illiquid funds generate a share illiquidity premium compensating investors for limited liquidity. In the crisis period, this share illiquidity premium turns into an illiquidity discount. Hedge funds with more stringent share restrictions invest more heavily in illiquid assets. While share restrictions enable funds to manage illiquid assets effectively in the pre-crisis period, they seem insufficient to ensure effective management of illiquid portfolios in the crisis. In a crisis period, funds holding illiquid portfolios experience lower returns and alphas, also when share restrictions are controlled for. Funds with an asset–liability mismatch perform particularly poorly and experience the strongest outflows. Share restrictions are also a proxy for incentives as investors cannot immediately withdraw their money after poor performance. We show that higher incentive fees can offset the share illiquidity discount in the crisis period.     

Risk,illiquidity or marketability: What matters for the discounts on private equity placements?

Using a clean sample of private equity placements over the period of 1999 to 2012, we examine the determinants of the discounts on private placements. Classifying various determinants into three categories, namely risk, illiquidity, and marketability, we show that risk and marketability are significant determinants of the discount on private placements over the entire sample period. However, we identify a structural break in the relation between the discount on private placements with illiquidity and, to a lesser degree, marketability. Specifically, we find that liquidity is a more important determinant during the pre-2003 period, but marketability becomes a more important determinant during the post-2003 period. We attribute the structural break to substantial changes in market microstructure during our sample period. Lower transaction costs make illiquidity less of a concern for investors, whereas more active trading by investors calls for a higher discount for the lack of marketability.     

Liquidity in the Foreign Exchange Market: Measurement,Commonality, and Risk Premiums

We provide the first systematic study of liquidity in the foreign exchange market. We find significant variation in liquidity across exchange rates, substantial illiquidity costs, and strong commonality in liquidity across currencies and with equity and bond markets. Analyzing the impact of liquidity risk on carry trades, we show that funding (investment) currencies offer insurance against (exposure to) liquidity risk. A liquidity risk factor has a strong impact on carry trade returns from 2007 to 2009, suggesting that liquidity risk is priced. We present evidence that liquidity spirals may trigger these findings.     

Measuring Pricing Inefficiencies Under Stressful Market Conditions

This study examines the mispricing and time between arbitrage trades of the Hong Kong Hang Seng index futures and index options contracts under various stressed market conditions. Ex‐ante trading profits and differences in time between trades across up and down as well as stressed and non‐stressed markets are used to measure how well the derivative markets perform under emotional distress. We find evidence of illiquidity in stressed and down markets. In stressful markets and down markets, liquidity suppliers are less likely to trade against the informed traders. This, in turn, leads to longer time between trades and higher arbitrage profits.     

交易所大宗交易流动性折价研究——来自沪深交易所的经验证据

随着证券市场规模的扩大及机构投资者规模的壮大，机构投资者对市场流动性的需求日益剧增，大宗交易制度是满足投资者流动性需求的制度性创新。由于大宗交易的数量较大，其交易价格有别于正常交易规模的价格。本文利用沪深交易所的大宗交易数据实证探讨大宗交易价格及其影响因素。研究结果表明，大部分大宗交易价格低于当日收盘价格，呈现流动性折价现象，折价率达到1．27％：研究还发现，折价水平还受交易数量、正常交易时间段股票流动性水平、市场流动性水平及股价波幅等因素影响。     

A comparison among various dimensions of illiquidity effect: A case study of Finland

We study different dimensions of the illiquidity effect on asset returns in the Finnish market. The market illiquidity is measured as unexpected rises and falls in average monthly zero returns across all stocks. We find that for the returns on the specific class of assets, a flight to the liquidity effect is the most important systematic risk among all dimensions of the illiquidity effect. In other words, higher returns for illiquid assets in good times compensate for a pronounced drop in those returns in bad times and vice versa. Furthermore, only one illiquidity-related factor has a similar pricing capacity as Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model and Carhart's (1997) four-factor model in the context of this study.     

Banks' Liquidity and the Cost of Liquidity to Corporations

We consider the liquidity shock banks experienced following the collapse of the asset‐backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the fall of 2007 to investigate whether banks' liquidity conditions affect their ability to provide liquidity to corporations. We find that banks that borrowed more from the Federal Home Loan Bank system or the Federal Reserve's discount window following that liquidity shock passed a larger portion of their borrowing costs onto corporations seeking access to liquidity when compared to the precrisis period. This increase is larger among banks with a bigger exposure to the ABCP market, credit lines that pose more liquidity risk to banks, and borrowers that are likely dependent on the credit‐line provider. Our findings show that the crisis that affected the banking system had a negative effect not only on the price of credit to corporations, but also on the price corporations pay to guarantee access to liquidity.     

Modelling illiquidity spillovers with Hawkes processes: an application to the sovereign bond market

Modelling the dynamics of (il)liquidity across assets is an important yet complicated task, especially when considering significant deteriorations of liquidity conditions. Here, we propose a peak-over-threshold method to identify abrupt liquidity drops from limit order book data and we model the time-series of these illiquidity events across multiple assets as a multivariate Hawkes process. This allows us to quantify both the self-excitation of extreme changes of liquidity in the same asset (illiquidity spirals) and the cross-excitation across different assets (illiquidity spillovers). Applying the method to the MTS sovereign bond market, we find significant evidence for both illiquidity spillovers and spirals. The proportion of shocks explained by illiquidity spillovers roughly doubles from 2011 to 2015, suggesting an increased synchronization of extreme illiquidity across assets.     

Stock price synchronicity and liquidity

We argue and provide evidence that stock price synchronicity affects stock liquidity. Under the relative synchronicity hypothesis, higher return co-movement (i.e., higher systematic volatility relative to total volatility) improves liquidity. Under the absolute synchronicity hypothesis, stocks with higher systematic volatility or beta are more liquid. Our results support both hypotheses. We find all three illiquidity measures (effective proportional bid-ask spread, price impact measure, and Amihud's illiquidity measure) are negatively related to stock return co-movement and systematic volatility. Our analysis also shows that larger industry-wide component in returns improves liquidity. We find that improvement in liquidity following additions to the S&P 500 Index is related to the stock's increase in return co-movement.     

Correlated Trading and Returns

A German broker's clients place similar speculative trades and therefore tend to be on the same side of the market in a given stock during a given day, week, month, and quarter. Aggregate liquidity effects, short sale constraints, the systematic execution of limit orders (coordinated through price movements) or the correlated trading of other investors who pick off retail limit orders do not fully explain why retail investors trade similarly. Correlated market orders lead returns, presumably due to persistent speculative price pressure. Correlated limit orders also predict subsequent returns, consistent with executed limit orders being compensated for accommodating liquidity demands.     

Pricing of time-varying liquidity risk in Finnish stock market: new evidence

Using two recently developed illiquidity measures, we estimate a conditional version of liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (LCAPM), which allows for a time-varying decomposition of the total illiquidity premium into a level component and three risk components. The total estimated annualized illiquidity premium for the Finnish equities during 1997–2015 is 1.13–1.90% depending on the illiquidity measure. Of the three systematic liquidity risk components, risk arising from hedging of wealth shocks is the most important followed by commonality in liquidity risk, whereas flight to liquidity risk is not significantly priced in the Finnish stock market. Our results show that the liquidity risk is time varying, therefore the models estimating the risk-return relationship should address the issue of conditionality.     

The Impact of Short-Sales Constraints on Liquidity and the Liquidity–Return Relations

Baker and Stein's (2004) model predicts that individual stock liquidity, commonality in liquidity across stocks, the contemporaneous correlation between stock returns and liquidity, and the degree of high liquidity associated with low subsequent stock returns decrease in the absence of short-sales constraints relative to in the presence. To test these theoretical predictions, we examine both the component stocks of the Taiwan 50 index and other nonindex stocks for the sample period before and after the removal of short-sales constraints on the former and use trading turnover and Amihud's (2002) illiquidity ratio as the measure of liquidity to proxy for investor sentiment. Overall, our empirical results are consistent with these theoretical predictions and therefore provide evidence in support of Baker and Stein's (2004) model.     

Share restrictions and asset pricing: Evidence from the hedge fund industry

This paper presents evidence on the relation between hedge fund returns and restrictions imposed by funds that limit the liquidity of fund investors. The excess returns of funds with lockup restrictions are approximately 4–7% per year higher than those of nonlockup funds. The average alpha of all funds is negative or insignificant after controlling for lockups and other share restrictions. Also, a negative relation is found between share restrictions and the liquidity of the fund's portfolio. This suggests that share restrictions allow funds to efficiently manage illiquid assets, and these benefits are captured by investors as a share illiquidity premium.     

Further analysis of the liquidity and information components of institutional orders: Active versus passive funds

Previous research examining the price impact of institutional trading concludes that index funds incur higher liquidity costs due to the higher demand for trading immediacy. However, this conclusion has only been inferred by comparing the total price impact of active and index funds. This study extends the literature by decomposing the price impact of both active and index funds' trades into liquidity (temporary) and information (permanent) components. Index fund trades incur higher liquidity costs and generate lower returns than active funds' trades. Indeed, the evidence presented in this study reveals the execution costs of index funds' trades are entirely liquidity-driven.     

Market Illiquidity and Conditional Equity Premium

We examine the time‐series relation between aggregate bid‐ask spreads and conditional equity premium. We document that average marketwide relative effective bid‐ask spreads forecast aggregate market returns only when controlling for average idiosyncratic variance. This control allows us to document the otherwise elusive relation between illiquidity and returns. The reason is that idiosyncratic variance correlates positively with spreads but has a negative effect on conditional equity premium, causing an omitted variable bias. Our results are robust to standard return predictors, alternative illiquidity measures, and out‐of‐sample tests. These findings are important because they provide strong support for the literature's conjecture that marketwide liquidity is an important asset pricing risk factor.     

Liquidity and Credit Risk

We develop a structural bond valuation model to simultaneously capture liquidity and credit risk. Our model implies that renegotiation in financial distress is influenced by the illiquidity of the market for distressed debt. As default becomes more likely, the components of bond yield spreads attributable to illiquidity increase. When we consider finite maturity debt, we find decreasing and convex term structures of liquidity spreads. Using bond price data spanning 15 years, we find evidence of a positive correlation between the illiquidity and default components of yield spreads as well as support for downward‐sloping term structures of liquidity spreads.