Investor flow-chasing and price–performance puzzle: Evidence from global infrastructure funds

Despite the importance and peculiarity of the infrastructure fund, determinants of infrastructure fund flow and the relation between fees and fund performance were poorly understood. This paper documents two new findings using a unique dataset for global infrastructure funds from January 2005 to June 2019. First, investor flow-chasing exists at the level of infrastructure fund companies, which is intensified by the opacity of information and uncertainty of returns. Second, infrastructure funds charge higher fees even when their before-fee performance is worse, which is explained by fund characteristics and year effects. Based on these findings, we put forward countermeasures from the perspectives of investors, regulators, investor protection managers, and fund managers, with incentive mechanism reforms to alleviate the price-performance puzzle, thereby improving the efficiency of infrastructure fund portfolios.     

Intermediated Investment Management

Intermediaries such as financial advisers serve as an interface between portfolio managers and investors. A large fraction of their compensation is often provided through kickbacks from the portfolio manager. We provide an explanation for the widespread use of intermediaries and kickbacks. Depending on the degree of investor sophistication, kickbacks are used either for price discrimination or aggressive marketing. We explore the effects of these arrangements on fund size, flows, performance, and investor welfare. Kickbacks allow higher management fees to be charged, thereby lowering net returns. Competition among active portfolio managers reduces kickbacks and increases the independence of advisory services.     

Earning investor trust: The role of past earnings management

Does earnings management, even though legal, hinder investor trust in reported earnings? Or do investors regard earnings management as a way for firms to convey private information, or simply as a neutral feature of financial reporting? We find that past abstinence from earnings management increases investor responses to future earnings surprises. Importantly, this effect occurs in industries where investor trust has recently been violated, and where managers would in the past have had incentives and opportunities to misrepresent earnings. Overall, investors seem to interpret the extent to which management resists temptations for misreporting as a “litmus test” of trustworthiness.     

Does societal trust make managers more trustworthy?

This study examines the effects of shareholders' trust on managers' bad news hoarding. Using a large sample of listed firms from 33 countries, we find that firms domiciled in countries with higher societal trust have higher stock price crash risk, which indicates that managers may exploit shareholders' trust to conceal bad news and that a low-trust society can be beneficial in restraining management misconduct due to the monitoring undertaken by low-trust outsiders. We also find that the positive association between societal trust and crash risk is less pronounced (1) when low-trust foreign shareholders have greater control over a country's firms, in line with the view that low-trust shareholders' concerns about being expropriated by managers and the consequent strong efforts at monitoring; (2) when long-term investors have greater control over a country's firms, suggesting that long-term investors playing a complementary role in monitoring corporate governance; and (3) when a country has strong formal institutions, such as investor protection and financial accounting systems, suggesting that robust formal institutions are substitute for social norms.     

Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management

We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more easily, more money is allocated to active management, fees are lower, and asset prices are more efficient. Informed managers outperform after fees, uninformed managers underperform, while the average manager's performance depends on the number of “noise allocators.” Small investors should remain uninformed, but large and sophisticated investors benefit from searching for informed active managers since their search cost is low relative to capital. Hence, managers with larger and more sophisticated investors are expected to outperform.     

How can firms repair their reputations when they discover information technology control material weaknesses?

We examine the effects of information technology material weaknesses on a firm’s reputation by examining how management’s actions before and after disclosure influence investors’ trust in management and perceptions of investment risk. Specifically, we look at the influence of: 1) management taking responsibility for an information technology material weakness, and 2) replacing the CFO with someone with technology expertise. We find that management taking responsibility for a material weakness does not lead to increased trust in management before or after remediation. However, investors perceive more favorable market reactions to remediation when management had previously taken responsibility for the control weakness. Further, we find that replacing the CFO with someone who has technology expertise results in increases in investor trust and improvements in perceptions of investment risk after control weakness remediation. This suggests the importance of sending clear signals to investors that the company is hiring managers with appropriate technology expertise.     

The networking function of investment banks: Evidence from private investments in public equity

We examine investment banks' networking function in capital markets, using a sample of Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs). We argue that investment banks develop relationships with investors through repeat dealings, and that investment banks' networks of relationship investors form the basis of their networking function. We find that investment banks, especially those with larger investor networks, help issuers attract investors. Correspondingly, an issuer that desires more investors is more likely to hire an investment bank than place the shares directly. We also find that issuers pay higher fees to hire investment banks with larger investor networks. Our empirical findings suggest that the networking function of investment banks is important in securities offerings.     

Choices of savings options related to trust in banks’ competence,benevolence and stability

The study investigates whether beliefs in professional investor skill in conjunction with trust in banks and other fund managers explain choices of options for long-term savings. From questionnaire data obtained for a population-based sample (n=178) and a sample of undergraduates (n=186), two index measures were constructed, one of beliefs in the skill of professional investors and another of trust in fund managers. The trust index was aggregated for the three interrelated components: competence, benevolence and stability. Regression analyses of the likelihood of savings in an actively managed fund showed an expected effect of investor-skill beliefs that was mediated by trust in the fund manager. In addition, self-reported knowledge played a larger role than trust for choices of passively managed index funds and in particular for own investment in stocks.     

Active mutual funds: Beware of smart beta ETFs!

Smart beta ETFs have gained tremendous prevalence among investors in recent years. This study provides empirical evidence that a proportion of this fast-paced growth can be attributed to the investor migration from closet factor active mutual funds to smart beta ETFs. Using a sample of US domestic equity active mutual funds and smart beta ETFs from 2000 to 2019, we find that smart beta ETFs offer factor exposures at lower fees and therefore higher risk-adjusted returns than closet factor funds. The investors notice the benefits of smart beta ETFs and replace closet factor funds with these ETFs. Closet factor funds are at higher risks of being replaced when investors are sophisticated, when the market share of smart beta ETFs increases, and after 2012. Our findings illustrate the dynamic changes in investor preference towards investment products that bring similar or greater benefits at a lower price.     

Investor communication and the benefits of cross-listing

While studies have sought to explain the benefits of cross-listing, little attention has been paid to the role of communication between managers and investors during this process. In this paper, I investigate whether managers change communication policies around U.S. cross-listings. I document significant increases in communication when firms cross-list. I then test whether these investor communication practices around cross-listing are associated with capital market benefits. I find that cross-listed firms that communicate more with investors experience greater and longer lasting cross-listing benefits. Lastly, I explore two potential reasons that may lead managers to choose higher levels of communication: to support an increase in investor recognition and to facilitate monitoring. I find results consistent with communication increasing visibility and scrutiny, suggesting that communication functions as a supporting tool to achieve managers’ cross-listing goals.     

Is knowledge powerful? Evidence from financial education and earnings quality

Previous studies emphasize the importance of investor legal protection on financial reporting quality. We argue that investors’ awareness of their legal rights and understanding of the financial products play complementary roles. Financially well-educated investors are more likely to be able to understand investment-related information and less likely to be tricked, hence can pressure managers to eschew misappropriate behavior. This paper explores the role of investor financial education as a corporate governance mechanism in the context of earnings quality. Using data from 43 countries during the sample period of 1994–2012, we find that earnings quality is higher in countries with better financial education after controlling for various institutional environments. Interestingly, the positive effect of financial education on earnings quality exists only in countries with stronger investor legal protection, indicating a complementary role of financial education. Our study provides evidence on the role of financial education in investor protection.     

High-Water Marks and Hedge Fund Management Contracts

Incentive fees for money managers are frequently accompanied by high‐water mark provisions that condition the payment of the performance fee upon exceeding the previously achieved maximum share value. In this paper, we show that hedge fund performance fees are valuable to money managers, and conversely, represent a claim on a significant proportion of investor wealth. The high‐water mark provisions in these contracts limit the value of the performance fees. We provide a closed‐form solution to the cost of the high‐water mark contract under certain conditions. Our results provide a framework for valuation of a hedge fund management company.     

Carrot and stick: A role for benchmark-adjusted compensation in active fund management

Investors delegating their wealth to privately informed managers face not only an intrinsic asymmetric information problem but also a potential misalignment in risk preferences. In this setting, we show that by tying fees symmetrically to the appropriate benchmark investors can tilt a fund portfolio toward their optimal risk exposure and realize nearly all the value of managers’ information. They attain these benefits despite an inherent inefficiency in the choice of the benchmark, and at no extra cost of compensating managers for exposure to relative-performance risk. Under certain conditions, benchmark-adjusted performance fees are necessary to prevent passive alternatives from dominating active management. Our results shed light on a recent debate on the appropriate fee structure of active funds in contexts of high competition from passive funds.     

Investor biases in Japan: Another pathology of Keiretsu

We examine how keiretsu-related institutional investors behave in the Japanese stock market relative to other investor categories for the period from 1985–1998. Based on the agency problem hypothesis for the general bias of institutional investors and the relational distance hypothesis for the unusual bias of keiretsu-affiliated money managers, this paper finds that keiretsu-affiliated money managers over-invest not only in large firms, but also in imprudent firms. The group affiliation of Japanese domestic money managers may drive their portfolio decisions towards financially weak group member firms at the expense of their client investors. Identifying the conditions for this rescue type of investment, we illustrate a rather weak corporate governance foundation of institutional money management in Japan.     

Cybersecurity breaches and investors’ interest in the firm as an investment

Cybersecurity breaches pose a significant risk to firms. To combat these risks, many firms engage in strategic cybersecurity risk management initiatives. While these efforts may reduce the likelihood of a cybersecurity breach, they do not eliminate the risk of a breach. In the event of a cybersecurity breach, firms may issue an apology to investors. This study uses an experiment to examine whether a firm indicates cybersecurity risk management is a strategic initiative and whether a post-cybersecurity breach apology by the CEO impacts nonprofessional investors’ investment interest in the firm. Results show that, in response to a cybersecurity breach, the presence of a CEO apology positively impacts investors’ investment impression and their perceptions of CEO affective and CEO cognitive trust. We find that investors’ investment interest is lowest for a firm that previously indicates cybersecurity risk management is a strategic initiative and where the CEO does not issue an apology. The CEO apology, however, does not significantly impact investment amount, a secondary measure of investor interest. Results from this study have implications for managers, investors, and regulators.     

Polynomial goal programming and the implicit higher moment preferences of US institutional investors in hedge funds

Polynomial goal programming (PGP) is a flexible method that allows investor preferences for different moments of the return distribution of financial assets to be included in the portfolio optimization. The method is intuitive and particularly suitable for incorporating investor preferences in higher moments of the return distribution. However, until now, PGP has not been able to meet its full potential because it requires quantification of “real” preference parameters towards those moments. To date, the chosen preference parameters have been selected somewhat “arbitrarily”. Our goal is to calculate implied sets of preference parameters using investors’ choices of and the importance they attribute to risk and performance measures. We use three groups of institutional investors—pension funds, insurance companies, and endowments—and derive implied sets of preference parameters in the context of a hedge fund portfolio optimization. To determine “real” preferences for the higher moments of the portfolio return distribution, we first fit implied preference parameters so that the PGP optimal portfolio is identical to the desired hedge fund portfolio. With the obtained economically justified sets of preference parameters, the well-established PGP framework can be employed more efficiently to derive allocations that satisfy institutional investor expectations for hedge fund investments. Furthermore, the implied preference parameters enable fund of hedge fund managers and other investment managers to derive optimal portfolio allocations based on specific investor expectations. Moreover, the importance of individual moments, as well as their marginal rates of substitution, can be assessed.     

Identifying and Attracting the "right" Investors: Evidence on the Behavior of Institutional Investors

This article summarizes the findings of research the author has conducted over the past seven years that aims to answer a number of questions about institutional investors: Are there significant differences among institutional investors in time horizon and other trading practices that would enable such investors to be classified into types on the basis of their observable behavior? Assuming the answer to the first is yes, do corporate managers respond differently to the pressures created by different types of investors– and, by implication, are certain kinds of investors more desirable from corporate management's point of view? What kinds of companies tend to attract each type of investor, and how does a company's disclosure policy affect that process? The author's approach identifies three categories of institutional investors: (1) “transient” institutions, which exhibit high portfolio turnover and own small stakes in portfolio companies; (2) “dedicated” holders, which provide stable ownership and take large positions in individual firms; and (3) “quasi‐indexers,” which also trade infrequently but own small stakes (similar to an index strategy). As might be expected, the disproportionate presence of transient institutions in a company's investor base appears to intensify pressure for short‐term performance while also resulting in excess volatility in the stock price. Also not surprising, transient investors are attracted to companies with investor relations activities geared toward forward‐looking information and “news events,” like management earnings forecasts, that constitute trading opportunities for such investors. By contrast, quasi‐indexers and dedicated institutions are largely insensitive to shortterm performance and their presence is associated with lower stock price volatility. The research also suggests that companies that focus their disclosure activities on historical information as opposed to earnings forecasts tend to attract quasi‐indexers instead of transient investors. In sum, the author's research suggests that changes in disclosure practices have the potential to shift the composition of a firm's investor base away from transient investors and toward more patient capital. By removing some of the external pressures for short‐term performance, such a shift could encourage managers to establish a culture based on long‐run value maximization.     

Can Investors Identify Managerial Discretion in Corporate Social Responsibility Practices? The Moderate Role of Investor Protection

This paper analyses investors’ ability to identify if managers use corporate social responsibility as an entrenchment practice to conceal the risk of dismissal associated with managerial discretion and if this detection is determined by the level of investor protection orientation. Results based on an international database of 1949 companies show that investors and markets do not identify managerial entrenchment based on the promotion of sustainable practices, except when such entrenchment is developed by companies located in countries with strong investor protection. In these countries, investors identify and penalise such companies with lower financial performance.     

On the Choice of Superannuation Funds in Australia

Using a sample of Australian retail and wholesale superannuation funds to proxy for choice and limited choice alternatives, respectively, we investigate the costs and benefits of providing choice to investors. We find that investors who have choice don't respond to fees. Also, loads - typical of the choice environment - are likely to be a dead-weight loss borne by investors. Employees who involuntarily contribute to (employer) funds, tend to pay the lowest fees. Given these results, the advantages of choice become questionable. Our results show that managers of limited choice funds achieve greater positive abnormal returns than retail fund managers. The analysis of flows provides insight into why choice funds do not perform better than limited choice funds. Investors are not responding to historical performance as predicted.     

BAYLOR UNIVERSITY ROUNDTABLE ON INTEGRITY IN FINANCIAL REPORTING

At the center of the U.S. corporate governance controversy are questions about the integrity of the U.S. financial reporting system. Can investors trust the numbers now being reported in corporate financial statements? And, if not, what steps are being taken to bring about the return of investor trust and confidence? The academics and practitioners who took part in this discussion began by expressing their reluctance to describe the current situation as a “crisis.” The consensus was that the recent governance failures are not the reflection of a general decline in corporate moral standards, but rather the work of a handful of opportunists who found ways to exploit some weaknesses in the present system. Part of the discussion focused on the expected benefits (and costs) of the heightened regulatory scrutiny provided by the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act and the newly formed Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. But most of the panelists placed greater emphasis on the role of self‐regulation in resolving problems such as the conflicts of interest within auditing and brokerage firms that played a major role in scandals like Enron and WorldCom. And rather than relying on more vigorous SEC oversight of financial statements, a number of panelists argued that top priority should be given to comprehensive reform of U.S. accounting standards, which are said to be a major source of confusion for both managers and investors.