共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
《Journal of Banking & Finance》1998,22(1):19-40
This paper develops a signalling model of call of convertible securities (bonds or preferred stock) in the presence of corporate taxes and asymmetric information about future earnings. In equilibrium, managers with relatively unfavorable information call to force convertible holders to convert to common stock (in spite of the loss of corporate tax benefits if the convertibles are bonds), while those with relatively favorable information do not call. The model predicts that the announcement period common stock returns are more negative at the call of convertible bond than at the call of convertible preferred stock. Furthermore, we predict that when the importance of the tax deductibility of interest differs among firms, so does the stock price reaction to the announcement of convertible debt call. Specifically, the loss of equity value at the announcement decreases with the amount of non-debt tax shield that the calling firm owns, decreases with the book value of convertible debt called, and increases with corporate taxes. 相似文献
2.
《Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics》2014,10(1):1-15
This study extends prior research on the willingness of firms to significantly decrease their corporate taxes. It specifically examines the associations between corporate tax avoidance and the reported significant uncertainty of a firm’s tax position, the tax expertise and tax affiliations of its directors, and the performance-based remuneration incentives of its key management personnel. Based on a dataset of 200 publicly listed Australian firms over the 2006–2010 period (1000 firm years), we find that the reported uncertainty of a firm’s tax position, the tax expertise of its directors, and the performance-based remuneration incentives of its key management personnel are significantly positively associated with tax avoidance. Conversely, firms with board members who have at least one tax-related affiliation are significantly negatively associated with tax avoidance. 相似文献
3.
We show that risk characteristics of projects' cash flows are endogenously determined by the investment decisions of all firms in an industry. As a result, in reasonable settings, financial structures which create incentives to expropriate debtholders by increasing risk are shown not to reduce value in an industry equilibrium. Without taxes, capital structure is irrelevant for individual firms despite its effect on the equityholders' incentives, but the maximum total amount of debt in the industry is determinate. Allowing for a corporate tax advantage of debt, capital structure becomes relevant but firms are indifferent between distinct alternative debt levels. 相似文献
4.
In 1936, the Federal Government unexpectedly imposed a tax on undistributed corporate profits. Despite the direct costs of the tax, its announcement produced a positive revaluation of corporate equity, particularly among lower-payout firms. We interpret this as evidence of a divergence between managerial and shareholder preferences regarding dividend payout policies, consistent with the presence of agency costs. We also find that despite the incentives created by the tax, the actual growth in dividends during 1936 was lower among firms judged more likely to be subject to higher agency costs after controlling for liquidity, debt, and the growth in earnings. 相似文献
5.
Reint E. Gropp 《International Tax and Public Finance》2002,9(1):51-71
This paper investigates the question of taxation and capital structure choice in Germany. Germany represents an excellent case study for investigating the question of whether and to what extent taxes influence the debt-equity decision of firms, because the relative tax burdens on debt and equity vary greatly across communities. German communities levy local taxes on profits and long-term debt payments in addition to personal and corporate taxes on the federal level. A stylized model is presented incorporating these taxes. The model shows that local taxes create substantial incentives for firms to use debt financing. Furthermore, the paper empirically investigates the effect of local business taxes on the share of debt used to finance incremental investments by German firms. I find that local taxes significantly influence the capital structure choice of firms, controlling for a large number of other factors. In an extensive sensitivity analysis the tax effect are found to be robust across several different specifications. 相似文献
6.
Jean-François Tremblay 《International Tax and Public Finance》2010,17(1):52-66
This paper examines the effects of wage taxation and corporate income taxation on training investment in frictional labor
markets. Because of labor market frictions, the wage structure is compressed and workers do not capture the entire return
from their skills. As a result, both firms and workers have incentives to support part of the costs of training investments.
The analysis shows that when decisions to invest in training are made by firms and workers acting cooperatively, a wage tax
increases the level of investment in skills whereas a corporate income tax decreases it. In this case, the introduction of
a small wage tax unambiguously increases efficiency. The effects of both types of taxes on training are reversed when investment
decisions are taken by firms alone. In any case, a corporate income tax is not neutral with respect to decisions to invest
in skills even if the full cost of investment is deducted from taxable income in the period when it is incurred and the tax
system provides full loss offset. 相似文献
7.
Finance theory has long viewed corporate income taxes as a potentially important determinant of corporate financing decisions and capital structures. But finance academics have been unable to provide convincing empirical evidence of a material effect of taxes on corporate leverage, in part because of difficulties in constructing an effective proxy for marginal corporate tax rates, and hence for the tax benefits of debt, for large samples of individual companies. The authors address this by analyzing leverage decisions in an industry whose publicly traded entities are organized either as taxable corporations, or as real estate investment trusts (REITs) that effectively avoid entity level taxation. This enables them to measure the relative tax benefits of debt with greater precision while controlling for important nontax characteristics that affect debt usage. The tax hypothesis predicts that for real estate firms with similar asset portfolios, taxable firms should have more debt than their nontaxable counterparts. Both the nontaxable and the taxable real estate firms in our sample routinely have more than twice the leverage of industrial firms, which suggests that factors other than taxes are contributing to their use of debt. But among real estate firms, tax status appears to play a much weaker role. Taxable firms have significantly more leverage only after 2000, when restrictions on REITs were removed through new regulations that made their operations much more like those of taxable real estate firms. Our findings also depend on real estate characteristics—most notably, only residential real estate firms demonstrated differences that are consistent with the tax hypothesis. Taken together, the authors’ findings suggest that although taxes do seem to matter, their role is clearly secondary relative to factors such as the nature of the firm’s assets. A generous interpretation of our evidence puts the effect of taxes between one‐third and one‐half of that implied by prior research. 相似文献
8.
Laura Dobbins 《Accounting & Business Research》2016,46(7):731-759
This paper studies the effect of corporate taxes on investment. Since firms with a foreign parent have more cross-country profit shifting opportunities than domestically owned firms do, their effective tax rate and, consequently, their tax-induced costs to investment are lower. We therefore expect capital investment responses to a corporate tax cut to be heterogeneous across firms. Using firm-level data on German corporations, we exploit the 2008 tax reform, which substantially cut corporate taxes as an exogenous policy shock and expect domestically owned firms' investments to be more responsive to the reform. We show exactly this in a difference-in-differences setting. We find that the reduction in corporate tax payments led to a one-to-one increase in the real investments of domestic firms. The effect is stronger for domestic firms relying more on internal funds. Correspondingly, labor investment increased more for domestic firms, ensuring a constant mix of input factors. In addition, we show that domestic firms' sales grew faster after the tax cut than the sales of foreign-owned firms. Our results imply that corporate tax changes can increase corporate investment but that domestic firms benefit more than foreign-owned firms from a tax cut through higher investment responses resulting in greater sales growth. 相似文献
9.
This paper investigates how corporate governance plays a role in long-run tax management and contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we add insight into the horizon problems related to executive and director compensation and show that incentive compensation provides long-term incentives to improve performance by establishing a link between higher pay-performance sensitivity and lower taxes. Second, this is one of the first papers, to our knowledge, to empirically examine the role of governance in corporate tax management from a long-term perspective in order to better understand the lasting effects of governance. We find that incentive compensation drives managers to make investments into longer-horizon pay outs such as tax management. Furthermore, we find that this investment into tax management benefits shareholders; better tax management is positively related to higher returns to shareholders. We also address the endogeneity issues of corporate governance and performance measures. Finally, our paper is unique in examining which type of tax management strategy (domestic or foreign) different firms focus on. Our results shed light into how governance can improve firm performance and increase shareholder value in the long run. 相似文献
10.
Kimberley Scharf 《Fiscal Studies》1999,20(4):451-477
This paper provides an empirical assessment of the overall incentives generated by taxes with respect to the choice between extraction and recycling of basic materials in Canada. We calculate measures of the overall impact of the Canadian tax system on the incremental cost of (i) producing virgin material or recycled material that is to be used as an intermediate input in the production of a final product and (ii) producing finished products. The sectors that we examine include producers of primary virgin material (forestry, mining, oil and gas), producers of recycled material (scrap dealers) and producers of finished products (metal, paper, plastic and glass). Our results indicate that the Canadian tax system significantly favours the use of virgin materials rather than recycled materials in the case of metal and glass products, but the reverse is true for plastic products. Features in the Canadian tax system contributing to these findings are not limited to corporate income and mining tax incentives at the exploration and extraction stages of the production of virgin materials, but also include provincial sales taxes on capital, which are borne more heavily by scrap firms than by resource and manufacturing firms, and provincial sales taxes that apply to business inputs, which also fall more heavily upon the recycling sector. 相似文献
11.
《Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics》2019,15(2):145-157
Ownership structure plays an important role in firms’ decisions on tax avoidance. Recently, the effect of family ownership on corporate tax avoidance has become an issue of increasing interest among scholars from both the fields of family business research and tax research; however, empirical findings have so far remained ambiguous. Based on a unique sample of 678 large private firms from Germany, we show that for unlisted large firms (i) family firms avoid more tax than non-family firms, (ii) tax avoidance increases with the percentage of family ownership, and (iii) tax avoidance is a function of the number of shareholders. We interpret our results as evidence that benefits from avoiding taxes outweigh the non-tax costs in the case of large private family firms in Germany. Furthermore, as the number of family shareholders increases, family firms satisfy increasing demand for dividends by avoiding taxes. 相似文献
12.
We find evidence suggesting that corporate lobbying for tax purposes over the period 1999–2009 is one method by which firms managed corporate taxes. Furthermore, tax management strategies employed by these politically active firms were valued by shareholders. Firms lobbying on tax issues have lower book effective taxes and greater discretionary permanent differences in GAAP and IRS taxable income. Investors place a premium on lobbying activities for tax purposes unless the firm already has a low effective tax rate or very high book-tax differences. We conclude that lobbying political officials is one method by which firms manage risks attendant an aggressive tax strategy. 相似文献
13.
This study examines equity risk incentives as one determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. Prior research finds that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make risky investment and financing decisions, since risky activities increase stock return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose costs on both firms and managers. As a result, managers must be incentivized to engage in risky tax avoidance that is expected to generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. We predict that equity risk incentives motivate managers to undertake risky tax strategies. Consistent with this prediction, we find that larger equity risk incentives are associated with greater tax risk and the magnitude of this effect is economically significant. Our results are robust across four measures of tax risk, but do not vary across several proxies for strength of corporate governance. We conclude that equity risk incentives are a significant determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. 相似文献
14.
Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax Incentives? 总被引:15,自引:0,他引:15
There are two tax incentives for corporations to hedge: to increase debt capacity and interest tax deductions, and to reduce expected tax liability if the tax function is convex. We test whether these incentives affect the extent of corporate hedging with derivatives. Using an explicit measure of tax function convexity, we find no evidence that firms hedge in response to tax convexity. Our analysis does, however, indicate that firms hedge to increase debt capacity, with increased tax benefits averaging 1.1 percent of firm value. Our results also indicate that firms hedge because of expected financial distress costs and firm size. 相似文献
15.
This paper discusses the role of multinational firms and double taxation treaties for corporate income taxation in open economies. We show that it is optimal for a small open economy to levy positive corporate income taxes if multinational firms are taxed according to the full taxation after deduction system or the foreign tax credit system. Positive corporate taxes also occur in the asymmetric case where some countries apply the exemption system and others apply the tax credit system. If all countries apply the exemption system, the optimal corporate income tax is zero. We also show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxes are not necessarily too low from the perspective of the economy as a whole. While the undertaxation result is confirmed for the case of the exemption system, tax rates may also be inefficiently high if the deduction or the credit systems are applied. 相似文献
16.
Using 113 staggered changes in corporate income tax rates across U.S. states, we provide evidence on how taxes affect corporate risk‐taking decisions. Higher taxes reduce expected profits more for risky projects than for safe ones, as the government shares in a firm's upside but not in its downside. Consistent with this prediction, we find that risk taking is sensitive to taxes, albeit asymmetrically: the average firm reduces risk in response to a tax increase (primarily by changing its operating cycle and reducing R&D risk) but does not respond to a tax cut. We trace the asymmetry back to constraints on risk taking imposed by creditors. Finally, tax loss‐offset rules moderate firms’ sensitivity to taxes by allowing firms to partly share downside risk with the government. 相似文献
17.
Valuation implications of socially responsible tax avoidance: Evidence from the electricity industry
《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》2022,41(4):106959
Prior literature suggests that firms may bear reputational costs associated with corporate tax avoidance, which could in turn reduce the net present value of firms’ tax planning strategies. However, these studies do not consider the fact that firms may have opportunities to avoid tax in socially responsible ways. We investigate the equity valuation implications of one form of socially responsible tax avoidance: claiming the renewable electricity production tax credit (PTC). We predict and find that investors more positively value tax savings generated from PTCs compared to other forms of corporate tax avoidance, consistent with the notion that socially responsible tax avoidance should not subject firms to reputational costs. Additionally, consistent with the role that CSR can play in enhancing a firm’s reputational capital, we find evidence of a spillover effect in which investors more positively value other sources of tax avoidance to the extent the firm also reduces its taxes in a socially responsible way. Our results demonstrate the importance for managers to consider socially responsible tax avoidance as a component of a firm’s tax planning portfolio and for policymakers to recognize the appeal of socially responsible tax strategies as the reputational consequences of tax avoidance become more prominent. 相似文献
18.
This paper examines the major determinants of tax haven utilization based on a sample of 200 publicly listed Australian firms, over the 2006–2010 period (1,000 firm‐years). Our regression results show that variables relating to transfer pricing, intangible assets, an interaction term between transfer pricing and intangible assets, withholding taxes, performance‐based management remuneration and multinationality are positively associated with tax haven utilization. We also find that corporate governance structures are negatively associated with tax haven utilization. The magnitude and significance of the regression coefficients indicate that transfer pricing, withholding taxes, intangible assets, an interaction term between transfer pricing and intangible assets, corporate governance and multinationality are the most important drivers of tax haven utilization. 相似文献
19.
Taxes and Corporate Finance: A Review 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
This article reviews tax research related to domestic and multinationalcapital structure, payout policy, compensation policy, riskmanagement, and organizational form. For each topic, the theoreticalarguments explaining how taxes can affect corporate decisionmaking and firm value are reviewed, followed by a summary ofthe related empirical evidence and a discussion of unresolvedissues. Tax research generally supports the hypothesis thathigh tax rate firms pursue policies that provide tax benefits.Many issues remain unresolved, however, including understandingwhether tax effects are of first-order importance, why firmsdo not pursue tax benefits more aggressively, and whether corporateactions are affected by investor-level taxes. 相似文献
20.
Abstract: This paper examines tax-induced income shifting behavior among affiliated firms in Korean business groups (chaebols). Korean corporate income tax law does not require consolidated tax returns, and business groups with a large number of affiliated member firms have incentives to shift income across member firms to reduce the overall taxes of the group. For a large number of Korean companies that are subject to external audits, we perform univariate and multivariate regression analyses on the income shifting behavior of chaebol firms compared with non-chaebol control firms. Our evidence suggests that tax-motivated income shifting activities exist among chaebol firms, and that the extent of income shifting is found to depend on its effect on non-tax cost factors such as the earnings, leverage, and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders. We also find that income shifting is more pronounced in chaebol firms where the control-cash flow divergence is relatively large, suggesting that income shifting is affected by the controlling shareholders' opportunism. Our study provides some insights on the intra-group income shifting activities where research is limited. 相似文献