Earnings Management and the Post‐earnings Announcement Drift

We posit that the post‐earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is related to earnings management. Accordingly, we find that firms with large negative (positive) changes in operating cash flows manage accruals upward (downward). Most importantly, we find that PEAD is concentrated largely among those firms that are most likely to have smoothed their reported earnings and is generally associated with discretionary accruals as opposed to nondiscretionary accruals. There is no evidence of a positive (negative) PEAD for those firms with large positive (negative) earnings changes that are least likely to have managed earnings downward (upward).     

Post‐Earnings Announcement Drift: Bounds on Profitability for the Marginal Investor

The persistence of the post‐earnings announcement drift (PEAD) leads many to believe that trading barriers prevent investors from eliminating it. We examine two factors that have not been adequately addressed by the literature: the exact timing of earnings announcements and liquidity costs. Under a wide range of timing and cost assumptions, our results leave little doubt that over our sample period the PEAD was highly profitable after trading costs. An additional incremental investor could have earned hedged‐portfolio returns of at least 14% per year after trading costs. Over our sample period, investors did indeed leave money on the table.     

Management Guidance Pre‐ and Post‐Restatement

We examine whether the quality of restating firms’ management guidance differs in periods before and after restatement announcements. While characteristics of restating firms and the consequences of restatement have been a central topic in accounting and auditing research, the quality of management guidance around restatements is less well understood. We consider two competing characterizations of the link between management forecast accuracy and bias and restatement (an event that tends to signal poor financial controls): “Forecast–Opportunism Explanation” and “Forecast–Ability Explanation”. Under the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls enable managers to manipulate earnings toward forecasts and to meet or exceed opportunistically biased forecasts, and the post‐restatement strengthening of financial controls constrains opportunistic behavior. Under the Forecast–Ability Explanation, pre‐restatement weaknesses in financial controls impede managers’ ability to issue accurate forecasts, and post‐restatement improvements remove impediments so that the accuracy of forecasts improves; forecast bias remains unaffected. Evidence indicates that before a restatement, restating firms’ forecasts are more accurate and relatively more downwardly biased than control firms’ forecasts. Post‐restatement, restating firms have less accurate and less downwardly biased management guidance. Our overall results are consistent with the Forecast–Opportunism Explanation.     

Pre‐packin' in the UK

A pre‐pack administration is one where a deal has already been agreed prior to the company entering administration. The company's business will commonly be sold to the incumbent management team immediately the company is placed into administration. The business survives relatively intact but will have managed to jettison its unsecured debt. The business is saved and jobs are saved. The pre‐pack will usually require the support of the company's bankers. Recent research suggests that pre‐packs may constitute between 50% and 80% of all insolvent going concern sales. The UK version of a pre‐packaged administration appears to have been rare until the administration process under the Insolvency Act 1986 was significantly amended in 2002, permitting a company to be placed into administration without a court order. The UK version of pre‐packaged administration does not involve any plan being approved by different classes of creditor nor for the court to be involved in approving activities of the administrator before or after the plan is put into effect. The paper considers whether or not pre‐pack administrations fit into the statutory framework of the Insolvency Act, the professional ethics requirements of being an insolvency practitioner and the equitable rules governing fiduciaries. Some aspects of the policy underpinning pre‐packs are also considered in particular the decision to allow insolvency practitioners to claim pre‐appointment fees as an expense of the administration. This decision appears to herald a change in government policy. This policy change is also considered. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pre‐Issuance Hedging of Fixed‐Rate Debt

This article analyzes several corporate hedging strategies to manage interest rate risk on fixed‐rate debt prior to issuance. The authors start by considering these strategies using a highly stylized model: a binomial forward interest rate tree that, while simple in design, illustrates derivative pricing methodologies that are used in practice. Under a given rate volatility assumption, they demonstrate expected outcomes when entering a forward bond contract, a forward‐starting pay‐fixed interest swap, and a purchased option on that swap, as well as the “default” alternative of doing nothing. In principle, the decision of whether or not to hedge, as well as how to do so, depends on management's view of future interest rate volatility and degree of comfort with possible outcomes. The authors then assess the pros and cons of hedging strategies, with considerable emphasis on practical considerations. For example, while their theoretical model would allow an issuer to “lock” a specific debt issuance, in practice one can hedge only “benchmark” interest rate risk. The authors describe the use of both Treasury locks and forward‐starting swaps to address unexpected benchmark yield changes, and discuss how factors such as the time to issuance affect an issuer's choice of instrument. For instance, Treasury locks are typically used when the time to issuance is relatively short, while interest rate swaps are more common for longer times to issuance. The article also discusses circumstances in which a “do nothing” strategy may be preferable to other alternatives, as well as the disadvantages of issuing in advance. Finally, the authors describe the impact of financial accounting on different hedge strategies.     

Conservatism and Cross-Sectional Variation in the Post–Earnings Announcement Drift

Accounting conservatism allows me to identify a previously undocumented source of predictable cross‐sectional variation in Standardized Unexpected Earnings' autocorrelations viz. the sign of the most recent earnings realization and present evidence that the market ignores this variation (“loss effect”). It is possible to earn returns higher than from the Bernard and Thomas (1990) strategy by incorporating this feature. Additionally, the paper shows that the “loss effect” is different from the “cross quarter” effect shown by Rangan and Sloan (1998) and it is possible to combine the two effects to earn returns higher than either strategy alone. Thus, the paper corroborates the Bernard and Thomas finding that stock prices fail to reflect the extent to which quarterly earnings series differ from a seasonal random walk and extends it by showing that the market systematically underestimates time‐series properties resulting from accounting conservatism.     

Implications of Transaction Costs for the Post–Earnings Announcement Drift

This paper examines the effect of transaction costs on the post–earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Using standard market microstructure features we show that transaction costs constrain the informed trades that are necessary to incorporate earnings information into price. This implies weaker return responses at the time of the earnings announcement and higher subsequent returns drift for firms with higher transaction costs. Consistent with this prediction, we find that earnings response coefficients are lower for firms with higher transaction costs. Using portfolio analyses, we find that the profits of implementing the PEAD trading strategy are significantly reduced by transaction costs. In addition, we show, using a combination of portfolio and regression analyses, that firms with higher transaction costs are the ones that provide the higher abnormal returns for the PEAD strategy. Our results indicate that transaction costs can provide an explanation not only for the persistence but also for the existence of PEAD.     

Accruals, Cash Flows and the Post‐Earnings‐Announcement Drift

Abstract:   Several prior studies have shown that cash flows have significantly greater impact on stock prices than accruals. We examine the implications of these findings for the post‐earnings‐announcement‐drift anomaly. We argue that, if investors under‐react to earnings news, then the larger price impact of cash flows causes the cash flow component of earnings news to predict future returns better than the accruals component. Consistent with this argument, we show that unexpected cash flows are more positively related to future returns, than are unexpected accruals. Also, unexpected cash flows are found to predict future returns above and beyond that predicted by earnings surprises. Finally, we show that a strategy that decomposes earnings news into its components significantly outperforms strategies based on earnings news alone. The results support under‐reaction explanations for the drift.     

Value Relevance of Environmental Provisions Pre‐ and Post‐IFRS

The purpose of this paper is to compare the value relevance of environmental provisions as recorded under Canadian/U.S. GAAP and IFRS accounting frameworks with consideration of the impact of voluntarily issuing stand‐alone sustainability reports. The value relevance of environmental provisions is tested using a modified Ohlson (1995) model. We exploit IFRS reconciliations as a quasi‐experimental setting to conduct this comparison. Results indicate that environmental provisions recorded under either framework only act as liabilities for oil and gas firms that release stand‐alone sustainability reports. For other firms in the oil and gas industry, and the mining industry, the liability nature of these provisions appears to be discounted by the market. Furthermore, for firms in the oil and gas industry that do not have stand‐alone CSR reports, provisions appear to be interpreted by the market as a costly signal about future growth. Instead of downwardly affecting market values, this information is associated with higher market values. In terms of the transition to IFRS, we find that, while the IFRS provisions are significantly higher than under former GAAP, they do not improve value relevance for investors. Accounting standard setters should consider examining the changes in the current standards from the original Canadian environmental provision reporting requirements under Capital Assets section 3060.39, as it was rightfully shown to be a relevant proxy for unbooked liabilities (Li and McConomy, 1999; Bewley, 2005) rather than earnings expectancy. The study builds upon prior research to examine the value of accounting standards that have gone through significant changes.     

Earnings Volatility,Post–Earnings Announcement Drift,and Trading Frictions

We find that lower ex ante earnings volatility leads to higher Post–Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD). PEAD is a function of both the magnitude of an earnings surprise and its persistence. While prior research has largely investigated market reactions to the magnitude of the earnings surprise, in this study we show that the persistence of the earnings surprise is equally important. A unique feature of the anomalous PEAD returns documented here concerns the association between abnormal returns and trading frictions. Besides demonstrating that firms with lower earnings volatility have higher abnormal returns, we also find that lower earnings volatility firms have lower trading frictions. Taken together, these findings imply that higher abnormal returns are associated with lower trading frictions. We exploit this implication to empirically demonstrate that PEAD returns due to earnings volatility are not concentrated in the firms with the largest trading frictions, which is in contrast to the findings in prior anomaly studies.     

Post-Earnings Announcement Drift and Market Participants' Information Processing Biases

Prior research has been unable to explain the phenomenon known as post-earnings announcement drift, raising questions concerning the semi-strong form efficiency of the market typically assumed in capital market research. This study contributes to our understanding of this anomaly by examining drift in the context of theories that consider investors' non-Bayesian behaviors. The empirical evidence reveals that investors' overconfidence about their private information and the reliability of the earnings information are two important factors that explain drift. Finally, this study also provides insight into the puzzling relationship between dispersion and drift discussed in prior research.     

The Adequacy of Pre‐purchase Due Diligence in Independent Small Business and Franchising

This research reports an in‐depth study of the due diligence activities that prospective independent small business operators and franchisees in Australia undertake prior to purchasing or starting up their businesses. Although academic literature and industry publications promote undertaking ‘proper due diligence’, there is a lack of empirical research into the nature of due diligence and its effect on business outcomes. Using a qualitative approach, 60 currently and formerly operating independents and franchisees were personally interviewed, exploring the diversity of approaches to undertaking due diligence prior to entering business. The research revealed that differences occur in both the type and amount of due diligence undertaken by independents and franchisees and highlighted further differences between current and former operators. In general, the due diligence undertaken by participants was relatively unsophisticated with few exceptions of rigour and planning. Where prospective independents and franchisees were entering business for the first time, their appreciation of business was naïve. A steep learning curve followed during which they often recognised flaws in their initial research. As a result of this qualitative in‐depth research, we present a set of propositions regarding due diligence and a model for future testing on a large sample.     

投资者意见分歧对盈余公告效应影响的实证研究

从投资者意见分歧的角度对盈余公告效应进行理论解释,借鉴衡量投资者意见分歧的模型对中国股票市场的盈余公告效应进行实证检验,研究结论认为:我国的股票市场表现出了明显的盈余公告效应.投资者意见分歧对盈余公告效应具有很好的解释作用.在研究期内,投资者意见分歧与股票组合的累积异常收益率呈正相关关系.     

盈余公告前价格漂移与交易成本

本文以上市公司业绩预告或正式盈余公告披露日的数据为样本,在控制盈余公告后价格漂移效应的基础上,通过构造相关组合交易战略,系统地研究了已公告公司的盈余信息在行业内的传递性,发现市场在信息传递过程中存在反应不足。可以认为,这种反应不足是我国A股市场长期存在但并未被证实的市场“异象”。     

Underreaction to Industry‐Wide Earnings and the Post‐Forecast Revision Drift

We test whether the post‐forecast revision drift is mainly attributable to investors’ underreaction to industry‐wide earnings news conveyed by analysts’ forecast revisions. We find a large drift associated with industry‐wide earnings news but no drift associated with firm‐specific earnings news. Consistent with the functional fixation hypothesis, we provide evidence that the post‐forecast revision drift is driven by investors’ underreaction to the higher persistence of industry‐wide earnings. Although prior research has focused on differential persistence of earnings components stemming from managerial reporting discretion, we provide evidence suggesting that investors do not fully understand the differential earnings persistence attributable to industry fundamentals.     

Comparing the Post–Earnings Announcement Drift for Surprises Calculated from Analyst and Time Series Forecasts

Post–earnings announcement drift is the tendency for a stock's cumulative abnormal returns to drift in the direction of an earnings surprise for several weeks following an earnings announcement. We show that the drift is significantly larger when defining the earnings surprise using analysts' forecasts and actual earnings from I/B/E/S than when using a time series model based on Compustat earnings data. Neither Compustat's policy of restating earnings nor the inclusion of “special items” in reported earnings contribute significantly to the disparity in drift magnitudes. Rather, our results suggest that this disparity is attributable to differences between analyst forecasts and those of time‐series models—or at least to factors correlated with these differences. Further, we document that analyst forecasts lead to return patterns around future earnings announcements that differ from those observed when using time‐series models, suggesting that the two types of surprises may capture somewhat different forms of mispricing.     

Volume, Opinion Divergence, and Returns: A Study of Post–Earnings Announcement Drift

This paper examines the relationship between post–earnings announcement returns and different measures of volume at the earnings date. We find that post‐event returns are strictly increasing in the component of volume that is unexplained by prior trading activity. We interpret unexplained volume as an indicator of opinion divergence among investors and conclude that post‐event returns are increasing in ex ante opinion divergence. Our evidence is consistent with Varian [1985] , who suggests that opinion divergence may be treated as an additional risk factor affecting asset prices.     

A Reconsideration of Consolidation Accounting Requirements and Pre‐acquisition Dividends

This article considers the consolidation accounting consequences of the International Accounting Standards Board's decision to replace the cost method of accounting for investments in subsidiaries with a new model that requires the recognition of dividend revenue for distributions received or receivable from pre‐acquisition profits. The article shows that the recognition of pre‐acquisition dividends as revenue with a potential indication of impairment causes problems to consolidation accounting procedures and may reduce the information content of consolidated financial statements. The highlighted problems relate to the elimination of the investment asset against the equity of the subsidiary and the definition and measurement of non‐controlling interest. A review of the due process relevant to the replacement of the cost method indicates that the standard setter may have paid insufficient regard to accounting concepts and principles.     

The Market Response to Beating After‐tax Earnings Targets Revisited using Analysts’ Pre‐tax Earnings Forecasts and Concurrent Tax Note Disclosures

We investigate whether the premium for achieving after‐tax earnings targets is informed by the availability of pre‐tax and after‐tax earnings forecasts. We find evidence the premium is discounted for firms achieving only after‐tax earnings forecasts compared with firms achieving both forecast targets. This is likely due to the uncertainty about future profitability and earnings quality created by failing to attain pre‐tax earnings targets. For firms achieving only pre‐tax earnings forecasts, no premium is documented. Taken together, our results indicate that while pre‐tax earnings forecasts may not move the market, they have an informational role in providing a context for assessing the achievement of after‐tax earnings targets. We also consider the usefulness of the tax note disclosures of deferred tax assets from carry‐forward losses for assessing the premium for achieving after‐tax earnings targets. Reflecting the duality of this tax deferral, we find evidence that recognition of these tax assets conveys information about lower earnings quality when recognition is likely to be opportunistic (in the case of firms achieving only after‐tax forecasts), and provides a signal of future profitability (in the case of firms achieving only pre‐tax forecasts).     

Stock‐Split Post‐Announcement Returns: Underreaction or Market Friction?

We explore the relationship between stock splits and subsequent long‐term returns during the period from 1950 to 2000. We find that, contrary to much previous research, firms do not exhibit positive long‐term post‐split returns. Instead, we find that significant positive returns after the announcement date do not persist after the actual date of the stock split. We also observe that abnormal returns are correlated with the price‐delay or market friction. We conclude that the stock‐split post‐announcement “drift” is only of short duration, and it is attributable to trading frictions rather than behavioral biases.