Outsourcing Mutual Fund Management: Firm Boundaries,Incentives, and Performance

We investigate the effects of managerial outsourcing on the performance and incentives of mutual funds. Fund families outsource the management of a large fraction of their funds to advisory firms. These funds underperform those run internally by about 52 basis points per year. After instrumenting for a fund's outsourcing status, the estimated underperformance is three times larger. We hypothesize that contractual externalities due to firm boundaries make it difficult to extract performance from an outsourced relationship. Consistent with this view, outsourced funds face higher powered incentives; they are more likely to be closed after poor performance and excessive risk‐taking.     

Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry

We study compensation contracts of individual portfolio managers using hand‐collected data of over 4,500 U.S. mutual funds. Variations in the compensation structures are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium. The likelihood of explicit performance‐based incentives is positively correlated with the intensity of agency conflicts, as proxied by the advisor's clientele dispersion, its affiliations in the financial industry, and its ownership structure. Investor sophistication and the threat of dismissal in outsourced funds serve as substitutes for explicit performance‐based incentives. Finally, we find little evidence of differences in future performance associated with any particular compensation arrangement.     

Contract Type and the Cost of Provision: Evidence from Maintenance Service Contracts*

More than half a billion dollars are spent each year on the maintenance of Australia's urban water and sewerage networks. Expenditure is governed through a mix of in‐house and outsourced maintenance service contracts. We re‐examine issues relating to the relationship between the cost of maintenance service provision and the type of contract used. We take advantage of the fact that water retailers in Melbourne use a mix of contract types – including fixed‐price (FP) and cost‐plus (C+) contracts – for the provision of water and sewerage network maintenance services. Our results suggest that the C+ contract results in substantial savings.     

Effect of outsourcing public sector audits on cost‐efficiency

This study compares the cost‐efficiency of ‘in‐house’ and outsourced to private sector audit supplier arrangements to deliver financial audits in the public sector by examining audit cost‐efficiency within the context of the public sector arrangement at one state in Australia (Western Australia). The results for 178 public agencies show that outsourced audits are, in general, more costly than in‐house audits, but this result is conditional on the type and size of public agency. Specifically, outsourced audits are more costly than in‐house audits for small statutory authority audits, whereas for specialist audits (i.e. hospitals) and large and complex statutory authority audits, the in‐house supply is equally efficient as the outsourced service.     

A Glimpse Behind a Closed Door: The Long‐Term Investment Value of Buy‐Side Research and Its Effect on Fund Trades and Performance

We examine proprietary research produced by buy‐side analysts working for a large fund management company. We find that the buy‐side research has investment value for a one‐year horizon, and the analysts producing this research exhibit differential ability that tends to persist over time. The buy‐side research strongly influences trades made by the company's funds, especially when it coveys information that is independent of the fund managers' own information, when it is produced by buy‐side analysts with good track records, and when the underlying stocks have little sell‐side coverage. The influence of sell‐side research is concentrated primarily in stocks not followed by buy‐side analysts and in funds with low overall buy‐side coverage. The company's funds that rely more heavily on buy‐side research generate superior performance.     

Do Central Banks React to House Prices?

We estimate the Federal Reserve's, the Bank of England's, and the Bank of Japan's responses to house prices. We show that generalized method of moments estimates of a Taylor rule augmented with house prices are biased and dispersed. We then use full‐information methods and estimate the policy rule together with a VAR for the nonpolicy variables. These estimates are also biased. We propose an alternative approach and estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model embedded with a monetary rule with a direct response to house prices. We find that house prices played a separate role in the reaction functions of these central banks.     

Do Funds Make More When They Trade More?

We model fund turnover in the presence of time‐varying profit opportunities. Our model predicts a positive relation between an active fund's turnover and its subsequent benchmark‐adjusted return. We find such a relation for equity mutual funds. This time‐series relation between turnover and performance is stronger than the cross‐sectional relation, as the model predicts. Also as predicted, the turnover‐performance relation is stronger for funds trading less‐liquid stocks and funds likely to possess greater skill. Turnover is correlated across funds. The common component of turnover is positively correlated with proxies for stock mispricing. Turnover of similar funds helps predict a fund's performance.     

Why Do Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts Change? Performance,Growth, and Spillover Effects

We examine changes in equity mutual funds' investment advisory contracts. We find substantial advisory compensation rate changes in both directions, with typical percentage fee shifts exceeding one‐fourth. Rate increases are associated with superior past market‐adjusted performance, whereas rate decreases reflect economies of scale associated with growth, and are not associated with extreme poor performance. There are within‐family spillover effects. Superior (e.g., star) performance for individual funds is associated with rate increases for a family's other funds. Rate reductions post‐2004 by family funds involved in market timing scandals do not have large industry spillover effects.     

THE EFFECTS OF MUTUAL FUNDS ON M&A COMPENSATION

Motivated by shareholders’ interest in combating executive wealth expropriation through the merger and acqusition (M&A) process, we study how mutual funds influence firm behavior around an acquisition through votes against management proposals. We find that mutual funds reduce the chief executive officer's ability to extract rents during the M&A process by voting against management‐sponsored compensation proposals after the acquisition, thus lowering both excess compensation and increasing pay‐for‐performance sensitivity. Furthermore, mutual fund voting magnifies the impact on negatively performing firms and firms with a larger amount of the mutual fund's holdings in the firm.     

Understanding in‐house transactions in the real estate brokerage industry

About 20% of residential real estate transactions in North America are in‐house transactions, for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage. We examine to what extent in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic incentives as opposed to matching efficiency. Using home transaction data, we find that agents are more likely to promote internal listings when they are financially rewarded and such effect becomes weaker when consumers are more aware of agents' incentives. We further develop a structural model and find that about one third of in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic promotion, causing significant utility loss for home buyers.     

Loss Sharing Rules for Bank Holding Companies: An Assessment of the Federal Reserve's Source‐of‐Strength Policy and the FDIC's Cross Guarantee Authority

In this article, we critically examine two policies designed to protect the deposit insurance funds—the Federal Reserve Board's source‐of‐strength policy and the FDIC's cross‐guarantee authority. We discuss why each of the policies was adopted and how effective each has been in practice since its implementation. We then evaluate the future application and usefulness of the two policies in light of the structural changes that have resulted from industry consolidation and the financial modernization of the 1990s.     

Preferential Regulatory Treatment and Banks' Demand for Government Bonds

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of preferential regulatory treatment on banks' demand for government bonds. Using unique transaction‐level data, our analysis suggests that preferential treatment in microprudential liquidity and capital regulation significantly increases banks' demand for government bonds. Liquidity and capital regulation also seem to incentivize banks to substitute other bonds with government bonds. We also find evidence that this “regulatory effect” leads banks to reduce lending to the real economy.     

Security Concentration and Active Fund Management: Do Focused Funds Offer Superior Performance?

We examine gross fund returns based on the number of securities held and find no evidence that focused funds outperform diversified funds. After deducting expenses, focused funds significantly underperform. Controlling for various fund characteristics, fund performance is positively related to the fund's number of holdings both before and after expenses. We find evidence linking focused fund underperformance to agency and liquidity problems. Finally, the attrition rate of focused funds is higher than that of diversified funds. These results do not support the view that managers holding focused portfolios have superior stock‐picking skills or that focused funds provide value to investors.     

The Style Consistency of Hedge Funds

This study examines the style classification and the style consistency of hedge funds using a new proprietary database over the period May 1989 to April 1999. First, a hard clustering procedure is applied to classify hedge funds into homogeneous groups. It is shown that the methodology is robust and can be used to build stable hedge funds indexes. The method performs equally well as the principal component analysis in explaining in‐ and out‐of‐sample cross‐sectional hedge funds' returns. Second, we extend hard to fuzzy cluster memberships, relaxing the full assignment of the funds to individual clusters. We apply the fuzzy clustering methodology to estimate hedge funds' probabilistic exposure to various styles. We introduce three consistency indicators to quantify the hedge fund managers' style opportunism levels. We finally document that there is no evidence that style consistency leads to superior hedge funds' performance.     

Do Female Mutual Fund Managers Manage Differently?

We examine the performance and investment behavior of female fixed‐income mutual fund managers compared with male fixed‐income mutual fund managers. We find that male‐ and female‐managed funds do not differ significantly in terms of performance, risk, and other fund characteristics. Our results suggest that differences in investment behavior often attributed to gender may be related to investment knowledge and wealth constraints. Despite the similarities between male and female managers, we find evidence that gender influences the decision making of mutual fund investors. We find that the net asset flows into funds managed by females are lower than for males, especially for the manager's initial year managing the fund.     

Measuring fund style,performance and activity: a new style‐profiling approach

We construct new measures of fund style, performance and activity from linear combinations of off‐the‐shelf stock‐market indices. A fund's benchmark portfolio is a linear combination of two or more reference portfolios that in a least‐squares sense most closely approximates the fund's portfolio. The resulting linear combination scalar is itself a measure of fund style and the distance between a fund and its benchmark is a measure of fund activity. Our approach has a number of advantages over existing characteristic‐matching methods. We illustrate our approach using a data set of US institutional funds.     

The Value of Crowdsourced Earnings Forecasts

Crowdsourcing—when a task normally performed by employees is outsourced to a large network of people via an open call—is making inroads into the investment research industry. We shed light on this new phenomenon by examining the value of crowdsourced earnings forecasts. Our sample includes 51,012 forecasts provided by Estimize, an open platform that solicits and reports forecasts from over 3,000 contributors. We find that Estimize forecasts are incrementally useful in forecasting earnings and measuring the market's expectations of earnings. Our results are stronger when the number of Estimize contributors is larger, consistent with the benefits of crowdsourcing increasing with the size of the crowd. Finally, Estimize consensus revisions generate significant two‐day size‐adjusted returns. The combined evidence suggests that crowdsourced forecasts are a useful supplementary source of information in capital markets.     

Public Pensions and U.S. Infrastructure Investment: The Perfect Partnership?

Public pension funds have been passive investors in U.S. infrastructure projects for years, serving primarily as limited partners in designated infrastructure funds. However, the continued maturation of U.S. public‐private partnerships, combined with pension funds' need for yield to match future liabilities, has prompted the funds to take a more active role in infrastructure investment. In recent years, many pension funds have built internal teams to make direct (as opposed to indirect and for the most part passive) investments in infrastructure projects. Governments in particular should pay close attention to the emergence of pension funds as direct infrastructure investors. With OECD pension assets totaling $10.6 trillion at the end of 2010, the world's pension funds offer governments a strong value proposition. Given the fixed nature of their pension liabilities, pension funds emphasize yield and long‐term appreciation, and are likely to accept rate of returns in the neighborhood of CPI + 5%. Infrastructure investments, which generate highly stable cashflow and enjoy high barriers to entry, are ideally suited to meet these criteria. Also of particular significance to governments, pension funds have two bottom lines. First is expected yield and returns; second is their desire to invest in projects that meet a mission of social responsibility. Pension investors prefer, when possible, to invest in projects that promote government objectives such as reduced congestion and clean air. Taking account of pension funds' double mission can help governments capture opportunities to develop infrastructure through meaningful partnerships with like‐minded investors.     

Exchange‐Traded Fund Introductions and Closed‐End Fund Discounts and Volume

Exchange‐traded funds (ETFs), like closed‐end funds (CEFs), are managed portfolios traded like individual stocks. We hypothesize that the introduction of an ETF in an asset class similar to an existing CEF results in a substitution effect that reduces the value of the CEF's shares relative to that of its underlying assets. Our event studies show that upon the introduction of a similar ETF, CEF discounts widen significantly and relative volume declines significantly. Single‐equation and systems estimation models show that the widening in discounts and reduction in volume are related to returns‐based measures of the substitutability of ETFs for CEFs.     

Portfolio concentration and fund manager performance

This research examines the relationships among portfolio concentration, fund manager skills, and fund performance in Taiwan's equity mutual fund industry, yielding several empirical findings as follows. First, after controlling for other factors, concentrated equity funds tend to have smaller net asset values, larger fund flows, higher turnover rates, and a younger age and prevail in smaller fund families. Second, concentrated fund managers buy and sell stocks more smartly based on economic trends or market factors than do diversified fund managers, i.e., they have better market‐timing abilities. Third, only partial evidence supports the premise that concentrated equity funds have better next‐quarter risk‐adjusted performances than do diversified ones, as these fund managers' skills positively correlate to risk‐adjusted fund performance. Fourth, fund managers who have better stock‐picking abilities and intensively invest in certain industries generally exhibit better Carhart's alpha in the next quarter than do other fund managers. Fifth, fund managers' stock‐picking abilities more closely relate to long‐term performance than do their market‐timing abilities. Lastly, positive performance persistence is much stronger than negative performance persistence, but concentrated funds do not have stronger performance persistence than do diversified funds.