Transmitters and receivers' investment to avoid interference: Is there an optimal regime?

The management of interference has been, and still is, the main concern in spectrum policy. Historically, interference has been dealt with by heavy regulation under an administrative control regime. Over the last decades, a new approach has been put forward based on users' property rights, better able to cope with a rapidly changing technological environment. The issue of dealing with interference across bands, however, remains crucial: What obligations should be put on users so as to keep interference at a socially acceptable level? Also, given that some unwanted emissions are bound to occur, how can private parties be provided with the right incentives to invest in high-quality reception technology? This paper assesses how well different regulatory regimes can lead to efficient outcomes. It develops an economic model of spectrum interference and identifies the efficient solution. A regime where spectrum users have the power to enjoin intruding emissions beyond a predefined level (property rights protection) is compared with a regime where users are forced to bear with intruding emissions, but are entitled to economic compensation for the harm suffered (liability rules protection). The analysis suggests that different regimes may perform differently under different circumstances depending on the cause of interference and, critically, on whether the services are organised as an open- or a close-architecture system. This suggests that regulators should pay more attention to the specific features of the different bands, and that the appropriate spectrum management regime should be designed to recognise these differences.     

The coevolution of rent appropriation and capability development

Extant approaches to rent appropriation are static in that they explore bargaining power at a fixed point in time. This article contributes by examining how capabilities and bargaining power coevolve. As capabilities are developed, those who are favored by knowledge asymmetries make decisions that balance value creation potential against the rent appropriation regime, such as the organizational form in which the capability will be embedded. Using the example of Apple's development of the iPod, this article illustrates how stakeholders plan for rent appropriation as they assemble new capabilities—well before any value is actually created. Given that firm performance is an outcome of both capability development and rent appropriation, a robust theory must incorporate an understanding of how they coevolve. As such, the article highlights the need to integrate property rights theory with theories of value creation and governance costs as actors constantly make trade‐offs along these dimensions. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On-line spectrum auctions in TV white spaces for supporting mobile services—A practical manual

This paper considers an approach for dynamic short-term spectrum leasing in TV white spaces (TVWS) using an on-line auction. The secondary spectrum market discussed here is organized by a central entity called the spectrum broker. The auctioned spectrum appears in blocks of available DVB-T channels with some transmit power constraints set-up to protect the primary users (DVB-T receivers). The bidders are institutional spectrum operators (telecommunication companies or service providers), operating in a given area. These players are characterized by heterogeneous demands concerning the spectrum bandwidth, the operation period with temporarily-exclusive rights for using the spectrum and the transmit power needed for successful transmission. Thus, the auctioned objects are non-identical and present different value for different players. Two auction models are proposed. The first one is the simultaneous auction in time domain and combinatorial in frequency and power dimension. The second proposed auction is fully combinatorial. Simulations results are also provided showing effectiveness of the analyzed auctions (high spectrum utilization ratio) and relation between the players’ satisfaction, their spectrum valuation and varying competition. Finally the guidelines concerning the spectrum auctions in TVWS for the policy makers are proposed.     

Spectrum auctions: Distortionary input tax or efficient revenue instrument?

Spectrum license auctions are widely recognized by economists as more efficient than lotteries or administrative approaches to allocate exclusive rights to spectrum. But whether spectrum auctions are the most efficient spectrum policy still generates debate, in part because the answer may vary depending on exactly what is being optimized, what else is assumed or held constant, and the policies to which one is comparing spectrum auctions. This paper examines the complex confluence of US spectrum policy and fiscal policy. It concludes that economically efficient spectrum policy requires several distinct optimizations, including devolvement of an efficient set spectrum rights and the optimal approach to raising and recycling government revenue in that devolvement process. It also requires allocation policies that take into account possible distortions of the secondary market for spectrum via the capital gains tax. The paper argues that there is no compelling theoretical case or empirical evidence that spectrum auctions are distortionary, and examines cases in which the most efficient policy is to auction spectrum and “recycle” the revenue to offset more distortionary revenue instruments. This paper also examines cases in which it is most efficient to allocate spectrum rights without raising revenue, for example when transactions costs are high or distributional concerns can prevent or delay efficiency-enhancing reforms.     

An optimal way to licence the radio spectrum

Radio spectrum licences are generally specified in terms of the power a holder is allowed to transmit. However, if licences become flexible, allowing change of use and technology, then this licensing approach could result in significant interference between users. A new approach is proposed termed “spectrum usage rights” (SURs) which restricts the interference a licence holder is allowed to cause rather than the power they are allowed to transmit. This approach is shown to protect users against interference while providing the maximum flexibility possible and its implementation is discussed.     

遥感影像特征解译在电网工程的应用探讨

用光谱特征、纹理特征、空间布局特征详细解译地表信息,对遥感影像进行高级解译,提高了影像信息的分区、一分类及统计精度。参考其他行业的应用实践,探讨了遥感影像特征解译在电网工程的应用,该技术在电网工程勘测中应。用可以更加合理地选择输电线路的路径,减少占用耕地、保护环境、降低工程造价、优化工程设计。     

Control of intellectual assets in client relationships: implications for innovation

This empirical study of business‐to‐business service firms examines the determinants and effects of control rights to intellectual assets in a property rights theoretic framework. Regression analyses using survey data suggest that service suppliers that retain control over their intellectual output are more innovative. In long‐term relationships, service firms' clients may thus be better off balancing their need to control outsourced activities with the suppliers' incentives to invest in learning and innovation. Additionally, and aligned with property rights theoretic predictions, service suppliers' bargaining power and their indispensability in service projects are positively associated with their ability to retain control rights. In contrast, innovation capabilities are not very significant in determining control rights allocation between service suppliers and their clients. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

实施《物权法》电网建设用地面临的挑战及应对策略

《物权法》实施后,电网建设遇到了一些新的问题和挑战。《物权渤严格限制以划拔方式设立建设用地使用权;明确规定建设用地使用权人需要履行登记手续,取得建设用地使用权证;新增加了地役权这一权利类型等,电网企业必须积极应对。目前电网建设用地中存在很多问题,如建设用地使用权的取得方式不确定,在杆塔用地方式、线路走廊与地表权利人关系、用地补偿方式等方面均存在法律风险。电网企业应有针对性地依托立法机关、政府部门等,努力完善电网建设用地制度,争取良好的建设环境。     

Technology and Rights

What do we know about technology and rights? This article provides a fairly comprehensive overview of current issues regarding this topic. We explore and analyse a wide spectrum of rights that are challenged in this current era of technological convergence. We use the United States Bill of Rights as an example of the vulnerability of legal protections for rights against particular political and technological changes in this post 9-11 climate. New streams of rights acting as a safeguard against further incursions of technology into civil liberties are explored. We also address intellectual property rights and international trends in copyright, patent and trademark laws. We question whether these issues of technology and rights have a place in current technological literacy scenarios.     

Cellular economies of scale and why disparities in spectrum holdings are detrimental

Now that traffic volumes are increasing rapidly, the cost of expanding capacity has become a large portion of expenditures for Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). This paper uses an engineering-economic model to show that there are strong economies of scale when expanding capacity, because an MNO with more spectrum benefits more from every new cell tower, and an MNO with more towers benefits more from every new MHz of spectrum. While it is technically possible to expand capacity by increasing either towers or spectrum holdings, we find that the cost-effective approach is to increase both types of assets at a similar rate. In the absence of countervailing policies, the big MNOs are well positioned to get bigger, in terms of spectrum holdings, towers, and ultimately market share. For policymakers, this economy of scale creates a trade-off between two important objectives: reducing the cost of cellular capacity, and increasing competition. This paper derives the Pareto optimal division of spectrum with respect to these two competing objectives, and shows that any Pareto optimal assignment will split the spectrum fairly evenly among competing MNOs. This is not simply a method of ensuring that there are many competitors; spectrum should be divided fairly evenly regardless of whether the number of competitors is large or small. A large disparity in spectrum holdings may yield poor results with respect to both objectives, i.e. the lower cost-effectiveness of a larger number of MNOs, and the lower competitive pressure of a smaller number of MNOs. One effective way to achieve a division of spectrum that is close to Pareto optimal is a spectrum cap, provided that this cap is set at a level consistent with other policies and policy objectives, including antitrust policy.     

Will 5G lead to more spectrum sharing? Discussing recent developments of the LSA and the CBRS spectrum sharing frameworks

This paper discusses two recent spectrum management frameworks, the Licensed Shared Access (LSA) developed in Europe and the Citizens Broadband Radio Services (CBRS) developed in the United States (US), which build their management approach on spectrum sharing. The importance of these two frameworks, besides their leading normative roles, is that recent debates have shaped them as cases to consider in the adoption of the upcoming fifth generation (5G) of mobile communications technology, in particular in the C-band. A discussion on these two frameworks is organised by following the four-step decision-making guide for spectrum management developed by Pogorel (2007), which requires spectrum authorities to make decisions in four areas of spectrum management: frequency harmonization, technology standardization, type of usage rights and assignment procedures.Notwithstanding the similarities with respect to the four areas of spectrum management considered, the two frameworks differ on their implementation schedules. CBRS leads the way, with a handful of providers receiving government approval to manage spectrum access controllers, and as of mid 2020, scheduled to have allocated spectrum licenses on half of its available spectrum. On the contrary, European countries have shown scarce interest towards implementing the LSA, despite the extensive work carried out by regulatory and standardization bodies.This may suggest that there are external contextual factors which influence the successful implementation of spectrum sharing frameworks. An interesting aspect which deserves further investigation is the institutional context in which decisions related to radio spectrum management are taken. Unlike the US authorities, European institutions do not possess coercive enforcement powers with respect to spectrum sharing. This key difference may contribute to explaining the different speed at which LSA and CBRS are implemented.     

分享制企业激励制度的比较--利润分成、员工持股、EVA、分配权等的比较分析

本文探讨分享制企业的激励问题。分享制首先是一种利益关系，它是通过利益关系产生激励作用的。激励相容表明一种正激励，而激励扭曲表明一种负激励。一般来说，激励可以提升人们的工作积极性，但由于激励效果不可能完全均衡，就会造成企业既有技术关系的变化和要素投入结构的变化，而投入要素结构的变化，进而会对企业已有的利益关系构成影响。在缺乏精心设计和组织的情况下，就会扰动分享制企业的既有利益关系，从而造成了激励扭曲问题。由此出发，本文对利润分成、员工持股、EVA分配、分配权分配的激励相容问题进行了比较。     

The Licensing of Market Development Rights within Technology Alliances: A Shareholder Value Perspective*

Technology alliances create market development rights that are shared between partners in an alliance relative to codeveloped product technology. Alliance partners will often manage the shared market development rights in a cooperative manner by forming an agreement in which one partner (i.e., the licensor) licenses its market development rights to the other partner in the alliance (i.e., the licensee). The real options and bargaining power literatures provide opposing recommendations regarding whether a licensor creates greater shareholder value by licensing its market development rights to the licensee on a more or less restrictive basis. Empirical analysis of technology alliance contracts reveals that the restrictiveness by which a licensor should license its market development rights to a licensee depends on the licensee's strategic marketing emphasis. Specifically, a licensee will create greater value by following a more restrictive distribution strategy when its partner's marketing strategy emphasizes value creation. Alternatively, a licensee will create greater value when its partner's marketing strategy emphasizes value appropriation by following a less restrictive distribution strategy. From a theoretical perspective, the paper's findings provide early evidence regarding the contribution of marketing strategy toward value creation in technology alliances and help resolve the differing expectations offered by the real options and bargaining power literatures. Managerially, the paper identifies an alliance partner's strategic marketing emphasis as a hitherto unrecognized factor determining when managers should follow a more or less restrictive distribution strategy when licensing marketing development rights within technology alliances.     

Is allowing trading enough? Making secondary markets in spectrum work

The debate on spectrum reforms has mostly focused on the choice between a property rights and a commons regime. This article argues that moving to a property right system requires careful attention to details in order to avoid that “micro” rather than “macro” factors may prevent efficient trades from taking place. It provides a framework to conduct this assessment, identifies a number of possible concerns and puts forward some solutions.     

Intellectual property: what do teachers and students know?

As society changes from an industrial to a knowledge era increasing importance and value is being placed on intellectual property rights. Technology teachers need to have pedagogical content knowledge of intellectual property if they are to incorporate it into their learning programmes to enable students to consider how to respect others’ intellectual property rights, how to protect their own ideas and how they can legitimately make use of others’ intellectual property. A survey of technology teachers and a small sample of students was undertaken to ascertain their knowledge of intellectual property and any misconceptions which may exist. The findings reflect an awareness of relevant concepts but confusion between key terms such as patent, copyright and registered design.     

企业主体性产权理论的构建 --相关和自主统一的属性所有权

企业是市场经济活动的主体，应该具有其主体属性，并且正是其主体属性决定它的主体地位和作用，并形成主体性产权。但是，学术界缺乏对这个问题的研究，主要是因为受西方经济学传统的限制，要突破这种限制必须把经济学与管理学结合起来进行研究，以构建企业主体性产权理论。企业主体性产权是其相关属性产权与自主属性产权的统一。企业相关属性及其产权是基础和结果，主要说明企业主体性产权的共性；企业自主属性及其产权是原动力和境界，主要说明企业主体性产权的个性。它们的互补和统一突出地体现在企业家及其产权上。企业主体性产权的目的是在防止“蛋糕”缩小的同时把“蛋糕”做大，其核心是基于相互关系的约束而进行自主创造的激励，其模型的运行特点是协同一自主创造。企业主体性产权理论的应用，可以保证和促使中国企业循着超越自然历史发展。     

国有企业改制中职工身份置换模式的再认识

通过建立三权互动的改制模式深化国有企业改革,对促进经济协调发展和维护社会稳定具有十分重要的战略意义。而建立这种模式的关键就是对改制过程中产生的“弱势群体”进行有效的救助。当前以“平均主义”为主要特征的身份置换模式虽然取得了促进产业结构调整等一系列积极效果,但由于缺乏科学和系统的规划,在制度设计和运行中并未遵循“弱者救助”的逻辑,出现了以不科学、不公正和低效率为主要内容的制度缺陷,迫切需要从制度上予以规范和改进。     

新建住宅区供电工程建设收费管理有关问题探讨

随着经济快速发展和居民生活水平的提高,城市住宅的发展十分迅速,政府通过出台相关政策来规范新建住宅建设标准。采用新的建设模式维护城市住宅的供电工程投资、建设和维护管理的秩序。为更好地理顺新建住宅区建设与管理方式,结合近年来政策实施过程存在的主要矛盾,从供电工程产权及维护责任、供电工程建设费测算、负荷标准配置、电网规划等几个方面进行分析,以期为下一步更好地完善新建住宅区供电设施建设管理提供参考。     

Tradable universal service obligations

This paper proposes a novel policy to motivate private-sector operators of basic infrastructure to expand infrastructure into previously unserved regions. It is particularly useful when resources are transferred to the private sector, as occurs during the privatisation of a state-owned telecommunications carrier, the introduction of competition, the release of spectrum, or the allocation of cash subsidies for this purpose. Firms receive tradable universal service obligations in the form of milestones that must be met, and commitments to meet specific deadlines. By exchanging its commitments, a firm can increase or decrease the rate at which it must expand infrastructure. By exchanging milestones, a firm can change where it must expand infrastructure. Making milestones and commitments independent and fully tradable allows each firm to develop the most cost effective business strategy possible, and to adapt that strategy as technology and demand evolve over time. The exchange of milestones and commitments does not diminish the obligations that must be met by industry as a whole, insuring the timely expansion of infrastructure. This paper focuses on telecommunications, but the approach is also applicable to other forms of infrastructure, such as electric power.     

Economic viability of private commons: Framework and guidelines for profitability

Ongoing regulatory reforms have led to several novel spectrum sharing models under the general umbrella of dynamic spectrum sharing. The private commons model introduced by FCC in 2004 allows spectrum licensees to provide secondary access to spectrum on an opportunistic basis while retaining ownership. Since wireless communication systems are typically overprovisioned in order to deliver service-level guarantees to (primary) users under short-term load variations, this model bears significant potential by facilitating utilization of temporal and spatial surplus of capacity through serving secondary users at possibly different service levels. A potential barrier to adoption of the private commons model is the uncertainty about secondary price–demand relationship which is difficult to predict in an emerging market: A selected price for secondary access may be profitable for some values of secondary demand but not for others, leading to a profound uncertainty about ultimate benefit of spectrum sharing. This paper aims to eliminate such an uncertainty by devising concrete guidelines and methods for profitability. The paper establishes that the price of secondary spectrum access can be chosen to guarantee profitability for any value of secondary demand: It is shown that for both the coordinated and uncoordinated commons regimes a profitable price should exceed a threshold value, which can be calculated. Hence profitability of private commons is insensitive to the demand function. This observation has two complementary interpretations: From a business perspective it provides a constructive approach to profitability; and from a regulatory perspective it provides reassurance that private commons is a healthy model. The paper also leverages the insensitivity property and outlines a technique to further enhance revenue via iterative spectrum offerings.