Reception-oriented radio rights: Increasing the value of wireless by explicitly defining and delegating radio operating rights

The increasingly intensive coexistence of diverse radio systems and the inability of existing institutions to resolve conflicts in a timely manner require a change in the way operating rights are defined, assigned, and enforced. This paper proposes a regulatory approach that increases delegation to operators and reduces ambiguity by (1) more clearly defining operating rights and harmful interference using the Three P approach of probabilistic reception protections and transmission permissions; (2) facilitating transactions by limiting the number of parties to a negotiation, only altering the rights in a license at renewal, and implementing a registry; and (3) making rights enforcement more efficient by enabling direct enforcement of rights, separating rulemaking from adjudication, and defining remedies up-front.     

Optimizing receiver performance using harm claim thresholds

More and more systems need to be squeezed together in frequency, space and time in order to satisfy the growth in demand for radio services. However, greater proximity increases the risk of service breakdowns caused both by poor interference tolerance in receivers and by inappropriate signals radiated by transmitters.     

Spectrum management reform: Rethinking practices

Unparalleled growth in wireless communications has increased the pressure for more spectrum to support more users, more uses and more capacity. To alleviate that pressure, major regulatory changes were introduced in several countries in two key areas of spectrum management, namely spectrum assignment and allocation. This paper analyzes those changes and discusses strategies and tactics for deregulating the use of radio spectrum. Spectrum management reforms are considered within the theoretical framework of transition economics, which is concerned with optimal reform speed and sequencing. The paper shows how Anglo-Saxon and European countries have been implementing gradual reforms. Meanwhile, Central American reformers have chosen a fast transition from command-and-control regulation to market mechanisms. Transition economics is used to evaluate the advantages and drawbacks of different spectrum reform strategies.     

Mechanisms to incentivise shared-use of spectrum

A key concern with the Licensed-shared access (LSA) approach currently being developed by European regulators is that leaving incumbents and secondary users to agree to bilateral arrangements may be insufficient to incentivise an optimal level of sharing.We propose an efficient auction mechanism to incentivise incumbent users to offer shared access to the spectrum they use. The mechanism consists of two stages. In the first stage, LSA licences are auctioned. In the second stage, the incumbent is provided with a choice of either granting access under an LSA agreement to the winner of the auction or not. If the incumbent accepts, its existing licence fee is reduced, whereas, if it rejects, its existing licence fee is increased. The change in the licence fee is such that a rational incumbent always opts to share when it is efficient to do so, i.e. when the cost of sharing is below the value to the secondary user.We also explore how this simple mechanism can be extended to situations in which there is more than one incumbent in a band. Our proposed approach involves package (combinatorial) bidding and linear reference prices.     

Cellular economies of scale and why disparities in spectrum holdings are detrimental

Now that traffic volumes are increasing rapidly, the cost of expanding capacity has become a large portion of expenditures for Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). This paper uses an engineering-economic model to show that there are strong economies of scale when expanding capacity, because an MNO with more spectrum benefits more from every new cell tower, and an MNO with more towers benefits more from every new MHz of spectrum. While it is technically possible to expand capacity by increasing either towers or spectrum holdings, we find that the cost-effective approach is to increase both types of assets at a similar rate. In the absence of countervailing policies, the big MNOs are well positioned to get bigger, in terms of spectrum holdings, towers, and ultimately market share. For policymakers, this economy of scale creates a trade-off between two important objectives: reducing the cost of cellular capacity, and increasing competition. This paper derives the Pareto optimal division of spectrum with respect to these two competing objectives, and shows that any Pareto optimal assignment will split the spectrum fairly evenly among competing MNOs. This is not simply a method of ensuring that there are many competitors; spectrum should be divided fairly evenly regardless of whether the number of competitors is large or small. A large disparity in spectrum holdings may yield poor results with respect to both objectives, i.e. the lower cost-effectiveness of a larger number of MNOs, and the lower competitive pressure of a smaller number of MNOs. One effective way to achieve a division of spectrum that is close to Pareto optimal is a spectrum cap, provided that this cap is set at a level consistent with other policies and policy objectives, including antitrust policy.     

Analysis of spectrum auctions in India—An application of the opportunity cost approach to explain large variations in spectrum prices

The remarkable growth of mobile communication has reinforced the significance of the radio spectrum for mobile network operators. The availability of spectrum varies considerably between different countries due to national regulatory decisions. The focus in this paper is on India where operators have access to a limited amount of spectrum. This paper analyses the value of spectrum by estimating the opportunity cost, which is calculated by the savings that can be achieved by acquiring appropriate amount of spectrum rather than investing in additional base stations. The applied approach combines network deployment, user demand levels, cost, and capacity issues, which are integrated in the application in the opportunity cost approach for spectrum. The opportunity cost of spectrum is compared with prices paid at spectrum auctions. The analysis includes a discussion of drivers that determine the willingness to pay for spectrum. The results show that the opportunity cost of spectrum in relation to auction prices is lower than prices operators paid for 3G spectrum in the metro circles (service areas) while the value derived from the opportunity cost is higher than auction prices in the remaining circles.     

Spectrum value

Radio spectrum is a scarce resource; understanding its economic value is one piece of information needed to manage it efficiently. Estimating the value of radio spectrum, however, creates significant challenges not found in valuing some other assets. Spectrum is somewhat of a special case; market transactions provide a basis for valuation, but almost always require significant adjustments. Some adjustments are best made using discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis or econometric evidence. A review of past work on spectrum valuations suggests that focusing on a single valuation technique leaves critical information about spectrum value unused.     

Allocative vs. technical spectrum efficiency

Achieving allocative and technically efficient spectrum management is a key aspect of deregulatory reforms in several OECD countries. However, reform legislation offers few clues as to how these objectives should rank when they conflict with one another. An ‘innocent’ prior acquisition of service-neutral spectrum at an efficiently run auction may prove allocative efficient but fail to be technically efficient if the spectrum is left fallow in the short term. Accountability for the productive usage of a public resource and pressures from short-term political cycles may induce regulators to mandate some minimal level of activity. Two plausible regulatory responses are considered: use it or lose it clauses and spectrum trading incentives. The former favours technical efficiency whilst the latter promotes allocative efficiency. The argument is formalised in a simple economic model buttressing the roles of uncertainty and transaction costs to assert the primacy of allocative efficiency over technical efficiency.