A Kaleckian Perspective on Financialisation and Distribution in Three Main Eurozone Countries before and after the Crisis: France,Germany and Spain

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, we examine if, and to what extent, a general Kaleckian analysis of the potential effects of financialisation on income shares in advanced capitalist economies is of relevance for the three Eurozone countries under investigation—France, Germany and Spain—in the period before the recent financial and economic crisis. Second, we study changes in the financialisation–distribution nexus that have occurred in the course of and after the financial and economic crisis. We find that the countries examined here have shown broad similarities regarding redistribution before the crisis, although there are some differences in the underlying determinants. These differences have continued during the period after the crisis and have led to different results in the development of distribution since then.     

Sudden stops, banking crises and investment collapses in emerging markets

We evaluate whether financial openness leaves emerging market economies vulnerable to the adverse effects of capital reversals (“sudden stops”) on domestic investment. We investigate this claim in a broad sample of emerging markets during the period 1976–2002. If the banking sector does not experience a systemic crisis, sudden stop events fail to have a significant impact on investment. Bank crises, on the other hand, have a significant negative effect on investment even in the absence of a contemporaneous sudden stop crisis. We also find that openness to capital flows worsens the adverse impact of banking crises on investment. Our results provide statistical support for the policy view that a strong banking sector which can withstand the negative fallout of capital flight is essential for countries that open their economies to international financial flows.     

The illusive quest: Do international capital controls contribute to currency stability?

We investigate the effectiveness of capital controls in insulating economies from currency crises, focusing in particular on both direct and indirect effects of capital controls and how these relationships may have changed over time in response to global financial liberalization and the greater mobility of international capital. We predict the likelihood of currency crises using standard macroeconomic variables and a probit equation estimation methodology with random effects. We employ a comprehensive panel data set comprised of 69 emerging market and developing economies over 1975–2004. Both standard and duration-adjusted measures of capital control intensity (allowing controls to “depreciate” over time) suggest that capital controls have not effectively insulated economies from currency crises at any time during our sample period. Maintaining real GDP growth and limiting real overvaluation are critical factors preventing currency crises, not capital controls. However, the presence of capital controls greatly increases the sensitivity of currency crises to changes in real GDP growth and real exchange rate overvaluation, making countries more vulnerable to changes in fundamentals. Our model suggests that emerging markets weathered the 2007–2008 crisis relatively well because of strong output growth and exchange rate flexibility that limited overvaluation of their currencies.     

Real effects of banking crises: Imports of capital goods by developing countries

We examine the hypothesis that banking crises have real effects on developing economies by reducing imports of capital goods. We test this hypothesis by estimating a model for the determinants of imports of capital goods by a panel of developing economies during 1961 to 2010. Our results suggest that not only do banking crises have statistically significant and economically important effects on imports of capital goods, but these effects increase the longer a banking crisis lasts. Imports of capital goods are a critical component of the capital stock and the production process in developing economies and, thus, our results highlight one important channel through which banking crises may hamper the growth prospects of these economies.     

Financialisation and Real Investment in the European Union: Beneficial or Prejudicial Effects?

This article presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between financialisation and real investment for non-financial corporations using panel data composed of 27 European Union countries over 19 years (1995 to 2013). On the one hand, financialisation leads to a rise in financial investments, diverting funds from real investments (‘crowding out’ effect); on the other, pressures from shareholders to intensify financial payments restrict the funds available for new real investments. We estimate an aggregate investment equation with the traditional variables (lagged investment, profitability, debt, cost of capital, corporate savings and output growth) and two further measures of financialisation (financial receipts and financial payments). The findings demonstrate that financialisation has damaged real investment in European Union countries, mainly through the channel of financial payments, either by interest or dividend payments. It is also found that the prejudicial effects of financialisation on investment were more severe in the pre-2007 crisis period. It is concluded that financialisation contributed to a slowdown of real investment by 1 to 8 per cent in the full and pre-crisis period, respectively. During the pre-crisis period, financialisation was the main driver of the slowdown of investment in the European Union.     

Currency crises and the stock market: empirical evidence for another type of twin crisis

We explore the dependency between currency crises and the stock market in emerging economies. Our focus is two-fold. First, the risk of a currency crisis rises as the foreign stake in the domestic stock market increases. Successful economies with high capital flows into their booming stock markets especially are prone to stock market-induced currency crises. Second, we apply the dividend growth model to show that stock markets crash in the run-up to a currency crisis. This new type of twin crisis is empirically tested by employing a logit framework using quarterly data for 33 emerging economies for 1994Q1–2007Q4.     

Optimal versus adequate level of international reserves: evidence for Turkey

The determination of international reserve balance for emerging economies is part of the efforts to strengthen the immunity of these economies to crises. However, there is still evidence on crises even for the countries with large foreign reserves. It has usually been experienced that the countries with greatest need for reserves economize more than others on their holdings since they might underestimate the cost of crisis. In this study, the official international reserves of Turkey are tested against optimality and adequacy. During 1988–2002, the actual reserves fell short of both the optimal and the adequate levels. They are only optimal when the expected cumulative contraction is about 5.2% of real GDP under crisis. However, early evidence from emerging economies and Turkey show that crises hit more heavily. Hence, it is found that the current financial structure in Turkey such as the absence of capital controls and a highly dollarized banking system necessitates more foreign reserves for preventing any future economic and/or financial shocks.     

CURRENCY VERSUS BANKING IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1931

During the 1920s, Germany was the world's largest capital importer, financing reparations through U.S. credits. We examine financial channels in crisis transmission between these two countries around the German financial crisis of 1931. We specify a structural dynamic factor model to identify financial and monetary factors separately for each of the two economies. We find substantial crisis transmission from Germany to the United States via the financial channel, while monetary or financial crisis transmission from the United States to Germany was weak. We also find major real effects of the 1931 crisis on both economies, again transmitted via the financial channel.     

银行危机与货币危机共生性关系的实证研究

1 997— 1 998年的亚洲金融风暴中 ,银行危机与货币危机的同时爆发 ,即共生性危机的发生引发国际社会与学术界对这种现象的重新思考 :这种共生性现象是否确实具有普遍性 ?从理论的角度来看 ,银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着一定的联系 ,但到目前为止 ,很少有研究从实证的角度来证明这种联系的确存在。正是基于此 ,本文从实证的角度出发 ,旨在揭示出银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着相互影响 ,换言之 ,共生性危机的发生是具有显著性的。具体来说 ,本文以 1 975— 2 0 0 0年期间 53个国家危机的发生情况为研究对象 ,分别运用频率分布、信号法 ,以及概率回归模型来分析两种危机的共生性 ,并得到非常一致的结论 :在新兴市场国家中 ,银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着明显的相互关系 ,同时银行危机更趋向于作为货币危机即将发生的同步或预警指标 ,而反之则不然。     

The role of international reserves holding in buffering external shocks

An extended literature analyses the accumulation foreign exchange holding observed in many developing and emerging countries since the 2000s. Empirical studies on the self-insurance motive suggest that high-reserves economies are more resilient to financial crises and to international capital inflows volatility. They show also that pre-crisis foreign reserve accumulation explains post-crisis growth. However, some papers suggest that the relationship between international reserves holding and reduced vulnerability is nonlinear, meaning that reserve holding is subject to diminishing returns. This article devotes more attention to the potential nonlinear relationship between the foreign reserves holding and macroeconomic resilience to shocks. For a sample of nine emerging economies, we assess to what extent the accumulation of international reserves allows to mitigate negative impacts of external shocks on the output gap. While a major part of the literature focuses on the global financial crisis, we investigate this question by considering two sub-periods: 1995–2003 and 2004–2013. We implement threshold VAR model in which the structure is allow to change if the threshold variable crosses a certain estimated threshold. We find that the effectiveness of reserve holding to improve the resilience of domestic economies to shocks has increased over time. Hence, the diminishing returns of foreign reserve holding stressed in the previous literature must be qualified.     

The 2014–15 Financial Crisis in Russia and the Foundations of Weak Monetary Power Autonomy in the International Political Economy

ABSTRACT

This article contributes to international political economy debates about the monetary power autonomy (MPA) of emerging market and developing countries (EMDs). The 2014–15 Russian financial crisis is used as a case study to explore why an accumulation of large international reserves does not provide protection against currency crises and macroeconomic adjustments in EMDs. The analysis centres on the interplay between two dimensions of MPA: the Power to Delay and the Power to Deflect adjustment costs. Two structural factors condition Russia’s low MPA. First, the country’s subordinated integration in global financial markets increases its financial vulnerability. The composition of external assets and liabilities, combined with cross-border capital flows, restrict the use of international reserves to delay currency crises. Second, the choice of a particular macroeconomic policy regime embraced the financialisation of the – mainly state-owned – Russian banking sector, thus making it difficult to transform liquidity inflows into credits for enterprises. Russia’s main comparative advantage, hydrocarbon export revenues, is not exploited. The type of economy created due to the post-Communist transition means that provided ‘excessive’ liquidity remains in the financial system and is channelled into currency arbitrage. This factor increases exchange rate vulnerability and undermines Russia’s MPA.     

The Changing Relationship between Banking Crises and Capital Inflows

Different types of capital inflows have varied effects when predicting banking crises in emerging and developing economies, and these relationships have meaningfully changed over time. In a sample of 29 developing and emerging economies over the period 1976–1991 increases in short‐term debt inflows raised the probability of a banking crisis while increases in inflows for long‐term borrowing by the private sector had the opposite effect. Conversely, over the period 1992–2007 increases in inflows for long‐term borrowing by the private sector and for equity investment both increased the probability of a banking crisis. The findings suggest distinct optimal capital account liberalization policies between the two periods.     

Sudden stops and the Mexican wave: Currency crises,capital flow reversals and output loss in emerging markets

Sudden stops are the simultaneous occurrence of a currency/balance of payments crisis with a reversal in capital flows. We investigate whether sudden-stop crises are a unique phenomenon and whether they entail an especially large and abrupt pattern of output collapse (a “Mexican wave”). Using a panel data set over 1975–1997 and covering 24 emerging-market economies, we distinguish between the output effects of currency crises, capital inflow reversals, and sudden-stop crises. Sudden-stop crises have a large negative, but short-lived, impact on output growth over and above that found with currency crises. A currency crisis typically reduces output by about 2–3%, while a sudden stop reduces output by an additional 6–8% in the year of the crisis. The cumulative output loss of a sudden stop is even larger, around 13–15% over a 3-year period. Our model estimates correspond closely to the output dynamics of the ‘Mexican wave’ (such as seen in Mexico in 1995, Turkey in 1994 and elsewhere), and out-of-sample predictions of the model explain well the sudden (and seemingly unexpected) collapse in output associated with the 1997–1998 Asian Crisis.     

金融危机中的衍生工具——基于20世纪80年代以来金融危机视角的思考

本文从20世纪80年代以来金融危机的不同特性对比分析入手,对衍生工具在金融危机中作用的二重性进行了研究。指出衍生工具除了具有引导资金从发达资本市场向发展中经济流动过程中的建构性作用,同时在诱导金融危机的发生和加剧方面还具有助动性作用。从衍生工具的产生和发展,降低了经济运作的透明度、削弱了金融管理当局的监管、威胁到固定汇率体系的稳定性、提高了系统风险和感染风险、进而加速并深化危机等不同角度,对衍生工具在金融危机中的负面作用作了较为具体的论证。     

The Vulnerability of ASEAN+3 Countries to International Financial Crises

This article focuses on the reaction of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies to international financial shocks. The crises in emerging markets at the end of the last century underlined the significant vulnerability of the emerging ASEAN economies to international financial fluctuations and a lack of sustainability in their exchange rate regime. A structural VAR model is used to analyze the efficiency of the measures adopted by these countries after this episode of crisis in order to protect their economies against speculative attacks. The results reveal that the impact of the recent subprime crisis on emerging ASEAN countries is less significant than that observed in industrialized ones.     

Does Inequality Lead to a Financial Crisis? Revisited

Financial crises have been attributed to rising income inequality via its induced high household leverage as observed in the USA and similar economies. Alternatively it has been suggested this is not a general relationship since it was found that inequality had no bearing on crises in 14 advanced countries over 1920–2008; instead, low interest rates and business cycle expansions are found to be the only two robust determinants of credit booms leading to crises. Using a similar dataset, this paper provides no support for the generality of the above findings by embracing country heterogeneity. The paper shows that real evidence still points back to the inequality‐leverage–crisis nexus for financialized economies. The implication is that finance can hardly be sustainable under rising inequality.     

Banking on the FED: QE1-2-3 and the Rebalancing of the Global Economy

Growing income inequality in most countries in the 1990s and 2000s led to a global shortfall between supply and demand. The US economy bridged this shortfall domestically and globally by blowing successive equity market and housing bubbles, but these produced ever more severe financial crises. Rebalancing after the 2008 crisis required trade surplus countries to expand their non-traded sectors, but rebalancing is never immaculate. Instead, the Federal Reserve Bank's three rounds of Large-Scale Asset Purchases, or quantitative easing, shifted investment flows towards some developed and developing economies. As a matter of accounting, capital inflows led to shrinking trade surpluses in those countries. However, their relatively undeveloped securities markets mean that rebalancing largely occurred through rising housing prices, mirroring the same unsustainable phenomenon the USA experienced in the 2000s. In effect, the USA shifted part of its unsustainably large non-traded sector back to trade surplus countries by causing the real-estate part of the non-traded sector in surplus countries to expand. However, this is not a sustainable solution to global trade and financial imbalances in the long run, and risks producing the same kind of crises the USA experienced in 2008.     

Crises and human capital accumulation

Abstract.  This paper studies the effects of crises on human capital formation. Theoretically, a crisis undermines total factor productivity, which reduces the return to working and to accumulating physical capital. If the crisis is temporary, young agents will study now and work later. Human capital rises. To test our model we rely on inflation crises as our main empirical proxy. Using GMM panel procedures, our analysis for 86 countries in 1970–2000 confirms the positive effects of crises on human capital. Our main findings survive several robustness tests. JEL classification: E31, D90     

The IMF and the Liberalization of Capital Flows

We evaluate the claim that the International Monetary Fund precipitated financial crises during the 1990s, by pressuring countries to liberalize their capital accounts prematurely. Using data from a panel of developing economies from 1982–98, we examine whether the changes in the regime governing capital flows took place during participation in IMF programs. We find evidence that IMF program participation is correlated with capital account liberalization episodes during the 1990s. We verify the robustness of our results using alternative indicators of capital account openness. To determine whether decontrol was premature, we compare the economic and financial characteristics of countries that decontrolled during IMF programs with those of countries who did so independently, and find some evidence of IMF-led premature liberalizations.     

Early Warning for Currency Crises: What Is the Role of Financial Openness?

The paper explores whether financial openness—capital account openness and gross capital inflows—makes countries vulnerable to currency crises. A quarterly dataset on 46 advanced and emerging market economies (AEs and EMEs) during 1975Q1–2011Q4 is used, with the period after Q2 2007 used for out‐of‐sample testing. The key findings are: (1) capital account openness is associated with lower probability of currency crises, but less so for EMEs; (2) surges in gross capital flows are associated with increased risk of currency crises; and (3) the model performs well out‐of‐sample, confirming that early warning models are helpful in judging relative vulnerability.