Empires and the Modern International System

In recent years several important books have argued that the United States of America, China, Russia and even the European Union “look, talk and walk” like empires. However, these books have failed to impress those working in the field of international relations. For some, the Westphalian state is still the major unit of analysis. Others prefer to use the terms “great powers” or “hegemony.” This research note will, first, try to assess the added value that the concept of empire brings to the study of international relations. The second aim is to establish how best to study contemporary empires. Which actors can be classified as empires? Should one focus on imperial structure, mission or behaviour? The third objective is to seek ways of identifying patterns of cooperation and competition among empires. Can the contemporary manifestations of empire co-exist without major conflict?     

The subversive nature of inequality: Subjective inequality perceptions and attitudes to social inequality

This paper shows that higher levels of perceived wage inequality are associated with a weaker (stronger) belief into meritocratic (non-meritocratic) principles as being important in determining individual wages. This finding is further corroborated using various complementary measures of individuals’ perception of the chances and risks associated with an unequal distribution of economic resources, such as their perception of the chances of upward mobility. I finally show that those individuals perceiving a high level of wage inequality also tend to be more supportive of redistributive policies and progressive taxation. Taken together, these findings suggest that high levels of perceived wage inequality do have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of market outcomes.     

Perceptions of inequality

Individual perceptions of (income or wealth) inequality have strong effects on their decisions as economic agents or voters. It is therefore important to know more about the relation between perceived and measured inequality. We present a novel formal framework that is based on the assumption that people typically do not observe the entire income (wealth) distribution and that their guesses about the extent of inequality are based on “self-centered” reference groups. This framework predicts that perceptions of inequality will change along positions in the income distribution and that for a specific position various dimensions of inequality perception are related to each other. First, low (high) income individuals overestimate (underestimate) their own position. Second, subjective estimates of average earnings increase with the own income position. Third, high or low income people have different perceptions about the skewness and the “shape” of the income distribution (e.g. pyramid or diamond). Fourth, the subjective perception of inequality is lower for high-income individuals. Survey data from 40 countries provide strong support for the framework.     

Misperceiving inequality

A vast literature suggests that economic inequality has important consequences for politics and public policy. Higher inequality is thought to increase demand for income redistribution in democracies and to discourage democratization and promote class conflict and revolution in dictatorships. Most such arguments crucially assume that ordinary people know how high inequality is, how it has been changing, and where they fit in the income distribution. Using a variety of large, cross‐national surveys, we show that, in recent years, ordinary people have had little idea about such things. What they think they know is often wrong. Widespread ignorance and misperceptions emerge robustly, regardless of data source, operationalization, and measurement method. Moreover, perceived inequality—not the actual level—correlates strongly with demand for redistribution and reported conflict between rich and poor. We suggest that most theories about political effects of inequality need to be reframed as theories about effects of perceived inequality.     

Does less inequality among households mean less inequality among individuals?

Consider an income distribution among households of the same size in which individuals, equally needy from the point of view of an ethical observer, are treated unfairly. Individuals are split into two types, those who receive more than one half of the family budget and those who receive less than one half. We look for conditions under which welfare and inequality quasi-orders established at the household level still hold at the individual one. A necessary and sufficient condition for the Generalized Lorenz test is that the income of dominated individuals is a concave function of the household income: individuals of poor households have to stand more together than individuals of rich households. This property also proves to be crucial for the preservation of the Relative and Absolute Lorenz criteria, when the more egalitarian distribution is the poorest. Extensions to individuals heterogeneous in needs and more than two types are also provided.     

On the dynamics of inequality

The dynamics of inequality are studied in a model of human capital accumulation with credit constraints. This model admits a multiplicity of steady state skill ratios that exhibit varying degrees of inequality across households. The main result studies equilibrium paths. It is shown that an equilibrium sequence of skill ratios must converge monotonically to the smallest steady state that exceeds the initial ratio for that sequence. Convergence is “gradual" in that the steady state is not achieved in finite time. On the other hand, if the initial skill ratio exceeds the largest steady state, convergence to a steady state is immediate.This paper is based on unpublished notes from 1990; see http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/debraj/DevEcon/Notes/incdist.pdf. Two considerations suggest that these results may be worth reporting in print. First, the existence of a sizeable recent literature indicates that these relatively early notes may have value outside a filing cabinet or a private webpage. Second, Mukul Majumdar’s own research on economic growth with a nonconvex technology is an even earlier precursor to some of this literature, so the current outlet – a special issue in his honor – seems appropriate. Conversations with Glenn Loury simplified the proof of the main result. I thank Dilip Mookherjee for many useful discussions, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Funding from the National Science Foundation under grant number 0241070 is acknowledged. This paper is dedicated with much affection and warm admiration to Mukul Majumdar – or to Mukulda, as I always think of him – on the occasion of his 60th birthday.     

Institutions and training inequality

We analyze how firm-provided training is affected by the interaction among important institutional variables in the labor market: firing costs, minimum wages and unemployment benefits. We find that the degree of complementarity and substitutability among these variables depends on employees' abilities. Thereby the institutional interactions influence skill inequality. We derive how the influence of one of the institutional variables above is affected by other institutional variables with respect to inequality in skills arising from firm-provided training. We derive several striking results, such as: (a) the minimum wage and unemployment benefits generate increasing skill inequality whereas firing costs generate skill equalization; (b) unemployment benefits and firing costs are complements in their effects on skill inequality, (c) firing costs and the minimum wage are substitutes in their effects on skill equalization, and (d) unemployment benefits and the minimum wage are substitutes in their effects on skill inequality.     

Income inequality and colonialism

This paper proposes that colonialism is a major explanation behind today's differences in income inequality across countries. We argue that income inequality has been higher in the colonies where the percentage of European settlers to total population was higher, as long as Europeans remained a minority. The countries where Europeans became the majority of the population did not suffer from high inequality. These initial differences continue to hold today. The empirical evidence we provide strongly supports our thesis.     

Decomposition and wage inequality

Earning differentials are investigated by a quantile regressions based decomposition, which disentangles the inequalities linked to the covariates and coefficients at various quantiles. Gender and region are considered the main sources of inequality. The unexplained gender and regional differences decrease at the highest wages. Their combination at the lower wages’ level affects women more, causing a so-called sticky floor. Gender and regional covariate effects show a prevalence of women covariates compared with the men’s group, and a prevalence of southern women covariates within the women’s group, particularly at the higher quantiles. This can be interpreted as a glass ceiling hindering southern women at higher wages.     

The roots of inequality: estimating inequality of opportunity from regression trees and forests*

We propose the use of machine learning methods to estimate inequality of opportunity and to illustrate that regression trees and forests represent a substantial improvement over existing approaches: they reduce the risk of ad hoc model selection and trade off upward and downward bias in inequality of opportunity estimates. The advantages of regression trees and forests are illustrated by an empirical application for a cross-section of 31 European countries. We show that arbitrary model selection might lead to significant biases in inequality of opportunity estimates relative to our preferred method. These biases are reflected in both point estimates and country rankings.     

A theory of persistent income inequality

This paper explores the dynamics of income inequality by studying the evolution of human capital investment and neighborhood choice for a population of families. Parents affect the conditional probability distribution of their children's income through the choice of a neighborhood in which to live. Neighborhood location affects children both through local public finance of education as well as through sociological effects. These forces combine to create incentives for wealthier families to segregate themselves into economically homogeneous neighborhoods. Economic stratification combines with strong neighborhoodwide feedback effects to transmit economic status across generations, leading to persistent income inequality.     

The inequality channel of monetary transmission

We examine optimal monetary policy in the presence of inequality by introducing unskilled agents with no access to the financial system into a DSGE model with sticky prices. Our main results are: (i) a contractionary interest rate shock increases inequality, while inflation and the output gap fall; (ii) the welfare-based objective of monetary policy includes inequality stabilization; (iii) as the proportion of unskilled agents increases, welfare decreases; and (iv) under scarcity of skilled agents, monetary policy is weakened, while fiscal policy produces a more relevant impact on the economy.     

The price of education and inequality

Constructing a simple model that includes the price of education, this paper shows that the educational expenditure of rich households could prevent poor households from escaping poverty. The paper offers an explanation for persistent inequality.     

Evolution of wealth inequality in China

Household wealth is a key indicator that reflects national economic competiveness and individual income levels. The distribution of wealth is central for evaluating social justice in a country. This article uses a data set composed of the 2002 China Household Income Project and the 2010 Chinese Family Panel Survey to analyze the level of wealth and wealth inequality in China during 2002 and 2010. The analysis decomposes the evolution of wealth inequality during that period in terms of the structure and composition of wealth. The findings show that there was a large increase in the quantity of wealth and wealth inequality between 2002 and 2010. The level of wealth in 2010 was four times that of 2002, and housing assets were the greatest component of overall wealth in 2010. Wealth inequality also rose dramatically after 2002, with the Gini coefficient of the distribution of wealth increasing from 0.538 in 2002 to 0.739 in 2010. The rapidly escalating price of housing has been the main contributor to increasing wealth inequality in recent years.     

Macroeconomic determinants of wealth inequality dynamics

The evolution of wealth inequality over the long run depends on income growth, inflation, and interest rates. In this paper, we examine, in a dynamic setting, the effect of these three macroeconomic variables on wealth inequality in the United States over the periods 1929–2009 and 1962–2009. The results show that these macroeconomic factors explain a significant amount of the changes in wealth inequality. The results indicate that increases in inflation and income growth contribute positively to net wealth shares of adults in the bottom 50% and middle 40% of the wealth distribution, leading to decreases in overall wealth inequality. Interestingly, the results show increases in interest rates contribute to lower wealth inequality in the U.S. although this result does not hold across all the inequality measures.     

The great Chinese inequality turnaround

This paper argues that after a quarter century of sharp and sustained increase, Chinese inequality is now plateauing and, according to some measures, even declining. A number of papers have been harbingers of this conclusion, but this paper consolidates the literature indicating a turnaround, and provides empirical foundations for it. The argument is made using a range of data sources and a range of measures and perspectives on inequality. The evolution of inequality is further examined through decomposition by income source and population subgroup. Some preliminary explanations are provided for these trends in terms of shifts in policy and the structural transformation of the Chinese economy. We relate the turnaround to two classic phenomena in the development economics literature—the Lewis turning point and the Kuznets turning point. The plateauing is not yet a full blown decline, and there are short term variations. But the narrative on Chinese inequality now needs to accommodate the possibility of a turnaround in inequality, and to focus on the reasons for this turnaround.     

Education, inequality and transition

I consider evidence on differences in access to education and in learning achievement within the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The situation inherited from the communist period is first summarized: there were some significant disparities with, for example, family background having a strong association with tertiary enrolments, as in Western countries. Analysis of the transition period focuses on differences in access and achievement associated with household income and geographic location. Disparities are not the same across the region; in some countries, such as Russia, there are clear grounds for serious concern, but it is unlikely that any country has cause for complacency.