Does the Mortality Decline Promote Economic Growth?

This paper analyzes qualitatively and quantitatively the effects of declining mortality rates on fertility, education and economic growth. The analysis demonstrates that if individuals are prudent in the face of uncertainty about child survival, a decline in an exogenous mortality rate reduces precautionary demand for children and increases parental investment in each child. Once mortality is endogenized, population growth becomes a hump-shaped function of income per capita. At low levels of income population growth rises as income per capita rises leading to a Malthusian steady-state equilibrium, whereas at high levels of income population growth declines leading to a sustained growth steady-state equilibrium.     

Public investment,taxation, and long-run output in economies with multi-level governments

This paper examines the dynamic effects of taxation and investment on the steady state output level of an economy. A simple neoclassical growth model with different tiers of government is developed. The initial focus is on governments that aim to maximise their citizens' welfare and economic performance by providing consumption goods for private consumption and public capital for private production. It is shown that a long-run per capita output maximising tax rate can be derived and that there also exists an optimal degree of fiscal decentralisation. The analysis then extends to the case where governments attempt instead to maximise their own tax revenue to fund expenditures which do not contribute to the utility of their citizens. Three different cases of taxation arrangement are considered: tax competition, tax sharing, and tax coordination. The modeling shows that intensifying tax competition will lead to an increase in the aggregate tax rate as compared to the cases of sharing and coordination amongst governments. These tax rates are both higher than the long-run per capita output maximising rate that was implied under the welfare maximising government scenario.     

Jointly determined saving and fertility behaviour: theory,and estimates for Germany,Italy, UK and USA

This study uses new theories of capital accumulation and fertility in a comparative framework to test predictions with time-series data for Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US. The exogenous-fertility model is based on models of Barro and Becker. The endogenous-fertility models are based on models of Veall and Nishimura and Zhang. It is assumed that life cycle periods are youth, middle age, and old age. Several theoretical frameworks are tested with endogenous and exogenous fertility and altruism and nonaltruism. Data are obtained during 1950-90. Dependent variables are the total lifetime fertility rate and real per capita household savings. Explanatory variables include social security, the real social security deficit per capita, the real rate of interest, the real per capita disposable income, the average male real wage rate, the average female real wage rate, and the real child benefit rate. The explanatory variables are individually graphed to show differences by country over time. Findings suggest that fertility is endogenous in a nonaltruistic model. The only model not rejected by the data was the model in which fertility and intergenerational transfers were explained by nonaltruistic concerns. Fertility was positively affected by the male wage rate in all countries. Fertility was negatively affected by the female wage rate in all countries. Disposable income was insignificant in the UK and Germany and positive and significant in Italy and the US. The interest rate was significant in only 1 model. Child benefits had a positive and significant effect on fertility in the UK. In savings models, disposable income was significant and positive, and child benefits and wage rates were insignificant. Social security coverage had a negative effect on fertility and a positive effect on savings, except in Germany. Findings indicate that saving and fertility are jointly determined.     

Endogenous mortality, human capital and economic growth

We consider growth and welfare effects of lifetime-uncertainty in an economy with human capital-led endogenous growth. We argue that lifetime uncertainty reduces private incentives to invest in both physical and human capital. Using an overlapping generations framework with finite-lived households we analyze the relevance of government expenditure on health and education to counter such growth-reducing forces. We focus on three different models that differ with respect to the mode of financing of education: (i) both private and public spending, (ii) only public spending, and (iii) only private spending. Results show that models (i) and (iii) outperform model (ii) with respect to long-term growth rates of per capita income, welfare levels and other important macroeconomic indicators. Theoretical predictions of model rankings for these macroeconomic indicators are also supported by observed stylized facts.     

Child allowances,educational subsidies and occupational choice

This paper examines the effects on occupational choice and capital accumulation attributable to government policies of child allowances and educational subsidies. We show that multiple steady states may arise under these two policies, with club convergence occurring, and the initial condition being of relevance, if the tax rate of labor income for skilled labor is fairly high. Under a policy of child allowances, an increase in the tax rate is found to raise the quantity of children, but lower the quality of adults; however, under a policy of educational subsidies, with an increase in the tax rate, corresponding increases are found in both the quantity of children and the quality of adults. For developed countries, introducing child allowances may improve or hurt the welfare while introducing educational subsidies is welfare improving.     

DOES PRO‐POPULATION POLICY RAISE PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION?

We theoretically analyze the effects of a child allowance, an improvement in the efficiency of child rearing and a labour income tax on the fertility rate and per capita consumption. The effects on per capita consumption are opposite in the absence, and the presence, of unemployment. For example, a child allowance urges people to have more children and allocate more labour to child rearing, decreasing labour supply for the purpose of commodity production. Therefore, under full employment it decreases per capita consumption. In the presence of unemployment, however, it reduces the deflationary gap and hence stimulates per capita consumption.     

A SAVINGS SUBSIDISATION SYSTEM IN A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH: AN EXTENSION OF WIGGER (1999)

Population ageing is now an established demographic characteristic of many economies. Economists working in the endogenous growth theory tradition have sought to model the relationship between public pensions, financed on a 'Pay-As-You-Go' basis, and the growth in per capita incomes. The resultant intergenerational wealth redistribution from young to older people seems to decrease private savings, diminish capital accumulation, and lower the growth of per capita incomes. The underlying transmission mechanism appears to be a crowding out effect in private capital markets contingent upon the introduction of public pension systems. A growing literature exists on the interrelationships between public pension schemes, fertility rates and endogenous growth. Following Wigger's (1999) pioneering overlapping generations endogenous growth model, we extend this model to examine the effects of a savings subsidisation system on the rate of per capita income growth, fertility and voluntary intrafamily wealth transfers, where parents view children both as an insurance good and a consumption good. Moreover, children care about the consumption levels of their parents. An increase in contributions to a savings subsidised public pension scheme will crowd out private intergenerational transfers from the young to the old and thereby negate the usefulness of children as an insurance good.     

An econometric analysis of the effects of population change on economic growth: a study of Taiwan

This study used an econometric model, estimated from time series data, to evaluate the effects of demographic factors on the T aiwanese economy. The simulation results suggest that, in the short run, a stationary population produces significantly higher income per capita than rapid population growth; in the long run, however, rapid population growth produces a slightly higher income per capita. Under assumptions of very low fertility trends, the population size, equivalent adult consumers, and labor force can be expected to grow by no more than 50% in a century, whereas under the very high fertility trend assumptions, they would more than double. The reason that lower fertility populations produce a smaller gross domestic product per capita in the long run than the normal fertility population is that the negative effects of a slower growing labor force dominate the positive effects of a faster growing capital formation. In terms of the present values of annual income per capita, the slow growing population shows considerably better economic performance. Given the immediate economic advantages of lower fertility, it is important for developing countries with high birth rates to reduce fertility in order to produce higher per capita income effects and break out of poverty. It is considered of little importance that the slow growing populations eventually produce slightly smaller per capita.     

Skill Composition,Fertility, and Economic Growth

While high fertility persists in the poorest countries and fertility declines with per capita income in developing countries, fertility and per capita income are now positively associated across most developed countries. This paper presents a model where a U‐shaped relationship between overall fertility and per capita income reflects within country differences in workforce skill composition and household choice of occupation, fertility, and childrearing. The fraction of skilled workers rises with economic growth. By allowing for both differences in the fertility of skilled and unskilled workers and purchased childrearing inputs, we explain a poverty trap with high fertility, fertility decline with economic development, and the possible reversal of fertility decline in a developed economy where most workers are skilled.     

Supply-Side Economics of Germany's Year 2000 Tax Reform: A Quantitative Assessment

Abstract. The paper provides an assessment of supply‐side economics following Germany's year 2000 tax reform. Investigated are a corporate tax cut, deteriorating depreciation allowances and imputation rules, and a private income tax cut. For this purpose, a neoclassical growth model is augmented by various fiscal policy parameters and endogenous corporate finance and calibrated with German data. The model is used to evaluate consequences of Germany's tax reform on production, firm finance and leverage, investment, consumption and welfare of a representative household.     

Property Rights,Predation, and Productivity*

I develop a neoclassical growth model with imperfect property rights in which predation entails both waste of resources and deadweight losses. According to the model, in the United States, the welfare costs of crime represent a loss of 18.6 percent of consumption per capita. This loss is 57.8 percent for a country in the average of the last decile of the distribution of an index of business costs of crime across 94 countries. An increase of one standard deviation in the institutional quality index increases GDP per worker by 23 percent for a country in the average of the last decile of its distribution.     

Growth in regions

We use a newly assembled sample of 1,528 regions from 83 countries to compare the speed of per capita income convergence within and across countries. Regional growth is shaped by similar factors as national growth, such as geography and human capital. Regional convergence rate is about 2 % per year, comparable to that between countries. Regional convergence is faster in richer countries, and countries with better capital markets. A calibration of a neoclassical growth model suggests that significant barriers to factor mobility within countries are needed to account for the evidence.     

Child policy ineffectiveness in an overlapping generations small open economy with human capital accumulation and public education

Motivated by the recent decrease in the number of children experienced in several developed countries, in this paper we consider a small open economy model with overlapping generations, endogenous fertility and human capital formation through public education, and look at the role the government can play in affecting fertility through the widely used child allowance policy. Contrary to conventional view, we show that the public provision of child allowances is fertility-neutral in the long run, that is it is not effective as a pro-natalist policy, while also reducing human capital accumulation. In contrast, the financing of the public education system is beneficial to both fertility and human capital. These results hold in the cases of both fixed and time cost of children.     

Decreasing fertility,economic growth and the intergenerational wage gap

Persistent low fertility rates lead to lower population growth rates and eventually also to decreasing population sizes in most industrialized countries. There are fears that this demographic development is associated with declines in per capita GDP and possibly also increasing inequality of the wage distribution. We investigate whether this is true in the context of neoclassical growth models, augmented with endogenous fertility decisions and endogenous educational decisions. Furthermore we allow for imperfect substitutability across workers of different age in the production process and learning by doing effects as well as human capital depreciation. In particular, we assess the intergenerational wage redistribution effects which follow after a demographic change to persistent low fertility rates.     

Fertility,income and welfare in an OLG model with regulated wages

We analyse the effects of the regulation of wages in a standard one-sector OLG model of neoclassical growth extended to account for endogenous fertility decisions of households and unemployment benefit policies financed at balanced budget. In contrast with the prevailing literature, which has failed to pay due attention to inter-temporal contexts, our conclusion is that minimum wages may be introduced not only for equity reasons, that is, to increase the income of low-paid workers, but under suitable conditions—i.e., if production is sufficiently capital oriented and the unemployment benefits are high enough—minimum wage legislation might be considered as a source of increased economic performance despite unemployment, i.e. a regulated-wage economy performs better than a market-wage economy. As a consequence, since higher minimum wages raise per capita income together with increasing unemployment, our results imply that a positive correlation between unemployment and long-run income per-capita may exist. Further, the lifetime welfare of the representative generation may be increased as well. Finally, the wage rate may also be treated as a policy instrument for the control of population growth.

The long-run determinants of fertility: one century of demographic change 1900–1999

We examine the long-run relationship between fertility, mortality, and income using panel cointegration techniques and the available data for the last century. Our main result is that mortality changes and growth of income contributed to the fertility transition. The fertility reduction triggered by falling mortality, however, is not enough to overcompensate the positive effect of falling mortality on population growth. This means that growth of income per capita is essential to explain the observed secular decline of population growth. These results are robust to alternative estimation methods, potential outliers, sample selection, different measures of mortality, the sample period, the inclusion of education as an explanatory variable, and the use of different data sets. In addition, our causality tests suggest that fertility changes are both cause and consequence of economic development.     

School Education,Learning‐by‐Doing,and Fertility in Economic Development

We examine the policy implications of relaxing constraints on the educational choice of individuals for economic development. Distinguishing human capital accumulation through schooling and through learning‐by‐doing and knowledge spillovers, we show that in the earlier stages of development, mitigating and eventually eliminating constraints on school education would be necessary for even further economic development. Expanded school education increases the income of individuals and encourages physical capital accumulation, which enlarges productive knowledge through implementation and operations. The increased labor productivity thus boosts economic growth. In the process, the fertility rate will decline because of the increased education cost per child.     

The impact of the credit crisis on poor developing countries: Growth,worker remittances,accumulation and migration

We show that the credit crisis of OECD countries has a negative impact on the growth of the world economy according to an error-correction model including China and Australia. This causes negative growth effects in poor developing countries. The reduced growth has a direct or indirect impact on the convergence issue, aid, remittances, labour force growth, investment and savings, net foreign debt, migration, tax revenues, public expenditure on education and literacy. We estimate dynamic equations of all these variables using dynamic panel data methods for a panel of countries with per capita income below $1200 (2000). The estimated equations are then integrated to a dynamic system of thirteen equations for thirteen variables that allows for highly non-linear baseline simulations for these open economies. Then we analyze the effects of transitional shocks as predicted by the international organizations for the OECD and world growth for 2008 and 2009. Whereas growth rates return to the baseline scenario until 2013 with overshooting for China and Australia, the level of the GDP per capita shows permanent effects, which are positive only for China. In the poor countries, investment, remittances, savings, tax revenues, public expenditure on education, all as a share of GDP as well as literacy and the GDP per capita, are reduced compared to the baseline until 2087 where our analysis ends. Investment, emigration and labour force growth start returning to baseline values between 2013 and 2017. GDP per capita and tax revenues start returning to baseline around 2040. Education variables do not return to baseline without additional effort.     

AN EMPIRICAL ESTIMATE OF THE RELATION BETWEEN TWO MEASURES OF ECONOMIC WELFARE*

The main objective of this paper is to explore and quantify the difference between two measures of comparative economic welfare: (a) the more or less conventional measure of per capita national income, and (b) the capitalized value of expected future income per capita. The paper begins with a brief summary of the argument in favor of the present value of expected future income per capita as a measure of economic welfare. This is followed by an examination of the empirical relationship of the ratio of the suggested alternative measure to per capita income and an analysis of the variables used to compute the present value of expected income per capita. The main conclusion drawn from the calculations is that very substantial differences occur in the measurement of relative economic well-being depending on which measure is used. A final section discusses the implications of this finding for international comparisons of economic welfare.     

Diverging Populations and Endogenous Growth in a Model of Meaningless Trade

The endogenous growth literature raises the possibility that countries may grow without bound in terms of per capita income, and that they may do so at different rates. This possibility also exists in neoclassical growth models with diverging populations—populations that grow at different rates. In both cases, however, this means that international inequality of per capita incomes will not only exist but also get worse over time. This paper examines that possibility within a very simple one-sector model that allows for both diverging populations and endogenous growth.