共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
HITOSHI MATSUSHIMA 《The Japanese Economic Review》2012,63(3):333-347
This paper investigates finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games with explicit contractual devices. It shows that full collusion can be achieved in a unique manner by incentivizing the players' final‐period play with small fines. The incentivizing modality is the penance contract, by which a player is penalized if and only if he deviates from the penance strategy in the final period. Using this contractual agreement brings the penance strategy profile into unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the entire game and achieves full collusion without being invalidated by renegotiation. 相似文献
2.
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions. 相似文献
3.
When are comparative statements credible? We show that simple complementarity conditions ensure that an expert with private information about multiple issues can credibly rank the issues for a decision maker. By restricting the expert's ability to exaggerate, multidimensional cheap talk of this form permits communication when it would not be credible in a single dimension. The communication gains can be substantial with even a couple of dimensions, and the complete ranking is asymptotically equivalent to full revelation as the number of issues becomes large. Nevertheless, partial rankings are sometimes more credible and/or more profitable for the expert than the complete ranking. Comparative cheap talk is robust to asymmetries that are not too large. Consequently, for sufficiently many independent issues, there are always some issues sufficiently symmetric to permit comparative cheap talk. 相似文献
4.
MAKOTO HANAZONO 《The Japanese Economic Review》2007,58(3):417-422
This note applies an evolutionary analysis to Skaperdas's (1992) static model of conflict and cooperation, in which agents are faced with trade‐offs between joint production and share competition. We adopt the stochastic evolution approach, and assume that each agent occasionally mimics the action of the winner of the stage. In contrast to Skaperdas's results that justify full or partial cooperation in productive activity, the long‐run equilibrium must exhibit total conflict; nobody engages in production at all. 相似文献
5.
Contest success functions 总被引:29,自引:0,他引:29
Stergios Skaperdas 《Economic Theory》1996,7(2):283-290
Summary Tournaments, conflict, and rent-seeking have been modelled as contests in which participants exert effort to increase their probability of winning a prize. A Contest Success Function (CSF) provides each player's probability of winning as a function of all players' efforts. In this paper the additive CSF employed in most contests is axiomatized, with an independence from irrelevant alternatives property as the key axiom. Two frequently used functional forms are also axiomatized: one in which winning probabilities depend on the ratio of players' efforts and the other in which winning probabilities depend on the difference in efforts.I am grateful to three anonymous referees, Jack Hirshleifer, Guillermo Owen, and especially Duncan Luce for their helpful comments, and to the UC Irvine Academic Senate and the NSF for financial support. 相似文献
6.
Bo Chen 《Journal of Economic Theory》2010,145(1):402-420
This paper extends the belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring. We first find that the previous belief-based techniques [T. Sekiguchi, Efficiency in repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring, J. Econ. Theory 76 (1997) 345-361; V. Bhaskar, I. Obara, Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring, J. Econ. Theory 102 (2002) 40-69] cannot succeed when players' private monitoring technologies are sufficiently different. We then modify the previous belief-based approach by letting the player with smaller observation errors always randomize between cooperate and defect along the cooperative path of the play. We show that with vanishing observation errors, efficiency and a folk theorem can be approximated using our modified belief-based strategies. 相似文献
7.
Drew Fudenberg 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,132(1):461-473
We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public” information. The results generalize to the n-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain equilibria by comparing the reports of different players, and using these “third parties” to effectively enforce contracts. 相似文献
8.
We propose a new concept for the analysis of games, the TASP, which gives a precise prediction about non-equilibrium play in games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like learning. We show that, when players learn using weighted stochastic fictitious play and so place greater weight on recent experience, the time average of play often converges in these “unstable” games, even while mixed strategies and beliefs continue to cycle. This time average, the TASP, is related to the cycle identified by Shapley [L.S. Shapley, Some topics in two person games, in: M. Dresher, et al. (Eds.), Advances in Game Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964]. The TASP can be close to or quite distinct from Nash equilibrium. 相似文献
9.
We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and does not generate short-term gains. In equilibrium, instability generated by a player decreases when the status quo favors them more. Equilibrium always exhibits a region of stable states in which the status quo persists. As players' threat power increases, this region shrinks, ultimately collapsing to a single stable state that is supported via a deterrence mechanism. There is long-run path-dependency and inequity: although instability eventually leads to a stable state, it typically selects the least favorable one for the initially disadvantaged player. 相似文献
10.
Yuichi Yamamoto 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,135(1):382-413
We demonstrate that efficiency is achievable in a certain class of N player repeated games with private, almost perfect monitoring. Our equilibrium requires only one period memory and can be implemented by two state automata. Furthermore, we show that this efficiency result holds with any degree of accuracy of monitoring if private signals are hemiindependent. Whereas most existing research focuses on two player cases or only a special example of N player games, our results are applicable to a wide range of N player games of economic relevance, such as trading goods games and price-setting oligopolies. 相似文献
11.
Ichiro Obara 《Journal of Economic Theory》2009,144(1):120-134
This paper proves a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication, extending the idea of delayed communication in Compte [O. Compte, Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, Econometrica 66 (1998) 597-626] to the case where private signals are correlated.The sufficient condition for the folk theorem is generically satisfied with more than two players, even when other well-known conditions are not. The folk theorem also applies to some two-players repeated games. 相似文献
12.
Network formation and stable equilibrium 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We study the non-cooperative formation of a (directed) network that builds upon one-way immediate links. Our novel feature is that we require circular paths of links for productive activities. This captures more clearly the higher level of coordination that is often required for network formations than models such as those of Jackson and Wolinsky [A strategic model of social and economic networks, J. Econ. Theory 71 (1996) 44-74] and Bala and Goyal [A non-cooperative model of network formation, Econometrica 68 (2000) 1181-1229], in that in our model a single agent's unilateral action is limited in affecting the network structure. We completely characterize the class of Nash equilibria by showing that the minimality of a graph is both necessary and sufficient (Theorem 1). We also propose the concept of a stable network that is similar to the pairwise stability of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). We show that stable equilibria are a wheel, a trivial network, or a sub-wheel partitioned network (Theorem 2). We modify the Bala and Goyal (2000) dynamic process with inertia, and obtain the convergence to stable equilibria regardless of the initial state (Theorem 3). 相似文献
13.
This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the highest stopping point wins. Unlike the explicit cost for a higher stopping time in a war of attrition, here, higher stopping times are riskier, because players can go bankrupt. We derive a closed-form solution of a Nash equilibrium outcome. In equilibrium, highest expected losses occur at an intermediate negative value of the drift. 相似文献
14.
Yuichi Yamamoto 《Journal of Economic Theory》2009,144(2):802-824
The present paper studies repeated games with private monitoring, and characterizes the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in the limit as the discount factor approaches one and the noise on private information vanishes. Contrary to the conjecture by Ely et al. [J.C. Ely, J. Hörner, W. Olszewski, Belief-free equilibria in repeated games, Econometrica 73 (2005) 377-415], the equilibrium payoff set is computed by the same formula, no matter how many players there are. As an application of this result, a version of the folk theorem is established for N-player prisoner's dilemma games. 相似文献
15.
TADASHI SEKIGUCHI 《The Japanese Economic Review》2005,56(3):317-331
This paper examines when a finitely repeated game with imperfect monitoring has a unique equilibrium payoff vector. This problem is nontrivial under imperfect monitoring, because uniqueness of equilibrium (outcome) in the stage game does not extend to finitely repeated games. A (correlated) equilibrium is equilibrium minimaxing if any player's equilibrium payoff is her minimax value when the other players choose a correlated action profile from the actions played in the equilibrium. The uniqueness result holds if all stage game correlated equilibria are equilibrium minimaxing and have the same payoffs. The uniqueness result does not hold under weaker conditions. 相似文献
16.
For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to incomplete information [A. Kajii, S. Morris, The robustness of equilibria to incomplete information, Econometrica 65 (1997) 1283-1309] and absorbing and globally accessible under perfect foresight dynamics for a small friction [A. Matsui, K. Matsuyama, An approach to equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995) 415-434]. Several simple sufficient conditions under which a game has an iterated MP-maximizer are also provided. 相似文献
17.
A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Anastassios Kalandrakis 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,116(2):294-322
We analyze an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an endogenous reversion point. In each period a new dollar is divided among three legislators according to the proposal of a randomly recognized member—if a majority prefer so—or according to previous period's allocation otherwise. Although current existence theorems for Markovian equilibria do not apply for this dynamic game, we fully characterize a Markov equilibrium. The equilibrium is such that irrespective of the discount factor or the initial division of the dollar, the proposer eventually extracts the whole dollar in all periods. We also show that proposal strategies are weakly continuous in the status quo that equilibrium expected utility is not quasi-concave, and the correspondence of voters’ acceptance set (the set of allocations weakly preferred over the status quo) fails lower hemicontinuity. 相似文献
18.
Seok-ju Cho 《Journal of Economic Theory》2009,144(2):851-868
We give a game-theoretic foundation for the median voter theorem in a one-dimensional bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn's [D. Baron, J. Ferejohn, Bargaining in legislatures, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 83 (1989) 1181-1206] model of distributive politics. We prove that as the agents become arbitrarily patient, the set of proposals that can be passed in any pure strategy, subgame perfect equilibrium collapses to the median voter's ideal point. While we leave the possibility of some delay, we prove that the agents' equilibrium continuation payoffs converge to the utility from the median, so that delay, if it occurs, is inconsequential. We do not impose stationarity or any other refinements. Our result counters intuition based on the folk theorem for repeated games, and it contrasts with the known result for the distributive bargaining model that as agents become patient, any division of the dollar can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. 相似文献
19.
Dominic Rohner 《Journal of development economics》2011,96(2):188-199
Social tensions impede social cohesion and public goods provision, and can be a driving force for more serious conflicts such as civil wars. Surprisingly, the emergence of social tensions has been studied only rarely in the literature. In the present contribution a game-theoretic model highlights how reputation concerns and the structure of group cleavages matter for the emergence of social tensions. In particular, the respective effects of ethnic fractionalization, polarization and segregation are analyzed. The differences between ethnicity and class, and the role of social mobility are also studied. The predictions of the model can account for recent empirical evidence. 相似文献
20.
Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. We investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private-monitoring perturbations. We show that with full support of public signals, no perfect public equilibrium is robust if it induces a “regular” 2×2 coordination game in the continuation play. This regularity condition is violated in all belief-free equilibria. Indeed, with an individual full rank condition, every interior belief-free equilibrium is robust. We also analyze block belief-free equilibria and point out that the notion of robustness is sensitive to whether we allow for uninterpretable signals. 相似文献