Irrationality and monopolistic competition: An evolutionary approach

This paper shows that a monopolistically competitive equilibrium can evolve without purposive profit maximization. Specifically, this paper formulates a precise evolutionary dynamic model of an industry where there is continuous entry of firms that randomly select their output levels on entry and fix their output levels thereafter. Firms exit the industry if they fail to pass the survival test of making nonnegative wealth. This paper shows that the industry converges in probability to the monopolistically competitive equilibrium as the size of each firm becomes infinitesimally small relative to the market, as the entry cost becomes sufficiently small, and as time gets sufficiently large. Consequently, in the limit, the only surviving firms are those producing at the tangency of the demand curve to the average cost curve and no potential entrant can make a positive profit by entry.     

Efficiency of two sided investments in an equilibrium unemployment framework

This paper investigates the efficiency of investments by firms and workers in a matching model with high- and low-productivity jobs. Search is sector specific and random within sectors. Search frictions and ex-post bargaining imply that wage inequality arises as a result of the difference in investment costs between the sectors. The efficiency properties of the equilibrium are analyzed under the particular division in bargaining proposed by Hosios (1990). The conclusion is that the equilibrium is inefficient, with a too low fraction of workers and a too high vacancy-unemployment ratio in the high-productivity sector. The opposite happens in the low-productivity sector.     

Why shops close again: An evolutionary perspective on the deregulation of shopping hours

This paper introduces a new perspective on the deregulation of shopping hours based on ideas from evolutionary game theory. We study a retail economy where shopping hours have been deregulated recently. It is argued that first, the deregulation leads to a coordination problem between store owners and customers, and second, the ‘solution’ to this problem depends on the specific cost structure of stores and the preferences of customers. In particular, it may happen that, even if extended shopping hours are Pareto efficient, stores and customers do not succeed in coordinating on this equilibrium. The analysis explains the observation in Germany, where shopping hours have been deregulated recently, that store owners tend to go back to the former shopping hours again. Moreover, it emphasizes the important role of advertisement campaigns as a signalling device.     

Endogenizing market institutions: An experimental approach

We study experimental two-sided markets in which the information structure is endogenous. When submitting an offer, a trader decides which other traders will be informed about the offer. This setup allows both a decentralized bargaining market (Chamberlin, J. Polit. Econ. 56 (1948) 95), and a double auction market (Smith J. Polit. Econ. 70 (1962) 111) as special cases. The results show that offers are typically directed to all traders of the other side of the market, but to none of the traders of the same side of the market. Even though traders receive much less information, the resulting market institution leads to the same outcomes in terms of prices and efficiency as a double auction market. In two additional treatments we examine the robustness of these results. First, it is found that the market institution adapts predictably, but not necessarily efficiently, to the imposition of transaction costs. Second, we find that the preference of sellers to conceal offers from competitors is strict. At the same time, sellers benefit collectively when they reveal offers to each other.     

Property rights and information flows: a simulation approach

With the growth of the information economy, the proportion of knowledge-intensive goods to total goods is constantly increasing. Lessig (The future of ideas: the fate of the commons in a connected world. Vintage, New York 2001) has argued that IPRs have now become too favourable to existing producers and that their ‘winner-take-all’ characteristics are constraining the creators of tomorrow. In this paper we look at how variations in IPRs regimes might affect the creation and social cost of new knowledge in economic systems. Drawing on a conceptual framework, the Information Space or I-Space to explore how the uncontrollable diffusibility of knowledge relates to its degree of structure, we deploy an agent-based modelling approach to explore the issue of IPRs. We take the ability to control the diffusibility of knowledge as a proxy measure for an ability to establish property rights in such knowledge. Second, we take the rate of obsolescence of knowledge as a proxy measure for the degree of turbulence induced by different regimes of technical change. Then we simulate the quantity and cost to society of new knowledge under different property right regimes.

Bargaining and network structure: An experiment

We consider bargaining in a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, who can only trade with the limited number of people with whom they are connected. We perform an experimental test of a graph-theoretic model that yields unique predictions about equilibrium prices for the networks in our sessions. The results diverge sharply depending on how a connection is made between two separate simple networks, typically conforming to the theoretical directional predictions. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link, and we find evidence of a form of social learning.     

Kidney exchange: An egalitarian mechanism

Kidney exchange programs utilize both deceased-donor and live-donor kidneys. One of these programs, a two-way kidney paired donation (KPD), involves two patients exchanging their live donors? kidneys. Another possibility is a list exchange (LE): a living incompatible donor provides a kidney to a candidate on the deceased-donor waitlist and in return the intended recipient of this donor receives a priority on the waitlist. By taking into consideration the fact that transplants from live donors have a higher chance of success than those from cadavers, we characterize the set of efficient and egalitarian exchanges involving the KPD?s and LE?s.     

RISKY VERSUS RISKLESS BARGAINING PROCEDURES: THE AUMANN‐ROTH CONTROVERSY REVISITED*

In a series of papers, Aumann and Roth discussed a game in which players can cooperate in pairs and two of them prefer to form a coalition with each other. Roth argued that the only rational outcome is that the players who prefer each other form a coalition; Aumann argued that all three coalitions are possible because the players have a problem of expectation coordination. A non‐cooperative analysis provides additional support for Aumann's arguments and shows that the difference between Aumann's and Roth's views can be traced back to a difference (risky versus/riskless) in the bargaining procedure.     

Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach

The purpose of this paper is to outline an evolutionary approach to the process of competition among institutions. We shall focus, in particular, on two issues: first, the role of the competitive process as a knowledge-creating process; and, second, the issue of what inferences, if any, can be drawn from the nature of this process regarding the desirability of its outcomes. In discussing both issues we will draw a parallel between ordinary market competition and competition in the realm of institutions. Some clarifying comments in order to narrow down what we mean by “evolutionary approach” and “institutional competition” precede the analysis. The authors wish to thank Richard Wagner for helpful criticism.     

An MPEC estimator for misclassification models

In this paper, we propose a constrained maximum likelihood estimator for misclassification models, by formulating the estimation as an MPEC (Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints) problem. Our approach improves the numerical accuracy and avoids the singularity problem. Monte Carlo simulations confirm that the proposed estimator reduces bias and standard deviation of the estimator, especially when the sample is small/medium and/or the dimension of latent variable is large.     

Alliances and negotiations

Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, political parties, etc.) each representing composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances. We formalise the notion of ‘alliance’ and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the alliance affect the bargaining outcome. In particular, we find that unanimity procedures lead to ‘more aggressive’ negotiating tactics than majority procedures.     

Testing convergence of European regions: A semiparametric approach

We provide a reappraisal of income convergence across European regions over the last two decades by using a semiparametric partially linear model to approximate the relationship between the average growth rate of GDP per capita and the initial GDP per capita. Estimation results point out both country heterogeneity and non-linearity in the convergence process. The findings suggest that low income regions, in particular those from new adhesion countries, diverge while medium income regions converge and that there is no evidence of convergence for high income regions.     

FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH SMALL FINES: THE PENANCE CONTRACT*

This paper investigates finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games with explicit contractual devices. It shows that full collusion can be achieved in a unique manner by incentivizing the players' final‐period play with small fines. The incentivizing modality is the penance contract, by which a player is penalized if and only if he deviates from the penance strategy in the final period. Using this contractual agreement brings the penance strategy profile into unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the entire game and achieves full collusion without being invalidated by renegotiation.     

Proportional concessions and the leximin solution

In this note we introduce a new axiom for bargaining solutions, named Proportional Concession Monotonicity (PCM), which imposes that no player benefits when all players collectively make proportional concessions with respect to their respective utopia values. We reconsider the leximin solution (Imai, 1983), and obtain an alternative characterization on the basis of PCM.     

Corrigendum to “School choice: An experimental study” [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]

We correct an inconsistency in the efficiency comparison reported in [Y. Chen, T. Sönmez, School choice: An experimental study, J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]. The efficiency comparison of the three school choice mechanisms in our paper is based on recombinant estimation with an identical set of 10 tie-breakers, while the statistics reported in Table 7 is computed using 14,400 tie-breakers.     

Is big better? On scale and scope economies in the Portuguese water sector

The ‘big is better’ idea has recently been challenged in network industries. Scale economies are considered finite so that for the individual utility an optimal scale of operations arises. A similar observation yields for scope economies as joint production is not predicted univocally anymore. In the water sector, scale economies and joint production are preferred. Nevertheless, several countries are restructuring the sector in order to improve the scale and scope of operations. This article intends to provide some insights into this matter. We analyze the Portuguese water market structure using non-parametric techniques with data from the year 2005. After surveying the literature on scale and scope economies, we discuss the peculiarities of the Portuguese water sector. The paper confirms the natural monopoly features. Although scope economies are absent, it highlights scale economies. The optimal scale of the utilities is located between 160,000 and 180,000 inhabitants. As such, the Portuguese water sector optimally counts 60 water utilities.     

Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation

The amount of institutional intervention necessary to secure efficiency-enhancing cooperation in markets and organizations, in circumstances where interactions take place among essentially strangers, depends critically on the amount of information informal reputation mechanisms need transmit. Models based on subgame perfection find that the information necessary to support cooperation is recursive in nature and thus information generating and processing requirements are quite demanding. Models that do not rely on subgame perfection, on the other hand, suggest that the information demands may be quite modest. The experiment we present indicates that even without any reputation information there is a non-negligible amount of cooperation that is, however, quite sensitive to the cooperation costs. For high costs, providing information about a partner's immediate past action increases cooperation. Recursive information about the partners' previous partners' reputation further promotes cooperation, regardless of the cooperation costs.     

Bargaining and markets: complexity and the competitive outcome

Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 63-78) consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade. They show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome. Here, I consider Rubinstein and Wolinsky's model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players’ preferences, together with the standard payoff in the game, then every equilibrium is stationary/Markov and induces the unique competitive price. Thus, I demonstrate that aversion to complexity may provide a justification for the competitive outcome.