Evaluating the Costs of Increased Lending in Low and Negative Growth Local Housing Markets

The literatures on default and the evaluation of low downpayment mortgage programs are extended by showing within an options pricing framework how differences in expected price appreciation trends across housing markets can influence default and, thereby, the cost of programs designed to increase mortgage liquidity. An equilibrium mortgage rate reflecting the risk premium required to compensate for expected default-related losses is endogenously determined within the model. Evaluating the entire process by which program losses arise strictly within a rigorous asset pricing framework has potentially important implications for policy evaluation, as the estimated present value of program losses in declining markets where expected default is high is quite sensitive to the choice of the discount rate. The implications of increased lending in low and negative price appreciation local markets are also investigated.     

The Integration of Mortgage Markets and Capital Markets

In this paper, we develop a model to predict the impact of deregulation in the form of relaxing interest rate control on the integration between the mortgage credit market and the general credit market. The model is tested through the examination of the long-term Granger-like equilibrium relationship between mortgage interest rates and general interest rates in the pre-1980 regulated vs. the post-1980 deregulated periods. It is shown that the level of regulation, in the form of targeting general interest rate levels, contributes to the segmentation of the mortgage market from the capital market. To test this model, we compare the relationship between mortgage interest rates and general interest rates around 1980 where major control on interest rate levels in capital markets was lifted. Using Engle and Granger's procedure to overcome the estimation problem from nonstationarity in the interest rate series, we are able to find that the two interest rates were cointegrated after 1980 but not before. More importantly, it appears that the two markets were already integrated before the full development of the secondary mortgage markets between 1984 and 1987. Therefore, we conclude that the bulk of the integration between the mortgage and capital markets was completed as a result of the removal of interest rate controls around 1980, in contrast with previous studies that find integration occurred during the mid-1980s primarily as a result of the rapid development of the secondary mortgage markets.     

FHA Terminations: A Prelude to Rational Mortgage Pricing

Recent models of pricing mortgages and/or mortgage insurance have used option-pricing models as their framework. The focus is usually on default, which is viewed as a put option (to sell the house to the lender in exchange for the mortgage) and prepayment, which is viewed as a call option (to buy the mortgage from the lender). Analysis then uses techniques like those used to price options in capital markets. Unfortunately, homeowners do not seem to exercise their option as quickly as do traders in organized markets. We estimate prepayment and default functions, which are meant to be a first step in developing modified, option-based models of mortgage pricing.     

Pricing Private Mortgage Insurance

Issues involved in an evaluation of the price of private mortgage insurance are discussed. Cost considerations are emphasized as long-run equilibrium competitive market prices equal long-run marginal and average cost. An empirical evaluation of current insurance premiums vis-a-vis competitive market norms requires more empirical information on the determinants of foreclosures, especially the links between micro and macro determinants. Option pricing models suggest other data comparisons that also may shed light on an evaluation of insurance premiums.     

Hedging Forward Mortgage Loan Commitments: The Option of Futures and a Future for Options

The purpose of this paper is to analyze theoretically the problem of how mortgage lending institutions assume the interest rate risks inherent in the granting of fixed-rate mortgage loan commitments.
Two approaches to hedge this risk are analyzed. First, the use of the GNMA futures market is evaluated from the standpoint of how it might be used to hedge against mortgage commitment risks. Secondly, the use of an appropriate pricing model—the Black-Scholes option pricing model—is offered as a proxy for establishing the market value of a fixed-rate mortgage commitment. This model is extended and empirically estimated for several hypothetical environments.
The paper demonstrates a basic flaw in the GNMA futures market as a hedge against mortgage commitments. Once this is established, the use of the options pricing approach is offered as a more rational approach for hedging these risks.     

Pricing Efficiency in the Mortgage Market

Traditionally, the presence of serial correlation has been presumed to indicate an inefficient market for financial assets. As Latham [15] discusses, while the absence of serial correlation implies market efficiency, its mere presence does not imply inefficiency. Rather, market efficiency is a characteristic of security pricing. This study investigates pricing efficiency in the mortgage market. Using mortgage loan quotations for 343 institutions over a 71-week period, the empirical findings show that a wide variety of mortgage contracts are efficiently priced.     

FOB or Uniform Delivered Prices: Strategic Choice and Welfare Effects

In spatial markets firms typically use either FOB (mill) or uniform delivered (UD) pricing. What competitive factors motivate this choice and what are the welfare implications of the choice? We study these questions in a duopsony market, where farmers with unit elastic supply curves sell to processing firms. In results that differ considerably from prior work, we show that the equilibrium price policy depends upon the extent of competition in the market, with FOB pricing emerging under very competitive structures and UD pricing emerging under less competition. Mixed FOB‐UD pricing may also emerge in equilibrium. In most cases welfare is higher under UD than FOB pricing.     

Information Externalities,Neighborhood Characteristics and Home Mortgage Pricing and Underwriting

Theories of rational redlining suggest thinness in housing markets should lead to greater uncertainty in house price appraisals, increasing mortgage denial rates or pricing. Empirical tests found support for this theory in mortgage underwriting using 1990s data. Using 2006 data and bank‐specific regression models, we revisit this topic in light of two developments leading to the recent mortgage bubble: the widespread securitization that allowed banks to shift loan risk to investors and the advent of risk‐based pricing. Consistent with expectations, we find that information externalities have become economically very small and have shifted from underwriting to pricing decisions.     

The Integration of Commercial Real Estate Markets and Stock Markets

This paper tests whether commercial real estate markets (both exchange-traded and non-exchange-traded) are integrated with stock markets using multifactor asset pricing models. The results support the hypothesis that the market for exchange-traded real estate companies, including REITs, is integrated with the market for exchange-traded (non-real-estate) stocks. Moreover, the degree of integration has significantly increased during the 1990s. However, when appraisal-based returns (adjusted for smoothing) are used to construct real estate portfolio returns, the results fail to support the integration hypothesis, although this may reflect the inability of these estimated private market returns to accurately proxy for commercial real estate returns. Interestingly, the growth rate in real per capita consumption is consistently priced in both commercial real estate markets and stock markets, whereas previous studies have found mixed evidence on the role of consumption in explaining ex ante stock returns.     

Borrower Attitudes Toward Alternative Mortgage Instruments*

Much of the existing literature on homeownership assumes that financial markets work well enough to allow households to translate permanent income into effective demand. However, transaction costs, imperfections, and uncertainties all constrain the markets' operation so that people are often forced to choose a quantity of housing stock that diverges from their desired consumption level. Instead of being able to borrow against future income for the down payment or to make monthly payments in a pattern that matches future income, young families in their early years may be constrained from purchasing the size house they desire, and older households may remain in homes larger than they need. In light of these market imperfections, housing and tenure decisions depend not only on permanent income and the relative price of housing services, but also on such mortgage parameters as monthly payment patterns, down payment, and rate of equity accumulation. Models of the demand for housing and homeownership described in the existing literature do not include these parameters of mortgage finance. Mortgage terms are important factors in housing consumption and investment decisions. Because the standard mortgage no longer seems appropriate for all households under all economic conditions, the extent to which alternative mortgage instruments meet the requirements and preferences of different segments of the market becomes an important issue.     

Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly when Markets are Covered*

We analyze oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination relative to uniform pricing when markets are covered. Pricing equilibria are critically determined by supply-side features such as the number of firms and their marginal cost differences. It follows that each firm's Lerner index under uniform pricing is equal to the weighted harmonic mean of the firm's relative margins under discriminatory pricing. Uniform pricing then lowers average prices and raises consumer surplus. We can calculate the gain in consumer surplus and loss in firms' profits from uniform pricing based only on the market data of the discriminatory equilibrium (i.e., prices and quantities).     

Privatized Default Risk and Real Estate Recessions: The U.K. Mortgage Market

A mortgage pricing model is developed when a borrower goes through a series of distress states, including delinquency, long-term nonpayment and ultimate default. These steps are sequential, and depend on prices and alternatives faced by the borrower. The multistate default model is applied to the mortgage market in the United Kingdom. As a byproduct, a pricing structure for the U.K. endowment mortgage, which combines a good and a life insurance policy, is developed. Income and liquidity constraints are shown to affect the decision to keep a mortgage current in different states of distress. Solvent borrowers may thus keep their mortgages current, even when equity is negative.     

Mortgage Brokers,Origination Fees,Price Transparency and Competition

This article examines the dynamics between mortgage broker competition, origination fees and price transparency. A reverse first‐price sealed‐bid auction model is used to motivate broker pricing behavior. Confirming the model predictions, our empirical analysis shows that increased mortgage brokerage competition at the Metropolitan Statistical Area level leads to lower fees. The findings are robust to different measures of fees as well as different measures of competition. We also provide evidence that broker competition reduces mortgage origination fees on retail (nonbrokered) loans as well. In addition, our results indicate that pricing complexity is an important determinant of fees, and increased broker competition is associated with a higher probability of a loan being priced with transparency. Our results suggest that mortgage brokers increase competition and lower fees in the mortgage market.     

Interest Rate Risk, Residential Mortgages and Financial Futures Markets

Residential mortgage markets in both the United States and Canada have recently been dominated by instruments such as variable-rate and short-term rollover mortgages which require borrowers to assume a greater burden of interest rate risk. An outstanding question is whether this approach to risk allocation is Pareto optimal or whether there are other more effective methods of dealing with the risk created by interest rate volatility. This study examines the potential for shifting this risk from the mortgage market to the financial futures market. After considering the rationale for expecting that neither mortgage borrowers nor lenders wish to absorb the high levels of risk present in the existing financial environment, this study discusses the hedging of interest rate risk through financial futures markets. Empirical tests are then performed to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. futures markets for hedging positions from the U.S. mortgage market. These results indicate that the interest rate risk inherent in residential mortgages can be substantially shifted through one or more positions in the existing futures contracts and long-term, fixed-rate mortgages may still be financially feasible under conditions of interest rate volatility.     

Localized Competition,Heterogeneous Firms and Vertical Relations

This paper investigates the link between firms' geographic configuration and market power in imperfect markets. We consider two related setups. The first illustrates the relevant characteristics of the pricing equilibrium. A main implication is that the equilibrium price vector changes in accordance with the firms' spatial configuration. The second, where firms operate as downstream retailers affiliated to rival upstream wholesalers, shows that upstream market power is strongly affected by an index of geographic concentration which reflects the spatial configuration of retailers. Finally, our analysis provides several insights for market delineation as well as merger evaluation and remedies.     

Oligopoly intermediation,relative rivalry and market conduct

We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices.     

Prepayment Behavior of Dutch Mortgagors: An Empirical Analysis

The suboptimal exercise of the prepayment option in a mortgage is relevant for mortgage pricing and the management of a mortgage portfolio. Construction of an accurate prepayment model requires quantification of driving factors such as seasoning, seasonality, refinance incentive and burnout. We focus on Dutch mortgages but also discuss the Dutch market in a European setting. Within the euro-denominated MBS market, the Dutch market is often referred to as the benchmark market. In our application we include typical Dutch market and contract characteristics such as the annual penalty-free prepayment of 10 to 20% of the original loan amount. We use loan-level historical data on mortgages originated between January 1989 and June 1999 to estimate separate models for two popular redemption types: savings mortgages and interest-only mortgages. In both models we allow for suboptimal prepayment behavior. The results clearly indicate that prepayment rates depend on interest rates and the age of the mortgage contract. Moreover, we find that burnout is an important element in describing the prepayment behavior of Dutch mortgagors.     

企业内部市场定价:基于行为的理论模型

本文从行为的视角探讨内部市场定价问题。根据内部市场主体之间的合作、竞争行为提出并界定了内部市场结构的概念，将内部市场划分为简单型、合作主导型、竞争主导型、复合型四种结构类型；通过分析企业战略、内部定价对内部市场主体之间合作、竞争行为的影响，得出了企业战略决定内部市场结构应然、内部定价调节内部市场结构实然的结论：以内部市场结构的实然与应然相一致为原则．构建了企业内部市场定价的理论模型，阐述了在各种内部市场结构应然要求下的内部定价方法、决策权安排、绩效考核标准和激励机制等。     

Reverse Mortgages: Contracting and Crossover Risk

A pricing model is developed for a reverse mortgage contract where the borrower receives payments either as a lump sum or in an annuity while the loan balance accumulates as a claim against the house. No underwriting criteria on income are applied. One risk of default is that the borrower will remain in the house after the negatively amortizing loan balance exceeds the value of the house. An explicit pricing model of the reverse mortgage permits the evaluation of this default "crossover" option. Alternative methods involving life insurance contracts and securitization are compared as secondary market channels.     

Equilibrium Real Options Exercise Strategies with Multiple Players: The Case of Real Estate Markets

This article derives a closed-form solution for an equilibrium real options exercise model with stochastic revenues and costs for monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly and competitive markets. Our model also allows one option holder to have a greater production capacity than others. Under a monopolistic environment we find that the optimal option exercise strategy in real estate markets is dramatically opposite to that in a financial (warrant) market, indicating the importance of paying attention to the institutional details of the underlying market when analyzing option exercise strategies. Our model can be generalized to the pricing of convertible securities and capital investment decisions involving both stochastic revenues and costs under different types of market structures.