The ambitious entrepreneur: High growth strategies of women-owned enterprises

During the last two decades, researchers have sought to develop categories of entrepreneurs and their businesses along a variety of dimensions to better comprehend and analyze the entrepreneurial growth process. Some of this research has focused on differences related to industrial sectors, firm size, the geographical region in which a business is located, the use of high-technology or low-technology, and the life-cycle stage of the firm (i.e., start-up vs. more mature, formalized companies). Researchers have also considered ways in which entrepreneurs can be differentiated from small business managers. One of these classifications is based on the entrepreneur's desire to grow the business rapidly. This is the focus of our study.To date, the media have paid considerable attention to rapidly growing new ventures. However, still lacking are large-scale research studies guided by theory through which we can expand our knowledge of the underlying factors supporting ambitious expansion plans. Some research has identified factors that enhance or reduce the willingness of the entrepreneur to grow the business. Factors include the strategic origin of the business (i.e., the methods and paths through which the firm was founded); previous experience of the founder/owner; and the ability of the entrepreneur to set realistic, measurable goals and to manage conflict effectively.Our study attempted to identify the strategic paths chosen by entrepreneurs and the relation of those paths to the growth orientation of the firm. The entrepreneurs sampled in this study are women entrepreneurs across a wide range of industrial sectors. Recent reviews of entrepreneurship research have suggested the need for more studies comparing high-growth firms with slower-growth firms to better delineate their differences in strategic choices and behaviors.Our study sought to answer the following questions: What characterizes a “high growth-oriented entrepreneur?” Is this distinction associated with specific strategic intentions, prior experience, equity held in previous firms, the type of company structure in place, or success factors the entrepreneur perceives are important to the business? Do “high growth” entrepreneurs show greater entrepreneurial “intensity” (i.e., commitment to the firm's success)? Are they willing to “pay the price” for their own and their firm's success? (i.e., the “opportunity costs” associated with business success and growth). Other relationships under investigation included different patterns of financing the business' start-up and early growth. Do “high-growth” entrepreneurs use unique sources of funding compared with “lower-growth” entrepreneurs?Eight hundred thirty-two entrepreneurs responded to a survey in which they were asked to describe their growth intentions along nineteen strategic dimensions, as well as respond to the foregoing questions. Some of the strategic activity measures included adding a new product or service, expanding operations, selling to a new market, and applying for a loan to expand operations. Actual growth rates based on sales revenues were calculated, and average annualized growth rates of the industrial sectors represented in the sample were obtained. This study showed that high-growth-oriented entrepreneurs were clearly different from low-growth-oriented entrepreneurs along several dimensions. The former were much more likely to select strategies for their firms that permitted greater focus on market expansion and new technologies, to exhibit greater intensity towards business ownership (“my business is the most important activity in my life”), and to be willing to incur greater opportunity costs for the success of their firms (“I would rather own my own business than earn a higher salary while employed by someone else”).The high-growth–oriented entrepreneurs tended to have a more structured approach to organizing their businesses, which suggests a more disciplined perception of managing the firm. In summary, results showed the group of high-growth–oriented entrepreneurs, labeled “ambitious,” as having the following distinctions: strategic intentions that emphasize market growth and technological change, stronger commitment to the success of the business, greater willingness to sacrifice on behalf of the business, earlier planning for the growth of the business, utilization of a team-based form of organization design, concern for reputation and quality, adequate capitalization, strong leadership, and utilization of a wider range of financing sources for the expansion of the venture. The purpose in uncovering these differences is to enable entrepreneurs and researchers to identify more clearly the attributes of rapid-growth ventures and their founders and to move closer to a field-based model of the entrepreneurial growth process which will help delineate the alternative paths to venture growth and organizational change.     

Distinguishing Economically from Legally Formal Firms: Targeting Business Support to Entrepreneurs in South Africa’s Townships*

Although the government of South Africa (SA) has formally adopted a policy of proactive support of entrepreneurship, providing business assistance to all of its entrepreneurs is beyond SA’s financial and human resource capabilities. This study utilizes the results of an in‐depth survey of entrepreneurs in SA’s townships to find: (1) The business and owner traits that predict revenues and job creation among the township entrepreneurs, (2) The key issues that challenge township entrepreneurs; and (3) What the answers to these issues imply about the appropriate content and recipients of business assistance to township entrepreneurs. A distinction is helpful in framing this study’s approach. In SA, registered (licensed) businesses are legally formal firms. In contrast, economically formal firms have institutionalized processes that lead to success as a profit‐making firm. We use this distinction in our analysis of the data and framing of the implications for business assistance strategy in SA.     

Exploring start-up event sequences

This research analyzed new venture start-up activities undertaken by 71 nascent entrepreneurs. Nascent entrepreneurs are individuals who were identified as taking steps to found a new business but who had not yet succeeded in making the transition to new business ownership. Longitudinal data for the study comes from a secondary data analysis of two representative samples, one of 683 adult residents in Wisconsin (Reynolds and White 1993) and the other of 1016 adult residents of the United States (Curtin 1982). These surveys were conducted between 1992 and 1993, and the nascent entrepreneurs were reinterviewed six to 18 months after their initial interview.Three broad questions were addressed: (1) What activities do nascent entrepreneurs initiate in attempting to establish a new business? (2) How many activities do nascent entrepreneurs initiate during the gestation of the start-up? and (3) When are particular activities initiated or completed?Between the first and second interview, 48% of the nascent entrepreneurs reported they had set up a business in operation. Over 20% had given up and were no longer actively trying to establish a business. Almost a third of the respondents reported they were still trying to establish a firm.As a way to summarize the results and as a springboard toward some insights into the implications of this research for practice and future research, we developed the following activity profiles of the three types of nascent entrepreneurs studied. These profiles are offered as a combination of both fact and some intuition about the findings.STARTED A BUSINESS. Nascent entrepreneurs who were able to start a business were more aggressive in making their businesses real. They undertook activities that made their businesses tangible to others: they looked for facilities and equipment, sought and got financial support, formed a legal entity, organized a team, bought facilities and equipment, and devoted full time to the business. Individuals who started businesses seemed to act with a greater level of intensity. They undertook more activities than those individuals who did not start a business. The pattern of activities seem to indicate that individuals who started firms put themselves into the day-to-day process of running an ongoing business as quickly as they could and that these activities resulted in starting firms that generated sales (94% of the entrepreneurs) and positive cash flow (50% of the entrepreneurs). What is not known is how successful or profitable these new firms will be over time. For example, 50% of the firms that were started had not reached positive cash flow and these firms may have been started by individuals who were foolhardy and rushed into operation of a business that would not be sustainable.GAVE UP. The pattern of activities for the group of entrepreneurs who gave up seem to indicate that these entrepreneurs discovered that their initial idea for their businesses would not lead to success. The finding that the activity of developing a model or prototype differentiated individuals who gave up from those who were still trying would suggest that those who gave up had “tested” their ideas out and found that they would not work according to their expectations. Nascent entrepreneurs who gave up seemed to be similar in their activity patterns compared with those who started their firms, that is, individuals who gave up pursued the activities of creating a business in an aggressive manner at the beginning of the process. But as the business unfolded over time, these entrepreneurs decreased their activities and then ceased start-up activities. This group of individuals might be seen as either having the wisdom to test their ideas out before jumping into something that might lead to failure or lacking the flexibility to find more creative ways to solve the problems that they were confronted with.STILL TRYING. It would seem that those who are still trying are not putting enough effort into the start-up process in order to find out whether they should start the business or give up. Those still trying had undertaken fewer activities than individuals in the other two groups. The still trying entrepreneurs were devoting their short-term efforts toward activities internal to the start-up process (e.g., saving money and preparing a plan) and less effort toward activities that would make the business real to others. The still trying entrepreneurs may be all talk and little action. Or these still trying entrepreneurs might be involved in developing businesses that take longer for these particular opportunities to unfold. (It should be noted that there was no industry effect across the three groups.)Our advice to individuals considering business start-up is that the results seem to provide evidence that nascent entrepreneurs should aggressively pursue opportunities in the short-term, because they will quickly learn that these opportunities will either reveal themselves as worthy of start-up or as poor choices that should be abandoned. Individuals who do not devote the time and effort to undertaking the activities necessary for starting a business may find themselves perennially still trying, rather than succeeding or failing.What entrepreneurs do in their day-to-day activities matters. The kinds of activities that nascent entrepreneurs undertake, the number of activities, and the sequence of these activities have a significant influence on the ability of nascent entrepreneurs to successfully create new ventures. This study suggests that the behaviors of nascent entrepreneurs who have successfully started a new venture can be identified and differentiated from the behaviors of nascent entrepreneurs who failed. We believe that future studies will more precisely identify the kinds of behaviors appropriate for certain new venture conditions. If such contingency information can be generated, entrepreneurship research is likely to have significant benefits for entrepreneurship practice, education, and public policy.     

The role of entrepreneurial capital in building service reputation

This paper uses theories of capital to discuss the impact of non-financial capital on small service firm reputation and performance. As the success of service firms is predicated on the ability to develop relationships and build reputation with key stakeholders, theories of capital provide a relevant conceptual framework for exploring the use of non-financial capital in building such relationships. Drawing on findings from a qualitative study, this paper discusses the economic, human, social, and symbolic capital of a matched-pairs sample of male and female entrepreneurs in the business services sector. The results highlight a relationship between symbolic capital and service reputation. Specifically, the interplay between economic, human, and social capital generates the symbolic capital relevant for service reputation and firm performance.     

The Impact of Collaboration Between Industry and Academia on SME Growth

One important aspect in the small firm sector is the increased provision of training available to encourage small businesses to expand and develop their knowledge base. In the belief that new small firms can generate a number of new jobs at a time of high unemployment, the UK government in the early 1980s developed public policy to encourage small firm formation and growth. Measures have been enacted to assist small firms in the UK in areas of taxation, education, funding and placement schemes. (Cross 1983). Although Curran (1986) describes this as a 'heading plunge' into a policy of discrimination in favour of the small enterprise, and is critical of the effectiveness of many of these actions, the measures are a clear indication that public policy and funds are firmly committed to support the small firm sector (Marlow 1992). Since then local support agencies, such as The Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), and Local Enterprise Councils (LECs) in Scotland, funded by the Department of Trade and Industry and European Union offer professional consultancy advice and training to small firms and their owners. Such agencies offer help in the form of business start-up support and training, management skills and any aspect, which can aid growth in the small firm. However, the indications from the agency consultants have found that not enough owner/managers are utilising this enterprise network to assist business growth (Marlow 1992, Choueke and Armstrong 1998).     

A comparison of new firm financing by gender: evidence from the Kauffman Firm Survey data

This study uses data from the new Kauffman Firm Survey to explore gender differences in the use of start-up capital and subsequent financial injections by new firms. We find that, consistent with previous studies, women start their businesses with significantly lower levels of financial capital than men. A new finding from this research is that women go on to raise significantly lower amounts of incremental debt and equity in years two and three. These results hold even controlling for a variety of firm and owner characteristics, including the level of initial start-up capital and firm sales. Our findings also reveal that women rely heavily on personal rather than external sources of debt and equity for both start-up capital as well as follow-on investments. Our findings have implications for further research into gender differences in financing sources and strategies and business outcomes.     

The entrepreneur's mode of entry: Business takeover or new venture start?

We extend the well-known occupational choice model of entrepreneurship by analyzing the mode of entry. Individuals can become entrepreneurs by taking over established businesses or starting up new ventures from scratch. We argue that the new venture creation mode is associated with higher levels of schooling whereas managerial experience, new venture start-up capital requirements and industry level risk promote the takeover mode. A sample of data on entrepreneurs from The Netherlands provides broad support for these hypotheses, and also bears out a prediction that entrepreneurs whose parents run a family firm tend to invest the least in schooling. We go on to discuss the implications for researchers, entrepreneurs and public policy makers.     

Human capital signals and entrepreneurs’ success in equity crowdfunding

Grounding on research about the role of signals in the attraction of equity finance, this paper studies the effects of diverse human capital signals on entrepreneurs’ success in equity crowdfunding. We argue that the human capital of an entrepreneur, who launches (alone or with other teammates) an equity crowdfunding campaign to finance her start-up, constitutes a set of signals of the start-up quality. The impact of each human capital signal on entrepreneur’s success in equity crowdfunding depends on both signal fit with start-up quality and signal ambiguity. Empirical estimates on 284 entrepreneurs who launched equity crowdfunding campaigns indicate that only entrepreneurs’ business education and entrepreneurial experience, two human capital signals that have both a good fit with start-up quality and a low degree of ambiguity, significantly contribute to entrepreneurs’ success in equity crowdfunding.     

Making a little go further: Capital and the New Zealand entrepreneur

Using case analysis, this article examines the sources of start-up and development capital for 133 entrepreneurs who began commercial enterprises in New Zealand between 1880 and 1910. Though capital markets were immature, entrepreneurs overcame this limitation by employing capital economizing techniques to start firms, and then continued to exert managerial control by reinvesting profits rather than borrowing. The results of this investigation offer a comment on the prevailing firm structure in New Zealand, as well as providing a partial explanation for the capacity building noted by other economic historians during this recessionary period in New Zealand economic history.     

New business entrepreneurship in the Japanese economy

This article presents the results of a study focused on the role of new business entrepreneurship in the Japanese economy. Particular attention is paid to the activities of various government agencies in relation to new business entrepreneurship and to the barriers to this activity in Japan. New business entrepreneurship was defined as the formation and rapid growth of a business enterprise through unique approaches to the firm's activities.In contrast to the American stereotype of Japan as an economy of a few large, interconnected firms, it is, in fact, characterized by small- and medium-sized enterprises. Over 99% of all Japanese enterprises are categorized as small or medium and over 80% of all employed Japanese are employed by such firms. However, very few of these firms are entrepreneurial in nature. The vast majority are small firms that are either subcontractors to a single larger firm or small retail, wholesale, or restaurant establishments.The start-up rate for all types of businesses in Japan has been declining for the past 10 to 15 years. More importantly, the rate of start-up s for independent firms, as opposed to firms started by a larger firm to serve primarily as a subcontractor, declined even more sharply. This indicates a significant weakness in Japan's otherwise strong economy.The low and declining rate of new business entrepreneurship in Japan is a function of structural, governmental, and cultural barriers. Structural barriers include an acute, long-term labor shortage, high financial start-up costs due in large part to high land prices, and a shortage of venture capital funding. Government barriers include “red tape,” financial and other support for small firms that is withdrawn as they enter rapid growth, and the persistent protection of inefficient industry structures. Cultural barriers involve Japan's strong group/collective orientation, the traditional career path in Japan, bounds on creativity, and the fact that entrepreneurship is not assigned a high social value.While the government provides an extensive, well-developed network of services for small- and medium-sized firms, these programs are not designed to facilitate rapid growth into the large firm phase. The Japanese experiences and programs offer useful insights for policy and tactics by other governments.     

Does easy start-up formation hamper incumbents’ R&D investment?

This paper investigates the implications that complementary assets needed for the formation of start-ups have on the innovative efforts of incumbent firms. In particular, we highlight a strategic incentive effect by which the innovative efforts of incumbents are decreasing in the availability of the complementary assets needed for the creation of a start-up. Furthermore, we argue that the R&D investments of incumbents are positively related to the presence of policy support to innovation, and to the firm’s endowment of human capital. The empirical relevance of our theoretical hypotheses is investigated—and supported—by using firm level data.     

A theory of serial entrepreneurship

The contribution of serial entrepreneurs to entrepreneurial activity is significant: in Europe, 18–30% of entrepreneurs are serial; in the US, their contribution is about one-eighth. Yet, theories of entrepreneurship and industry dynamics presume that all firms are launched by novice entrepreneurs and firm failure is synonymous with exit from entrepreneurship. We propose a theory of serial entrepreneurship in which an entrepreneur has three occupational choices: maintain his business in operation, shut it down to enter the labor market to earn an exogenous wage, or shut it down to launch a new venture while incurring a serial startup cost. In equilibrium, a high-skill entrepreneur shuts down a business of low quality to become a serial entrepreneur, launching and subsequently closing firms until a high quality business is found; a low-skill entrepreneur shuts down a business of low quality to enter the labor market, never to become a serial entrepreneur. A decrease in the wage or serial startup cost, or an increase in the startup capital, enhances the contribution of serial entrepreneurs to entrepreneurial activity and promotes new firm formation (by increasing entrepreneurship and the number of new firms that survive), but its effect on the exit rate of new firms is ambiguous. We show the model is consistent with evidence relating to the impact of an entrepreneur’s characteristics and prior experience in entrepreneurship on the survival of his firm and his entry into and survival in entrepreneurship.     

The role of incubator organizations in the founding of growth-oriented firms

The role of incubator organizations, those organizations where entrepreneur work before starting their own firms, is examined. Using a sample of 161 new, growth-oriented firms, the relationships of the new companies to their incubator organizations are considered, as well as the characteristics of the incubator organizations. 5The findings have implications for prospective entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs in most industry categories do not change geographic location and, in most technical industries, usually start businesses related to what they did before. An individual's decision to join a particular organization results in a particular geographic location and in knowledge about a particular industry. The would-be founder located in an unpromising geographic area and getting experience in an industry offering few opportunities for company start-ups is unlikely to be able to start a growth-oriented technical firm, regardless of personal motivation. However, the prospective founder of a nontechnical firm appears to be less tied to the experience gained in an incubator organization.There are also implications for regional economic development. Because technically oriented start-ups are tied closely to the business of their incubator organizations and because most entrepreneurs don't move when starting, the possibilities for high-technology start-ups may be very limited in many geographic regions. There have been no studies, to date, on why some founders move when starting. Programs to attract entrepreneurs at the time of start-up may have promise, but, at least to date, there is not much evidence of entrepreneurs being mobile at this stage of their careers.Local and regional programs to attract branch facilities of larger corportions have a long history. The emphasis is usually upon attracting facilities that will offer the maximum number of blue-collar jobs. In contrast to this traditional approach, it might be beneficial to shift the emphasis to those facilities most likely to function as incubators. The greatest benefits might come from laboratories or divisions that would “seed” a region with people learning about promising technologies or industries.The role of universities in this process appears to be less direct than is often assumed. Based upon our sample, it appears that software and biotechnology/medical firms often have spun-off from universities or hospitals. However, in other industry categories, it is business firms that have primarily served as incubators. There are currently many experiments underway to create university-affiliated innovation centers or incubator centers intended to help aspiring entrepreneurs. Whether these will enable universities to function more effectively as incubators, spinning off students and faculty who start growth-oriented firms, remains to be seen.     

Human capital and structural upheaval: A study of manufacturing firms in the west bank

Firms in various worldwide locations are repeatedly subjected to radical political, economic, and social upheavals, including changes in administrative governance, new economic paradigms, natural disasters, and warfare. Perhaps because of the difficulty of conducting research in these environments, little is known regarding the unique requirements of entrepreneurs and their business organizations in such troubled locations. Reliable research and information is necessary in order to design and assess methods of providing institutional support both during, and after, such turmoil.Based on data collected from field interviews over a six-month period, this article examines the characteristics of the owners of 64 small manufacturing businesses that have undergone or were experiencing radical political and economic upheaval in the West Bank town of Ramallah in the Palestinian Territories. The objective of the study is to examine characteristics that influence and assist an entrepreneur's resource allocation decision-making processes. This was done by comparatively assessing the effects on profitability of both firm and individual assets in a highly constrained rapidly changing environment. Understanding this allocation process will lead to more effective targeted assistance in regions experiencing or exiting environmental transitions and upheavals.Human capital theory is utilized in this study as a framework for understanding the comparative response of owners to reallocate resources under the stressful environment of the pre- and post-intifada West Bank territories. While human capital has been well studied in literature examining resource allocation in “typical” competitive environments, our understanding of the influence of human capital in transitional environments is quite limited.This study provides some useful, and perhaps surprising results, from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Owner's human capital (coded from formal education) was found to impact profitability only with the micro firms studied (those with three or fewer employees), however, it is possible that this finding reflects dilution of human capital in comparatively larger small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). One interesting departure from similar studies is that experience was not found to affect the profitability of the firm. Plant capital, on the other hand, was found to be associated with the profitability of only larger SMEs, controlling for business age and experience of the owner. This finding is significant because, presently, institutions such as the World Bank, NGOs and national development agencies focus their efforts primarily on providing credit to small businesses, whereas training and education currently are somewhat out of favor.A model is proposed in this study comparing resource requirements according to both the size and the productivity/technological level of the firm. The object is to explain the reduced importance of human capital and experience in environments of radical transition, specifically the arbitrary nature and lack of predictability of transitional governance, and the increased importance of financial capital only with large SMEs. It is argued that skills acquired in functional expertise do not necessarily prepare an entrepreneur for the abrupt environmental transformations characteristic of tumultuous political events. This research suggests that owners are in a better position to maximize their cognitive skills in decision making within smaller organizations. However, these skills are naturally diffused and so less effective at influencing the outcomes of somewhat larger organizations. Larger SMEs are necessarily more capital intensive and more bureaucratic, and so the cumulative human capital at the organizational level may be more important to allocative efficiency than the human capital of the individual firm owner. Further, larger SMEs require organizational expertise that may not be captured in the individual level characteristics of entrepreneurs.This research suggests that efforts to support such environments should carefully consider the size of the firms in question before designing and implementing programs of assistance, differentiating microenterprises from small businesses. In particular, the findings of this study suggest that smaller firms experiencing rapid environmental upheaval will benefit most from formal education, training and advice. Larger firms, in contrast, appear to benefit most from loans providing traditional capital support, and from advice across the entire firm's human capital base, particularly regarding organizational management and delegation skills.     

Women Entrepreneurs and Family Firm Heterogeneity: Evidence from an Emerging Economy

Family firms add to the economic and social well-being of countries. While research on heterogeneity of family firms is gaining momentum, it has mostly been gender-neutral. The study fills this gap by examining heterogeneity of family firms owned and managed by women, in the context of a developing country—Brazil. The study draws upon the resource-based view of the firm to investigate the relationships between firm performance, family involvement, and financial resources at the start-up phase. An inductive analysis reveals two patterns. First, family firms that are started with the family achieve better performance than firms that are launched without the family and later evolve into a family business. Second, family firms that are funded with women entrepreneur’s own savings achieve worse performance than family firms that are started with borrowed funds. The results are useful for strategic decision making in fostering family businesses headed by women and proactive public policies for future innovation to enhance the success of women entrepreneurs.     

Under what institutional conditions does overseas business knowledge contribute to firm performance?

We examine the extent to which the impact of the overseas business knowledge transferred by returnee entrepreneurs on firm performance is conditional on institutional factors. The findings show that informal institutional differences between the home and host countries strengthen the positive impact of overseas business knowledge on the performance of returnee-founded firms. There is a complementarity between informal institutional differences and local government policy support which jointly enhance the positive impact of overseas business knowledge. However, a well-developed local business infrastructure substitutes for the impact of informal institutional differences on the relationship between overseas business knowledge and returnee venture performance.     

The Choice between Bank Debt and Trace Credit in Business Start-ups

This paper investigates the choice between bank debt and trade credit in business start-ups. While trade credit is more expensive than bank debt, suppliers tend to follow a more lenient liquidation policy when client firms encounter financial distress. As a result, suppliers are more willing to renegotiate the outstanding debt or grant additional debt whereas banks are more likely to liquidate borrowers upon default. Given the risky nature of business start-ups, we argue that the entrepreneur’s choice of debt instruments reflects these differences in liquidation policy between lenders and is thus determined by the venture’s failure risk, the entrepreneur’s private control benefits that are lost upon liquidation and the liquidation value of firm assets. Using unique data on 325 first-time business start-ups, we find that firms in industries with high historical start-up failure rates and entrepreneurs who tend to highly value private benefits of control use less bank debt. These effects are especially prevalent in start-ups where assets have a high liquidation value and thus banks are more likely to liquidate the venture following default. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Networks and Local Environmental Characteristics in the Survival of New Firms

This study seeks firstly to clarify which networks at start-up situation and early in life influence the survival of new firms. Secondly the study examines regional differences in the success of new firms. The subjects were firms which had closed down during their fourth to sixth year of operations, and they were compared with firms continuing in business. The results indicate, firstly, that it is networks internal to firm that create competitive advantage, innovation and efficiency. Secondly, management based on working in groups was emphasized in the firms that continued in business. In a typical family enterprise, ownership, management and family are united in a single entity. In other types of firms networks are seen as participating in the strategic management of the firm. Thirdly, close-downs were often caused by uncontrolled risks. A firm which fails after a successful start-up often tends to grow rapidly in the beginning, leaning on its product idea, but this rate of growth is too high from the viewpoint of the financing and the management of the firm. In firms which closed the growth objectives were too ambitions compared with the resources of the entrepreneur.     

Networks,Entrepreneurial Orientation,and Internationalization Scope: Evidence from Chilean Small and Medium Enterprises

During the last 20 years, the literature on internationalized small firms discussed at length the speed of internationalization, illustrating the importance of born globals. The geographic scope of small firm internationalization and its implications for international business and entrepreneurship theories has however been overlooked, especially with regard to firms based in Latin America. This study expands the research agenda on the effects of networks and entrepreneurship orientation for the internationalization strategy of small firms by examining their effects on internationalization scope. It uses survey data from small firms based in Chile. The findings suggest that the greater the number of networks utilized, the more entrepreneurs are likely to target markets based in diverse regions of the world. The study has managerial and policy implications, suggesting that nurturing diverse international networks can help entrepreneurs reach a broader number of markets.     

A Case Study on the Dual Effect of External Support and Implications on Small Business Growth,Entrepreneurial Creativity and Performance

ABSTRACT

Using a case study approach, this article investigates a Small Plastic Manufacturing Firm (SPMF) and Entrepreneur in Nigeria. The firm represents an example of a firm that has received external support. Very few firms are able to acquire adequate SME grants in Nigeria. Findings from the study revealed that most Small Plastic Manufacturing Entrepreneurs in Nigeria constrained by certain external and internal factors ironically, seem to be challenged to invent original strategies on their own, to cope, survive and to remain in business. Lack of financial capital, especially foreign exchange needed to import vital operating inputs from abroad has been the most serious constraint. Other serious external constraints identified are inadequate infrastructure facilities, competition from large firms, unfavorable government policies, dearth of machines and spare parts and paucity of raw materials. Internal obstacles like incompetent planning, poor organizational skills, and limited knowledge, among others, are common obstacles faced by most Nigerian entrepreneurs. It is also discovered that, in Nigeria, funding assis tance to entrepreneurs by relevant institutions concerned are not based on merit but rather biased on the basis of favoritism.