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1.
Effective Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System with a Self-Reporting Requirement 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
We propose an enforcement strategy to achieve complete compliance in a transferable emissions permit system when firms are required to provide reports of their own emissions. Like the literature on self-reporting in the enforcement of standards, we find that self-reporting can conserve monitoring costs, but for a different reason. In addition, we show that targeted monitoring—the practice of monitoring some firms more closely than others—is not necessary in a competitive permit system. Furthermore, tying penalties to the equilibrium permit price can stabilize the monitoring effort necessary to maintain full compliance in the face of permit price fluctuations. 相似文献
2.
Odd Godal Yuri Ermoliev Ger Klaassen Michael Obersteiner 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2003,25(2):151-169
The Kyoto Protocol foresees emission trading but does not yet specify verification of (uncertain) emissions. This paper analyses a setting in which parties can meet their emission targets by reducing emissions, by investing in monitoring (reducing uncertainty of emissions) or by (bilaterally) trading permits. We derive the optimality conditions and carry out various numerical simulations. Our applications suggest that including uncertainty could increase compliance costs for the USA, Japan and the European Union. Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union might be able to gain from trading due to higher permit prices. Emissions trading could also lower aggregate uncertainty on emissions. 相似文献
3.
John K. Stranlund 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2007,38(1):99-117
This paper addresses the following question: To achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost-effectively, should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full compliance, or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target? The total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs, monitoring costs, and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Under common assumptions, I show that allowing noncompliance is cost-effective only if violations are enforced with an increasing marginal penalty. However, one can design a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty that meets the aggregate emissions target with lower expected costs. This last result does not depend on setting an arbitrarily high constant marginal penalty. In fact, the marginal penalty need not be higher than the equilibrium marginal penalty under the policy with the increasing marginal penalty, and can actually be lower. Finally, tying the marginal penalty directly to the permit price allows the policy objective to be achieved without any knowledge of firms’ abatement costs. 相似文献
4.
Carmen Arguedas Eva Camacho José Luis Zofío 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2010,47(2):261-274
We study the incentives to adopt advanced abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance. Interestingly, incentives under emission taxes and pollution abatement subsidies are the same that in the perfect compliance scenario. However, under emission standards imperfect compliance can increase firms’ incentives to invest, whereas under an emission permit mechanism investment incentives decrease only if widespread non-compliance induces a reduction in the permit price. Our results are valid for fairly general characteristics of the monitoring and enforcement strategies commonly found in both, theoretical and empirical applications. 相似文献
5.
This paper examines the investment strategies of compliance companies in irreversible abatement technologies and the environmental achievements of the system in an inter-temporal cap-and-trade market using laboratory experiments. The experimental analysis is performed under varying market structures: firstly, in a market that is exclusive to compliance companies and subsequently, in a market that is open to both compliance and non-compliance entities. In line with theoretical models on irreversible abatement investment, the paper shows that regulated companies trade permits at a premium. Also, steep per unit penalties for excess emissions prompt early investments in irreversible abatement technologies. Further, the paper shows that by contributing to the permit demand and supply, non-compliance companies (i) enhance the exchange of permits, helping the system to achieve a zero-excess permit position, (ii) increase the price levels, but has no apparent effect on price variability. 相似文献
6.
Pooling of Uncertainty: Enforcing Tradable Permits Regulation when Emissions are Stochastic 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
An under-appreciated advantage of tradable permits regulation is its ability to create better decision-making when emissions are stochastic. In general, the distribution of stochastic actual emissions around intended emissions results in over- or under-compliance. Permit tradability reduces the extent to which actual aggregate emissions deviate from regulatory targets, by giving firms an additional mechanism for responding to uncertainty. We construct a two period model of permit regulation with ex post enforcement to demonstrate how the permit market distributes uncertainty, and to illustrate the importance of expectations toward permit market outcomes. 相似文献
7.
We study the cost-effectiveness of inducing compliance in a program that caps aggregate emissions of a given pollutant from
a set of heterogeneous firms based on emissions standards and the relative cost-effectiveness of such a program with respect
to an optimally designed program based on tradable discharge permits. Our analysis considers abatement, monitoring and sanctioning
costs, as well as perfect and imperfect information on the part of the regulator with regard to the polluters’ abatement costs.
Under perfect information we find that (a) the total-cost-effective design of a program based on standards is one in which
the standards are firm specific and perfectly enforced, and (b) the total cost of an optimally designed program based on standards
is lower than the total cost of an optimally designed transferable emission permits system, except under special conditions.
This is true when it is optimum to induce perfect compliance and when it is not. Under imperfect information, nevertheless,
it is only by implementing a system of tradable permits and perfectly enforcing it with a constant marginal penalty tied to
the price of the permits, that the regulator can surmount the informational problem and at the same time minimize the total
cost of the program with certainty. 相似文献
8.
Enforcement can affect compliance directly and indirectly, through spillovers. We study intertemporal enforcement spillovers by conducting a randomized field experiment in a university exam. The initial phase of the experiment is the exam itself. We induce variation in enforcement by randomly assigning students to rooms with different monitoring levels. The second phase is post-exam. In this phase, all students are subject to the same low level of monitoring. Our outcome variable is the probability that students steal a pen in the post-exam phase. We find that enforcement in the exam phase has a strong intertemporal spillover on compliance in the post-exam phase: students subject to a high monitoring level in the initial phase are about 33% less likely to steal the pen than students subject to low initial monitoring. 相似文献
9.
On the interaction between imperfect compliance and technology adoption: taxes versus tradable emissions permits 总被引:3,自引:1,他引:2
This paper analyzes the effects of the interaction between technology adoption and incomplete enforcement on the extent of
violations and the rate of abatement technology adoption. We focus on price-based and quantity-based emission regulations.
First, we show that in contrast to uniform taxes, under tradable emissions permits (TEPs), the fall in permit price produced
by technology adoption reduces the benefits of violating the environmental regulation at the margin and leads firms to modify
their compliance behavior. Moreover, when TEPs are used, the deterrent effect of the monitoring effort is reinforced by the
effect that technology adoption has on the extent of violations. Second, we show that the regulator may speed up the diffusion
of new technologies by increasing the stringency of the enforcement strategy in the case of TEPs while in the case of uniform
taxes, the rate of adoption does not depend on the enforcement parameters. 相似文献
10.
Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms’ pollution levels and this information may allow agencies to differentiate their monitoring strategies in the future. If a firm is less successful than its peers in reducing emissions, it faces the risk of being targeted for increased inspections in the next period. This risk of stricter monitoring might induce high-abatement cost firms to mimic low-abatement cost firms by choosing lower emission levels, while the latter might try to avoid being mimicked. We explain firms’ compliance decisions and the inspection agency's monitoring strategy by means of a signaling game which incorporates dynamic enforcement and learning. Interestingly, we show that the ongoing signaling game between firm types might lead to firms over-complying with the emission standard. 相似文献
11.
Christian Langpap 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2008,40(4):489-506
Self-reporting of compliance status has become a common feature in the enforcement of environmental regulation. In this paper,
I generalize existing models of enforcement with self-reporting to include the possibility of private enforcement of regulation
through citizen suits. This allows me to identify an additional argument for the efficiency of self-reporting: it can increase
the likelihood of a successful suit and thus facilitate private enforcement of regulation. Specifically, if self-reporting
sufficiently increases the expected penalty for losing a citizen suit, if the costs of private enforcement are low, and if
inspection costs are high enough relative to enforcement costs, self-reporting lowers expected regulatory and social costs
by allowing the regulator to rely on private enforcement and decrease his enforcement efforts.
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12.
David F. Perkis Timothy N. Cason Wallace E. Tyner 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2016,63(4):703-718
Tradable emissions permits have been implemented to control pollution levels in various markets and represent a major component of legislative efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions. Because permits are supplied for a fixed level of pollution, allowing the market for permits to determine the price, price control mechanisms may be needed to protect firms from price spikes caused by fluctuations in the demand for permits. We test permit markets in an experimental laboratory setting to determine the effectiveness of several price control mechanisms, with special attention on the soft price ceiling. We focus on a static setting similar to some of the earliest experimental work focused on price ceilings. Results indicate that both permit supply adjustments and price ceilings (hard ceilings) effectively limit elevated prices in this setting. By contrast, reserve auctions to implement soft ceilings do not consistently control prices, especially when a minimum reserve permit price is applied. Furthermore, the grandfathering of permits allows permit sellers to realize significant welfare gains at the expense of buyers under a soft ceiling policy. Our results thus highlight several advantages of hard ceilings for controlling short term price increases. 相似文献
13.
Permit Trading and Credit Trading: A Comparison of Cap-Based and Rate-Based Emissions Trading Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions (permit trading) and on relative standards per unit
of output (credit trading). Two types of market structure are considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. We find
that output, abatement costs and the number of firms are higher under credit trading. Allowing trade between permit-trading
and credit-trading sectors may increase welfare. With perfect competition, permit trading always leads to higher welfare than
credit trading. With imperfect competition, credit trading may outperform permit trading. Environmental policy can lead to
exit, but also to entry of firms. Entry and exit have a profound impact on the performance of the schemes, especially under
imperfect competition. We find that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry emissions. Under credit
trading several levels of the relative standard can achieve the same total level of emissions. 相似文献
14.
This paper tests the convergence in per-capita carbon dioxide emissions for a collection of developed and developing countries
using data spanning the period 1870–2002. For this purpose, three recently developed panel unit root tests that permit for
dependence among the individual countries are employed. The results lend strong support in favor of convergence for the panel
as a whole. Estimates of the speed of this convergence is also provided.
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15.
Project-based emissions trading schemes, like the Clean Development Mechanism, are particularly prone to problems of asymmetric information between project parties and the regulator. In this paper, we extend the general framework on incomplete enforcement of policy instruments to reflect the particularities of credit-based mechanisms. The main focus of the analysis is to determine the regulator??s optimal spot-check frequency given plausible assumptions of incomplete enforcement under asymmetric information on reduction costs and heterogeneous verifiability of projects. We find that, depending on the actual abatement cost and penalty schemes, optimal monitoring for credit-based systems is often discontinuous and significantly differs from the one to be applied for cap-and-trade schemes or environmental taxes. We conclude that, in a real-world context, project admission should ultimately be based on the criterion of verifiability. 相似文献
16.
We analyze the role of targeted enforcement of emissions taxes when the regulator wants to minimize aggregate emissions via the adoption of new more environmentally friendly technology. The regulator wants to speed up the path of technology adoption generated by a policy of uniform enforcement (that monitors adopters and nonadopters with the same probability) by engaging in a regulatory deal where a reduced monitoring probability is granted in “exchange” for adoption of the new technology. We set up a theoretical model, characterize the circumstances in which such dealing minimizes aggregate emissions, and test our hypothesis using economic laboratory experiments. Our analytical and experimental results suggest that even though such a deal might imply an increased level of violation by adopters, such tolerance is rather an integral part of an overall enforcement strategy that minimizes aggregate emissions when the rate of adoption is endogenous. (JEL L51, Q53, Q55, Q58) 相似文献
17.
从企业的目标函数和生产函数两个角度出发,分析了排污权交易政策对企业环保行为的影响机理,并讨论了排污权交易政策下企业的环保行为选择。研究发现:排污权交易政策通过影响企业的资本要素分配,从而影响企业环境资源的使用成本,进而影响企业的生产和环保行为决策;在排污权交易政策的作用下,企业主要采取不同的污染治理投资策略来满足该政策的规制。基于此,政府应制定配套政策和措施,引导企业沿着“政策遵从—环保投资策略—新环保技术采纳”的行为选择路径进行行为决策,以实现排污权交易政策的目标。 相似文献
18.
This paper presents a model of environmental regulations with firms that are heterogeneous with respect to the cost for reducing emissions to the legally permitted level. Given that the enforcement capacity is limited due to budgetary constraints and that each firm's inspection probability depends on its emissions relative to other firms’ emissions, the likelihood of being punished for violations is endogenously determined and multiple equilibria may therefore arise. Hence, both good outcomes with high compliance rates and bad outcomes with many violations are possible. Multiple equilibria are most likely to emerge at intermediate levels of deterrence and at low permitted emission levels. However, it is generally not straightforward how stricter legislation impacts on equilibrium outcomes, indicating that behavioral expectations among regulated firms are an important factor to consider when adapting enforcement to changes in the law. 相似文献
19.
Runar Brännlund Yangho Chung Rolf Färe Shawna Grosskopf 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1998,12(3):345-356
The purpose of this paper is to develop models with and without potential emissions trading and to compare industry profits under the two regimes. The model in which emissions trading is permitted is a nonparametric industry frontier model in the spirit of Färe et al. (1992). It is relative to this model that industry profit is computed. This profit is compared to the profit without emissions trading to give an estimate of the potential gains that can be realised by allowing for emissions trading. The model, which is applied to data for the Swedish pulp and paper industry, suggests that this industry would have had up to 6% (1%) higher profits in 1989 (1990) if emissions trading had been used instead of individual permits to achieve the same total emissions target. Currently there is no permit trading in this industry so our results only model the potential gains that can be made. 相似文献
20.
We empirically estimate a penalty function for water quality violations of private firms in Georgia. We find that seriousness of infraction and historical compliance records strongly influence penalty levels, while the intentionality of violations and the method of discovery do not. The size of the polluting company is also an important determinant of financial penalties. Overall the results support the plausibility of modeling assumptions used in much the theoretical enforcement literature but indicate the need for caution in interpreting models that assume penalty amounts are invariant to violation characteristics. 相似文献