Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking?

We examine whether executive stock options can induce excessive risk taking by managers in firms’ security issue decisions. We find that CEOs whose wealth is more sensitive to stock return volatility due to their option holdings are more likely to choose debt over equity as a capital-raising vehicle. More importantly, the pattern holds not only in firms that are underlevered relative to their optimal capital structure but also in overlevered firms. This evidence is inconsistent with executive stock options aligning the interests of managers and shareholders; rather, it supports the hypothesis that stock options sometimes make managers take on too much risk and in the process pursue suboptimal capital structure policies.     

The Hybrid Option: A New Approach to Equity Compensation

Equity compensation can provide part of the expected reward needed to attract and retain talent while strengthening the unity of interest between management and its shareholders. But more can be done. Until now, managers and boards have used standard equity instruments such as restricted common stock and at-the-money stock options. Boards typically place various restrictions on these instruments to improve retention or alignment, or mix and match them according to taste or fashion. But each of these standard instruments has well-understood limitations. For example, employee stock options that are granted at the money are worth considerably less, on the day of the grant, to the managers that receive them than to the shareholders of the companies that give them. And the values of both options and restricted stock depend heavily on variables, like the general state of the economy, that have little or nothing to do with managerial performance.
An instrument designed specifically for executive compensation can overcome these limitations. More specifically, the author proposes the use of options that are both in-the-money —to limit their value-to-cost discount—and indexed to industry- and market-wide variables—to tie rewards more directly to firm-specific performance. Properly designed, such a hybrid instrument could meet all the equity-based compensation objectives for a given company, greatly simplifying its compensation plans, while improving the balance among the compensation governance criteria of retention, alignment, and cost control.     

Optimal strike prices of stock options for effort-averse executives

This paper evaluates the common practice of setting the strike prices of executive option plans at-the-money. Hall and Murphy [Hall, Brian, Murphy, Kevin J., 2000. Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options. American Economic Review 90 (2), 209–214] claim this practice to be optimal since it maximizes the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance. However, they do not incorporate effort and the possibility that managers are effort-averse into their model. We revisit this question while explicitly introducing these factors and allowing the reward package to include fixed wages, options, and stock grants. We simulate the manager’s effort choice and compensation as well as the value of shareholders’ equity under alternative compensation schemes, and identify schemes that are optimal. Our simulations indicate that, when abstracting from tax considerations, it is optimal to award managers with options that will most likely be highly valuable (i.e., substantially in-the-money) on their expiration date. Prior to 2006, the tax code and financial reporting standards provided incentives to award options that are closer to the money when issued than the options that were optimal in the absence of these considerations. Recent tax and reporting changes voided these incentives and thus we predict that these changes will induce firms to issue options with lower strike prices than those that were issued prior to 2006.     

Letting Go of Norm: How Executive Compensation Can Do Better Than "Best Practices"

With executive pay under the media spotlight, the corporate search for “best practices” is in reality a drive toward common practices as cautious boards gravitate toward a safe norm. But are current trends in compensation structure as good for shareholders as they are for the consultants who implement them? This article explores some of these trends and derives some conclusions about their role in shareholder value creation based on detailed data on executive plans and stock price performance for the S&P 500. One key finding is that rewarding managers for profit growth produces higher stock price returns than rewards based on multiple measures or balanced scorecards. Also, the popular practice of adding long‐term incentive plans to the compensation mix does not appear to improve long‐term performance. Finally, the granting of equity based on the past year's performance rather than in annual fixed‐value amounts appears to be good for shareholders because of additional incentives created by performance‐based grants as well as the elimination of the perverse incentive of rewarding poor stock price performance with more shares.     

Stock repurchasing and corporate social responsibility

Stock repurchases are controversial. Researchers often view the positive association between free cash flow and the volume of the stock repurchases to be in the shareholders’ interest and the positive association between executive options and stock repurchases to be in the managers’ interest. Using firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings as a measure of ethical culture—one that increases the cost of self-serving behavior for managers— we examine whether a firm’s CSR rating is related to its stock repurchase decisions. Although the baseline regression shows a positive association between CSR and repurchases, we find that CSR amplifies the positive association between free cash flow and stock repurchases and lessens the positive association between executive options and stock repurchases. These results indicate that ethical culture might play a role in repurchase decisions: it may encourage repurchases aligned with shareholders’ interests and discourage those primarily in managers’ interest. Furthermore, we also find that high CSR firms are associated with a greater completion rate of announced repurchase programs and receive more favorable stock market reaction to their repurchase announcements.     

SIX CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING EQUITY-BASED PAY

The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the equitybased pay of U.S. corporate executives, an increase that has been driven almost entirely by the explosion of stock option grants. When properly designed, equity‐based pay can raise corporate productivity and shareholder value by helping companies attract, motivate, and retain talented managers. But there are good reasons to question whether the current forms of U.S. equity pay are optimal. In many cases, substantial stock and option payoffs to top executives–particularly those who cashed out much of their holdings near the top of the market–appear to have come at the expense of their shareholders, generating considerable skepticism about not just executive pay practices, but the overall quality of U.S. corporate governance. At the same time, many companies that have experienced sharp stock price declines are now struggling with the problem of retaining employees holding lots of deep‐underwater options. This article discusses the design of equity‐based pay plans that aim to motivate sustainable, or long‐run, value creation. As a first step, the author recommends the use of longer vesting periods and other requirements on executive stock and option holdings, both to limit managers' ability to “time” the market and to reduce their incentives to take shortsighted actions that increase near‐term earnings at the expense of longer‐term cash flow. Besides requiring “more permanent” holdings, the author also proposes a change in how stock options are issued. In place of popular “fixed value” plans that adjust the number of options awarded each year to reflect changes in the share price (and that effectively reward management for poor performance by granting more options when the price falls, and fewer when it rises), the author recommends the use of “fixed number” plans that avoid this unintended distortion of incentives. As the author also notes, there is considerable confusion about the real economic cost of options relative to stock. Part of the confusion stems, of course, from current GAAP accounting, which allows companies to report the issuance of at‐the‐money options as costless and so creates a bias against stock and other forms of compensation. But, coming on top of the “opportunity cost” of executive stock options to the company's shareholders, there is another, potentially significant cost of options (and, to a lesser extent, stock) that arises from the propensity of executives and employees to place a lower value on company stock and options than well‐diversified outside investors. The author's conclusion is that grants of (slow‐vesting) stock are likely to have at least three significant advantages over employee stock options:

• ? they are more highly valued by executives and employees (per dollar of cost to shareholders);
• ? they continue to provide reasonably strong ownership incentives and retention power, regardless of whether the stock price rises or falls, because they don't go underwater; and
• ? the value of such grants is much more transparent to stockholders, employees, and the press.

     

Executive stock-based compensation and firms’ cash payout: the role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences

We hypothesize that the structure of executive stock-based compensation helps to align managers’ payout choices with shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences. Specifically, stock options, which are not dividend-protected, can deter self-interested executives from using dividends as a form of payout. In contrast, restricted stock, which is dividend-protected, is more likely to induce the use of dividends. Relatedly, shareholders’ preferences for dividends, which are taxed as ordinary income, can depend on the income tax consequences of dividends relative to those of long-term capital gains. To test our hypothesis, we investigate whether the exogenous changes in shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences following the 2003 dividend tax rate reduction result in predictable shifts in executive stock-based compensation and in managers’ payout choices. Consistent with our prediction, we find a positive relation between the increased use of dividends in firms’ payouts and the increased (decreased) use of restricted stock (stock options) in executive compensation, particularly for firms with a greater percentage ownership by individual investors and with lower costs associated with modifying the structure of their compensation plans. Our investigation of the role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences in the design of executive stock-based compensation extends the prior literature that has largely focused on the role of incentive contracts in inducing managerial effort, risk taking, and retention.     

The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders

Executive stock option plans have asymmetric payoffs that could induce managers to take on more risk. Evidence from traded call options and stock return data supports this notion. Implicit share price variance, computed from the Black-Scholes option pricing model, and stock return variance increase after the approval of an executive stock option plan. The event is accompanied by a significant positive stock and a negative bond market reaction. This evidence is consistent with the notion that executive stock options may induce a wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders.     

Management compensation contracts and distribution policies in the US technology sector

This paper examines the impact of executive compensation practices on (a) the decision to distribute and (b) the distribution channel employed by companies from the US technology sector. We report that firms that compensate their managers using executive stock options (ESOs) tend to distribute less and firms that use stock awards make more distributions. When we simultaneously examine the distribution and the channel used, we find firms using ESOs restrict their dividend payments but their propensity for stock repurchases is unaffected. Firms using stock awards to compensate managers make greater distributions across all channels. We also provide strong evidence in favour of the agency and leverage explanations for distributions.     

Executive Stock Options

Abstract

As a part of the compensation package many companies provide executives with executive stock options, which are call options with additional restrictions. They provide some financial advantages to the executives and help the company retain the service of the executives who improve the company’s earnings and management.

Until recently the values of the executive stock options were not required to be disclosed in the company?s financial reports. But recent statements from the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have made it necessary to value these executive stock options. The valuation of executive stock options is also required for investors and financial practitioners. This paper considers the award of performance-based executive stock options when the stock price at the time of stock option award exceeds a given preassigned value. It is assumed that the stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion, and that the number of stock options awarded at any time depends on the stock price at that time.

A valuation formula is derived using the method of Esscher transforms for a multiyear award plan. The closed-form formula derived is similar to the Black-Scholes formula for options and utilizes the standard bivariate normal distribution function, which is available in statistical software. In this paper the number of stock options awarded is assumed to be in a specific form, but the theory presented can be modified to suit other forms of award structure. Moreover, by suitable choice of parameters, a valuation formula is also presented for the award of fixed-value executive stock options grants; this formula is also in a closed form and involves cumulative distribution values of the standard normal random variable. Numerical illustrations of the use of the valuation formulas are presented.     

Top Management Incentives and Corporate Performance

There is little agreement about either the effect of executive compensation on corporate performance or the best way to measure the strength of executive incentives. With little guidance from academic research, managers and directors continue to rely heavily on the percentage of pay "at risk" as a proxy for incentive strength.
Starting with the premise that managers, like investors, are motivated by prospective changes in their wealth, this article presents a measure of incentive strength called "wealth leverage" that reflects the sensitivity of an executive's company-related wealth—total stock and option holdings plus the present value of expected future compensation, including future salary, bonus and stock compensation—to changes in shareholder wealth. After estimating top management's wealth leverage at 702 companies, the authors conclude that: 1) the median company has significant wealth leverage; 2) almost all corporate wealth leverage comes from their accumulated stock and option holdings, not from current compensation; and 3) companies with higher wealth leverage significantly outperform their industry competitors.     

EVA IN THE E&P INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF NUEVO ENERGY

This article presents a case study illustrating some aspects of the new business model discussed in the roundtable above. Continuing a major theme in the roundtable, the authors begin by arguing that the long‐run failure of the E&P industry to create shareholder wealth stems to a large degree from weak or distorted incentives held out to the top executives and managers of most large, publicly traded companies. This article traces the incentive problem to the lack of an effective wealth creation metric to guide the financial management process. Although the industry employs a variety of accounting‐based performance measures, none is a reliable measure of wealth creation. In place of traditional financial metrics such as earnings, annual cash flow, and return on capital, this article recommends a performance evaluation and incentive compensation system that is tied to the use of a “reserve‐adjusted” EVA measure—one that exhibits a strong statistical correlation with changes in shareholder wealth in the E&P business. The greater explanatory power of this new measure reflects the reality that changes in the value of reserves in the ground can greatly outweigh changes in annual earnings or cash flows. As the focal point of a compensation plan, EVA has advantages over stock options in that it can be calculated at various levels in the organization, even at the level of a single well, whereas stock prices only exist for the company as a whole. For this reason, an EVA incentive system permits a clearer “line of sight” between pay packages and the performance of the part of the business for which managers are directly accountable. Perhaps even more important, EVA can be calculated (using an “internal hedging” mechanism) in a way that removes the impact of changes in oil prices on the incentive outcome. And, as demonstrated in the case study of Nuevo Energy, such internal hedging allows companies to give their employees a much greater share of wealth created with far less cost than by simply granting stock or stock options.     

The Subjective Valuation of Indexed Stock Options and Their Incentive Effects

We analyze the potential role of indexed stock options in future pay‐for‐performance executive compensation contracts. We present a unified framework for index‐linked stock options, discuss their incentive effects, argue that indexation schemes based on the capital‐asset pricing model (CAPM) are the most suitable for executive compensation, and derive a subjective pricing model for the class of CAPM‐based indexed stock options. Contrary to earlier work, executives would not be motivated to take on investment projects with high idiosyncratic risk once their lack of wealth diversification and degree of risk aversion are factored into the analysis.     

Does tunneling explain the sensitivity of executive compensation to other member firms’ performance?

This study examines how executive compensation is set when a firm is a business group member. Using Korea's unique setting of family-controlled business groups, we find that a member firm's executive cash compensation is positively linked to the stock performance of other member firms as well as its own. Further analyses reveal that this positive link is consistent with the hypothesis that corporate managers are rewarded for their decision to benefit the controlling family at the expense of the firm they manage. Specifically, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to other member firms’ performance exists only in respect to firms in which the cash flow rights of the controlling family exceed those of the subject firm. We also find that this sensitivity is strengthened if the controlling family's control–ownership disparity in the subject firm is above the sample median.     

Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent

We find that executives who jump to chief executive officer(CEO) positions at new employers come from firms that exhibitaboveaverage stock price performance. This relationship is morepronounced for more senior executives. No such relationshipexists for jumps to non-CEO positions. Stock options and restrictedstock do not appear to significantly affect the likelihood ofjumping ship, but the existence of an "heir apparent" on themanagement team increases the likelihood that executives willleave for non-CEO positions elsewhere. Hiring grants used toattract managers are correlated with the equity position forfeitedat the prior employer and with the prior employer's performance.     

Rainbow trend options: valuation and applications

Asset selection and timing decisions are major investment concerns. To resolve these issues simultaneously, a new class of rainbow trend options is proposed. The diversification effect of rainbow options can reduce the importance of asset selection decisions and trend options can mitigate unfavorable effects on market entry and exit decisions. We consider a general framework to facilitate the derivation of analytic pricing formulas for simple, pure, and Asian rainbow trend options using the martingale pricing method. The properties of these options and their Greeks are analyzed. We also investigate the performance of the dynamic delta hedging strategy for issuers of rainbow trend options. Last, this paper explores the applications of rainbow trend options for hedging price risks, designing executive stock options, modifying countercyclical capital buffer proposed by Basel Committee, and acting as control variates of the Monte Carlo simulation.     

Optimal exercise of executive stock options

Valuing executive stock options is a challenging problem, because the standard risk-neutral valuation of those options is not appropriate; the executive is not allowed to trade the stock of the firm, so is not operating in a complete market. As this paper shows, an executive holding many American-style call options on his firm’s stock will optimally exercise the options bit by bit, whereas a risk-neutral valuation of the options would assume that all are exercised at the same time. Comparative statics of the optimal exercise policy show many surprising features.      

Executive Option Repricing, Incentives, and Retention

While many firms grant executive stock options that can be repriced, other firms systematically restrict or prohibit repricing. This article investigates the determinants of firms' repricing policies and the consequences of such policies for executive turnover and retention. Firms that have better internal governance, that use more powerful stock-based incentives, or that face less shareholder scrutiny are more likely to maintain repricing flexibility. Firms that restrict repricing are more vulnerable to voluntary executive turnover following stock price declines. When share price declines are severe, restricting firms appear to award unusually large numbers of new options.     

GOLF TOURNAMENTS AND CEO PAY—UNRAVELING THE MYSTERIES OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Leading financial economists and activist institutional investors have long argued that the proper alignment of manager and shareholder interests requires the use of performance based compensation. Partly in response to these pressures, and in combination with a change in the tax code that encourages performance-based pay, corporate boards have dramatically increased their use of stock grants and executive stock options. Combine this development with the longest bull market in U.S. financial history, and the result is unprecedented levels of CEO pay at the close of the 20th century. This review of executive compensation reveals that the economic theory of tournaments may provide a rationale for the pattern, if not the level, of executive pay. Specifically it finds that the total compensation of the five highestpaid executives in a cross-section of new and old-economy firms is very similar to the pattern of payouts to players in a golf tournament. The author also reports that recent studies show a significant increase in the pay-for-performance correlation throughout the 1990s. But whether that correlation is as high as it should be, and whether current levels of CEO pay are socially "optimal," are questions that remain unanswered.     

Executive Stock Options: Early Exercise Provisions and Risk-taking Incentives

Traditional executive stock option plans allow fixed numbers of options to vest peri‐odically, independent of stock price performance. Because such options may climb deep in‐the‐money long before the manager can exercise them, they can exacerbate risk aversion in project selection. Making the proportion of options that vest a gradually increasing function of the stock price can ensure that appropriate numbers of options are retained while they provide risk‐taking incentives, but are exercised once they have lost their convexity. “Progressive performance vesting” can allow the firm more efficiently to rebalance the manager's risk‐taking incentives.