会计师事务所内部利益分配机制研究

完善会计师事务所内部治理,关键在于解决会计师事务所相关利益主体的利益分配问题,利益分配机制是会计师事务所内部治理最核心的内容。本文在分析我国会计师事务所内部利益分配现状的基础上,借鉴西方会计师事务所的成功经验,构建有中国特色的会计师事务所内部分配机制。     

关于会计师事务所内部治理问题的探讨

本文围绕会计师事务所内部治理,介绍了内部治理的要素和问题,并就提高会计师事务所内部治理质量提出了建议措施。     

会计师事务所内部治理问题思考

本文通过总结国外会计师事务所的特点,指出目前我国会计师事务所内部治理存在的问题,提出改进和完善我国会计师事务所内部治理,应从制度和政策上积极引入有限责任合伙制、建立和修改会计师事务所章程以及建立健全各项内部管理制度。     

浅论中小会计师事务所的内部治理机制

经过近三十年的发展,我国中小会计师事务在取得成绩的同时,也暴露出自身内部治理的许多弱点内部治理直接关系着会计师事务所的质量管理和风险控制水平,是事务所健康运转和稳步发展的重要基础.本文通过对中小会计师事务所内部治理机制的重要意义、存在的问题展开论述,进而对中小会计师事务所的内部治理机制优化提出若干建议.     

会计师事务所内部治理优化及评价指标建议

内部治理是会计师事务所发展的基础和根本,是事务所执业质量和品牌声誉的重要影响因素,然而我国会计师事务所的内部治理状况并不乐观.文章针对我国目前会计师事务所内部治理的现实情况及突出问题,提出对其重要方面的优化选择,并给出一系列有益的评价指标建议.     

会计师事务所内部治理、产权性质与审计质量——基于我国A股上市公司2008-2010年的数据

利用基于问卷调查数据和因子分析方法得出的会计师事务所内部治理水平综合得分,以及我国A股上市公司2008-2010年数据,检验了会计师事务所内部治理水平、企业产权性质和资本市场审计质量之间的相关性。研究发现,会计师事务所内部治理水平越高,其审计的上市公司异常应计项目的绝对值越低,审计质量越高。进一步研究发现,这一效应会因审计客户的国有企业性质而弱化。研究表明,会计师事务所内部治理是资本市场审计质量的重要影响因素,政府主管部门和行业自律组织鼓励和促进会计师事务所完善内部治理的政策能够在一定程度上提高资本市场的审计质量。     

规模化视角下我国会计师事务所的内部治理问题研究

近年来，我国会计师事务所规模化进程不断加快，形成了一批本土大型会计师事务所。同时，我国会计师事务所在内部治理上存在的问题也突显出来。本文以立信会计师事务所的发展壮大为例，提出应当从改善组织形式、加强分所管理、增强内部信息披露、改进利润分配制度、强化风险管理等方面加强我国会计师事务所内部治理。     

会计师事务所内部治理问题探索

资本市场的不断完善凸显了会计师事务所作为"守门人"的重要性,也给其内部治理带来了些许难题. 本文结合当下会计师事务所发展状况,分析会计师事务所内部治理存在的问题,并提出相应对策.     

会计师事务所内部治理机制研究——基于立信会计师事务所的治理实践

加强会计师事务所内部治理机制建设是提高会计信息质量和注册会计师审计质量的重要保证,是促进资本市场健康稳定发展、维护社会公众利益的重要举措,是实施会计行业国际化发展战略的重要基础工程。本文全面阐述了立信会计师事务所转制为特殊普通合伙后的内部治理实践,以期为完善我国会计师事务所的内部治理机制提供经验借鉴和政策建议。     

本土会计师事务所的项目管理与内部治理调查分析——基于访谈调研的证据

基于我国本土会计师事务所做强做大的战略目标导向，本文通过调研，对比和总结了国际大型会计师事务所与不同类型本土会计师事务所在项目管理及内部治理各方面的现实特征，发现：由于会计师事务所的性质、形成方式、规模、经营理念、战略定位等不同，导致其在审计项目管理和内部治理方面存在不同程度的差异，而我国很多合伙制会计师事务所治理整合不到位的“形式合伙”则是其根源，应从学习先进经验、完善内部治理、强化项目管理等方面加以改进。     

企业控制权视角下的公司治理与内部审计

公司治理是企业内部投资者和管理者之间一系列调解利害关系的契约,内部审计即产生于此。内部审计满足了投资者对公司治理和管理者对经营控制的需求。本文从企业产权理论的角度对公司治理和内部审计的关系及内部审计在公司治理中的作用进行了研究。     

上市公司会计信息披露问题研究

上市公司会计信息披露是现代资本市场监管的核心内容。目前我国上市公司会计信息披露,无论是从强制性会计披露还是从自愿性会计信息披露都存在着许多不完善的地方。为了提高我国上市公司会计信息披露的质量,必须加强上市公司的内部治理结构的完善,同时还要改善上市公司的外部治理环境。     

CEO retention,firm performance and corporate governance

This paper seeks to determine if CEO turnover is a function of firm performance, and therefore attempts to gauge the extent to which CEO interests are aligned with those of stockholders. The methodology in this paper focuses primarily on estimating the relationship between the probability of CEO exit and indices of firm performance and corporate governance structure. A major finding of the paper is that the accountability of CEOs to stockholders is significantly limited by CEO power, and CEO turnover is influenced more by internal governance structure than by firm profit or sales performance.     

Corporate governance and firm efficiency: evidence from China's publicly listed firms

This paper applies a two‐stage, double bootstrapping data envelope analysis approach to investigate whether and to what extent various distinctive corporate governance practices affect productive efficiency in a sample of 461 publicly listed manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2002. We find that firm efficiency is negatively related to state ownership while positively related to public and employee share ownership. In addition, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is U‐shaped, indicating the presence of tunneling activities by the largest shareholder. Among three types of controlling shareholder, state exerts the most negative impact on firm efficiency, followed by state‐owned legal entities. These results provide strong evidence that political interferences have reduced firm efficiency. It shows that the proportion of outside directors and the number of board meetings are positively associated with firm efficiency, suggesting that board of directors can be an effective internal governance mechanism. Furthermore, provincial market development, a proxy for the strength of external governance mechanism, is positively related to firm efficiency. Overall, our findings illustrate that restructuring state‐owned enterprises via improvements in corporate governance has enhanced firm efficiency, but partial privatization without transfer of ownership and control from the state to the public remains a major source of inefficiency in corporate China. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social trust environment and firm tax avoidance: Evidence from China

We examine the impact of the social trust environment in which a firm is located on its tax avoidance in China and paying attention to the moderating effect of corporate governance and state-ownership. Drawing from theoretical and empirical work on firm tax avoidance and manager–shareholder agency conflict, we hypothesize that social trust can lower firm tax avoidance. It is because a high social trust environment can reduce agency conflict so that tax avoidance is less. Our findings are consistent with our hypothesis, and robust to a battery of robustness tests. Furthermore, we document that the association between social trust and firm tax avoidance is more pronounced for firms with weak corporate governance and state-owned. Moreover, we find that firms in more trustworthy provinces present less general and administrative expenses and higher asset turnover, corroborating our theoretical foundations with respect to agency cost in our hypothesis. Our findings suggest that social trust and its interactions with corporate governance and state ownership are important internal and external determinants on the variations in tax avoidance.     

会计师事务所外部治理效用探究——基于创业板上市公司IPO审计的面板数据分析

基于2009--2012年257家创业板上市公司的432个IPO审计样本，检验审计质量与企业长期资本市场回报、投资回报率的关系，实证结果表明：应计利润和审计收费显著地表明了审计质量的高低，同时有微弱证据表明行业专长代表了较高的审计质量；事务所声誉与企业经营业绩呈正相关，但是与企业长期资本市场回报呈现显著负相关，该结果源于中国资本市场的非效率性。总体上说，会计师事务所在IPO审计市场上起到了一定的外部治理效用，但仍然有待加强。     

Ownership structure, corporate governance and productive efficiency in China

This paper investigates whether and to what extent ownership structure and corporate governance affect productive efficiency in a sample of 744 publicly listed manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2006. The paper finds that firm efficiency, as estimated using stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis, is negatively related to state ownership while positively related to public and employee share ownership. In addition, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is U-shaped, indicating that the largest shareholder may engage in tunneling activities. As the identity of the largest shareholder changes from government, government-controlled legal entity to other types of legal entity, firm efficiency significantly improves. These results provide strong evidence that political interferences have reduced firm efficiency. Moreover, firms with more independent board are more efficient, supporting the argument that board of directors can be an effective internal governance mechanism. Furthermore, provincial market development, a proxy for the strength of external governance mechanism, is positively related to firm efficiency. Overall, the findings illustrate that restructuring state-owned enterprises via improvements in corporate governance has enhanced firm efficiency, but partial privatization without transfer of ownership and control from the state to the public remains a major source of inefficiency in corporate China.     

Internal Market Failure: A Framework for Diagnosing Firm Inefficiency*

ABSTRACT The theory of market and government failure can be used to diagnose inefficiency within firms and to identify strategies to deal with these problems. Internal market failures (IMFs) – internal public good problems, internal negative and positive externalities, internal information asymmetries, internal monopolies, the presence of uncertainty – create inefficiencies within firms just as they do in normal markets. As well, self‐interested behaviour by executives and internal interest groups (rent‐seeking) are analogous to government, or governance, failures (IGFs). Associated with many of these internal market failure problems are generic solutions that can usefully inform executives in their efforts to improve efficiency within the firm. Internal governance failures, in contrast, normally require action by shareholders and boards of directors.     

物联网经济下的会计信息使用 ——以海尔共赢增值表为例

会计信息是一项重要的公司治理机制。然而,在新经济与新技术的驱动下,传统业态的模式变革对单纯财会信息的治理功能提出了挑战,管理会计信息日益受到社会各界的关注。从物联网经济的特征分析入手,系统阐述物联网技术驱动下企业商业模式变革对会计信息使用的深刻影响,突出了以海尔共赢增值表为代表的管理会计信息载体在物联网经济下企业内部治理实践中的重要作用,并以此为探索或践行物联网业务模式的众多企业提供一定的借鉴与参考。