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1.
Darwinism in economics: from analogy to ontology 总被引:19,自引:0,他引:19
Geoffrey M. Hodgson 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2002,12(3):259-281
Several social scientists, including ‘evolutionary economists’, have expressed scepticism of ‘biological analogies’ and rejected
the application of ‘Darwinism’ to socio-economic evolution. Among this group, some have argued that self-organisation is an
alternative to biological analogies or Darwinism. Others have seen ‘artificial selection’ as an alternative to natural selection
in the socio-economic sphere. Another objection is that Darwinism excludes human intentionality. It is shown that all these
objections to ‘biological analogies’ and ‘Darwinism’ are ungrounded. Furthermore, Darwinism includes a broad theoretical framework
for the analysis of the evolution of all open, complex systems, including socio-economic systems. Finally and crucially, Darwinism
also involves a basic philosophical commitment to detailed, cumulative, causal explanations. For these reasons, Darwinism
is fully relevant for economics and an adequate evolutionary economics must be Darwinian, at least in these fundamental senses.
However, this does not undermine the need for auxiliary theories and explanations in the economic domain. 相似文献
2.
James F. Henderson 《Forum for Social Economics》1998,28(1):23-34
The Ricardian economists’ famous model of economic growth employed the Malthusian population doctrine, the law of diminishing
returns, and the classical or iron law of wages. This analysis was based on utilitarian moral philosophy. The gloomy Stationary
State conclusions of the Ricardian growth model — maldistribution of income and widespread poverty — were challenged by both
economists and moral philosophers. A particularly important challenge was that offered by William Whewell (1794–1866), Professor
of Moral Philosophy and the dominant figure at the University of Cambridge. Whewell is remembered today for his early contributions
to mathematical economics. This article begins with a review of the Ricardian growth model. Next, Whewell’s system of moral
philosophy is examined and the scientific and religious basis of Whewell’s antagonism to Ricardian economics is considered.
After considering Whewell’s treatment of agricultural progress, economic classes, and rent doctrine, his own model of economic
growth is analyzed. Finally, Whewell’s appraisal of the duty of government to those harmed by development is explored. 相似文献
3.
Peter A. Corning 《Journal of Bioeconomics》2007,9(2):109-144
Synopsis Synergy – here defined as otherwise unattainable combined effects that are produced by two or more elements, parts or individuals
– has played a key causal role in the evolution of complexity, from the very origins of life to the evolution of humankind
and complex societies. This theory – known as the ‘Synergism Hypothesis’ – also applies to social behavior, including the
use of collective violence for various purposes: predation, defense against predators, the acquisition of needed resources
and the defense of these resources against other groups and species. Among other things, there have been (1) synergies of
scale, (2) cost and risk sharing, (3) a division of labor (or, better said, a ‘combination of labor’), (4) functional complementarities,
(5) information sharing and collective ‘intelligence’, and (6) tool and technology ‘symbioses’. Many examples can be seen
in the natural world – from predatory bacteria like Myxococcus xanthus to social insects like the predatory army ants and the colonial raiders Messor pergandei, mobbing birds like the common raven, cooperative pack-hunting mammals like wolves, wild dogs, hyenas and lions, coalitions
of mate-seeking and mate-guarding male dolphins, the well-armed troops of savanna baboons, and, closest to humans, the group-hunting,
group-raiding and even ‘warring’ communities of chimpanzees. Equally significant, there is reason to believe that various
forms of collective violence were of vital importance to our own ancestors’ transition, over several million years, from an
arboreal, frugivorous, mostly quadrupedal ape to a world-traveling, omnivorous, large-brained, tool-dependent, loquacious
biped. The thesis that warfare is not a recent ‘historical’ invention will be briefly reviewed in this paper. This does not
mean that humans are, after all, ‘killer apes’ with a reflexive blood-lust or an aggressive ‘drive’. The biological, psychological
and cultural underpinnings of collective violence are far more subtle and complex. Most important, the incidence of collective
violence – in nature and human societies alike – is greatly influenced by synergies of various kinds, which shape the ‘bioeconomic’
benefits, costs and risks. Synergy is a necessary (but not sufficient) causal agency. Though there are notable exceptions
(and some significant qualifiers), collective violence is, by and large, an evolved, synergy-driven instrumentality in humankind,
not a mindless instinct or a reproductive strategy run amok.
相似文献
4.
Synopsis This paper is the product of a collaboration between a biologist (Ghiselin 1997) who works on the philosophy of classification
and an economist (Landa 1981, 1994) who works on the ‘Economics of Identity’: how and why people classify people based on
identity in the context of a theory of ethnic trading networks. In developing the ‘bioeconomics’ (the synthesis of economics
with biology) of classification, we crossed a number of disciplinary boundaries—anthropology, economics, sociology, biology,
and cognitive psychology including evolutionary psychology’s ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics. Using a bioeconomics approach,
we argue that folk classifications—the classifications used by ordinary persons—have much in common with scientific classifications:
underlying both is the need for economy of information processing in the brain, for the efficient organization of knowledge,
and for efficiency of information acquisition and transmission of information to others. Both evolve as a result of trial
and error, but in science there is relatively more foresight, understanding, and planning. 相似文献
5.
6.
In China’s transitional economy, government regulation could be a substitute for the lack of law mechanism and regulator’s
power could spill over into other areas not regulated. Then, theoretically it could construct implicit contracts. For example,
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has the rights to choose initial public offering(IPO) firms among applicants.
It might construct implicit contracts between CSRC and local governments if the former consider the frequency and the severity
of the scandals among different areas. Local governments could make decisions on whether and how much to implement the implicit
contracts.
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Translated from Jingji yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2008, (3): 60–72 相似文献
7.
This paper discusses an evolutionary process of rural collective property rights or agricultural cooperation economy in detail.
We convince that both the evolution of the household contract system and the rural cooperation economy in the market elaborate
the key position of property rights’ multi-attribute in the formation of contract structure and organization shape. If there
were strong externality between several elements of household, the collective property rights should be chosen.
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Translated from Guanli Shijie 管理世界 (Management World), 2008, (6): 61–67, 94 相似文献
8.
Shengmin Sun 《Frontiers of Economics in China》2008,3(3):410-429
In this paper, we develop a model of institutional change of land property right in China, which include the influences of
lobbying and the political power division in 1978. The model illustrates how extra gains are produced under different institutions
and how lobbying and political power division can affect the change. It is clear that the institutional innovation has something
to do with the leaders’ legal income, the cost of institutional change and the conversion rate. Given the pattern of leader’s
power division, it is the best way for the people in rural areas to change their institutional framework, and it is efficient
to mix local and central governmental policies. And lobbying and leading power division can affect the direction and the course
of institutional changes that would lead different result among different areas.
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Translated from Nankai jingji yanjiu 南开经济研究 (Nankai Economic Research), 2007, (6): 17–32 相似文献
9.
Synopsis Hayek’s cognitive theory, which seeks to describe the operation of a particular order, in fact provides a paradigmatic account
of knowledge-generating orders in general. We claim that this paradigm provides a fertile conceptual framework for exploring
a variety of problems in economics and social theory. In particular, we shall show that Hayek’s conception of the ‘map’ and
the ‘model’, which he uses to explain the operation of the complex adaptive classifying system called ‘mind’, are promising
analytical devices with applications extending to social structures of various kinds and complexity. We use Hayek’s notion
of the map and model to analyze how different social structures – regarded as classifying systems – work in terms of their
input, processing, and output capabilities. The adaptive characteristics of such systems, via communicative routines, multi-level
classification, and feedback, form central motifs for our discussion of markets, science, and other social structures. We
show that by analyzing the knowledge-generating characteristics of such structures we are also able to gain insights about
the circumstances affecting their adaptive properties. 相似文献
10.
Jens Großer 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):191-192
Almost every week national elections are held somewhere in the world. Many more elections take place at federal and local
levels of government. Surely, these are important events to many of us. This thesis aims at providing a better understanding
of why and how people vote in elections.
Three original modifications of Palfrey and Rosenthal’s (1983) participation game are used to study voter turnout theoretically
and experimentally.1 In the basic game, each voter supports (i.e., prefers) one of two exogenous candidates and privately decides between voting
at a cost and abstaining (without costs). The candidate who receives more votes wins the election (ties are broken randomly)
and each supporter of this candidate receives an equal reward, independent of whether or not she voted.
The first study (published in the American Political Science Review 100, pp. 235–248) analyzes the effects of social embeddedness on turnout, assuming that voters may be influenced by observing
the decisions of other voters around them (e.g., a family or working place). Our experimental results show that the social
context matters: this information increases turnout by more than 50%. The increase is greater when neighbors support the same
candidate rather than when they support opponents.
The second study investigates the effects of public opinion polls on voter turnout and welfare. Poll releases resolve uncertainty
about the level of support for each candidate caused by `floating’ voters, whose preferences change across elections. This
information increases turnout in the laboratory by 28–34%, depending on the fraction of floating voters in the electorate.
If polls indicate equal levels of support for both candidates—in which case aggregate benefits for society are not affected
by the outcome—welfare decreases substantially due to costs from excessive turnout.
In the final study, elections are preceded by the competition between two candidates: they simultaneously announce binding
policy offers in which some voters can be favored at the expense of others through inclusion and exclusion in budget expenditure
(Myerson 1993).2 We observe that policy offers include 33% more voters—yielding a smaller budget share for each—when voting is compulsory
rather than voluntary. Moreover, we find evidence of political bonds between voters and long-lived parties.
Overall, in all three experiments many subjects strongly react to economic incentives (i.e., benefits, costs, and informational
clues), often in line with what is observed outside of the laboratory.
JEL Classification C72, C92, D72
Dissertation Committee:
Arthur Schram, University of Amsterdam (advisor)
Axel Ockenfels, University of Cologne
Thomas Palfrey, California Institute of Technology
Cees van der Eijk, University of Nottingham
Frans van Winden, University of Amsterdam
1Palfrey, T.R., & Rosenthal, H. (1983). A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice, 41, 7–53.
2Myerson, R.B. (1993). Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems. American Political Science Review, 87, 856–869. 相似文献
11.
Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Michael Wohlgemuth 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2000,10(3):273-295
An analytical framework for dealing with political entrepreneurship and reform is proposed which is based on some new combinations
of Schumpeterian political economy, an extended version of Tullock's model of democracy as franchise-bidding for natural monopoly
and some basic elements of New Institutional Economics. It is shown that problems of insufficient award criteria and incomplete
contracts which may arise in economic bidding schemes, also – and even more so – characterise political competition. At the
same time, these conditions create leeway for Schumpeterian political entrepreneurship. The same is true for various barriers
to entry in politics. These barriers affect a trade-off between political stability and political contestability which will
be discussed with special emphasis on incentives and opportunities for political entrepreneurship in the sense of risking
long-term investments in basic political reforms. 相似文献
12.
Eric Nævdal 《Journal of Bioeconomics》2008,10(2):145-163
One logical implication of the Darwinian hypothesis of ‘survival of the fittest’ is that animals exhibit optimizing behavior.
Surprisingly, this has not been included in the resource economics literature. This paper explores the implications of optimizing
behavior in a model where moose face migration decisions and humans wish to keep moose out of an area to protect young pine
trees. The results show that if moose are rational, a given hunting effort will lead to better outcomes for humans than if
the moose only focus on harvesting opportunities. This finding suggests that the validity of the standard assumption that
animal migration behavior is density-dependent should be re-examined.
相似文献
13.
Nikolai Wenzel 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2010,23(1):55-78
This paper develops the concept of constitutional culture—the attitude, thoughts, and feelings about constitutional constraints
and the nature, scope, and function of constitutionalism. Constitutional culture is approached as a complex emergent phenomenon
bridging Hayekian cognitive and institutional insights. It can be studied as a mental model, a series of expectations and
understandings about the constitutional order, how it is, and how it ought to be. The “map” and “model” approach from Hayek’s
Sensory Order (1952) is employed to understand how individuals and (cautiously) groups of individuals at the national level approach constitutionalism.
This paper goes beyond the more traditional one-size-fits-all approach where all individuals respond uniformly to incentives,
as provided by the constitution qua contract. Instead, constitutionalism is tied up in the individual’s vision of the world,
that is, what Hayek (1948) labels “the facts of the social sciences.” The paper concludes with four areas where constitutional
culture can further the insights of constitutional political economy: comparative political economy, constitutional stickiness,
constitutional maintenance, and the new development economics. 相似文献
14.
Jie Meng 《Frontiers of Economics in China》2010,5(4):657-676
This article aims to offer a reply to Steedman’s critique of Marx’s labor theory of value. Although this critique having been
there for about three decades, the anti-critiques from Marxists are up to date flawed with fatal limitation, losing sight
of an important dimension of labor theory of value, i.e., without taking it as a theoretical tool of understanding the uncertainty
rooted in capitalist mode of production. The first part of this article reviews the controversy initiated by Steedman. Part
2 discusses Marx’s dual theory of market value and Rubin’s interpretation. Our view is that, if Rubin’s interpretation is
accepted, a refutation of Steedman’s critique towards Marx will be impossible. Part 3 of this article explores the possible
reconstruction of market value in the perspective of the dynamics in the pivoting of market value. We concludes that, the
relationship between the standard condition of production and value is not, as argued by Steedman, of deterministic and one-directional
character. For Marx, labor theory of value is applied to analyze the uncertain relation between the means and the end, the
condition and the result of capitalist production. Meanwhile, another reply is attempted towards the negative comment on labor
theory of value made by contemporary evolutionary economist such as Hodgson. In our view, Marx’s labor theory of value is
not irrelevant as claimed by Hodgson to the main topics of evolutionary economics such as variety and “natural selection.”
It is through labor theory of value that Marx explains the co-evolution of technology and economy. 相似文献
15.
Our overview has the objective of making our study relevant to bioeconomists. The need for the ‘alternatives’ to the Synthetic
Theory of Evolution in social-economic studies was substantiated, for example, by Colombatto (Journal of Bioeconomics, 5, 1–25, 2003), who maintains that the natural-selection theory is ‘ill suited’ to describing evolutionary processes in
economics. He proposed an alternative ‘non-Darwinian’ approach by equating the ‘non-Darwinian’ approach with a definite version
of neo-Lamarckism. Yet, as we will show, there is a palette of alternative approaches within and beyond the neo-Lamarckism.
We hope to give bioeconomists more choice in their theoretical modeling and constructing of analogies between biology and
economics. It will also be shown that in the light of suggested definitions the concept of ‘universal Darwinism’ recently
discussed in bioeconomics makes little sense as a generalizing category. In addition, in the concluding part of the paper
we demonstrate that the majority of alternative approaches are far from being pigeonholed as archaic and once and for all
wiped off the theoretical landscape. On the contrary, in recent years one can observe some revival of interest in the theoretical
‘heresies’.
相似文献
16.
Zhihong Mo 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2012,25(2):115-129
By drawing attention to the planning islands of firm organizations in a market economy, Coase makes us believe that besides
the price mechanism, there is another means of coordination, namely deliberate coordination. With the firm as an exemplary
case of deliberate coordination was introduced into landscape of economics, Coase initiated a new research program which is
to inquire into how efficiency is (and could be) achieved via various kinds of institutional arrangements, from the price
mechanism, to firms, to government regulations. This paper acknowledges the positive role Coase has played in drawing economists’
attention to the generally neglected field of organizational research. It criticizes, however, his research program for viewing
the economy, or society, from the perspective of some concrete decision-making entity. 相似文献
17.
Burczak reformulates socialism to escape Hayek’s strictures against central planning. While Hayek supports a social safety
net as well as other liberal reforms, Burczak points out that these reforms fall outside Hayek’s theoretical framework. We
explain that this is because Hayek narrowed the classical economists’ conception of sympathetic agency to imitation and rule
following. By contrast, liberal reform proposals follow from the theoretical framework of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill.
For Smith and Mill, sympathy is a richer concept in which people change places imaginatively with others. Sympathetic agency
allows a wide range of other regarding actions and political reforms.
相似文献
David M. Levy (Corresponding author)Email: |
18.
The consumer price index (CPI) and producer price index (PPI) are interrelated but significantly different concepts. Relationships
between the two indices may be that of causality or non-causality. The paper conducts a Granger-causality test on China’s
CPI and PPI data for the period from January 2001 to August 2008, and finds that CPI Granger causes the change in PPI, and
the latter reacts to the former with a time lag of 1–3 months. The result may suggest that in contemporary Chinese economy,
demand-side factors have played a more important role than supply-side factors, although the two sides both have influences
on domestic inflation trend which is measured by CPI.
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Translated from Jingji Yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2008, (11): 16–26 相似文献
19.
Graziella Bertocchi 《Journal of Economic Growth》2006,11(1):43-70
We study the connection between inheritance systems and the historical evolution of the relationship between a society’s economic
structure and its political system, with a focus on Europe from feudal times. The model predicts that, in an early agrarian
phase, aristocratic political systems prevail, while democracies tend to emerge with industrialization. At the same time,
as indivisible landed estates are replaced by capital as the primary source of wealth, the inheritance system evolves endogenously
from primogeniture to partition. The dynamics of output, distribution, class structure and political participation are in
turn reinforced by the system of intergenerational wealth transmission, with primogeniture tending to concentration and partition
to equalization.
“But the law of inheritance was the last step to equality.”
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835). 相似文献
20.
The process aimed at discovering new ideas is an economic activity the returns from which are intrinsically uncertain. We
extend the neo-Schumpeterian growth framework to investigate the role of strong uncertainty in the innovative process. In particular, we postulate that, when deciding upon R&D efforts, investors hold ‘ambiguous
beliefs’ about the exact probability of arrival of the next vertical innovation, and that they face ambiguity via the α −MEU decision rule (Ghirardato et al., J Econ Theory 118:133–173, 2004). Along the balanced growth path, the higher the agent’s ambiguity aversion (α), the lower the R&D efforts and the economic performance. Consistent with cross-country empirical evidence, this causal mechanism
suggests that, together with the profitability conditions of the economy, different ‘cultural’ attitudes towards ambiguity
may help explain the different R&D efforts observed across countries. 相似文献