The Medium term Outlook

In this Forecast Release we consider the prospects for the economy after the present phase of cyclical recovery. Our central forecast, which we regard as the best medium-term planning assumption, is that the economy slows down to a sustainable growth rate of around 1% per cent. This is in line with the underlying growth of productive capacity but not sufficient to cure unemployment. We recognise that in practice the economy may be pushed away from the underlying growth trajectory by random shocks, and we look at three major risks surrounding the present forecast: a rise in the savings ratio; a slower world recovery; and a cut in investment. We contend that the most serious of these risks is to investment, since the company sector will face a major increase in its tax bill from 1985-6 onwards. A growth recession is thus distinctly possible in 1986, which could, for economic and electoral reasons, be the low point of the present cycle.     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Growth resilient to protectionist concerns

• ? Despite the mounting threat of more protectionist trade measures, we expect the impact on global growth and trade to be mild. Given this, and the still fairly solid underlying economic picture, we have left our global GDP growth forecasts for 2018 and 2019 unchanged at 3.2% and 3.0% respectively.
• ? Although economic data in Q1 painted a pretty solid picture, there are signs that the global expansion may lose momentum in Q2. Most notably, the global PMI fell sharply in March, more than offsetting the gains of the previous three quarters or so. Some of the decline may reflect an over‐reaction to recent trade threats and could be reversed in April and despite the drop, the surveys still point to strong growth. But the fall highlights the risk that lingering trade tensions could damage confidence and prompt firms and consumers to delay investment and major spending plans.
• ? On a more positive note, China's economic growth picked up markedly in early 2018, which could provide a fillip to global trade growth in the near term. Given the betterthan‐expected start to the year, we have made no change to our 2018 China GDP growth forecast (of 6.4%) despite the probable negative effects of trade measures.
• ? Meanwhile, most advanced economies remain in the late expansionary stage of the cycle. And those that show signs of slowing, such as the Eurozone, are doing so from multi‐year highs. While we have nudged down our 2018 Eurozone GDP growth forecast slightly to 2.2%, the pace is expected to remain well above trend. We judge the impact of US tariffs and counter‐measures on the US economy to be subdued and have lowered our GDP growth forecasts for 2018 and 2019 by just 0.1pp.
• ? For now, we see further solid growth for the world economy this year even in the environment of rising protectionism. While there is a risk that a further escalation of trade tensions could trigger a sharper slowdown in global GDP growth, we still see the risks of a full‐blown and damaging trade war as limited and the chances of protectionism leading to recessions as smaller still.

     

Scenarios for long‐term world growth

• In the second of two articles on long‐term world growth, we present a set of stylised scenarios for world growth in the next decade. Our baseline forecast, which sees growth edging down, is compared to scenarios based on ‘lost decades’ in China and India, lower productivity and investment growth and a bigger drag from excess debt. The more likely of these scenarios could cut world growth by around 0.5 percentage points per year, rising to a 1.5 percentage point cut for the most extreme scenario.
• Our baseline forecast assumes productivity and investment grow at a similar pace in the next decade to the past ten years. But there are downside risks to productivity growth, especially in Emerging Markets (EMs). And with investment in China and in commodity exporters slowing, our investment forecast relies on a significant rebound in the major economies.
• Demographic factors are a significant downside risk to our forecast. The negative impact of demographic changes on growth in Japan since the 1990s was not generally foreseen. This risk exists in the US and Europe but also in emerging Asia, a particular concern given that the latter region accounted for over 50% of world growth in 2000–14.
• Growth in commodity‐exporting economies could undershoot our current predictions. Historical evidence suggests a danger that the drop in commodity prices could extend for several more years. Even with zero real growth in commodity prices, aggregate GDP growth in the main commodity exporters might only be around 2.5% per year.
• Another risk area is debt. International evidence suggests debt ratios above certain thresholds slow growth. We find that countries accounting for 44% and 31% of world GDP respectively exceed these estimated public and corporate debt thresholds. But the share is lower, and has dropped, for household debt, thanks to deleveraging in the G7.

     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The world recovery, now 18 months old, suffered two major setbacks in May: heightened political tension in the Middle East and a crisis in financial markets following a rise in US interest rates. On the assumption that oil supplies are not disrupted, we forecast that industrial production in the OECD area will rise by 7per cent in 1984 compared with 1983 and that total GNP will be 4 per cent higher. The Fed3 decision to tighten monetary policy, and run the risks of a US banking crisis, underline its determination to prevent the re-emergence of high inflation in the US. Higher interest rates are expected to produce a pause in the US recovery later this year, but, by reining back the economy and dampening down inflationary expectations, they should avert both a return to high inflation and the need for a more pronounced US recession at a later date. Compared with the January forecast, therefore, in which we assumed that, for political and debt-crisis reasons, the US authorities would avoid a rise in interest rates, the present forecast embodies higher interest rates and an earlier pause in the American recovery but, in the medium term, lower inflation and steadier growth of output. For the European and Japanese economies, where policy has remained more restrictive throughout, we have not changed our view that inflation will continue either to remain low (West Germany, Japan) or to moderate (France, Italy), thereby underpinning a sustainable medium-term recovery.     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Are we entering another global ‘soft patch’?

• Global growth has tended to hit ‘soft patches’ at the start of recent years and some indicators are again pointing in that direction at present.
• In the US, we expect GDP growth at around 2% annualised in Q1 based on recent indicators which have included subdued jobs growth and some slowdown in housing.
• Meanwhile, the latest readings for the export orders components of key manufacturing surveys – which are good predictors of world trade growth – suggest some pullback after a modest upturn in the final months of 2013. Trade growth remains especially subdued in Asia, including Japan and China.
• The crisis in Ukraine also poses some downside risks, should it escalate further – in particular the danger of a sharp rise in European gas prices which could harm the still fragile Eurozone economy.
• Overall, we regard most of these factors as temporary and continue to forecast a strengthening global economy over the coming 18 months. US data at the start of this year have been partly dampened by climatic factors, while underlying domestic demand growth in Japan remains robust and the Eurozone outlook has continued to improve slowly.
• As a result, our world GDP growth forecasts are little changed from last month, at 2.8% for 2014 and 3.2% for 2015.
• This forecast is partly underpinned by a renewed pickup in world trade. But there are some risks to this assumption, including the possibility that emerging market countries will have to rapidly improve their current account positions due to the more restrictive external financing conditions associated with US tapering.
• Such an adjustment could put a significant dent in our forecast for world trade growth. For ten large emergers, shifting current account balances to our estimates of their sustainable levels would mean an adjustment of around US$280 billion – around 40% of the increment to world trade that we forecast for 2014.

     

WORLD OUTLOOK

Last year's slowdown in activity in the world economy is expected to extend into the first half of this year. However, the outlook remains favourable with our forecast suggesting a pick-up in the second half of the year accompanied by continued low inflation. We expect the recovery in world activity to be broadly based with all the major economies enjoying growth close to its trend rate in 1997. Japan is forecast to be the strongest growing economy this year, with Germany the weakest - as activity is depressed by an unwinding of the stock cycle. US growth is forecast to continue steadily, at close to its trend rate     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The slowdown in the world economy, which followed last year's oil price collapse and which awakened fears that the world was on the threshold of a new recession, is coming to an end. Output growth in the first half of the year was stronger than we had previously expected and a gentle acceleration is forecast over the next eighteen months. In contrast to this improvement on output, there has been little or no progress on the major problems of the world economy, including the USA's twin structural deficits, budget and trade, and the international debt crisis. Moreover, with the US facing elections in just over a year's time, no economic initiative is likely until 1989. Hence the prevailing view that the US and world economies will "muddle through" for another year. But in 1989 a new US administration is likely to face up to the trade and budget imbalances and many US forecasters believe that the required fiscal tightening will lead to recession. As we explain below, this is not our view and the forecast embodies steady 3 per cent growth in the world economy over the medium term. Inflation has now passed the low point brought about by the oil price collapse. On our forecast of output, inflation is expected to remain close to its present underlying rate of 4 per cent.     

Forecast Summary

The recovery that we forecast in February remains intact, though its composition is shifting between external and domestic demand. As we reported in International Economic Outlook earlier this month, the recession in Europe is intensifying so that, even with the devaluation-induced improvement in competitiveness, exports are being held back The weaker world outlook is the main factor behind a lower growth forecast next year. For 1993, however, we are continuing to forecast growth of 11/2 per cent, principally on the basis of more buoyant consumer spending. But the boost from consumption, while welcome in the first stage of recovery, is short-lived since the higher taxes already announced for next year hold back the growth of disposable incomes. Again this is desirable for the share of consumption, private and public, in GDP has been rising steadily and needs to be reversed in order to devote resources to reducing the two deficits: the PSBR and the trade gap. Over the forecast as a whole it is exports and investment which drive demand, not consumption. Underlying inflation has fallen below 3 per cent for the first time in twenty years, but it is now at its cyclical low point. We expect some increase in inflation from now on, though the Government's 1–4 per cent target is not likely to be breached this year. Next year and beyond, however, without more action on the budget deficit or a sharper increase in interest rates than we are assuming, inflation is forecast to settle in the 4–5 per cent range. Unemployment has fallen in recent months but the underlying trend remains upwards. We expect the three million level to be reached in the second half of the year.     

改革开放以来中国经济增长动力转换的时空特征

基于中国1978~2012年的省级面板数据,采用检验后的超越对数生产函数的随机前沿模型,利用两套资本存量核算方法,对中国经济增长动力的来源及其时空特征进行分析,并对2008年金融危机的4万亿元投资政策进行了效率评价。研究结果表明,中国属于典型的投资主导型经济,资本投入是中国经济增长持续稳定的最主要来源,TFP贡献率呈现逐年下降的趋势;中国经济增长动力由改革开放初期的资本、劳动力和TFP三驾马车平衡拉动,形成了现阶段的资本投入与TFP反向角力态势;区域经济差距主要源于资本投入与TFP双重差异,但TFP差异是最重要因素;4万亿元经济刺激政策下中国经济复苏属于典型的“投资主导型复苏”,是以牺牲中国生产率为代价的,TFP在2008年后呈现断崖式下降,平均拉低中国TFP达0.23~0.32个百分点。     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The strength of US domestic demand is exerting a very strong pull on the world economy. Japan in particular is benefiting from soaring export demand, but the effects on European exports have been offset by weak domestic demand and, in the case of West Germany and the UK, by damaging industrial disputes which have interrupted supply. Over the next 12 months we expect the US economy to slow down under the weight of the financial and external balance pressures, which two years of very rapid but unbalanced growth have built up. For the world economy, however, we expect the slowdown in the US to be counterbalanced by expanding domestic demand in Europe and Japan, especially if a lower dollar permits reductions in interest rates. We forecast world output growth of about 3 per cent next year, well below the near-5 per cent projected for 1984 - the cyclical peak. By the second half of 1985 the world recovery will be three years old and we expect a pause in the growth of output. Against a background of stable monetary growth we expect world inflation in the 5–6 per cent range over the medium term. This is consistent with some increase in US inflation, low and stable inflation in Japan and West Germany and further progress in reducing inflation in countries such as France and Italy. Our forecast is based on the assumption that the dollar falls next year. If it does not fail we believe there is a significant risk of slower growth.     

Global growth to 2024: reversion to which mean?

• We expect global GDP growth to average 3.5% per year (at PPP exchange rates) over the next ten years. This is lower than the 3.8% recorded in 2000–14 though not dramatically so. There will be a modest recovery in advanced economy growth ‐ but not to pre‐crisis rates. Emerging market (EM) growth will slow but remain faster than growth in the advanced economies. And with EM's share in world GDP much increased from 10–15 years ago, EMs will continue to provide a large proportion of world growth.
• EM growth is expected to run at around 4.5% per year in 2015–24, well down on the 6% seen in 2000–14. This includes a slowdown from around 10% to 5–6% in China ‐ but China's share in world GDP has risen so much that China's contribution to world growth will remain very substantial.
• Advanced economies are forecast to grow by 1.9% per year in 2015–24, a big improvement from the 1% pace of 2007–14 (which was affected by the global financial crisis) but below the 1990–2014 average. Indeed, the gap between forecast G7 GDP and GDP extrapolated using pre‐crisis trends in potential output will remain large at 10–15% in 2015–24.
• Global growth will remain relatively strong compared to much longer‐term averages: growth from 1870–1950 was only around 2% per year. But a return to such low growth rates looks unlikely; China and India were a major drag on world growth until the 1980s but are now fast growing regions.
• Our forecast is relatively cautious about key growth factors; the contribution of productivity growth is expected to improve slightly, while those from capital accumulation and labour supply fall back. Demographics will be a more severe drag on growth from 2025–40. Overall, risks to our long‐term forecasts look to be skewed to the downside.

     

Forecast Summary

Output is expected lo grow steadily for the next four years, continuing the recovery which has been in progress since I981. The underlying rate of growth is forecast to slow down next year as the world economy also slows, though because of the miners' strike actual recorded growth next year will be higher than this. However, throughout the period output grows more rapidly than its historical trend. This growth is accompanied by steady increases in labour productivity, and unemployment is forecast to rise. With fiscal and monetary policy following the guidelines set by the Medium-Term Financial Strategy, inflation stays at about its current level or falls slightly.     

Productivity – your countries need you!

• Increased global productivity could boost real wages, consumption, fiscal positions and alleviate fears of secular stagnation. But will it? Puzzles relate to the longer term global slowdown and to some countries' recent productivity‐less recoveries in jobs. We assess various explanations including mismeasurement, secular stagnation, financial sector malfunction and increased labour market flexibility. Our baseline forecast is for a moderate pro‐cyclical recovery in productivity but we show how downside risks imply it could be anaemic.
• Sustained weak productivity is a secular issue. Eight years after 2007, median productivity growth in OECD economies is less than Japan's was eight years into its lost decade. Aspects of secular stagnation and balance sheet adjustment have contributed. Measurement error may have played a role over the longer term.
• Recent experience divides recoveries into “haves” and “have nots” in terms of productivity and employment. The UK may finally be emerging from a “productivity‐less” recovery in employment after 2011; Spain and the Netherlands have experienced jobless recoveries in productivity; others, such as Canada and Sweden, have experienced pro‐cyclical (typically weak) recoveries in productivity; Italy hardly got going in either direction.
• Most theories provide, at best, a limited explanation for recent weak productivity performance. These include data mis‐measurement, increased labour market flexibility, financial sector malfunction and supply side secular stagnation.
• On balance, we think that a modest productivity bounce‐back could be imminent, caused by some demand recovery, tighter labour markets in major economies, higher real wages and firms deciding to invest more in capital, which enhances productivity and points the global economy towards normality.
• We also illustrate how global risk scenarios could dampen recovery. Negative skews imply mean G7 productivity growth across the scenarios would be an anaemic 1.1% in 2016, 0.5 percentage points (pp) lower than the baseline.

     

The London Business School with Gower WORLD OUTLOOK

Although there are indications that the world economy is beginning to emerge from recession, the early stages of recovery are turning out to be extremely weak and industry worldwide has still not recorded any significant advance. Consequently business planners are now having to take account of the possibility that there will be no recovery during 1982 or even that the world will enter a prolonged downturn. We discuss these scenarios here and indicate why we consider them unlikely; our central forecast remains that the world economy will enter a recovery phase towards the end of 1982 and grow strongly in 1983-84.     

World economy

Although recent developments suggest that the risks of an escalation in US-China trade tensions have eased, we doubt this will deliver a significant boost to the global economy. We still expect world GDP growth of just 2.5% this year, the weakest since the global financial crisis, after an estimated 2.6% in 2019. But over the past three months, the risks around the forecast now seem less skewed to the downside.     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: World growth still seen at just 2.5% in 2020

• ▀ Although recent developments suggest that the risks of an escalation in US-China trade tensions have eased, we doubt this will deliver a significant boost to the global economy. We still expect world GDP growth of just 2.5% this year, the weakest since the global financial crisis, after an estimated 2.6% in 2019. But the risks around the forecast now seem less skewed to the downside.
• ▀ While our view remains that global GDP growth is likely to have softened further around the turn of the year, the decline remains gradual. And latest survey-based measures of activity and sentiment show tentative signs that prospects are beginning to improve, consistent with our long-standing view that the low point for global growth will be in Q1 2020.
• ▀ Just as importantly, the likelihood of the US and China formally signing off a phase one trade deal in mid-January has reduced the chances of a further flare-up in trade tensions between the two economies. However, this has to some degree been offset by the troubling events recently unfolding between the US and Iran.
• ▀ We remain sceptical that the global economy is set for a major growth boost. Any healing in US-China relations may quickly be unwound and a full reversal of the tariffs already implemented remains a distant prospect. Furthermore, some of the associated growth boost is likely to be offset by less policy support. As a result, we have raised our 2020 GDP growth by just 0.1pp in the US but by a more significant 0.3pp in China.
• ▀ Meanwhile, although the ongoing and broad-based monetary policy loosening in both AEs and EMs should start to feed through to growth this year, we doubt this will be a game-changer. Not only is policy loosening at a global level set to be fairly muted, limited spare capacity, the rising stock of global debt and elevated asset prices are likely to reduce the positive impulse from policymakers' actions.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Global growth in 2019 revised down again

• ? In response to continued weakness in global trade and signs that the softness has spread to other sectors, we have cut our 2019 world GDP growth forecast to 2.5% from 2.7% last month (after 3.0% in 2018). But we see growth accelerating in H2 due to fiscal and monetary policy changes and as some temporary negative forces unwind. While revised fractionally lower, global growth is still expected to tick up to 2.7% in 2020 – but the risks lie to the downside.
• ? The latest tranche of trade data points to another poor quarter in Q1. While the weakness in Chinese trade is partly related to the impact of US tariffs, the causes of the trade slowdown are rather broader. Reflecting this, we have again lowered our world trade growth forecast – we now see it slowing from 4.8% in 2018 to just 2.5% in 2019, only a little above the previous low of about 2% in 2016.
• ? One source of comfort is that the February global services PMI rose to its highest level since November. But retail sales in the advanced economies as a whole have been weak recently and, while consumer confidence bounced in February, it has trended lower over recent months. Reflecting this, we have cut our global consumer spending forecast for this year.
• ? We expect ongoing policy loosening in China and dovish central banks – either in the form of delays to rate hikes and liquidity tightening or via renewed easing – to boost the global economy in H2 and beyond. Some recent temporary drags on growth (such as auto sector weakness) should also wane, providing further modest support.
• ? But the modest rise seen in GDP growth in 2020 exaggerates underlying dynamics due to sharp rebounds in a few crisis‐hit economies such as Turkey, Venezuela and Argentina. And downside risks for 2020 are probably larger than in 2019; benign financial conditions and the weaker US$ assumed in our baseline may not materialise, while the build‐up of debt in EMs could act as a larger‐than‐expected drag on growth.

     

房地产投资的风险识别与评价

政策、文化、经济环境的多样性,使房地产市场具有太多的不确定性因素和未知的风险,然而房地产开发商既需要依托市场,更需要开拓市场,因此,对房地产投资风险进行识别与评价,可以使开发商更加具体地把握房地产投资的潜在风险,并且分析来自各方面风险的可能性大小与程度高低,以便根据房地产经营的具体情况,区分投资的轻重缓急。     

Global wages: we don't (yet) have lift‐off

• ? Policymakers, most notably in the US, have been expecting wage growth to pick up for some time as job markets tighten. But the data over the last six months have shown few indications of wage lift‐off. Our review of the latest evidence suggests that although labour markets are, on the whole, still tightening, we see increased downside risks to our forecasts for faster global wage growth in 2018–19.
• ? Rates of “churn” in labour markets – a possible precursor to faster wage growth – have continued to rise in the US and parts of Europe.
• ? But other structural factors may still be holding wages down. A recovery in prime‐age participation in the US may be helping to cap wage rises, as may a pool of “underemployed” workers in the US and UK (though this pool is shrinking fast).
• ? Productivity growth also remains weak, running at a 0.5%–1% annual pace in Q1 2017 across the US, UK, Germany and Japan. This compares with a G7 average pace of 1.5% per year in 1985–2006.
• ? Overall, the risks to our baseline forecast of faster wage growth in the major economies in 2018 look skewed to the downside. We expect wage growth to firm in 2018 by 0.5–1 percentage points in the US, UK, Germany and Japan. We would give this modal forecast a probability of around 60%, but with a 25% chance that wage growth is somewhat slower than this and only a 15% chance that it is higher.

     

UK Overview

Substantial revisions to the historical GDP data have led to both the outturn for 2012 being upgraded and to us revising up our estimation for 2013 growth from 1.4% to 1.9%. We have also nudged up our forecast for 2014 from 2.2% to 2.6%, which is partly influenced by the data revisions but also by business survey data which suggest that the recovery is finally broadening out towards business investment and exports…