The Brazilian bankruptcy law reform,corporate ownership concentration,and risk-taking

We investigate whether a bankruptcy reform, which increased creditors' protection, affected the risk taking of Brazilian firms. Collecting data from Brazilian (treatment group) and Argentinian, Chilean, Colombian, Mexican, and Peruvian firms (control group) and using a difference-in-difference technique, we show that Brazilian firms with concentrated ownership structure decreased risk taking after the reform. Our results suggest that these firms reduced risk in response to increasing creditors' protection, possibly because controlling shareholder fear losing control. Moreover, our results indicate that the reform probably provoked a wealth transfer from minorities to controlling shareholders.     

Ownership structure and returns to defensive stock repurchase

This study investigates the wealth effect of defensive common stock repurchase (CSR) on outside shareholders. It is found that the impact varies with the type of corporate control activity that precipitates the repurchase. Outside shareholders suffer wealth losses when a CSR announcement follows an unsolicited bid for the firm. The impact of the CSR announcement following a partial acquisition is negative but not as strong. However, outside shareholders benefit from CSR following antitakeover charter amendments. This study also documents a nonlinear relationship between managerial equity ownership and changes in the value of the firm at the announcement of a defensive CSR.     

The Acquisition of Restructured Firms: An Illustration of Market Discipline?

We examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and acquisition activity subsequent to corporate restructurings in a sample of 152 firms created by a voluntary corporate spin-off. We also investigate the linkage between these relationships and the stock market reaction to the initial restructuring announcements. Surprisingly, CEO wealth in the form of stock and options is strongly related to friendly and hostile acquisition activity, respectively. Moreover, the stock market appears to anticipate this subsequent acquisition activity. These results ask us to rethink our understanding of the motivational properties of equity ownership and the stock market's reaction to voluntary corporate spin-off announcements.     

Board gender diversity and corporate environmental performance: The moderating role of family and dual‐class majority ownership structures

While prior work has investigated the impact of (a) ownership structure and (b) board gender diversity separately on corporate environmental performance, researchers have not studied the potentially important relationship between ownership control and female board diversity in influencing corporate environmental performance jointly. We do so in the context of majority ownership in family‐controlled and dual‐class firms whose motives and influence are theoretically different from that of the firm's minority shareholders. Drawing on resource dependency, socioemotional wealth theory, and secondary agency theory, we hypothesize that majority family owners and dual‐class owners likely choose women directors to help advance their personal preferences for environmental corporate social responsibility. Our empirical tests utilizing 2,755 U.S. firm years over the 2010–2015 show that, as hypothesized, these two majority ownership types interact with board gender diversity to positively influence corporate environmental performance.     

Corporate Governance and Firm’s Efficiency: The Case of a Transitional Country, Ukraine

In this study, we look for empirical support for the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the levels of corporate governance quality across firms and the relative efficiency levels of these firms. This hypothesis is related to Leibenstein’s idea of X-efficiency. We use the data envelopment analysis (DEA) estimator to obtain proxies for X-[in]efficiency of firms in our sample and then analyze them with respect to different ownership structures by comparing distributions and aggregate efficiencies across different groups. We also use truncated regression with bootstrap, following Simar and Wilson Estimation and influence in two stage, semi-parametric models of production process, Simar and Zelenyuk (2003) to infer on relationship of inefficiency to various indicators of quality of corporate governance, ownership variables, as well as industry and year specific dummies. The data is coming from seven industries in Ukraine. “The entrepreneurship structure itself may be critical, with the classic issue of the separation of ownership from control being regarded as one of the earliest and most important sources of X-efficiency” (Button and Weyman-Jones, 1992, American Economic Review). We would like to dedicate this paper to the memory of Christos Panzios—co-editor who handled our paper to almost the very end, whose suggestions and encouragement have helped us substantially improve our paper.     

Parasites and Paragons: Ownership Reform and Concentrated Interest among Minority Shareholders

Do investors with concentrated shareholding infringe on the value of more-fragmented shareholders (‘parasites’) or facilitate the growth of firm value for all shareholders (‘paragons’)? In a major ownership reform of Chinese listed firms, we obtain evidence which suggests that larger minority shareholders undertook certain actions both for a rent-seeking purpose – that these actions allowed them to reap private benefits at the expense of smaller minority shareholders, and for a value-creating purpose – to potentially increase firm value after the reform. It is plausible that both drivers co-existed, but they generated different implications of wealth redistribution. When institutional constraints on rent-seeking were ineffective, higher concentration of minority shares decreased the immediate gains captured by the small investors who held minority shares at the time of the reform, but increased the future value of the firm to be divided among for all investors, large and small, who held firm shares after the reform.     

Do institutional shareholders police management?

Some have argued that legislation limits the ability of institutional shareholders to discipline shirking management teams. However the level of takeover activity in the 1980s suggests that the cost of using takeovers to discipline management has decreased. This may give institutional shareholders the ability to participate actively in corporate governance. This paper presents an empirical examination that is consistent with this hypothesis. First, institutional ownership concentration varies across firms according to the benefits of policing firms in 1988. The relationship is less pronounced in 1980. Second, firms characterized by concentrated institutional ownership are more likely to use takeovers as the disciplinary mechanism. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the different styles of large shareholders’ activism

This paper extends Noe’s (Rev Financial Studies 15:289–317, 2002) model of large shareholder activism in two directions. First, it considers a framework in which large shareholders can choose not only when to monitor, but also how intensively they want to monitor the firm. Second, it considers the impact of laws and regulations by introducing a governance quality parameter that makes monitoring more cost effective. The model yields a new and rich characterization of activism. We find that share wealth (ownership concentration) induces monitoring for higher firm value through more frequent monitoring with unchanged intensity. Cash wealth motivates activism for trading gains, not higher firm value, through less frequent monitoring coupled with higher intensity. We also find that better governance leads to higher firm value through more frequent but less intense activism. When asymmetries within the group of large shareholders exist, the model predicts that the larger/wealthier/more efficient shareholders are more active. These results are broadly consistent with the empirical evidence.     

Market structure,common ownership,and coordinated manager compensation

We study oligopolistic competition in product markets where the firms' quantity decisions are delegated to managers. Some firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds, whereas the other firms are owned by independent shareholders. Under such an asymmetric ownership structure, the common owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing the manager compensation schemes. This implicit collusion induces a less aggressive output behavior by the coordinated firms and a more aggressive behavior by the noncoordinated firms. The profits of the noncoordinated firms are increasing in the number of coordinated firms. The profits of the coordinated firms exceed the profits without coordination if at least 80% of the firms are commonly owned.     

Acquisition activity of large depository institutions in the 1990s:: An empirical analysis of motives

This study examines the performance and ownership structure characteristics of financial institutions that chose to aggressively expand by acquiring other institutions. The “wealth maximization hypothesis” posits that in an era of deregulation, the most efficient institutions will acquire the less efficient, thereby creating value and benefiting shareholders. Conversely, the “incentive conflict hypothesis” argues that a large number of acquisitions is a symptom of managers pursuing their own self interests. The empirical results are consistent with the wealth-maximization hypothesis for acquirers that have at least one large outside blockholder and when acquisition activity is measured by assets acquired. But, when acquisition activity is measured by the number of acquisitions, our results fail to support the wealth-maximization hypothesis. Together, these results imply that benefits are more likely to be created when the expansion strategy is implemented by making large acquisitions rather than numerous small acquisitions.Jel classification: G21, G28, G34     

Performance compensation contracts and CEOs’ incentive to shift risk to debtholders: An empirical analysis

The paper investigates the relationships among CEO incentive contracts, manager ownership, charter value, and bank risk taking. We analyze whether the presence and magnitude of incentive contracts induce CEOs of financially distressed firms and firms with high manager ownership to take unprofitable risks that shift wealth from debtholders to equity holders. Our sample focuses on banks that had both the incentive and opportunity to shift risks, and compares them with those that did not. We compare weak and strong banks in periods when the banks’ principal creditor, the FDIC, was a lenient and then a stringent monitor. The evidence is consistent with bonus compensation inducing CEOs of financially weak firms to shift risk to debtholders only if they do not have large insider ownership. The evidence is also consistent with these contracts rewarding CEOs for their effort to manage unforeseeable risk albeit not their ability. Low charter value banks with high managerial ownership took profitable risk during the lenient regulatory period.     

Ownership Structure and the Cost of Debt

This paper examines the impact on the cost of debt by ownership concentration and shareholder identity; that is, whether the shareholders are banks, non-financial firms, the state, institutional investors or the board of directors. Our analysis suggests that directors who own shares tend to be aligned with external shareholders, that firms with government ownership enjoy lower cost of debt and that banks effectively monitor management, so reducing the agency costs of debt.     

The underwriter’s early lock-up release: Empirical evidence

A lock-up agreement is an arrangement between the underwriter and certain pre-IPO shareholders. This paper examines the influence of an underwriter’s early lock-up release on shareholder wealth. The study found significant negative abnormal returns associated with the early lock-up release annoucement. Negative abnormal returns are more pronounced for venture capital backed firms than for firms not venture capital backed. In addition, scheduled lock-up release day abnormal returns, found in previous studies to be significantly negative, are reduced for firms announcing the early lock-up release.(JEL G24, G30)     

Firms,shareholders, and financial markets

We study the influence of the financial market on the decisions of firms in the real market. To that end, we present a model in which the shareholders’ portfolio selection of assets and the decisions of the publicly traded firms are integrated through the market process. Financial access alters the objective function of the firms, and the market interaction of shareholders substantially influences firms’ behavior in the real sector. After characterizing the unique equilibrium, we show that the financial sector integrates the preferences of all shareholders into the decisions for production and ownership structure. The participation from investors in the financial market also limits the firms’ ability to manipulate real prices, i.e., there is a loss of market power in the real sector. Note that, while the loss of market power changes expected profits, it is not detrimental to shareholders since the expected return of equity share depends on the variance (and not the mean) of profits. Indeed, any change in expected profits is absorbed by the financial price. We also show that financial access increases production, thereby altering the distribution of profits. In particular, financial access induces firms to take on more risk. Finally, financial access makes the relationship between risk-aversion and risk-taking ambiguous. For example, it is possible that an increase in risk-aversion leads to more risk-taking, i.e., the variance of real profits increases.     

Why firms adopt and discontinue new-issue dividend reinvestment plans

We examine several arguments—past performance, capital structure adjustment, and broadening the ownership base—involving why firms adopt and discontinue new-issue dividend reinvestment plans (DRPs). We test hypotheses for each argument by analyzing financial characteristics for firms adopting and discontinuing new-issue DRPs compared with matching non-DRP firms. The evidence provides some support for the past performance argument but none for the capital structure adjustment argument. Limited support also exists for the broadening the shareholder base argument. Overall, the results support the notion that firms needing funds initiate new-issue DRPs, and then discontinue them when the need for external funding diminishes. The authors wish to thank two anonymous referees and Joachim Zietz, the editor, for many constructive suggestions for the improvement of the paper. The authors take responsibility for any remaining errors.     

The impacts of family involvement on R&D investment intensity in firms: Evidence from China

Drawing on the perspective of socioemotional wealth, this paper explores the types of family involvement in family firms and their impacts on R&D investment intensity. Using data from the forecasts issued by A-share family firms listed on Chinese stock markets between 2008 and 2019, the study finds that the separation of ownership and control is negatively associated with R&D investment intensity in non-high-tech firms, whereas potential gains of socioemotional wealth from R&D activities by high-tech firms produce a positive influence that offsets the negative impact of the separation of ownership and control on R&D investments. It reveals the importance of gains of socioemotional wealth. In contrast to the separation of ownership and control, family involvement in management is negatively associated with firms’ R&D investment intensity in both high-tech firms and non-high-tech firms. Our results capture the diversity of family members’ identity recognition, which leads to family members’ different evaluations of the potential gains and losses of socioemotional wealth. Overall, the distinction between high-tech family firms and other family firms is shown to be significant, as is the distinction between the impacts of different types of family involvement.

     

Bank monitoring,managerial ownership and Tobin's Q: an empirical analysis for India

The paper examines how banking relationships and managerial ownership relate to firm valuation. It is argued that both the number of banking relationships (which serves as an external monitoring function) and managerial ownership (which serves as an internal monitoring function) affect firm value, while internal monitoring by managers and external monitoring by banks were viewed as substitutes or complements. After controlling for the effect of exogenous variables, the results reveal the existence of a complementary monitoring effect between banks and the managerial group. On the other hand, the results indicate that increased external monitoring by banks will simultaneously raise the incentive on the part of managers to engage in internal monitoring. Also, firm valuation is found to be a significant determinant of managerial ownership. A disaggregated analysis of firms according to size and leverage suggests the existence of a complementary monitoring effect between banks and managers, except for small‐sized firms. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Long-term performance of divesting firms and the effect of managerial ownership

We study the long-term performance of firms that divest assets to assess whether gains arise from reducing agency costs. We find that divesting firms underperform control firms before the divestiture and outperform control firms following the divestiture. The poor performance experienced by divesting firms is unrelated to managerial ownership, but the post-divestiture improvement in performance is strongly related to stock ownership by the CEO. The results support the argument that divestitures remove assets that generate negative synergies and that managerial ownership provides strong incentives to improve operations following the divestiture.     

Equity private placements, liquid assets, and firm value

This paper finds wealth enhancement from equity private placement issuances where liquid assets are provided to slack-poor companies. This result runs counter to the expected Jensen's (1986) excess free-cash-flow problem, where the predominant findings of numerous studies include negative wealth effects from externally financed liquidity enhancements. We also find greater announcement-period returns for smaller firms and firms with better recent performance. Investors appear to view either of these factors, together with the private investor’s willingness to provide additional liquidity, as an asymmetric information release on the firm’s viability and likelihood of improved performance.     

The Effects of a Separation of Ownership from Control on UK Listed Firms: An Empirical Analysis

There has been a wide‐ranging debate concerning the effects of the separation of management and ownership of large firms. Given recent issues concerning corporate remuneration, this debate is as relevant and possibly more so today as it has ever been. Theoretically, as the ownership of a firm becomes more diverse, the management of the firm will have more discretion and opportunity to act in accordance with their own interests at the expense of those of the shareholders. This paper considers the effect of a separation of ownership from control on 406 UK listed firms. Simultaneous equations are used to test for a relationship between the percentage of shares owned by significant outsiders and insiders and the performance of the firm. A number of authors have suggested that there may be a significant relationship between these variables. The analysis conducted in this study supports the view that there is a relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.