Earnings Warnings and CEO Welfare

Some CEOs decide voluntarily to issue a warning when they expect a negative earnings surprise. Prior research suggests that warnings contain incremental information beyond actual earnings; warning firms tend to experience permanent earnings decreases. This paper investigates whether compensation committees take warnings into account in setting CEO compensation. We find that warnings are significantly negatively (positively) associated with CEO bonus (option grants), suggesting that compensation committees adjust CEO compensation towards a more high‐powered structure after warnings. However, the sensitivity of bonus or option grants to earnings and stock returns is not affected except for bonus sensitivity to stock returns. We also find weak evidence of an increase in forced CEO turnover after warnings, accompanied by a significant increase in its sensitivity to stock returns. This benefits CEOs with higher ability but imposes more risk on other CEOs. These findings provide a partial explanation of why not every CEO facing a negative surprise decides to issue a warning. Our results are robust to various specifications. In particular, the impact of warnings on compensation appears invariant to the timing or the number of warnings. Overall, these findings suggest that the signal from warnings is used in determining CEO compensation and retention.     

Earnings management around founder CEO reappointments and successions in family firms

This paper studies reappointment of a chief executive officer (CEO) and succession events in listed family firms with an incumbent family CEO. We explore whether family firms with a founder CEO are more likely to engage in earnings management preevent than other family firms. We find evidence of preevent upward earnings management for firms that reappoint their founder CEO but no for other family firms. These findings suggest that the costs and benefits from earnings management change around founder CEO reappointments in family firms. Investors, auditors, policymakers and regulators should be aware of the temptation of founder CEOs to inflate earnings preceding their reappointment.     

CEO权力、董事会稳定性与盈余管理

基于CEO和董事会相对权力的视角,研究了CEO权力和董事会稳定性对盈余质量的影响。研究发现,CEO权力越大,上市公司盈余管理程度越高;而稳定的董事会能够有效削弱CEO权力与盈余管理之间的正相关关系。区分企业产权性质后发现,上述研究结论主要体现在民营企业中。进一步研究发现,CEO任期较短时,CEO相对董事会的权力较小,稳定的董事会能够有效削弱CEO权力与盈余管理之间的正相关关系。但随着CEO任期的增长,CEO相对于董事会的权力越强,董事会并不能有效监督CEO操纵盈余管理行为。     

Earnings management surrounding M&A: Role of economic development and investor protection

We examine accruals based earnings management by acquiring firms surrounding merger and acquisition events from thirty countries for the period 2004–2015. We find that the acquiring firms do manage earnings surrounding mergers when the method of payment is acquirer's stock, but there is no such evidence when the method of payment is cash. We also examine whether level of economic development and country-specific institutional characteristics play any role in acquiring firms' earnings manipulation. Using two groups of countries based on the level of economic development and nine different institutional variables we find evidence that acquirers' accrual manipulation differs based on such characteristics.     

CEO Overconfidence and Earnings Management During Shifting Regulatory Regimes

This study examines the relationship of CEO overconfidence with accrual‐based earnings management, real activities‐based earnings management, and targeting to meet or just beat analyst forecasts. Following, we measure “overconfidence” based on the CEO's tendency to hold in‐the‐money stock options, as rational expected utility maximizers should exercise early to avoid overexposure to company idiosyncratic risks. The results show that before the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), companies of overconfident CEOs were more likely than other CEOs to engage in managing earnings through accelerating the timing of cash flow from operations and achieving analyst forecast benchmarks. After SOX, we find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to have income‐increasing discretionary accruals. They remain more likely to engage in real activities management through abnormally high cash flows, and also have abnormally low discretionary expenses. These results are consistent with overconfident CEOs feeling less constrained by SOX, and suggest that this individual characteristic works against regulators’ attempts to constrain earnings management by corporate executives. In contrast, we find that the tendency of overconfident CEOs to manage to targets decreases after SOX, perhaps due to changes in investor behavior in the new regulatory environment.     

Earnings Management Surrounding CEO Turnover: Evidence from Korea

This article examines the empirical relation between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and earnings management in Korea using a sample of 403 CEO turnovers and 806 non‐turnover control firms during the period 2001–2010. We classify CEO turnovers into four types depending on whether the departure of the outgoing CEO is peaceful or forced and whether the incoming CEO is promoted from within or recruited from outside the firm. We measure earnings management by both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also control for the endogeneity of CEO turnover and a potential selection bias using 2SLS and Heckman's two‐stage approach. After controlling for corporate financial performance and governance structure, we find upward earnings management by the departing CEO only when the departure is forced and the new CEO is an insider. In this case, the new CEO also engages in downward earnings management using both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also find some evidence that the new CEO recruited from outside the firm manages discretionary accruals upward following the peaceful departure of his predecessor. In all other types of CEO turnover, we do not find evidence of significant earnings management by either CEO.     

Earnings Smoothing,Cash Flow Volatility,and CEO Cash Bonus

Prior studies generally relate managers’ decisions to smooth earnings to their desire to maximize their overall compensation and to smooth their consumption. However, earnings smoothing could also be driven by the firm's expected benefits from reporting a smooth earnings stream. Our paper provides empirical support for the latter explanation of earnings smoothing. Specifically, we find that while CEO bonus on average increases with earnings smoothing, the increase is larger when the firm's cash flow volatility is higher. Further, CEO bonus is shielded from the negative effects of lower earnings arising from the need to report a smoother earnings stream.     

Meeting or Missing Earnings Benchmarks: The Role of CEO Integrity

This paper examines the role of CEO integrity in determining whether a company's earnings benchmarks will be met, beaten or missed. Prior literature provides evidence that managers have incentives for meeting or beating earnings benchmarks and are rewarded by the market for doing so (Lopez and Rees, 2002; and Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Managers also have incentives to miss their earnings targets for the benefit of a lower strike price on subsequent option grants (McAnally et al., 2008). A CEO's involvement in backdating is taken here as a measure of his or her integrity. This paper shows that CEO integrity significantly influences whether benchmarks are met or beaten. In other words, backdating CEOs are more likely to meet or narrowly beat all three earnings benchmarks examined in the paper: positive earnings, last year's earnings and analysts’ forecasts. At the same time, they are also less likely to narrowly miss a zero‐earnings benchmark. The results presented in this paper further validate the use of benchmark meeting/beating as a measure of earnings manipulation.     

The pattern of investment surrounding CEO retirements: UK evidence

The recent spate of corporate scandals worldwide has again raised serious concerns about the quality of corporate governance. We examine the governance effects on investment expenditure in the year of CEO retirement. Based on a sample of the 460 largest UK listed companies during 1990–1998, we find no evidence of changes in capital or research and development expenditure when CEOs are on the verge of retiring. In addition, neither board size nor leadership structure (separating the posts of CEO and chairman) influence corporate investment during the CEO's final year. However, we do show that there are some important governance effects. Cutbacks in fixed asset spending at the time of CEO departure are less likely in firms with executive-dominated boards. There is evidence that stock ownership of outside directors is associated with increased capital expenditure when the CEO retires. Finally, further analysis suggests that insider board monitoring and outsider equity ownership may act as substitute mechanisms in ensuring that retiring CEOs focus on value creating activities.     

CEO Overconfidence and Earnings Management: Evidence from Property-Liability Insurers' Loss Reserves

This study investigates the relation between managerial overconfidence and loss-reserving practices in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry. We find robust evidence that CEO overconfidence is significantly associated with relatively low loss reserves, resulting in relatively high reported earnings. This finding is consistent with the theoretical predication that overconfident managers overestimate the returns on their investment projects and underestimate losses. Our result contributes to the literature linking CEOs' personality traits and firms' accounting policy as well as to the literature on insurer loss-reserving practices.     

Earnings management and deferred tax

This study analyses the deferred tax provisions of firms during a period in which the firms' incentive to manage earnings may have been be particularly strong and in which firms made disclosures in relation to partial deferred tax provisions which revealed readily their under- or over-provision of deferred tax. Using a sample of 58 firms for the two years 1991 and 1992, the magnitude of the under- or over-provisions found is economically significant, amounting, on average, to around 20% of the maximum potential deferred tax liability and, more important, 9% of profit or loss before tax. This paper takes such under- and over-provision of deferred tax and investigates its relationship with a number of posited explanatory variables - as derived and developed from the earnings management literature. In a multivariate setting it is found that the level of under-/over-provision is related to the following characteristics: whether the firm is reporting a pre-tax loss or a pre-tax profit; the extent of adjustment to prior year tax; and the level of surplus advance corporation tax (ACT). These findings support a general profit- smoothing hypothesis, and the finding in relation to ACT suggests that firms take an overall view in determining the required level of provision in order to manage earnings, rather than concentrating upon particular line items. There is also weaker evidence of a relationship between the level of under-/over-provision and firms' levels of gearing and effective tax rates.     

Earnings management and market liquidity

The main purpose of this paper is to argue the extent that earnings management lowers disclosure quality. It should increase information asymmetry and impair trading liquidity. Using a large sample of NYSE firms from 1996 to 2001, we find evidence to suggest that firms which exhibit greater earnings management are associated with lower market liquidity. Our results are robust to both real and accounting based measures of earnings management and two well established measures of market liquidity. However, they are not consistent with the Easley et al. probability of informed trade measure.     

Earnings management and corporate spinoffs

In this study we examine whether firms manage earnings before pursuing corporate spinoffs. Using a sample of 226 completed spinoffs between 1985 and 2005, we find strong evidence of pre-spinoff earnings management among parent firms involved in non-focus-increasing spinoffs. We also find higher levels of earnings management among parent firms that have a higher level of information asymmetry prior to spinoff announcements. Our regression results show a significant negative relation between income-increasing earnings management and the announcement period returns for non-focus-increasing spinoffs. In addition, a significant positive relation is found between income-increasing earnings management and the announcement period returns for focus-increasing spinoffs. The results suggest that income-increasing earnings management sends out negative signals about non-focus-increasing spinoffs but positive signals about focus-increasing spinoffs.     

Earnings management and earnings quality

Viewing the detection of earnings management from the perspective of a crime scene investigator sheds new light on prior research on earnings management and its close relative, earnings quality. The works of Ball and Shivakumar [2008. Earnings quality at initial public offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, in press.] and Teoh et al. [1998. Earnings management and the subsequent market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 53, 1935–1974.] are used to illustrate the application of seven components of a crime scene investigation to earnings management research.     

Real earnings management around CEO turnovers

Following CEO turnovers, US firms adjust real business activities to manage earnings downwards (REM bath). This effect is most pronounced in firms with low levels of institutional ownership. REM baths early in CEOs’ tenure can be confounded with legitimate adjustments to business activities. However, we show that they are not accompanied by increases in R&D or capital expenses, nor are they explained by restructuring expenses. CEOs with short tenure record more negative REM measures in their first year of tenure, when compared with CEOs with long tenure.     

Earnings and Impression Management in Financial Reports: The Case of CEO Changes

This article examines earnings management, as well as the presentational format of graphs (impression management) in the financial reports of sixty-three Australian listed public companies that changed chief executive officers (CEOs). Prior U.S. evidence generally suggests downward earnings management in the year of senior management changes and upward earnings management in the following year (Pourciau, 1993). We argue that new managers not only have incentives to manage earnings but also have similar incentives to manipulate the impressions created by graphs in financial reports. Examining earnings and impression management at the same time also provides an opportunity to distinguish between alternative explanations for any observed earnings management. In the year of CEO change, we hypothesize and find evidence of downward earnings management and some limited evidence of unfavourable impression management of the key financial variables (KFVs) graphed. As posited, we find evidence of upward earnings management and some evidence of favourable impression management in the year after a CEO change. These results are strongest for the subsample in which the CEO change was prompted by a resignation rather than a retirement.     

Earnings management of initial public offering firms: evidence from regulation changes in China

Discretionary current accruals of Chinese initial public offering (IPO) firms decreased after the abolition of fixed‐price offering systems that directly linked offering price to reported earnings. Results suggest IPO firms that decrease managerial ownership manage earnings upward during the fixed‐price offering period, but this relationship disappeared after the introduction of a book‐building system. We also find that bank debt is negatively related to discretionary current accruals during the fixed‐price offering period, but no relation exists for the book‐building period. Leverage has a significant positive relationship with earnings management. However, this finding is potentially attributable to nonoffering price objectives or endogeneity biases.     

Earnings management and accounting income aggregation

Quarterly earnings allow aggregation into annual earnings in four different ways. Fiscal year earnings is one measure of annual earnings, the others being earnings for annual periods ending at interim quarter-ends. We investigate earnings management in fiscal year earnings relative to these alternative measures of firms’ annual earnings. We confirm prior findings in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 99–126) of discontinuities around zero and prior year earnings in histograms of earnings. Subsequent research questions whether these discontinuities are evidence of earnings management. Using histograms of our alternative annual earnings measures, we offer evidence suggesting earnings management is responsible for the discontinuities.     

Earnings management around employee stock option reissues

We investigate market behavior in a setting where managerial incentives to manipulate earnings and market price should be apparent ex ante to market participants. We find evidence of abnormally low discretionary accruals in the period following announcements of cancellations of executive stock options up to the time the options are reissued. Nevertheless, analysts and investors are not misled. Discretionary accruals have little power in explaining stock price performance during this period. Moreover, discretionary accruals do not explain subsequent analyst forecast errors. Thus, our findings suggest that, in this transparent setting, analysts and investors do not respond to earnings management.