上市公司内部人亲属股票交易行为研究

中国的《证券法》等法律法规禁止内部人短线交易,并设置了内部人禁止股票买卖的敏感期,但内部人亲属不受此限制。本文对深圳证券交易所2007年5月至2010年5月的内部人亲属股票交易数据分析发现:(1)上市公司的内部人亲属对内部人任职企业的股票交易次数已经远远多于内部人自身的交易次数;(2)内部人亲属的交易存在很多的短线交易行为与敏感期交易行为;(3)内部人亲属股票交易整体而言能够获得超额收益;(4)短线交易与敏感期交易有助于内部人亲属获得超额收益;(5)董事长或总经理的亲属获得的收益比其他内部人亲属更高。据此,本文认为证券交易监管机构需要关注内部人亲属股票交易行为,尤其警惕内部人亲属交易可能成为规避内部人交易管制的替代方式。     

内部人交易会影响会计信息可比性吗?北大核心CSSCI

会计信息可比性是会计信息质量重要特征之一,有利于提高会计信息的决策有用性,进而促进资源优化配置。本文以内部人交易为视角,研究分析公司内部人的行为特征对会计信息可比性的影响。研究结果表明,公司内部人交易会显著降低会计信息可比性,而这种负相关关系主要表现在董事会成员的内部人交易行为组别。进一步研究发现,降低会计信息可比性有利于降低被监管机构处罚的可能性。本文研究不仅丰富了管理层行为特征与会计信息方面的文献,并为内部人交易的事后监管提供了新的启示。     

内部人交易与持续经营审计意见——来自财务困境类上市公司的经验证据

股改完成后内部人交易日益常态化,内部人交易受到监管层和市场各方的关注。为了降低事后被查处的可能性,发生内部人交易的财务困境类上市公司可能会要求审计师签发更好的审计意见。基于2007至2013年上市公司内部人交易数据,研究发现:财务困境类上市公司内部人交易与持续经营审计意见显著负相关;审计师对上市公司经济依赖的程度越高,内部人卖出交易与持续经营审计意见负相关关系越显著。更进一步地,内部人交易与持续经营审计意见负相关的关系主要体现在股权制衡度较低、分析师跟进数量较少以及机构投资者持股比例较低的上市公司,表明上述公司治理机制有效地遏制了财务困境类上市公司发生内部人交易后胁迫审计师签发干净审计报告的行为。     

农村中小银行违规关联交易的现状、成因与解决策略

农村中小银行关联交易违规问题一直较为严重.近几年,有关农村中小银行关联交易违规的行政处罚案由主要表现在交易违规、程序违规和管理违规等方面.这些违规问题的发生源自农村中小银行管理体制导致的内部人控制、违规关联交易本身的隐蔽性以及农村中小银行监管长期形成的体系性问题等.据此,应建立针对性的农村中小银行关联交易管理制度体系,...     

公司内部人具有交易时机的选择能力吗?——来自中国上市公司内部人卖出股票的证据

本文以内部人卖出股票的交易为对象,研究发现从短窗口来看,上市公司内部人卖出本公司股票时表现出很强的时机把握能力。回归分析发现,在卖出股票时,除董事长和总经理外的内部董事和经理的超常回报显著高于监事和独立董事,董事长和总经理的超常回报可能低于监事和独立董事;内部人本人交易的超常回报显著高于内部人直系亲属;小规模公司内部人的超常回报显著高于大规模公司内部人;国有控股公司内部人的超常回报可能高于其他公司内部人。本文经验证据表明,内部人的时机选择能力可能来自于其掌握的非公开信息,且受公司信息透明度影响。     

内幕交易的压制与暗流:美国预定交易计划规则修法镜鉴

美国内幕交易规制涵盖于证券反欺诈体系之下,并通过交易计划规则为内部人士证券交易松绑.随着市场主体的逐利性挖掘与执法实践的深入,交易计划规则逐渐被内部人士通过巧妙信息披露、策略性修改和终止以及多样化操作等方法所滥用,成为隐蔽型内幕交易的合规倚靠.美国新法案旨在探求内部人士所持证券流动性与严格监管内幕交易行为之间的平衡点,但规则变革仍面临现实利益考验.在依法从严打击证券违法活动的浪潮下,我国《证券法》以及相关司法解释应当从现有减持规定重置、界定标准划分、强制延迟期施加与严格信息披露等方向入手,完善预定交易计划规则,以使其为内幕交易规制体系服务.     

商业银行经营关联交易业务风险分析与对策建议

当前,银行普遍重视银行与股东和内部人之间的关联交易,事实上,除此之外,银行辖内集团客户内部之间的关联交易由于隐蔽性强、危害更大,带来的信贷风险也更加突出。本文梳理涉及银行的关联交易,剖析银行与其股东及内部人之间和银行客户集团内部之间的关联交易和关联交易的表现,分析商业银行内外两种类型关联交易及其蕴涵的风险,期望能为商业银行在关联交易的风险控制上提供一些参考性建议。     

未来内部控制鉴证服务之断想

一、财务造假四起，内部控制鉴证服务呼之欲出 经过十几年的发展，我国资本市场已经拥有1300多家上市公司和数千万投资者，总市值超过5万亿元。然而近年来，我国资本市场频繁发生大股东侵占挪用上市公司资金、大股东欺诈中小投资者、上市公司虚假陈述、信息披露违规误导等现象，从“红光实业”的造假上市到“兰州黄河”的内部人控制，从“棱光实业”的非公允关联交易到“银广厦”的虚假信息披露，一幕幕触目惊心的危险游戏不断上演。我国证券监管部门先后出台了独立董事制度、审计委员会制度、内部审计制度等规范文件，试图通过一种有效的制度安排达到内部约束和外部监督的目的。     

内幕信息披露规则的国际比较及借鉴意义

本文通过研究各国的证券立法的相关内客以及实际案例,指出世界各国对内幕消息的界定、公开标准和内部人交易行为的理解存在重要差异,监管实践的做法不尽相同。建议我国结合金融市场微观结构的发展和加强业内自律管理的作用,来完善内幕消息披露规则和强化内部人交易监管。     

上市公司内部控制缺陷影响因素的实证研究

文章以2010年深圳股市披露内部控制自我评价报告的463家上市公司为研究样本,使用Logistic回归分析上市公司内部控制缺陷的影响因素.经研究发现,公司内部控制建设与内部控制缺陷显著负相关,上市年限与内部控制缺陷显著正相关,公司独立董事比例与内部控制缺陷显著负相关,存货比率和销售增长率与内部控制缺陷相关性不显著     

浅析单位内幕交易违法的认定与处罚

近年,单位作为主体从事内幕交易的案例呈增加之势。本文结合行政执法与刑事司法实践,结合近年典型单位内幕交易案例,并借鉴海外监管查处经验,着重讨论了单位内幕交易认定的一些疑难法律问题,诸如是否将单位作为违法主体以及是否处罚、如何认定单位知悉与利用内幕信息、如何区分单位内幕交易行为与个人内幕交易行为等问题。     

The Effect of Illegal Insider Trading on Takeover Premia

This paper empirically investigates whether illegal insider trading increases the premium a bidder pays for a target. Illegal insider trading is trading by traditional corporate insiders, as well as others in a position of trust and confidence (e.g. investment bankers, lawyers), based on material, non-public information (inside information). The paper examines the premia of takeovers with known illegal insider trading and compares them to a control sample of takeovers matched by industry, time period, and size that do not have detected illegal insider trading. After controlling for differences in merger characteristics, such as number of bidders, type of offer, form of payment, etc., we find that takeovers with detected illegal insider trading have takeover premia which are approximately 10 percentage points, or almost one-third, higher than the control sample. We conduct additional tests in an attempt to determine the direction of causality between illegal insider trading and takeover premia size and explore the effect of potential detection bias. The results suggest both that illegal inside traders base their trades on factors other than premia size, and that illegal insider trading in takeovers with large premia is not necessarily more likely to be detected. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the illegal insider trading itself tends to create larger takeover premia.     

Insightful Insiders? Insider Trading and Stock Return around Debt Covenant Violation Disclosures

This study asks whether insider trading associates with an information advantage around first‐time debt covenant violation disclosures in SEC filings, which potentially results from early access to information about the debt covenant violation disclosure. We document two results. First, we find net insider selling up to 12 months before a debt covenant violation disclosure, which precedes investors' negative returns before disclosure; and net insider buying up to 12 months after disclosure, which precedes investors' positive returns after disclosure. Second, we show that net insider trading one to two months before and after the violation disclosure associates predictably with investors' short‐term reaction to the covenant violation announcement.     

Do Insider Trading Laws Work?

This paper presents the first comprehensive global study of insider trading laws and their first enforcement. In a sample of 4,541 acquisitions from 52 countries, I find that insider trading enforcement increases both the incidence, and the profitability of insider trading. The expected total insider trading gains increase. Consequently, laws that proscribe insider trading fail to eliminate insider profits. However, harsher laws work better at reducing the incidence of illegal insider trading.     

The Effect of Illegal Insider Trading on Takeover Premia

This paper empirically investigates whether illegal insidertrading increases the premium a bidder pays for a target. Illegalinsider trading is trading by traditional corporate insiders,as well as others in a position of trust and confidence (e.g.investment bankers, lawyers), based on material, non-publicinformation (‘inside information’). The paper examinesthe premia of takeovers with known illegal insider trading andcompares them to a control sample of takeovers matched by industry,time period, and size that do not have detected illegal insidertrading. After controlling for differences in merger characteristics,such as number of bidders, type of offer, form of payment, etc.,we find that takeovers with detected illegal insider tradinghave takeover premia which are approximately 10 percentage points,or almost one-third, higher than the control sample. We conductadditional tests in an attempt to determine the direction ofcausality between illegal insider trading and takeover premiasize and explore the effect of potential detection bias. Theresults suggest both that illegal inside traders base theirtrades on factors other than premia size, and that illegal insidertrading in takeovers with large premia is not necessarily morelikely to be detected. Our findings are consistent with thehypothesis that the illegal insider trading itself tends tocreate larger takeover premia.     

Trading on inside information when there may be tippees

This paper compares four scenarios of a model in which, for the possible presence of tippees, firm insiders may not be the only persons having inside information. The four scenarios are that of free insider trading, that with a ban on insider trading, that of observable insider trading, and that with full disclosure of information. Each of these scenarios is shown to be strictly more efficient than the one before so long as there is a positive probability that a tippee exists. The paper sheds some light on why and how insider trading should be regulated, and also on the role of the disclosure system in the overall scheme of securities regulation.

Sooner or Later: An Analysis of the Delays in Insider Trading Reporting

Abstract:  Until October 2004, corporate insiders in Germany were required to report trades in the shares of their firm 'without delay'. Yet in practice, substantial reporting delays were common. We show that the delays are related systematically to the characteristics of the firm. Delays are longer in firms with dispersed ownership and in firms using German accounting standards. This suggests that managers of these firms are less responsive to the informational requirements of the capital market. We further find that abnormal returns after the reporting date of an insider trade are independent of the reporting delay. This implies that prices are distorted in the period between the insider trading and the reporting date. This is a strong point in favour of regulations that require and enforce the immediate disclosure of insider trades.     

Information‐Hedging Disclosures and Insider Trading

I model the effect of disclosure on the tradeoff between information risk, liquidity risk, and price risk for a well‐informed, risk‐averse insider. Revealing some information before trading decreases the variability of the insider's information advantage and thus reduces his information risk. Disclosure also lowers adverse selection costs for market makers, which reduces the insider's liquidity risk by increasing his trading flexibility. However, disclosure increases price risk for the insider because the price fully reflects the revealed information. The reduction in information and liquidity risks outweigh the rise in price risk when the insider is less risk averse because a less risk‐averse insider's information‐based motive for trading is stronger than his hedging motive. The opposite relation holds when the insider is more risk averse. Therefore, a less (more) risk‐averse insider experiences an increase (decrease) in welfare when he discloses some information before trading. Cost of capital and policy implications are identified.     

Does stronger corporate governance constrain insider trading? Asymmetric evidence from Australia

We investigate the role of internal corporate governance in limiting opportunities for ASX company ‘insiders’ to extract abnormal returns from trading ‘own shares’. We show that stronger governance translates into more restrictive insider trading policies and, while not resulting in lower insider purchase volumes, values or profits, it does reduce insider selling profitability. Firm size and increasing trading policy restrictiveness is associated with reduced insider purchase profitability while insider sale profitability is reduced by aggregate governance, trading restrictions and increasing trading policy restrictiveness. We conclude that internal firm governance constrains insider sales but not purchases, providing contrarian trading signals.