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1.
In this paper, we examine the impact of capital regulation on bank risk and the moderating role of deposit insurance on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk during both normal and crisis periods. Using an international sample of banks from 111 countries, our results show that stringent capital regulation reduces bank default risk, in general, during normal growth period, and this effect is not conditioned by the existence of explicit deposit insurance. Further, stringent capital regulation in place during the pre-crisis period reduces bank default risk during the crisis period, and this effect is stronger for countries with explicit deposit insurance during the pre-crisis period. These results have important policy implications to design the optimal bank regulations. 相似文献
2.
The paper aims to study the pricing issue of deposit insurance with explicit consideration of bankruptcy costs and closure policies. Full coverage from deposit insurance is imposed by many regulators to stabilize the banking system in the current financial crisis, despite of the potential moral hazard problems. We argue that bankruptcy cost is an important factor in pricing deposit insurance, especially when the insured institution is insolvent. Applying the isomorphic relationship between deposit insurance and put option, we first derive a closed-form solution for the pricing model with bankruptcy costs and closure policies. Then, we modify the barrier option approach to price the deposit insurance in which the bankruptcy cost is set as a function of asset return volatility and more realistic closure policies considering possible forbearance can be accounted for. The properties of the models are supported by numerical simulations and are consistent with the risk-based pricing scheme. 相似文献
3.
In this paper, we investigate whether and how the Deposit Insurance (DI) system and its Risk-adjusted Premium (RAP) scheme affect the systemic risk of Chinese banks. Based on bank-level panel data from 2007 to 2020 and the difference-in-differences (DID) method, we find that the establishment of the explicit DI system in China increases bank systemic risk, while the implementation of RAP alleviates this negative impact by reducing systemic risk. We further find the mechanism behind this phenomenon that bank profit acts as a mediator. We also find evidence for international heterogeneity using cross-country data and show that, as China has a longstanding implicit government guarantee, the establishment of explicit DI actually reduces the extent to which banks are protected, thus increasing bank systemic risk. Our study highlights the specificity of Chinese DI system, offers important policy implications for the design of financial safety nets in China and worldwide. 相似文献
4.
On April 1, 2002, the Japanese government lifted a blanket guarantee of all deposits and began limiting the coverage of time deposits. This paper uses this deposit insurance reform as a natural experiment to investigate the relationship between deposit insurance coverage and market discipline. I find that the reform raised the sensitivity of interest rates on deposits, and that of deposit quantity to default risk. In addition, the interest rate differentials between partially insured large time deposits and fully insured ordinary deposits increased for risky banks. These results suggest that the deposit insurance reform enhanced market discipline in Japan. I also find, however, that too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policy became a more important determinant of interest rates and deposit allocation after the reform, thereby partially offsetting the positive effects of the deposit insurance reform on overall market discipline. 相似文献
5.
Max Bruche 《Journal of Monetary Economics》2010,57(1):45-61
In the presence of deposit insurance, a rise in counterparty risk may cause a freeze in interbank money markets. We show this in a general equilibrium model with regionally segmented bank-based retail financial markets, in which money markets facilitate the reallocation of funds across banks from different regions. Counterparty risk creates an asymmetry between banks in savings-rich regions, which remain marginally financed by the abundant regional insured deposits, and in savings-poor regions, which have to pay large spreads in money markets. This asymmetry distorts the aggregate allocation of credit and, in the presence of demand externalities, can cause large output losses. 相似文献
6.
Cornelis A. Los 《Journal of Banking & Finance》1999,23(12):1997
Science progresses by improving its measurement apparatus. This holds true in finance too. The new methodology of “complete identification”, using simple algebraic geometry, throws new light on Galton's Error in finance and economics and the resulting misinformation of investors. Mutual funds conventionally advertise their relative systematic market risk, or “betas”, to potential investors based on incomplete measurement by unidirectional bivariate projections: they commit Galton's Error by under-representing their systematic risk. Consequently, far too many mutual funds are marketed as “defensive” and too few as “aggressive”. Using the new methodology it is found that, out of a total of 3217 mutual funds, 2047 funds (63.7%) claimed to be defensive based on the current industry standard methodology, but only 608 (18.9%) actually are. This under-representation of systematic risk leads to inefficiencies in the capital allocation process, since biased betas lead to mispricing of mutual funds. Complete bivariate projections produce a correct representation of the epistemic uncertainty inherent in the bivariate measurement of relative market risk and provide a new CAPM taxonomy. Our conclusions have also serious consequences for the proper “bench-marking” and recent regulatory proposals for the mutual funds industry. Extension of the new methodology to multivariate systematic risk measurement by Asset Pricing Theory (APT) is suggested. 相似文献
7.
Peter Paul Klein Richard van Kleef Josefa Henriquez Francesco Paolucci 《The Journal of risk and insurance》2023,90(1):59-91
Many regulated health insurance markets include risk adjustment (aka risk equalization) to mitigate selection incentives for insurers. Empirical studies on the design and evaluation of risk-adjustment algorithms typically focus on mandatory health insurance schemes. This paper considers risk adjustment in the context of voluntary health insurance, as found in Chile, Ireland, and Australia. In addition to the challenge of mitigating selection by insurers, regulators of these voluntary schemes have to deal with selection by consumers in and out of the market. A strategy for mitigating selection by consumers is to apply some form of risk rating. Our paper shows how risk adjustment and risk rating interact: (1) risk rating reduces the need for risk adjustment and (2) risk adjustment reduces premium variation across rating factors, thereby increasing incentives for consumers to select in and out of the market. 相似文献
8.
《Journal of Financial Stability》2013,9(4):530-544
We consider the provision of deposit insurance as the outcome of a non-cooperative policy game between nations. Nations compete for deposits in order to protect their banking systems from the destabilizing impact of potential capital flight. Policies are chosen to attract depositors who optimally respond to the expected return to deposits, which depends on deposit insurance levels, systemic risk and transaction costs. We identify both defensive and beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The model sheds light on the European banking crisis of 2008 in which individual nations ratcheted up their deposit insurance levels. 相似文献
9.
A key policy to limit the possibility of bank runs is an explicit deposit insurance scheme, which can be either privately or government funded. Using syndicated loans from 63 countries during the period 1985–2016, we study the effect of government involvement in deposit insurance funding on price and non-price characteristics of loans. We show that changes from purely private-funded to either government-funded or jointly funded deposit insurance increase all-in-spread-drawn by approximately 4.6 %, further increase loan fees, decrease loan maturity, and increase the use of performance pricing provisions. Our findings are consistent with the moral hazard problem behind government-funded deposit insurance schemes. 相似文献
10.
Ting-Fang Chiang E-Ching Wu Min-Teh Yu 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2007,29(2):205-222
This study analyzes the effect of premium rates on banks’ incentives to join a deposit insurance scheme and their incentives
to invest in risky projects under a voluntary deposit insurance scheme. We find that in order to maximize social welfare,
the insurance agency must either set the premium rate to be low so as to attract all banks to join the insurance scheme, or
not to have the deposit insurance at all. However, the low premium rate in the voluntary scheme does not balance the budget
of the deposit insurance. We also show that in the compulsory deposit insurance scheme, however, it is possible to impose
an optimal premium rate that can balance the insurance agency’s budget and achieve the highest social welfare. The results
also present the dominance of the compulsory scheme over the voluntary scheme in terms of maximizing social welfare and balancing
the budget.
相似文献
Min-Teh Yu (Corresponding author)Email: |
11.
In this paper, we propose a risk-based model for deposit insurance premiums and provide the closed-form formula for premiums, including early closure, capital forbearance, interest rate risk, and moral hazard. Our numerical analysis confirms the proposed pricing formula and the relative impact of the provisions for deposit insurance premiums. We illustrate how to use credit default swaps (CDSs) to manage the bank’s asset risk corresponding to the deposit insurance model. A failed bank, Washington Mutual, is used to demonstrate how to calibrate the model’s parameters and calculate fair premiums that are consistent with market risks on the basis of our proposed model and credit derivatives. Finally, a numerical experiment is designed to determine the optimal hedge ratio, which can minimise the variance of cash-flow of the deposit insurance corporations. 相似文献
12.
This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyholder, insurer, and reinsurer. We assume that the preferences of the parties are given by distortion risk measures, which are equivalent to dual utilities. By maximizing the dual utility of the insurer and jointly solving the optimal insurance and reinsurance contracts, it is found that a layering insurance is optimal, with every layer being borne by one of the three agents. We also show that reinsurance encourages more insurance, and is welfare improving for the economy. Furthermore, it is optimal for the insurer to charge the maximum acceptable insurance premium to the policyholder. This paper also considers three other variants of the optimal insurance/reinsurance models. The first two variants impose a limit on the reinsurance premium so as to prevent insurer to reinsure all its risk. An optimal solution is still layering insurance, though the insurer will have to retain higher risk. Finally, we study the effect of competition by permitting the policyholder to insure its risk with an insurer, a reinsurer, or both. The competition from the reinsurer dampens the price at which an insurer could charge to the policyholder, although the optimal indemnities remain the same as the baseline model. The reinsurer will however not trade with the policyholder in this optimal solution. 相似文献
13.
Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability. 相似文献
14.
John Kerr 《Journal of Risk Research》2016,19(3):331-346
This article investigates the under-researched sphere of insurance. It uses empirical research data to focus on one case study, the London art world, to analyse how the global art insurance industry ‘does’ security and how it enables risk and security to be embraced. Examining how the industry plays a crucial role in the security of art and within the art world itself, the article argues that the global art insurance industry’s role is largely beneficial for the art world because by enabling risk to be embraced through insurance, its pre-crime and post-crime responses, and its influence ‘beyond’ insurance, it emboldens and fuels the dynamic, thriving global art world. 相似文献
15.
Sema Bayraktar 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2009,32(2):169-195
This article derives international equity pricing relations by taking into account inflationary exchange risk under various
forms of market segmentation/integration. In a mean-variance framework, a two-country, two-period, two-goods model is analyzed
under three different market structures: segmented, mildly segmented and integrated. It is found that as long as investors
are consuming imported goods, in the presence of market frictions, inflationary exchange risk is an important determinant
of real equity prices. This is the case because inflationary exchange rate affects the real purchasing power of investors.
相似文献
Sema BayraktarEmail: |
16.
We analyze insurance demand when insurable losses come with an uninsurable zero-mean background risk that increases in the loss size. If the individual is risk vulnerable, loss-dependent background risk triggers a precautionary insurance motive and increases optimal insurance demand. Prudence alone is sufficient for insurance demand to increase in two cases: the case of fair insurance and the case where the smallest possible loss exceeds a certain threshold value (referred to as the large loss case). We derive conditions under which insurance demand increases or decreases in initial wealth. In the large loss case, prudence determines whether changes in the background risk lead to more insurance demand. We generalize this result to arbitrary loss distributions and find conditions based on decreasing third-degree Ross risk aversion, Arrow–Pratt risk aversion, and Arrow–Pratt temperance. 相似文献
17.
This paper investigates the relationship between the two major sources of bank default risk: liquidity risk and credit risk. We use a sample of virtually all US commercial banks during the period 1998–2010 to analyze the relationship between these two risk sources on the bank institutional-level and how this relationship influences banks’ probabilities of default (PD). Our results show that both risk categories do not have an economically meaningful reciprocal contemporaneous or time-lagged relationship. However, they do influence banks’ probability of default. This effect is twofold: whereas both risks separately increase the PD, the influence of their interaction depends on the overall level of bank risk and can either aggravate or mitigate default risk. These results provide new insights into the understanding of bank risk and serve as an underpinning for recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening banks (joint) risk management of liquidity and credit risks. 相似文献
18.
基于KMV模型对我国上市保险公司的信用风险度量 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
目前,我国对保险公司的监管主要是静态监管,不能完全满足未来经济发展对保险业监管提出的挑战。为此,本文在介绍了KMV模型后,利用KMV模型对我国已上市的保险公司的风险进行了度量,旨在探讨在未来时机成熟时保险监管中引入KMV模型,利用KMV模型良好的风险预测能力,加强和改善保险监管的可能性。 相似文献
19.
战略风险管理模式是金融企业比较流行的一种全面风险管理模型。本文在分析养老保险公司业务经营及风险管理特殊性的基础上,应用战略风险管理基本思想,提出了当前形势下养老保险公司风险管理的核心问题,并对公司目前面临的风险类别、风险因素以及风险管控措施进行了分析研究。 相似文献
20.
Previous studies support the hypothesis that institutional ownership leads to an enhanced systematic liquidity risk by increasing the commonality in liquidity. By using a proprietary database of all incoming orders and ownership structure in an emerging stock market, we show that institutional ownership leads to an increase in commonality in liquidity for mid- to-large cap firms; however, only individual ownership can lead to such an increase for small cap firms, revealing a new source of systematic liquidity risk for a specific group of firms. We also reveal that commonality decreases with the increasing number of investors (for both individual and institutional) at any firm size level; suggesting that as the investor base gets larger, views of market participants become more heterogeneous, which provides an alternative way to decrease the systematic liquidity risk. 相似文献