金融发展、汇改最优次序与长期经济增长--基于118个经济体的面板模型的分析

本文构建由金融发展、资本开放、汇率制度与产出增长组成的理论模型,选取世界上118个经济体1972-2016年的宏观数据,综合运用动态面板、面板门槛与面板IV模型进行实证分析。本文得出主要结论为:第一,在汇率制度弹性对长期经济增长的边际影响中,金融发展水平呈显著为正的调节效应;第二,对于金融发展水平较高的国家,汇率制度弹性在资本项目开放度与长期经济增长之间存在显著正向的调节效应;第三,在金融发展水平较高时,对外贸易开放度在汇率制度弹性与长期经济增长之间存在显著为正的中介效应。借鉴历史发展经验,本文归纳出"先发展国内金融市场,再开放浮动汇率,最后加强资本开放"的汇改最优次序,为我国克服汇率制度改革难点、推进资本项目开放、维持经济基本面稳定增长提出合理化政策建议。     

Deposit Insurance, Capital Adequacy Requirements and Interest Rate Dynamics

This paper examines the long run interaction among deposit insurance, bank deposit rates and capital adequacy requirements. Using analysis similar to the price discrimination model of Lott and Roberts (1991) we find that a competitive environment among banks would link the spread between insured and uninsured deposit rates to the size of the insurance premium. We also find that banks that choose to operate at the regulatory minimum capital level, would increase asset risk with increased capital requirements if (1) the implicit interest paid to insured and uninsured depositors is equally sensitive to changes in risk and capital adequacy and (2) the insurance premium is independent of the level of risk and capital adequacy. Under the present risk-based premium structure, asset risk has the potential to decline when the regulatory agency raises capital requirements. Finally, we examine the time series behavior of insured and uninsured interest rates to see if it is consistent with our theoretical model. We find that insured and uninsured rates, along with deposit insurance premiums, are cointegrated series as suggested by our model.     

Politics,credit allocation and bank capital requirements

I develop a normative theory of political influence on bank lending and capital structure. Legislators want banks to make politically-favored loans that reduce bank profits but generate social or political benefits. The regulator uses asset-choice regulation and capital requirements to induce the lending desired by legislators. There are four main results. First, if regulators dislike bank fragility, then credit-allocation regulation should be accompanied by higher capital requirements. Second, banks will resist higher capital requirements, which will be lower when banks have more bargaining power. Third, when politics matters more in bank regulation, the banking sector is larger and more competitive, with higher capital requirements. Fourth, the optimal reporting mechanism, in which banks report their privately-known profitability and the regulator endogenously determines capital requirements and stringency of credit-allocation regulation in response, shows that political influence is stronger when banks are more profitable.     

The Dynamics of Financially Constrained Arbitrage

We develop a model in which financially constrained arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies across segmented markets. We show that the dynamics of arbitrage capital are self‐correcting: following a shock that depletes capital, returns increase, which allows capital to be gradually replenished. Spreads increase more for trades with volatile fundamentals or more time to convergence. Arbitrageurs cut their positions more in those trades, except when volatility concerns the hedgeable component. Financial constraints yield a positive cross‐sectional relationship between spreads/returns and betas with respect to arbitrage capital. Diversification of arbitrageurs across markets induces contagion, but generally lowers arbitrageurs' risk and price volatility.     

利差、美元指数与跨境资本流动

一般认为跨境资本流动由利差决定,政策制定也强调利差对资本流动的指示意义。但本文发现,中国跨境资本流动历史上主要是由套汇而非套息资本决定,且套汇的显著指标是多边美元指数(DXY)而非人民币兑美元双边汇率,我们把这一现象称之为“中国的跨境资本流动之谜”。我们提出,汇率影响大于利率且多边汇率影响大于双边汇率的原因在于人民币兑美元双边汇率历史上波动幅度较小,及时和充分反映中美基本面的分化还不够。美元指数是市场指标,能够预示人民币兑美元双边汇率的走势,进而驱动资本流动。进一步研究发现,由于中国经济的外溢效应,中美经济基本面的分化不仅决定中美利差,还在很大程度上驱动美欧、美日经济基本面的分化,进而略有时滞地驱动美元指数。因此,中美利差在统计意义上是美元指数的同步甚至略微领先的指标,从这个意义上讲,政策制定仍要关注利差。随着人民币汇率弹性增强,中美利差和美元指数对中国跨境资本流动的解释力都会边际减弱。     

Dynamic risk, accounting-based valuation and firm fundamentals

This study extends the accounting-based valuation framework of Ohlson (Contemp Acc Res 11(2):661–687, 1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (Acc Rev 74(2):165–183, 1999) to incorporate dynamic expectations about the level of systematic risk in the economy. Our model explains recent empirical findings documenting a strong negative association between changes in economy-wide risk and future stock returns. Importantly, the model also generates costs of capital that are solely a linear function of accounting variables and other firm fundamentals, including the book-to-market ratio, the earnings-to-price ratio, the forward earnings-to-price ratio, size and the dividend yield. This result provides a theoretical rationale for the inclusion of these popular variables in cost of capital (expected return) computations by the accounting and finance literatures and obviates the need to estimate costs of capital from unobservable (future) covariances. The model also generates an accounting return decomposition in the spirit of Vuolteenaho (J Finance 57(1):233–264, 2002). Empirically, we find that costs of capital generated by our model are significantly associated with future returns both in and out of sample in contrast to standard benchmark models. We further obtain significantly lower valuation errors in out-of-sample tests than traditional models that ignore dynamic risk expectations.     

Acquisition finance and market timing

Bidders have an incentive to pay with stock when their shares are overvalued, but target firms should be reluctant to accept such overvalued payment. In a sample of 2978 acquisitions, we find that stock payment is readily accepted only when the bidder can justify the financing decision in terms of such economic fundamentals as optimal capital structure. Yet even when the fundamentals justify stock payment, paying with cash is common. In that way, firms can preclude paying with undervalued stock and are more likely to experience positive long-term excess returns.     

全球金融周期与跨境资本流动

本文从全球42个主要的股票市场指数提取全球股票市场因子,作为全球金融周期的代理变量,考察全球金融周期对跨境资本总流入的影响。结果发现:(1)当全球股票市场因子(全球风险规避和不确定性)上升时,跨境资本流入显著下降;(2)一国处于经济繁荣时期,经济增速和利率处于相对较高水平,全球金融周期对资本流入的影响会减弱;(3)一国资本账户开放程度或金融发展水平越高,全球金融周期对资本流入的影响会越强;(4)更具弹性的汇率制度尽管不能完全隔绝全球金融周期的影响,但相比固定汇率制度,可提高一国抵御全球金融周期冲击的能力;(5)美国货币政策冲击是全球金融周期的重要驱动因素,并通过全球金融周期影响跨境资本流动。本文的政策含义在于,一国应夯实经济基本面、采取富有弹性的汇率制度和适当的资本管制措施,以缓解全球金融周期给资本流动带来的冲击。     

Capital Requirements,Monetary Policy,and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending. The model predicts that the bank's decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower's stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital-constrained the bank. I provide empirical support for this prediction. The model explains the recent inability of the Federal Reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply. I show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk.     

Overreaction in capital flows to emerging markets: Booms and sudden stops

This paper applies the overreaction hypothesis of De Bont and Thaler [De Bont, W., Thaler, R., 1985. Does stock market overreact? Journal of Finance 40(3), 793–805], developed for stock price behavior, to capital flows to emerging markets. We find that a surge in capital flows, or what we call a capital boom, can predict future sharp contractions in capital flows, or sudden stops. We use a large list of possible economic fundamentals as control variables, and the results show that the best predictor of a sudden stop is a preceding capital boom. Moreover, the probability of a country undergoing a sudden stop increases considerably with the length of the boom: this probability more than doubles when the boom is three years old, and rises by three to four times when the boom lasts for four years. These results are interesting for two reasons. In the first place, they contradict previous studies that emphasize worsening fundamentals as the ultimate cause of a sudden stop. Second, they are of policy interest because of the enormous negative impacts that sudden stops have on the real economy.     

The Interaction between Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy

The interaction between capital requirements and monetary policy is assessed by means of simple rules in a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring a banking sector. In “normal” times, when economic dynamics are driven by supply shocks, an active use of capital requirements generates modest benefits in terms of volatility of the target variables compared to the case in which only the central bank carries out stabilization policies. The lack of cooperation between the two policymakers may result in excessive volatility of the monetary policy rate and capital requirements. The benefits of introducing capital requirements become sizeable when financial shocks, which affect the supply of loans, are important drivers of economic dynamics; the availability of capital requirements as a policy tool yields a significant gain in terms of macroeconomic stabilization, regardless of the type of interaction between monetary and capital requirements policies.     

Bank Portfolio Allocation: The Impact of Capital Requirements, Regulatory Monitoring, and Economic Conditions

This paper develops a structural, dynamic model of a banking firm to analyze how banks adjust their loan portfolios over time. In the model, banks experience capital shocks, face uncertain future loan demand, and incur costs based on their proximity to regulatory minimum capital requirements and the intensity of regulatory monitoring. Implications of the model then are estimated using panel data on large U.S. commercial banks operating continuously between December 1989 and December 1997. The estimated model is used to simulate the optimal bank response to (1) past and proposed changes in capital requirements, (2) changes in regulatory monitoring intensity, and (3) economic downturns. The simulation results are used to shed light on the decline in loan growth and the rise in bank capital ratios witnessed over a decade ago as well as the possible impact of the current proposed modification to capital requirements.     

Incentive-Based Lending Capacity,Competition and Regulation in Banking

This paper studies moral hazard in banking due to delegated monitoring in an environment of aggregate risk and examines its implications for credit market equilibrium and regulation, in a model where banks are price competitors for loans and deposits. It provides a rationale for an incentive-based lending capacity positively linked to the bank's capital and profit margin, for an oligopolistic market structure wherever banks have market power, and for capital requirements. Social-welfare-maximizing capital requirements are lowered in recessions, are higher the more fragmented the banking sector, and are increased when anti-competitive measures are removed. In equilibrium banks earn excessive profits and credit may be rationed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G28, L13.     

Are Financial Constraints Priced? Evidence from Firm Fundamentals and Stock Returns

Using comprehensive firm‐ and aggregate‐level data, this paper studies the real and financial implications of capital market imperfections. We first examine whether financially constrained firms' business fundamentals (capital spending and operating earnings) are more sensitive to macroeconomic movements than unconstrained firms' fundamentals. We then examine whether financial constraint “return factors” respond to macroeconomic shocks in tandem with the responses from business fundamentals. The evidence in this paper points to financial constraints affecting both fundamental quantities and asset returns.     

Agglomeration,tax competition,and fiscal equalization

This paper analyzes the impact of fiscal equalization on asymmetric tax competition when positive agglomeration externalities are present. It uses a model focusing on the strategic reason for capital taxes to demonstrate that per capita fiscal capacity equalization improves the spatial allocation of capital provided a sufficiently rich (marginally) larger region and sufficiently strong agglomeration externalities. If tax revenue is used to finance public goods, per capita fiscal capacity equalization generally cannot simultaneously eliminate public good inefficiency and spatial inefficiency. However, the achievement of full efficiency for ex ante identical regions requires excessive (full) equalization in the presence (absence) of agglomeration externalities.     

Credit derivatives, capital requirements and opaque OTC markets

In this paper we study the optimal design of credit derivative contracts when banks have private information about their ability in the loan market and are subject to capital requirements. First, we prove that when banks are subject to a maximum loss capital requirement the optimal signaling contract is a binary credit default basket. Second, we show that if credit derivative markets are opaque then banks cannot commit to terminal-date risk exposure, and therefore the optimal signaling contract is more costly. The above results allow us to discuss the potential implications of different capital adequacy rules for the credit derivative markets.     

Procyclicality: The Macroeconomic Impact of Risk-Based Capital Requirements

Recent research on the Basel II capital framework suggests that binding capital requirements may be responsible for bank behaviour which causes procyclical amplifications of the macroeconomic cycle. This paper presents a model of the interrelations between the state of the economy, credit risk, and loan supply to clarify and quantify this effect. Special attention is paid to the fact that both regulatory and economic capital requirements can significantly influence loan supply, provided that they are binding. The model shows that both economic capital, based on a one-factor model, and the regulatory IRB requirements cause more procyclicality than the constant regulatory requirements of the Basel I capital accord. However, the overall impact depends on the interrelation of the regulatory requirements with economic capital. Based on this result, the replacement of the Basel I requirements with risk-sensitive IRB capital requirements boosts procyclicality under most, but not under all conditions.     

Value-at-risk vs. building block regulation in banking

Existing regulatory capital requirements are often criticized for only being loosely linked to the economic risk of the banks' assets. In view of the attempts of international regulators to introduce more risk sensitive capital requirements, we theoretically examine the effect of specific regulatory capital requirements on the risk-taking behavior of banks. More precisely, we develop a continuous time framework where the banks' choice of asset risk is endogenously determined. We compare regulation based on the Basel I building block approach to value-at-risk or ‘internal model’-based capital requirements with respect to risk taking behavior, deposit insurance liability, and shareholder value. The main findings are: (i) value-at-risk-based capital regulation creates a stronger incentive to reduce asset risk when banks are solvent, (ii) solvent banks that reduce their asset risk reduce the current value of the deposit insurance liability significantly, (iii) under value-at-risk regulation the risk reduction behavior of banks is less sensitive to changes in their investment opportunity set, and (iv) banks' equityholders can benefit from risk-based capital requirements.     

Do prices reflect market fundamentals in real estate markets?

The purpose of this article is to examine prices on land and REIT shares for possible evidence of deviations from market fundamentals, the underlying economic forces. Models of market fundamentals are developed from the intertemporal capital asset pricing model so that risk aversion and a stochastic investment opportunity set can be incorporated in the analysis. The approach in this article is to compare ex post values of actual discounted cash flows with prices and to test whether the price series are unbiased predictors of the future discounted cash flows. Several tests of the relationship are presented, and the results suggest that prices of real estate investment trusts and prices of farm land do not always reflect fundamental value.     

Is mark-to-market accounting destabilizing? Analysis and implications for policy

Fundamental economic principles provide a rationale for requiring financial institutions to use mark-to-market, or fair value, accounting for financial reporting. The recent turmoil in financial markets, however, has raised questions about whether fair value accounting is exacerbating the problems. In this paper, we review the history and practice of fair value accounting, and summarize the literature on the channels through which it can adversely affect the real economy. We propose a new model to study the interaction of accounting rules with regulatory capital requirements, and show that even when market prices always reflect fundamental values, the interaction of fair value accounting rules and a simple capital requirement can create inefficiencies that are absent when capital is measured by adjusted book value. These distortions can be avoided, however, by redefining capital requirements to be procyclical rather than by abandoning fair value accounting and the other benefits that it provides.