Monetary policy and regional availability of debt financing

The relative availability of bond and bank financing should affect the firm's external financing and investment decisions. We define a measure that proxies for the regional borrowing inflexibility to substitute between bank and bond financing: “debt inflexibility”. Debt inflexibility tilts the firm's financial structure towards equity and reduces investment. The impact is stronger during the period of tight monetary policy, particularly for smaller firms and firms without banking relationships. Debt inflexibility increases the sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flows, reduces the likelihood of dividend payment and makes the firm more likely to pay equity in mergers and acquisitions.     

Firm location and corporate debt

This study examines the influence of a firm’s geographical location on corporate debt and provides evidence that the higher cost of collecting information on firms distant from urban areas has significant implications on a wide array of corporate debt characteristics. We find that rural firms face higher debt yield spreads and attract smaller and less prestigious bank syndicates than urban firms. Rural firms attempt to reduce their informational disadvantage by relying more on relationship banking. Our results on the effect of location on corporate debt are robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of firm and issue characteristics.     

Bankruptcy laws and debt renegotiation

This paper analyzes the effect of the toughness of bankruptcy law on the number of liquidations in a simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information, where the creditor cannot credibly commit to liquidate the firm if the default occurs. In our setting we consider a bankruptcy law to be a one-dimensional variable that influences creditor's expectation value of collateral. We find that there is an interval of the bankruptcy law, where the number of liquidations decreases in the toughness of the bankruptcy law. We also find that if the liquidation costs are high, softer bankruptcy law is preferred.     

Incomplete contracts,renegotiation, and the choice between bank loans and public debt issues

In a two-period model where an investment project is funded with standard debt, the probability distribution of final cash flow is determined, at the interim date, by an unverifiable state of nature together with a choice by the controlling party (entrepreneur or creditor). With a control allocation contingent on a noisy default signal, renegotiation may improve efficiency in two ways: (i) reduce excessive risk-taking – due to the entrepreneur's moral hazard – through debt forgiveness; (ii) avoid the costs of financial distress associated with excessive liquidation or underinvestment by debt-holders, by letting them receive an equity stake in the firm. Such efficiency gain is an advantage of bank loans over publicly traded debt, given that the former are more easily renegotiated than the latter. The difference between the two types of debt is increasing in the degree of contractual incompleteness (noise present in the default signal) and in the portion of project value accounted for by future discretionary investment options.     

Distressed debt prices and recovery rate estimation

This paper has two purposes. First, it uses distressed debt prices to estimate recovery rates at default. In this regard, estimates are obtained for three recovery rate models: recovery of face value, recovery of Treasury, and recovery of market value. We show that identifying the “economic” default date, as distinct from the recorded default date, is crucial to obtaining unbiased estimates. The economic default date is defined to be the first date when the market prices the firm’s debt as if it has defaulted. An implication is that the standard industry practice of using 30-day post default prices to compute recovery rate yields biased estimates. Second, we construct and estimate a distressed debt pricing model. We use this model to implicitly estimate the parameters of the embedded recovery rate process and to price distressed debt. Our distressed debt pricing model fits market prices well, with an average pricing error of less than one basis point.      

The ins and outs of mortgage debt during the housing boom and bust

From 1999 to 2013, U.S. mortgage debt doubled before contracting sharply. I estimate mortgage inflows and outflows that shed light on the sources of volatility. During the boom, inflows from real estate investors tripled, far outpacing other segments such as first-time homebuyers. During the bust, a collapse in inflows keyed the debt decline, while an expansion of outflows due to defaults played a more minor role. Inflow declines partly reflect a dramatic falloff in first-time homebuying, especially for low credit score individuals. Further analysis helps support the notion that the differential decline by credit score reflects markedly tightened credit supply.     

The market for corporate control and the cost of debt

How do bondholders view the existence of an open market for corporate control? Between 1985 and 1991, 30 states in the U.S. enacted business combination (BC) laws, raising the cost of corporate takeovers. Relying on these exogenous events, we estimate the influence of the market for corporate control on the cost of debt. We identify different channels through which an open market for corporate control can benefit or harm bondholders: a reduction in managerial slack or the “quiet life,” resulting in higher profitability and firm value; a coinsurance effect, in which firms become less risky after being acquired; and an increasing leverage effect, in which bondholder wealth is expropriated through leverage-increasing takeovers. Consistent with the first two mechanisms, we find that the cost of debt rose after the passage of the BC laws; moreover, it rose sharply for firms in non-competitive industries, and for firms rated speculative-grade. In contrast, there is virtually no effect for firms in competitive industries, or firms rated investment-grade.     

提升债务本币化程度 完善我国外债管理

外债作为对境外资金利用的一种形式,一定程度上是国家综合实力和经济承受力的体现。从别国本币外债的发展趋势看,发达经济体本币外债占比一直较高,新兴经济体近年来普遍呈上升态势。发展本币外债的主要动因,在于其能消除货币错配风险、规避汇率风险以及便利本币跨境使用等。随着人民币跨境使用需求的增长,人民币外债类型和规模将逐渐增多,建议按照国际标准建立统一的全口径外债统计体系等方式,完善我国本外币外债管理。     

Nominal versus indexed debt: A quantitative horse race

The main arguments in favor and against nominal and indexed debts are the incentive to default through inflation versus hedging against unforeseen shocks. We model and calibrate these arguments to assess their quantitative importance. We use a dynamic equilibrium model with tax distortion, government outlays uncertainty, and contingent-debt service. Our framework also recognizes that contingent debt can be associated with incentive problems and lack of commitment. Thus, the benefits of unexpected inflation are tempered by higher interest rates. We obtain that costs from inflation more than offset the benefits from reducing tax distortions. We further discuss sustainability of nominal debt in developing (volatile) countries.     

Corporate investment and financing under asymmetric information

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of corporate actions and their debt-equity mix. Using this result, we show that asymmetric information induces firms with good prospects to speed up investment, leading to a significant erosion of the option value of waiting to invest. Additionally, we demonstrate that informational asymmetries may not translate into a financing hierarchy or pecking order over securities. Finally, we generate a rich set of testable implications relating firms’ investment and financing strategies, abnormal announcement returns, and external financing costs to a number of managerial, firm, and industry characteristics.     

基于VECM模型的信贷约束、家庭债务与中国宏观经济波动分析

采用1997~2013年家庭债务、贷款价值比与 GDP 增长率等变量数据,在借鉴 Kim 的模型基础上,构建 VECM 模型,检验了信贷约束、家庭债务与中国宏观经济波动之间的关系。结果表明：短期内宽松的借贷约束促进了家庭债务的增加,从而推动经济增长,但从长期来看,宽松的借贷约束会导致家庭债务过高,阻碍长期经济增长;与居民消费率、家庭债务等变量相比,贷款价值比、利率对宏观经济波动的影响较大。因此,政府决策部门应制定合理的消费金融政策,居民应通过优化家庭资产组合,以实现家庭债务的可持续性增长,从而促进经济增长。     

Establishing bounds on the tax advantage to debt

The partial dismantling of the imputation tax system that commenced in July 1997 once more opens the discussion on the relative tax advantage to debt and its impact on the cost of capital. In this paper we examine the implications of these recent changes for the value of the tax advantage to debt. We analyse the value of debt-related tax shields by computing the individual tax liabilities of 1268 quoted companies that reported during the period 1980–2000 taking account of any tax exhaustion or surplus ACT. We use these estimates to establish an upper bound on the tax advantage to debt. We conclude that even following the 1997 changes in the imputation tax system the probable value for the average current tax advantage to debt in the UK at present is at most about 13% of the value of debt.     

Capital structure and financing of SMEs: Australian evidence

This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure and use of financing for small and medium sized enterprises. Hypotheses utilising static trade-off and pecking order arguments are empirically examined using a series of firm characteristics including: size, asset structure, profitability, growth and risk. The hypotheses developed are tested using a large Australian nationwide panel survey. The results suggest that asset structure, profitability and growth are important determinants of capital structure and financing. For asset structure the direction of the influence is reliant upon the capital structure or financing measure employed. The results generally support static trade-off and pecking order arguments proposed by theoretical models.     

An empirical analysis of corporate debt maturity structure

This paper provides an empirical investigation of the maturity structure of corporate debt. A dynamic model is estimated by GMM estimation procedure using data for an unbalanced panel of 429 non-financial UK firms over the period of 1983–96. The evidence provides strong support for the hypotheses that firms with more growth opportunities in their investment sets tend to have more shorter-term debt and firm size exerts a negative impact on debt maturity structure. The results also support the maturity-matching hypothesis that firms match the maturity structure of their debt to the maturity of their assets. There is less support for the view that firms use their debt maturity structure to signal information to the market. We do not find evidence for a negative correlation between taxes and debt maturity. Our results also suggest that firms have long-term target ratios and they adjust to the target ratio relatively fast, which might indicate that the costs of being away from target ratios are significant for firms.     

Leadership structure and the value of debt contracts: Evidence from the Canadian market

This paper investigates the impact of a firm's leadership structure on its ability to generate value from loans by examining the market reaction to the disclosure of Canadian bank credit agreements. Two leadership structures are considered in this paper. In the first scenario, the positions of Chief Executive Officer and Chair of the Board are held by two different persons (denoted as a Separate CEO-Chair structure); in the second scenario, both positions are held by the same person (denoted as a Combined CEO-Chair structure).We observe a stronger market reaction to the announcement of bank credit agreements when firms have a Separate CEO-Chair structure (relative to a Combined CEO-Chair structure). This stronger market reaction for firms with a Separate CEO-Chair structure suggests that the division of CEO and Chair of the Board responsibilities between two people enhances a firm's ability to generate value from its loans. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the observed market reaction for firms with a Separate CEO-Chair structure is even greater when the size of the board of directors is small. Our results also indicate that bank monitoring activities are more valuable for firms with a Combined CEO-Chair structure and no institutional shareholder.