运营时滞、债务协商和可转债融资企业投资决策研究

在运营时滞的背景下,将债务协商机制引入到利用股权和可转债融资的上市企业,建立动态模型分析企业的投资问题。数值分析表明：在相同的运营时滞下,如果股东谈判能力较弱（强）,相比于破产清算,债务协商会加速（推迟）投资;项目首次投资成本和股东谈判能力会同时影响运营时滞与企业投资水平之间的关系。当首次投资成本低时,随着运营时滞增加,较强（弱）的股东谈判能力会推迟（加速）投资;当首次投资成本较高时,运营时滞增加会推迟投资,但股东谈判能力越强,推迟程度越小;债务协商可以提高实物期权价值,并且实物期权价值和股东谈判能力成正比,和运营时滞成反比。     

Strategic Default and Equity Risk Across Countries

We show that the prospect of a debt renegotiation favorable to shareholders reduces the firm's equity risk. Equity beta and return volatility are lower in countries where the bankruptcy code favors debt renegotiations and for firms with more shareholder bargaining power relative to debt holders. These relations weaken as the country's insolvency procedure favors liquidations over renegotiations. In the limit, when debt contracts cannot be renegotiated, equity risk is independent of shareholders' incentives to default strategically. We argue that these findings support the hypothesis that the threat of strategic default can reduce the firm's equity risk.     

Dynamic capital structure with callable debt and debt renegotiations

We consider a dynamic trade-off model of a firm's capital structure with debt renegotiation. Debt holders only accept restructuring offers from equity holders backed by threats which are in the equity holders' own interest to execute. Our model shows that in a complete information model in which taxes and bankruptcy costs are the only frictions, violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are typically optimal. The size of the bankruptcy costs and the equity holders' bargaining power affect the size of APR violations, but they have only a minor impact on the choice of capital structure.     

Debt valuation, renegotiation, and optimal dividend policy

The valuation of debt and equity, reorganization boundaries,and firm's optimal dividend policies are studied in a frameworkwhere we model strategic interactions between debt holders andequity holders in a game-theoretic setting which can accommodatevarying bargaining powers to the two claimants. Two formulationsof reorganization are presented: debt-equity swaps and strategicdebt service resulting from negotiated debt service reductions.We study the effects of bond covenants on payout policies anddistinguish liquidity-induced defaults from strategic defaults.We derive optimal equity issuance and payout policies. The debtcapacity of the firm and the optimal capital structure are characterized.     

Debt overhang and non-distressed debt restructuring

In this paper, we analyse the restructuring of debt in the presence of debt overhang. The firm starts out with a debt liability and an investment opportunity. Then with unrestructured debt, the firm maintains the current borrowing payments until default or investment. If the creditors allow the parties to restructure the debt with exchange offers, then the borrowing payments change as well as the default and investment points. We find that there is a unique optimal restructuring path which maintains debt at positive levels but defers default indefinitely. This path is optimal regardless of whether the debt holders or the firm control the process through superior bargaining power. Moreover, a debt-for-equity exchange to remove all existing debt takes place just before investment that is followed by the issue of an optimal amount of new debt as part of the funding for the investment cost. The optimal investment trigger is higher along the optimal restructuring path than it is for an unlevered firm. We discuss the findings in the light of existing empirical evidence.     

The Debt Trap: Wealth Transfers and Debt‐Equity Choices of Junk‐Grade Firms

If outstanding debt is risky, issuing equity transfers wealth from equity holders to debt holders. If existing leverage is high and bankruptcy costs are small, this wealth transfer effect outweighs the gains to stockholders from optimizing firm value. Empirically, we find that for investment‐grade firms, higher leverage implies a greater likelihood of issuing equity, as expected in a standard tradeoff model. However, consistent with the impact of wealth transfer effects, for junk‐grade firms, higher leverage implies a greater likelihood of issuing debt. The analysis implies an additional route through which historical shocks determine firms’ financing choices.     

The real effects of credit default swaps

We examine the effect of introducing credit default swaps (CDSs) on firm value. Our model allows for dynamic investment and financing, and bondholders can trade in the CDS market. The model incorporates both negative and positive effects of CDSs. CDS markets lead to more liquidations, but they also reduce the probability of costly debt renegotiation and reduce costly equity financing. After calibrating the model, we find that firm value increases by 2.9% on average with the introduction of a CDS market. Firms also invest more and increase leverage. The effect on firm value is strongest for small, financially constrained, and low productivity firms.     

Inside debt renegotiation: Optimal debt reduction,timing, and the number of rounds

This paper develops a model of debt renegotiation in a structural framework that accounts for taxes, bankruptcy costs and renegotiation costs. To our knowledge, all the previous work on debt renegotiation implies an infinite number of renegotiations. This feature preempts the analysis of the optimal number of renegotiations. We address this drawback by incorporating fixed renegotiation costs in a model of multiple renegotiations, hence obtaining a small finite number of renegotiations. Simple analytical formulae are derived for debt and equity, as well as implicit formulae for the coupon reduction, as a result of a backward recursive technique. The results show that the optimal number of renegotiations, the size and the dynamics of the coupon reductions depend critically on the bargaining power of the claimants. Testable empirical implications regarding multiple costly renegotiations are drawn.     

Investment,agency conflicts,debt maturity,and loan guarantees by negotiation

We consider an irreversible investment, of which the sunk cost is financed by a finite-term debt after entering into an option-for-guarantee swap (OGS) with negotiation. The OGS is a three-party agreement among a lender (bank), an insurer, and a borrower (entrepreneur), where the bank lends at a given interest rate to the entrepreneur and if the borrower defaults on debt, the insurer must pay all the principal and remaining interests to the lender instead of the borrower. In return for the guarantee, the borrower must allocate a perpetual American call option to purchase a fraction (guarantee cost) of his equity at a given strike price. We find that the investment threshold decreases but the exercise threshold of the insurer’s option increases with the borrower’s bargaining power. Both the investment and exercise threshold increase with debt maturity, but there is a U-shaped relation between the guarantee cost and debt maturity. The borrower postpones investment once the funding gap or project risk increases. The swap may overcome the inefficiencies from asset substitution and debt overhang, strongly depending on the debt maturity and borrower’s bargaining power.     

Accelerated investment effect of risky debt

In this paper we examine a new effect of risky debt on a firm’s investment strategy. We call this effect “accelerated investment”. It stems from a potential loss of investment option in the event of default. The possibility of default reduces the value of the option to wait and provides equity holders with an incentive to speed up investment. As a result, in the absence of wealth expropriation by a levered firm’s debt holders, its shareholders exercise their investment option earlier than the shareholders of an otherwise identical all-equity firm. This result is at odds with the generally accepted intuition that in the absence of potential wealth transfers and taxes the shareholders of a levered firm would follow the same investment policy as that of an unlevered firm. In addition to providing various illustrations of the accelerated investment effect, we relate its magnitude to the presence of competition for investment opportunities.     

Convertible debt and investment timing

In this paper we provide an investment-based explanation for the popularity of convertible debt. Specifically, we demonstrate the ability of convertible debt to alleviate and potentially totally eliminate the underinvestment problem of Myers (1977). A conversion feature induces shareholders to accelerate investment. This effect arises from the incentive of equity holders to accelerate the issuance of new equity, used to finance investment, since by investing early shareholders dilute the value of convertible debt holders by reducing their proportional claims to the firm's cash flows. Since the underinvestment effect and the accelerated investment effect work in opposite directions, convertible debt allows to mitigate or completely eliminate the debt overhang problem. In addition, we show that by choosing the right combination of straight debt and convertible debt, shareholders can, for a wide range of overall debt levels, commit to the investment strategy of an all-equity firm.     

The choice between informal and formal restructuring: The case of French banks facing distressed SMEs

This empirical paper investigates the paths leading to the resolution of financial distress for a sample of small and medium-sized French firms in default, focusing in particular on their decisions between bankruptcy and informal (out-of-court) renegotiations. The procedure is depicted as a sequential game in which stakeholders first decide whether to engage in an informal renegotiation. Second, conditional on opting for renegotiation, the debtor and its creditors may succeed or fail in reaching an agreement to restructure the firm’s capital structure. We test different hypotheses that capture (i) coordination and bargaining power issues, (ii) informational problems, (iii) firm characteristics, and (iv) loan characteristics. The empirical implementation is based on sequential LOGIT regressions. First, we find that the likelihood of informal renegotiations increases with loan size and the proportion of long-term debt. These two results support the argument that size matters when deciding whether to opt for informal renegotiation. Second, the probability of a successful renegotiation decreases when (i) the bank in charge of handling the process is the debtor’s “main” creditor and when (ii) the firm is badly rated and its management is considered faulty. Third, the estimations show that collateral plays a significant role in the first stage of the renegotiation process. However, it does not impact the likelihood of success in reaching a renegotiated agreement. Finally, some banks are clearly better than others at leading successful renegotiation processes.     

Renegotiation of financial contracts: Evidence from private credit agreements

Using a large sample of private credit agreements between U.S. publicly traded firms and financial institutions, we show that over 90% of long-term debt contracts are renegotiated prior to their stated maturity. Renegotiations result in large changes to the amount, maturity, and pricing of the contract, occur relatively early in the life of the contract, and are rarely a consequence of distress or default. The accrual of new information concerning the credit quality, investment opportunities, and collateral of the borrower, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations in credit and equity market conditions, are the primary determinants of renegotiation and its outcomes. The terms of the initial contract (e.g., contingencies) also play an important role in renegotiations; by altering the structure of the contract in a state contingent manner, renegotiation is partially controlled by the contractual assignment of bargaining power.     

DOES FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY REDUCE INVESTMENT DISTORTIONS?

The average U.S. firm has less leverage than one would expect based on the trade‐off between tax shields and bankruptcy costs. We focus on firms’ financial flexibility and examine whether firms preserve debt capacity to reduce investment distortions in the future. We find that firms with high unused debt capacity invest more in future years than do firms with low unused debt capacity. Furthermore, firms that are reluctant to borrow in unconstrained periods are more likely to issue debt in periods in which access to capital markets is more constrained.     

Callable or convertible debt? The role of debt overhang and covenants

We analyze what role debt overhang and covenants have in a manager’s choice between issuing callable or convertible debt when a firm needs to issue a substantial amount of debt. Callable bonds provide a higher coupon in exchange for a repurchase option. Convertible bonds offer bondholders the option to exchange debt to equity. Using a dynamic capital structure model with investment choice, we find that callable debt implies a larger debt overhang friction, and for highly leveraged firms convertible debt is preferred. Moreover, if outstanding bonds have net-worth covenants attached, callable bonds are more likely to be issued. Our empirical findings support the theory.     

On the determinants of the implied default barrier

Many structural models specify the default barrier, but few have explored its empirical significance and determinants. The effect of liquidity shortage is not well measured, nor is the effect of strategic default well identified. We use the maximum likelihood (ML) approach to estimate the default barrier model and the Merton-KMV model using market values of equities in a sample of 762 public industrial firms. The estimated barrier is below leverage in our sample. The default probability from the two structural models provides similar in-sample fits, but the default barrier framework achieves better out-of-sample forecasts. Our analysis also focuses on the factors that influence the level of the implied default barrier when leverage is endogenous, and shows that endogenous leverage is not the only determinant of the default barrier as predicted by the standard structural credit model. The implied default threshold is positively related to financing costs, and negatively related to liquidity, asset volatility, and firm size. Three strategic default variables (liquidation costs, renegotiation frictions and equity holders’ bargaining power) increase the implied default barrier level. This evidence supports strategic default models.     

The Bankruptcy Decision and Debt Contract Renegotiations

We consider the bankruptcy law and workout practices in theUnited States and model bankruptcy as a strategic decision.We analyze a firm's choice between liquidation under Chapter7, renegotiation of the debt contract in a workout, and reorganizationunder Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Our premise is thata financially distressed firm chooses its action in order tominimize the loss in value caused by the well-known over- andunder-investment problems. We show that the firm initiates aworkout when it faces under-investment, and commences Chapter11 when it faces over-investment. Some of the results are: (i)in default, total firm value and equity value increase uponthe announcement of a workout and decrease upon the announcementof Chapter 11; (ii) firms with shorter maturity of debt aremore likely to reorganize in a workout; (iii) among the firmsthat renegotiate their debt contract, the proportion of firmsentering Chapter 11 is higher for firms in mature industriesthan for firms in growth industries.     

On debt service and renegotiation when debt-holders are more strategic

The contingent claims analysis of firm financing often presents a debt renegotiation game with a passive bank that does not use its ability to force liquidation strategically, contrary to what is observed in practice. We consider two motives that may lead a bank to refuse to renegotiate: maintaining its reputation to preserve its future lending activity and deterring firms from overstating their debt service abatement when they renegotiate. We show that with public information and private debt only, the optimal probability of debt renegotiation is high when the firm’s anticipated liquidation value is high. Under asymmetric information about liquidation value, the high liquidation value firm may be tempted to mimic the low liquidation value firm to reduce its debt service. To deter such mimicking, banks may sometimes refuse to renegotiate with firms having a low liquidation value.     

The Bankruptcy Decision and Debt Contract Renegotiations

We consider the bankruptcy law and workout practices in the United States and model bankruptcy as a strategic decision. We analyze a firm's choice between liquidation under Chapter 7, renegotiation of the debt contract in a workout, and reorganization under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Our premise is that a financially distressed firm chooses its action in order to minimize the loss in value caused by the well-known over- and under-investment problems. We show that the firm initiates a workout when it faces under-investment, and commences Chapter 11 when it faces over-investment. Some of the results are: (i) in default, total firm value and equity value increase upon the announcement of a workout and decrease upon the announcement of Chapter 11; (ii) firms with shorter maturity of debt are more likely to reorganize in a workout; (iii) among the firms that renegotiate their debt contract, the proportion of firms entering Chapter 11 is higher for firms in mature industries than for firms in growth industries.     

The changing relevance of accounting information to debt holders over time

A number of studies have examined the change over time in the information content of accounting numbers to stockholders. However, the stockholders’ perspective is not necessarily identical to that of debt holders. The two groups face different risks and rewards, and thus their informational needs are not the same. We examine the change in the information content of accounting numbers over time from the debt holders’ perspective and hypothesize about the economic and reporting factors likely to affect this change. Using the association between accounting numbers and bond valuation and returns, we find that the information content to debt holders has increased over time. In contrast, but consistent with prior studies, we find that the information content to equity holders has declined. The results suggest that the increased information content to debt holders is related to changes in credit risk and to reporting factors such as the increase in reporting conservatism, the shift towards fair value accounting, and the increase in the frequency of losses. The findings contribute to the scant literature on the use of accounting information by debt holders and the extent to which financial reporting meets their unique needs.