Fiscal Stimulus and Endogenous Firm Entry in a Monopolistic Competition Macroeconomic Model

This paper sets up a monopolistic competition model featuring the returns to production specialization. Some novel results are derived from the analysis. First, the effect of a fiscal stimulus on consumption may be positive or negative, depending crucially upon whether the production function is characterized by increasing or decreasing returns to production specialization. Second, following a fiscal expansion, increasing returns to specialization lead to a positive linkage between real wages and aggregate output, while decreasing returns to specialization result in a negative relationship between real wages and aggregate output. Third, a fiscal expansion may raise social welfare, provided that the degree of increasing returns to production specialization is sufficiently large.     

内生增长、政府生产性支出与中国居民消费

中国财政支出的较大一部分用于生产建设,中国居民消费与政府生产性支出表现出稳健的正相关关系,这一事实与从标准的新古典和新凯恩斯模型得出的挤出效应截然不同。本文构建了包含存量和流量两部分政府生产性支出的内生增长模型,研究表明,政府支出增加在提高税负、挤出居民消费的同时,也通过其生产性增加收入、挤入居民消费;政府支出增加究竟挤入还是挤出居民消费取决于两种效应的比较以及政府的生产性支出比重和税负水平。政府生产性支出的最优结构等于其相对生产性之比,政府支出的最优规模等于政府支出的生产性。     

PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS AND FALLING TRADE COSTS: BOON OR BANE?*

This article looks at two features of globalization, namely, productivity improvements and falling trade costs, and explores their effect on welfare in a monopolistic competition model with heterogenous firms and technological asymmetries. Contrary to received wisdom, and for reasons different from adverse terms of trade effects, it is shown that improvements in a partner's productivity must hurt us. Moreover, falling trade costs can raise welfare in the technologically advanced country while reducing it in the backward one, if technological asymmetries are large enough.     

Tax Base and Crowding‐in Effects of Balanced Budget Fiscal Policy

A dynamic general equilibrium business cycle model is constructed with staggered price adjustment, monopolistic wage setting and distortionary taxation. The government purchases goods, runs an unemployment benefit system and balances its budget through a proportional tax on labour income. A temporary tax‐financed increase in government expenditures can lower the tax rate through a demand‐induced widening of the tax base. It is shown analytically that this allows private consumption to rise, under realistic conditions, despite the negative wealth effect of increased fiscal spending.     

Fiscal federalism,jurisdictional competition,and the size of government

Fiscal federalism is commonly held to reduce the size of government, but how does it do so: through shrinking the welfare state, cutting government consumption, or reducing public investment? This paper examines tax competition under fiscal federalism through the lens of imperfect competition theory, derives new empirical implications from different theories of fiscal federalism, and tests those hypotheses with new variables and data. Cross-national statistical results show that jurisdictional competition under fiscal federalism is associated with reductions in the administrative expense of government but not the size of the welfare state. Moreover, the apparent impact of fiscal federalism with a high degree of jurisdictional competition is larger than that estimated in previous research. Once the models have been appropriately specified, the United States is no longer an outlier among high-income democracies on either government consumption or social spending. Close examination of the data reveals that some fiscally federal systems better approximate a “market-preserving model” and others a “capital-privileging” or “state-corroding” model.     

International Transmission of Government Spending,Monopolistic Competition and North-South Trade

This paper utilises a North–South general equilibrium model where South exports an intermediate good to North in exchange for differentiated goods. The model is used to examine international transmission of government spending and its welfare implications. It is shown that an increase in government spending in North (South) can increase (decrease) the number of differentiated goods produced, thereby decreasing (increasing) the degree of monopoly power in North. Furthermore an increase in government spending in South can decrease the welfare North, but the impact of an increase in government spending in North the welfare of South cannot be unambiguously determined. [F11, H41]     

The Intergenerational Incidence of Government Spending*

This paper analyzes the effect of an increase in government spending on the welfare of different generations in a dynamic general equilibrium model. The paper shows that the intergenerational incidence of government spending on a public good is determined not only by the welfare effects due to the public good and to financing the good but also by a welfare effect due to intertemporal substitution between private consumption when government spending is increased. The degree of substitutability between private consumption and public spending is shown to be a key determinant of this incidence.     

The efficiency of government promotion of inbound tourism: The case of Australia

This paper examines the effect of tax-funded promotion of inbound tourism on domestic welfare in an open economy setting with increasing returns in the tourism industry. As inbound tourism is a way of extending the market and getting more demand to realize the implication of increasing returns, promotion can help overcome the underproduction of tourism goods. However, taxation leads to a decline in domestic residents' consumption of tourism and non-tourism goods and reduces the competitiveness of the non-tourism industry in the host country. An important result obtained is that government promotion of inbound tourism will not improve welfare unless the degree of increasing returns in the tourism industry is high enough and the national income of the foreign country multiplied by the parameter of marketing effectiveness is larger than the national income of the home country. This finding is supported by a simulation with the case of Australia.     

The Comparison between Ad Valorem and Unit Taxes under Monopolistic Competition

This paper shows that the welfare dominance of ad valorem over unit taxes under imperfect competition, extends to a Dixit-Stiglitz-type monopolistic competition framework with differentiated products, increasing returns to scale, entry/exit and love of variety. This result is obtained, even though ad valorem taxation leads to increased firm exit compared to the equal-yield unit tax. Yet the smaller tax over-shift, occurring under ad valorem taxation, more than compensates this disadvantage.Acknowledgement Comments and suggestions from Anthony Atkinson, Jürgen Bitzer, Rainald Borck, David Collie, Jan G. Jørgensen and two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged.     

General equilibrium impact of an energy-saving policy in the public sector

We analyse a disregarded environmental policy instrument: a switch in government expenditure away from energy (or other natural resources) and toward a composite good which includes energy-saving expenditure. We first develop two variants of an analytical general equilibrium model. A composite good is produced with constant returns to scale, and energy is imported or produced domestically with diminishing returns, yielding a differential rent to its owners. The government purchases energy and composite goods from private firms. Such a policy unambiguously increases employment. It also raises private consumption and welfare under two conditions: (i) it is not too costly and (ii) the initial share of the resource is smaller in public spending than in private consumption, or the difference is small enough. We then run numerically a model featuring both importation and domestic production of energy (oil, gas and electricity), for the OECD as a whole. Simulations show that employment, welfare and private consumption rise. We provide magnitudes for different parameter values. Earlier versions of this paper have benefited from conference participants at the European Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, International Society for Ecological Economics World Congress, CIRED seminar and EUREQua environmental economics seminar. We especially thank Michèle Sadoun and two anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies.     

The welfare cost of monopolistic competition: a quantitative assessment

This paper quantifies the welfare cost of monopolistic competition in a simple parametric class of endogenous growth models, embedding the neoclassical growth framework as a special case. We put particular emphasis on taking transitional dynamics into account. In doing so, we develop an original two-step numerical procedure to compute the value function. We find for conservative calibrations that the welfare cost of monopolistic competition can be anywhere between 0.4 and 1.2% of consumption, depending on whether labor is elastically or inelastically supplied.     

International Factor Mobility, Government Size and Welfare

An examination of the available data reveals that the size of government varies considerably across time and countries. By making use of a simple general equilibrium model, this paper demonstrates that size of government is affected by the availability of capital and labour within an economy. Specifically, this paper utilises a model of a closed economy that produces one-private and one-public good. Both goods are produced by means of capital and labour. Production functions are subject to constant returns to scale and perfect competition prevails in all markets. The elasticity of substitution between the public and the private good is greater than unity and there is no international factor mobility in the initial equilibrium. The size of government is measured by total spending on the public good as a proportion of the total expenditure on the private and public goods. It is shown that capital (labour) inflow can decrease (increase) the size of government. Capital inflow increases welfare if the private good is relatively capital intensive whereas labour inflow increases welfare if the public good is relatively capital intensive.     

The inflation tax in an open economy with imperfect competition

This paper studies the national welfare maximizing inflation tax in an open economy with imperfect competition. It shows that the presence of a monopolistic distortion dampens the incentive to engage in strategic use of the inflation tax. If this dampening effect is strong enough, monetary policy becomes completely inward-looking, restoring the Friedman rule as an equilibrium strategy regardless of the actions of the foreign government. This aspect of the policy interaction—driven entirely by the presence of imperfect competition—is important because it determines the underlying structure of the policy game and is therefore crucial for determining whether or not there exist welfare gains from international monetary cooperation.     

Investment scaling up and the role of government

This article studies the fiscal and welfare implications of a scaling up of public investment when the government is subject to inefficiencies on the spending and on the tax collection side. In our simulations, the scaling up of public investments results in higher long-run output and consumption levels but requires a fiscal stabilization package in order to preserve fiscal sustainability. The effects on consumers’ welfare after the fiscal adjustment are nontrivial. Our welfare analysis shows that consumers’ welfare is increased when the government smooths the fiscal adjustment via higher borrowing and not through an increase in taxation. Moreover, the comparison between several stabilization packages via tax adjustment shows that higher welfare is achieved when the government relies mostly on taxation of capital as this allows higher levels of consumption. Lower fiscal costs that do not undermine fiscal sustainability can however be achieved if the government manages to reduce inefficiency in tax collection. Finally, we consider a change in the trade regime that causes a decline in revenues. We find that the higher fiscal burden required to preserve fiscal sustainability would completely wipe out the welfare gain of higher public investments.     

Why aren't developed countries saving?

National saving rates differ enormously across developed countries. But these differences obscure a common trend, namely a dramatic decline over time. France and Italy, for example, saved over 23% and 19% of national income in 1970, but only 9% and 4% respectively in 2008. Japan saved almost 33% in 1970, but only 7% in 2008. And the U.S. saved around 11% in 1970, but only 1% in 2008. What explains these international and intertemporal differences? Is it demographics, government spending, productivity growth or preferences?For the U.S. and France, whose saving behavior we study, preferences appear to be an important factor. American and French societies are placing increasing weight on the welfare of those currently alive, particularly contemporaneous older generations. Government spending also appears to be one of the reasons why France is saving at much lower rates. These conclusions emerge from estimating two models in which society makes consumption and labor supply decisions in light of uncertainty over future government spending, productivity, and social preferences. The two models differ in terms of the nature of preference uncertainty and the extent to which current society can control future societies' spending and labor supply decisions.     

Ad valorem versus unit taxes: monopolistic competition, heterogeneous firms, and intra-industry reallocations

Real-world industries are composed from heterogeneous firms and substantial intra-industry reallocations take place, i.e. high productivity firms squeeze out low productivity firms. Previous tax-tool comparisons have not included these central forces of industry structure. This paper examines a general equilibrium monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms and intra-industry reallocations. We show that the welfare superiority of ad valorem over unit taxes under imperfect competition is not only preserved but amplified. The additional difference between the tools arises because unit taxes distort relative prices, which in turn reduces average industry productivity through reallocations (the survival and increased market share of lower productivity firms). Importantly, numerical solutions of the model reveal that the relative welfare loss from using the unit tax increases dramatically in the degree of firm heterogeneity.     

Government expenditure,external and domestic public debt,and economic growth

This paper analyzes the relationship between government expenditure, tax on returns to assets, public debt, and growth in an endogenous growth model. Public debt is composed of two components, domestic debt and external debt. We show conditions for existence, uniqueness, and multiplicity of the steady states. More precisely, existence of steady state requires a sufficiently high productivity and a sufficiently low tax on returns to assets. We also provide the effects of an increase in the tax rate on returns to assets on the steady state. In particular, the relation between public spending and the tax rate has a bell shape. Domestic debt unambiguously increases with tax whereas external debt displays an inverted U‐shaped curve. A high tax rate leads to a reallocation of public debt in favor of domestic debt (to the detriment of external debt). The effect of taxation on consumption (and production) also displays a nonlinear pattern when the output elasticity of capital is lower than unity (the effect is monotonously increasing if this elasticity is unity). We also derive the conditions under which a tax increase can boost or reduce the balanced growth rate.     

FIXED COSTS,THE BALANCED BUDGET MULTIPLIER AND WELFARE*

In a two‐sector model, where one of the sectors is monopolistically competitive and subject to increasing returns to scale but without love for variety, we analyse the effects of a balanced budget fiscal expansion. Such an expansion could increase the welfare of the representative individual, if elasticities of substitution in production and consumption are low. A reorganization of production takes place—increasing returns enabling a rise in real income.     

Regional productivity variation and the impact of public capital stock: an analysis with spatial interaction,with reference to Spain

In this article, we examine whether variations in the level of public capital across Spain's Provinces affected productivity levels over the period 1996 to 2005. The analysis is motivated by contemporary urban economics theory, involving a production function for the competitive sector of the economy (‘industry’) which includes the level of composite services derived from ‘service’ firms under monopolistic competition. The outcome is potentially increasing returns to scale resulting from pecuniary externalities deriving from internal increasing returns in the monopolistic competition sector. We extend the production function by also making (log) labour efficiency a function of (log) total public capital stock and (log) human capital stock, leading to a simple and empirically tractable reduced form linking productivity level to density of employment, human capital and public capital stock. The model is further extended to include technological externalities or spillovers across provinces. Using panel data methodology, we find significant elasticities for total capital stock and for human capital stock, and a significant impact for employment density. The finding that the effect of public capital is significantly different from zero, indicating that it has a direct effect even after controlling for employment density, is contrary to some of the earlier research findings which leave the question of the impact of public capital unresolved.