Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice

We study the effect of introducing a bilingual option on the long run equilibrium outcome in a class of two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff and risk dominant equilibria under the logit choice rule. Existing results show that in the class of two-strategy games under consideration, the inefficient risk dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run under noisy best response models. We show that if the cost of the bilingual option is sufficiently low then the efficient payoff dominant equilibrium will be selected in the long run under the logit choice rule.     

Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games

We develop a notion of subgames and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium – possibly in mixed strategies – for stochastic timing games. To capture all situations that can arise in continuous-time models, it is necessary to consider stopping times as the starting dates of subgames. We generalize Fudenberg and Tirole’s (Rev. Econom. Stud. 52, 383–401, 1985) mixed-strategy extensions to make them applicable to stochastic timing games and thereby provide a sound basis for subgame-perfect equilibria of preemption games. Sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence are presented, and examples illustrate their application as well as the fact that intuitive arguments can break down in the presence of stochastic processes with jumps.     

Markov Perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games

This paper examines the issue of multiplicity of Markov Perfect equilibria in alternating move repeated games. Such games are canonical models of environments with repeated, asynchronous choices due to inertia or replacement. Our main result is that the number of Markov Perfect equilibria is generically finite with respect to stage game payoffs. This holds despite the fact that the stochastic game representation of the alternating move repeated game is “non-generic” in the larger space of state dependent payoffs. We further obtain that the set of completely mixed Markov Perfect equilibria is generically empty with respect to stage game payoffs.     

Evolving densities in continuous strategy games through particle simulations

Many cases of strategic interaction between agents involve a continuous set of choices. It is natural to model these problems as continuous space games. Consequently, the population of agents playing the game will be represented with a density function defined over the continuous set of strategy choices. Simulating evolutionary dynamics on continuous strategy spaces is a challenging problem. The classic approach of discretizing the strategy space is ineffective for multidimensional strategy spaces. We present a principled approach to simulation of adaptive dynamics in continuous space games using sequential Monte Carlo methods. Sequential Monte Carlo methods use a set of weighted random samples, also named particles to represent density functions over multidimensional spaces. Sequential Monte Carlo methods provide computationally efficient ways of computing the evolution of probability density functions. We employ resampling and smoothing steps to prevent particle degeneration problem associated with particle estimates. The resulting algorithm can be interpreted as an agent based simulation with elements of natural selection, regression to mean and mutation. We illustrate the performance of the proposed simulation technique using two examples: continuous version of the repeated prisoner dilemma game and evolution of bidding functions in first-price closed-bid auctions.     

On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games

This note demonstrates that a symmetric 3×3 supermodular game may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in symmetric 3×3 supermodular games is known to be independent of the noise structure, this result implies that a noise-independent selection in global games may not be a robust equilibrium. Our proof reveals that the assumption in global games that the noise errors are independent of the state imposes a non-trivial restriction on incomplete information perturbations.     

Restricted houseswapping games

Restricted houseswapping games (RHGs) are a generalization of ‘one-sided matching games’, in which we specify a class II* of ‘allowable’ simple trading cycles. The cores of such games may be empty. Given II*, all possible closed RHGs have non-empty cores of II* is ‘strongly balanced’. Examples include the one-sided matching markets (^{Shapley and Scarf. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1974. 1. 23–37}. ^{Tijs et al., OR Spektrum 1984, 6, 119–123}; ^{Quinzii, International Journal of Game Theory 1984, 13, 41–60}) and the two-sided matching markets (^{Gale and Shapley. American Mathematical Monthly 1962. 69, 9–16}; ^{Shapley and Shubik, International Journal of Game Theory 1972, 1, 111–130}: and ^{Demange and Gale Econometrica 1985, 53, 873–888}).We then consider the subclass of RHGs in which there is no transferable resource. In this case, a weaker condition on II*, called ‘weak balancedness’, is sufficient to guarantee core non-emptiness. In addition, if II* is not weakly balanced, then there exists a preference profile such that the strict core of the resultant game is empty.Several other examples are given of II* that are (a) strongly balanced: (b) weakly balanced but not strongly balanced: and (c) not even weakly balanced.Finally, we discuss the issues of equilibrium definition, existence, and core-equilibrium allocation equivalence in RHGs.     

A note on strategies for bandit problems with infinitely many arms

A bandit problem consisting of a sequence of n choices (n) from a number of infinitely many Bernoulli arms is considered. The parameters of Bernoulli arms are independent and identically distributed random variables from a common distribution F on the interval [0,1] and F is continuous with F(0)=0 and F(1)=1. The goal is to investigate the asymptotic expected failure rates of k-failure strategies, and obtain a lower bound for the expected failure proportion over all strategies presented in Berry et al. (1997). We show that the asymptotic expected failure rates of k-failure strategies when 0<b1 and a lower bound can be evaluated if the limit of the ratio F(1)–F(t) versus (1–t)^b exists as t1^– for some b>0.     

A method for generating uniformly scattered points on the <Emphasis Type="Italic">L</Emphasis><Subscript><Emphasis Type="Italic">p</Emphasis></Subscript>-norm unit sphere and its applications

Tashiro (Ann Inst Stat Math 29:295–300, 1977) studied methods for generating unform points on the surface of the regular unit sphere. The L _p -norm unit sphere is a generalization of the regular unit sphere. In this paper we propose a method associated with an algorithm for generating uniformly scattered points on the L _p -norm unit sphere and discuss its applications in statistical simulation, representative points of a wide class of multivariate probability distributions and optimization problems. Some examples are illustrated for these applications. This research was supported by The University of Hong Kong Research Grant and a University of New Haven 2005 and 2006 Summer Faculty Fellowships.     

Consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games

In this paper we investigate possible ways to define consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games, i.e. signaling games in which the sets of types, messages and answers are complete, separable metric spaces. Roughly speaking, a consistency concept is called appropriate if it implies Bayesian consistency and copies the original idea of consistency in finite extensive form games as introduced by ^{Kreps and Wilson (Econometrica 1982, 50, 863–894)}. We present a particular appropriate consistency concept, which we call strong consistency and give a characterization of strongly consistent assessments. It turns out that all appropriate consistency concepts are refinements of strong consistency. Finally, we define and characterize structurally consistent assessments in infinite signaling games.     

Nested balancedN-ary designs

Nested balancedn-ary designs are introduced. Some methods of construction of such designs are presented with some series of designs.     

Mean residual life functions of finite mixtures,order statistics and coherent systems

We study properties of the mean residual life functions of finite mixtures. Specifically, we study ordering properties, monotonicity and the limiting behaviour. We show, under some mild conditions, that the limiting behaviour is similar to that of the strongest member (in the mean residual life order) of the mixture. We also consider the case of negative mixtures (i.e., mixtures with some negative coefficients) which is applied to study the behaviour of the mean residual life of order statistics and coherent systems with possibly dependent components. Partially Supported by Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologí a under grant BFM2003-02947 and Fundación Séneca under grant 00698/PI/04.     

Incorrect asymptotic size of subsampling procedures based on post-consistent model selection estimators

Subsampling and the m out of n bootstrap have been suggested in the literature as methods for carrying out inference based on post-model selection estimators and shrinkage estimators. In this paper we consider a subsampling confidence interval (CI) that is based on an estimator that can be viewed either as a post-model selection estimator that employs a consistent model selection procedure or as a super-efficient estimator. We show that the subsampling CI (of nominal level 1−α for any α(0,1)) has asymptotic confidence size (defined to be the limit of finite-sample size) equal to zero in a very simple regular model. The same result holds for the m out of n bootstrap provided m²/n→0 and the observations are i.i.d. Similar zero-asymptotic-confidence-size results hold in more complicated models that are covered by the general results given in the paper and for super-efficient and shrinkage estimators that are not post-model selection estimators. Based on these results, subsampling and the m out of n bootstrap are not recommended for obtaining inference based on post-consistent model selection or shrinkage estimators.     

The Marshallian macroeconomic model: A progress report

In this progress report, we first indicate the origins and early development of the Marshallian macroeconomic model (MMM) and briefly review some of our past empirical forecasting experiments with the model. Then we present recently developed one-sector, two-sector and n-sector models of an economy that can be employed to explain past experience, predict future outcomes and analyze policy problems. The results of simulation experiments with various versions of the model are provided to illustrate some of its dynamic properties that include “chaotic” features. Last, we present comments on planned future work with the model.     

When does defection pay?

The present paper investigates cluster adjustment to changing economic environments by focussing on the role and stability of institutional arrangements in their local culture. It postulates two idealtypical local cultures where firms act in the common (collective) or in their own interest (egoistic). By comparing adjustment performance and stability for both types, the model finds that clusters in very volatile environments are unlikely to exhibit collective local cultures as these are unstable and provide only limited benefits for adjustment performance. Clusters facing more stable environments are more likely to show collective local cultures as these increase adjustment performance and are more stable against individual defection. Both findings suggest that collective local cultures in clusters can be relatively stable for limited environment volatility.     

Optimising a Probabilistic Model of the Development of Play in Soccer

We present a probabilistic model based on the one developed by Hernández Mendo and Anguera (Revista de Psicologíca Social, 16(1), 71–93, 2001). Here we have tried to break down the interaction contexts that the opposing teams are able to generate and transform during the game. We are aware that a given player or team does not produce consistent behaviour in similar situations. However, a degree of uncertainty is assumed to exist regarding whether the results obtained are a specific function of the analysis used. In order to carry out this research a category system which optimized that used in the previous model was developed. This system should enable the interaction between teams to be observed within the actual play of a soccer game. A lag sequential analysis was performed on the basis of a coding of the behavioural flow. After describing the behavioural patterns obtained a probabilistic model of the development of play in soccer is proposed.     

$${\phi_p}$$-optimal designs for a linear log contrast model for experiments with mixtures

A mixture experiment is an experiment in which the k ingredients are nonnegative and subject to the simplex restriction on the (k − 1)-dimensional probability simplex S ^k-1. In this work, an essentially complete class of designs under the Kiefer ordering for a linear log contrast model with a mixture experiment is presented. Based on the completeness result, -optimal designs for all p,−∞ ≤ p ≤ 1 including D- and A-optimal are obtained, where the eigenvalues of the design moment matrix are used. By using the approach presented here, we gain insight on how these -optimal designs behave. Mong-Na Lo Huang was supported in part by the National Science Council of Taiwan, ROC under grant NSC 93-2118-M-110-001.     

Economically optimalc- andnp-control charts

In v. Collani (1981, 1986, 1987a and 1987b) simple procedures are developed to determine the approximately optimal economic design of control charts for measurements. Applying these procedures to the case of control charts for attributes, nomograms are obtained from which the approximately optimal design ofc-charts, i.e. charts for defects, is readily available. Furthermore it is shown that this method also provides good approximately optimalnp-charts, i.e. charts for defectives. Research supported by the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft).